CourtListener 10595742•People v. Rios CA2/1
Gesamter Gesetzestext
Filed 5/30/25 P. v. Rios CA2/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
THE PEOPLE, B335515
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. VA109877)
v.
SERGIO RIOS,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Roger Ito, Judge. Affirmed.
Jonathan E. Demson, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Wyatt E. Bloomfield, William H. Shin and
Amanda V. Lopez, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
______________________
INTRODUCTION
In 2010, Sergio Rios pleaded no contest to second degree
murder. In 2023, Rios filed a petition for resentencing under
Penal Code1 section 1172.6, which the superior court denied at
the prima facie stage. Rios appeals, contending the court
erroneously denied him an evidentiary hearing because it is
possible he was convicted based on an imputed malice theory not
viable under current law.
We disagree. A person convicted of murder as the actual
killer is not eligible for relief under section 1172.6. In People v.
Patton (2025) 17 Cal.5th 549, our Supreme Court held that a
court properly denies a section 1172.6 petition involving a plea at
the prima facie stage where there are “unchallenged, relief-
foreclosing facts within a preliminary hearing transcript.”
(Patton, at p. 564.) Here, the preliminary hearing transcript
shows Rios was prosecuted and convicted as the actual killer, and
Rios’s petition alleges no facts that might contradict this
conclusion.
Patton was decided after oral argument in this case and
resolved a split of authority on the use of preliminary hearing
transcripts at the prima facie stage of a section 1172.6
proceeding. Following the approach adopted in Patton, and as
requested by Rios in supplemental briefing we ordered regarding
Patton, we remand to the superior court to consider any
additional facts should Rios, within 30 days of remand, seek to
supplement his petition. We otherwise conditionally affirm the
denial of his petition.
1 All further unspecified statutory references are to the
Penal Code.
2
POSTCONVICTION RELIEF UNDER SECTION 1172.6
We begin by summarizing section 1172.6, which was
enacted in 2018 as part of Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017-2018 Reg.
Sess.).2 The legislation’s overall purpose was “to amend the
felony murder rule and the natural and probable consequences
doctrine, as it relates to murder, to ensure that murder liability is
not imposed on a person who is not the actual killer, did not act
with the intent to kill, or was not a major participant in the
underlying felony who acted with reckless indifference to human
life.” (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 1, subd. (f).) To accomplish this,
the bill added section 188, subdivision (a)(3) “to amend the
natural and probable consequences doctrine,” and added section
189, subdivision (e) “to amend the felony-murder rule.” (People v.
Gentile (2020) 10 Cal.5th 830, 842-843.) Section 188, subdivision
(a)(3) provides, “Except as stated in subdivision (e) of [s]ection
189, in order to be convicted of murder, a principal in a crime
shall act with malice aforethought. Malice shall not be imputed
to a person based solely on his or her participation in a crime.”
Section 189, subdivision (e) provides that a person can be held
liable for murder based on their participation in the perpetration
or attempted perpetration of a felony “only if one of the following
is proven: [¶] (1) The person was the actual killer. [¶] (2) The
person was not the actual killer, but, with the intent to kill,
aided, abetted, counseled, commanded, induced, solicited,
2 Section 1172.6 was originally codified as section 1170.95.
The Legislature renumbered the statute as section 1172.6, with
no change in text, effective June 30, 2022. (Stats. 2022, ch. 58,
§ 10.) For ease of reference, we use the current citation
throughout.
3
requested, or assisted the actual killer in the commission of
murder in the first degree. [¶] (3) The person was a major
participant in the underlying felony and acted with reckless
indifference to human life, as described in subdivision (d) of
[s]ection 190.2.” These amendments to sections 188 and 189
became effective January 1, 2019. (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, §§ 2, 3.)
