People v. Ramos CA2/1

CourtListener 10595743Calctapp30.05.2025

Gesamter Gesetzestext

Filed 5/30/25 P. v. Ramos CA2/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not
certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not
been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

THE PEOPLE, B337505

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. BA274391)
v.

SERRATO JOSE RAMOS,

Defendant and Appellant.

Appeal from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County, Craig E. Veals, Judge. Affirmed.
Marilee Marshall, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Kenneth C. Byrne and Allison H. Chung, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

______________________________
In 2005, a jury convicted Serrato Jose Ramos of three counts
of willful, deliberate, premeditated attempted murder after he
and a co-perpetrator fired multiple gunshots into an occupied
vehicle. In addition, the jury found true Ramos had personally
discharged a handgun during the attempts and had committed
the offenses for the benefit of a criminal street gang. The trial
court sentenced Ramos to 50 years to life in prison. We affirmed
the convictions and sentence on appeal. (People v. Ramos et al.
(Mar. 21, 2007, B189663) [nonpub. opn.] (Ramos I).)
Almost two decades later, Ramos filed a petition pursuant
to Penal Code section 1172.61 challenging his convictions. That
section permits defendants convicted under certain recently
invalidated theories of homicide—including “attempted murder
under the natural and probable consequences doctrine”—to seek
resentencing. (§ 1172.6, subd. (a).) After appointing counsel for
Ramos, soliciting briefing, and holding a hearing, the trial court
concluded Ramos had failed to make a prima facie case for relief
and denied his petition.
Ramos now asks us to reverse, arguing the court improperly
relied on the factual summary in Ramos I to deny the petition. We
conclude, however, Ramos forfeited this argument by failing to raise
it below. We further conclude the argument fails on its merits:
The record does not support Ramos’s contention the court “relied
almost exclusively on” Ramos I’s factual summary in evaluating
his petition. And even assuming for purposes of argument the
court did so, Ramos fails to demonstrate any resulting prejudice.
Accordingly, we affirm.

1 All subsequent statutory references are to the Penal Code.

2
FACTUAL SUMMARY AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY2
In July 2023, Ramos, representing himself, filed a
section 1172.6 petition challenging his May 2005 convictions
for attempted murder. Checking boxes on a preprinted form,
Ramos attested he was eligible for resentencing because
an “information . . . was filed against [him] that allowed the
prosecution to proceed under a theory of . . . attempted murder
under the natural and probable consequences doctrine.” Ramos
also checked the box requesting the trial court appoint counsel
to represent him in the resentencing proceedings.
The next day, the court issued a written order appointing
counsel for Ramos and directing the prosecution to file a response to
his petition. The order included a summary of the facts of the case
derived from Ramos I and set forth the trial court’s tentative view
that Ramos was ineligible for section 1172.6 relief:
“[Ramos] claims entitlement to relief under
[section] 1172.6 . . . . [¶] The facts of the case, taken from
the appellate decision, are summarized as follows. Three men
assaulted and attempted to rob Andrés Lopez. Andrés managed
to escape, ran to his house, armed himself with a tire iron, and
left. His cousin, Juan Reyes, witnessed this and followed him as
Andrés’[s] uncle, Guadelupe Jimenez, entered his van and drove off
in search of both young men. Andrés located two of his attackers
and struck one of them with the tire iron. Juan and Mr. Jimenez
arrived in the van moments later and drove off with Andrés inside.
[Ramos] and codefendant Arturo Zambrano then drove up in a black
Camaro, intercepting them. They both began shooting at the van

2 We summarize here only the facts and procedural history
relevant to our resolution of this appeal.

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with Andrés, Juan, and Mr. Jimenez still inside, striking it eight to
ten times.
“Vivian Flores, a [Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD)]
detective, happened to observe the shooting from a short distance
away, and noticed Ramos holding a chrome firearm. LAPD officers
John Jamison and Jason Sharman also heard the shooting and
immediately gave chase to the Camaro as it fled from the scene at
speeds up to 70 miles per hour. The Camaro crashed into another
car during the chase. Zambrano and petitioner jumped out of it but
were quickly apprehended during their attempt to escape on foot.
The officers found a Beretta semi-automatic pistol on the floor of
the passenger’s seat and noticed all of the guns’ rounds had been
fired. They also recovered a .38 blue steel revolver containing
empty casings from the floor behind the driver’s seat.
“[Ramos] was convicted of three counts of attempted murder,
among other crimes. In this respect, his culpability at trial was
argued exclusively upon his having been one of the actual shooters.
Consistent with this, the jury was instructed on express malice
aforethought as the sole theory of criminal culpability. No
instruction was given on felony murder, natural and probable
consequences, or any other theory of imputed malice. The jury
convicted petitioner of each of the three attempted murder counts
and found true the allegations [Ramos] personally used a firearm in
the commission of the crimes and that he personally discharged a
firearm in the commission of the crimes. Based on the record of
conviction, it preliminarily appears, therefore, that the petition is
without merit.
“Nonetheless, the court will appoint counsel to assist
petitioner further in the presentation of his claim. The prosecution
is ordered to brief the matter as set forth in [section] 1172.6,
subd[ivision] (c).”

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The prosecution filed an opposition to the petition, arguing
Ramos and his co-defendant “were prosecuted and convicted as the
actual perpetrators who individually committed these crimes with
actual malice[,] and [Ramos] therefore [could not] avail himself of
the relief offered pursuant to [section] 1172.6.”
Ramos’s appointed counsel did not file any written reply to
the opposition, failed to object to the court’s July 2023 tentative
ruling in any respect, and elected not to present any argument at
the March 2024 hearing on the petition. At the conclusion of that
hearing, the court denied Ramos’s petition, adopting the July 2023
written tentative ruling as its final order.
Ramos timely appealed.

DISCUSSION
Ramos contends we must reverse the denial of his petition
because the trial court erroneously relied on the summary of facts
in Ramos I to find him ineligible for section 1172.6 relief. We
disagree.
“In 2018, the Legislature amended the law of homicide,
eliminating several theories of liability based on imputed malice.
It has also offered relief to those convicted under certain homicide
theories, such as . . . attempted murder under the natural and
probable consequences doctrine, whose convictions are now
tainted. [Citation.] Petitioners seeking relief under section 1172.6
must, first, file a facially valid petition that states the statutory
requirements for relief [citation], and second, make a ‘prima facie
showing’ [citation], before a court must issue an order to show
cause and hold an evidentiary hearing on the ultimate question of
resentencing at which the People will bear the burden of defending
a conviction under the amended law [citation].” (People v. Patton
(2025) 17 Cal.5th 549, 556 (Patton).)

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In assessing whether a petitioner has made a prima facie
case, the court may “not engage in ‘factfinding involving the
weighing of evidence or the exercise of discretion,’ ” but may
consider the record of conviction. (Patton, supra, 17 Cal.5th at
p. 563.) “ ‘ “[I]f the record, including the court’s own documents,
‘contain[s] facts refuting the allegations made in the petition,’
then ‘the court is justified in making a credibility determination
adverse to the petitioner.’ ” ’ [Citation.]” (Ibid.)
“A number of courts of appeal have held,” however, “ ‘the
Legislature intended to prohibit consideration of “the factual
summar[y]” ’ in an appellate opinion” for purposes of evaluating
a section 1172.6 petition at the prima facie stage. (See People v.
Beaudreaux (2024) 100 Cal.App.5th 1227, 1238 (Beaudreaux),
italics omitted.) At least one appellate court so held in March
2022—more than a year before Ramos filed his resentencing
petition. (See People v. Flores (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 974, 988,
disapproved on another ground in Patton, supra, 17 Cal.5th at
p. 569.)
Here, the trial court’s July 2023 tentative ruling states
expressly its factual summary is “taken from the appellate decision”
in Ramos I. Ramos, however, failed to object to the tentative ruling
on this (or any) ground. He therefore has forfeited any argument on
appeal premised on the court’s consideration of the Ramos I factual
summary. (See People v. Vance (2023) 94 Cal.App.5th 706, 714
[defendant forfeited challenge to trial court’s erroneous reliance on
prior appellate opinion at section 1172.6 evidentiary hearing by
failing to object].)
Further, Ramos’s argument fails on the merits. The record
does not support his contention the court “relied almost exclusively
on [Ramos I’s] statement of facts in finding that [he] was ineligible
for relief.” To the contrary, the record demonstrates the court based

6
its conclusion on the fact “the jury was instructed on express malice
aforethought as the sole theory of criminal culpability,” and on
the absence of any jury instruction on the natural and probable
consequences doctrine. (See People v. Coley (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th
539, 548 [section 1172.6 “applies by its terms only to attempted
murders based on the natural and probable consequences
doctrine”]; accord, People v. Lovejoy (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 860,
865, petn. for review den. July 24, 2024, S285447.)
Finally, even assuming for purposes of argument the court
relied on Ramos I’s factual summary, Ramos fails to demonstrate
any resulting prejudice. (See Beaudreaux, supra, 100 Cal.App.5th
at p. 1239 [trial court error in relying on factual summary in prior
appellate opinion subject to harmless error analysis].) He does not
attempt a showing the court might have ruled favorably on his
petition had it excluded from consideration the factual summary in
Ramos I. Ramos therefore fails to demonstrate any reversible error
by the trial court.3 (See Vance, supra, 94 Cal.App.5th at p. 717.)
We are not persuaded otherwise by Ramos’s argument—
raised for the first time on reply—that “malice was imputed to
[him] based on a gang expert’s testimony[,] most of which would be
inadmissible today or subject to bifurcation.” Ramos has failed to
provide us with a copy of the relevant testimony, and he cites no
pertinent supporting authority. We therefore decline to address
this belated argument. (See City of Santa Maria v. Adam (2012)
211 Cal.App.4th 266, 286-287 [“[i]n order to demonstrate error, an

3 In light of our conclusion, we need not address Ramos’s
additional contention his counsel rendered ineffective assistance
by failing to object to the court’s purported reliance on Ramos I’s
factual summary.

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appellant must supply the reviewing court with some cogent
argument supported by legal analysis and citation to the record”].)
Accordingly, we affirm.

DISPOSITION
The order denying Ramos’s section 1172.6 petition is
affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

ROTHSCHILD, P. J.
We concur:

BENDIX, J.

M. KIM, J.

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