Section 1172.6 allows a defendant convicted of murder
under a theory now precluded by section 188 or 189 to petition to
vacate their conviction and be resentenced on any remaining
counts. A defendant must initially make a prima facie showing of
eligibility for relief by demonstrating they can satisfy three
criteria: first, that they were charged by a complaint,
information, or indictment “that allowed the prosecution to
proceed under a theory of felony murder, murder under the
natural and probable consequences doctrine or other theory
under which malice is imputed to a person based solely on that
person’s participation in a crime” (§ 1172.6, subd. (a)(1)); second,
that they “w[ere] convicted of murder . . . or accepted a plea offer
in lieu of a trial at which [they] could have been convicted of
murder” (id., subd. (a)(2)); and third, that they “could not
presently be convicted of murder . . . because of changes to
[s]ection 188 or 189 made effective January 1, 2019” (id., subd.
(a)(3)). If the defendant makes a prima facie showing satisfying
all three criteria, the resentencing court must issue an order to
show cause and hold an evidentiary hearing at which the burden
is on the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the
defendant is ineligible for resentencing. (Id., subds. (c), (d).)
4
FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEEDINGS BELOW3
A. The Murder Charge and Plea
On June 1, 2008, Cynthia Vargas was shot in the head and
later died from her wound. The district attorney charged Rios
with Vargas’s murder.
At the preliminary hearing held on July 27, 2009, two
investigating officers from the Huntington Park Police
Department testified. Officer Alonso Gonzalez testified that in
the early morning hours of June 1, 2008, he responded to a call
regarding a shooting and found Rios at a residence with a female,
later identified as Vargas, who was bleeding from a head wound
and was not responsive. Rios initially stated to Officer Gonzalez
that Vargas had shot herself, and then later stated she had been
shot by a masked intruder. Officer Gonzalez observed a spent .38
caliber casing on the bed, and later found a .38 caliber handgun
in a trash can located in an alley behind the residence. Detective
Miguel Navia testified that he took Rios to the police station,
where he and another detective interviewed Rios. Rios waived
his Miranda rights4 and admitted that he had been holding the
gun when Vargas was shot. At the conclusion of the preliminary
hearing, the court held Rios to answer for the charge.
On August 10, 2009, the People filed an information
charging Rios with one count of murder (§ 187, subd. (a)), with
enhancements for personal use of a firearm under section
12022.53, subdivisions (b), (c), and (d).
3 We summarize only the facts and procedural history
relevant to our resolution of this appeal.
4 Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 (86 S.Ct. 1602, 16
L.Ed.2d 694).
5
On February 9, 2010, Rios pleaded no contest to second
degree murder (§ 187, subd. (a)) and admitted a personal firearm
use enhancement allegation under section 12022.5, subdivision
(a).5 Through his counsel, Rios stipulated to a factual basis for
the plea as set out in the police reports and the preliminary
hearing transcript. The court found a factual basis for the plea
and accepted both the plea and Rios’s waivers on the record,
finding them to have been knowingly, intelligently, and
voluntarily made. The court later sentenced Rios to an aggregate
prison term of 18 years to life in accordance with the plea
agreement.
We affirmed Rios’s conviction in an unpublished decision.
(People v. Rios (Dec. 17, 2010, B224352) [nonpub. opn.].)
B. The Section 1172.6 Petition
On February 21, 2023, Rios filed a form resentencing
petition. By checking boxes on the form, Rios alleged he satisfied
the criteria for relief under section 1172.6. The trial court
appointed counsel to represent Rios.
The People filed a response to Rios’s petition in which they
contended the court should summarily deny the petition because
Rios was prosecuted for murder as the actual perpetrator. The
People relied on our decision affirming Rios’s conviction, a
transcript of the preliminary hearing, and a transcript of Rios’s
no contest plea. Rios did not file any reply to the People’s
response.
5 On that date, the People filed an amended information
which additionally alleged a personal firearm use enhancement
under section 12022.5, subdivision (a).
6
At the hearing on Rios’s petition on October 6, 2023, the
court inquired of Rios and his counsel whether there was
anything they wanted to add to Rios’s petition, and they both
declined. The court then summarily denied the petition,
concluding Rios was ineligible for relief as a matter of law
because his record of conviction showed he was “the personal
killer, . . . the individual [who was] responsible for the murder
himself.” (See § 1172.6, subd. (c).)
DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Review
In reviewing the summary denial of a section 1172.6
petition, “ ‘[w]e independently review a trial court’s
determination on whether a petitioner has made a prima facie
showing.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Lee (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 1164,
1174.) Because we conduct an independent review, “we may
affirm a ruling that is correct in law on any ground. [Citation.]”
(People v. Cortes (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 198, 204, fn. omitted.)
B. Rios Fails to Make a Prima Facie Case for Relief
under Section 1172.6
When a defendant files a facially sufficient petition for
resentencing, as Rios has done here, the trial court must first
determine whether the defendant has made a prima facie case for
relief. (§ 1172.6, subd. (c).) At this stage, the trial court must
“ ‘ “take[] [the] petitioner’s factual allegations as true” ’ ” (People
v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 971) and may “not engage in
‘factfinding involving the weighing of evidence or the exercise of
discretion.’ [Citation.]” (Id. at p. 972.) The prima facie stage sets
a “ ‘very low’ ” bar for defendants to clear (ibid.), but it
nevertheless serves an important role in “ensuring that clearly
7
meritless petitions can be efficiently addressed as part of a
single-step . . . review process” without requiring an evidentiary
hearing (id. at p. 971).
A defendant’s bare assertion that he meets the criteria of
section 1172.6, subdivision (a) does not satisfy the prima facie
showing when the record of conviction contradicts that assertion.
Our Supreme Court has made clear that “ ‘if the record, including
the court’s own documents, “contain[s] facts refuting the
allegations made in the petition,” then “the court is justified in
making a credibility determination adverse to the petitioner” ’ ”
and denying the petition at the prima facie stage. (People v.
Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 971.) In another case, the high
court independently reviewed the record and affirmed the denial
of a petition at the prima facie stage because “the record . . .
makes clear that [the defendant] was the actual killer and the
only participant in the killing.” (People v. Delgadillo (2022) 14
Cal.5th 216, 233.)
The People contend that Rios has failed to make a prima
facie showing he is eligible for relief under section 1172.6 because
the preliminary hearing transcript (which is part of the record of
conviction) contradicts his conclusory allegations that he was
convicted on a theory of murder which is no longer valid as a
result of Senate Bill No. 1437. We agree. Based on our
independent review of the record, Rios has not made a prima
facie showing for relief under section 1172.6 because the
preliminary hearing transcript demonstrates he was convicted as
the actual killer. Officer Gonzalez testified that he responded to
a call regarding a shooting and found Rios at a residence where
Vargas lay bleeding from a wound to the head. Rios told Officer
Gonzalez conflicting versions of what had happened—first that
8
Vargas had shot herself and then that she had been shot by a
masked intruder. Detective Navia testified that later, during an
interrogation at the police station, Rios admitted that he had
been holding the gun when Vargas was shot. The preliminary
hearing transcript includes a stipulation by Rios’s counsel that
the medical examiner who performed the autopsy on Vargas
would testify that she died as the result of a single gunshot
wound to the head.
There was no evidence at the preliminary hearing that
suggested Rios acted in concert with anyone else before Vargas
was shot. Rios does not dispute that the testimony introduced at
the preliminary hearing indicates he personally committed the
murder, as opposed to being involved as an accomplice. He also
does not dispute that his counsel stipulated to the preliminary
hearing transcript being a factual basis for his plea and
conviction.
Because the record of conviction showed Rios was the
actual killer, and he supplied no contradictory evidence other
than his bald assertions of entitlement to resentencing relief, he
has failed to make a prima facie showing as required by section
1172.6 because an actual killer can be convicted of murder under
current law. (§ 189, subd. (e)(1); see People v. Delgadillo, supra,
14 Cal.5th at p. 233 [the defendant was “not entitled to any relief
under [§] 1172.6” because he “was the actual killer and the only
participant in the killing”]; People v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th
698, 710 [§ 1172.6 resentencing “relief is unavailable if the
defendant was . . . the actual killer”].)
Rios contends he was entitled to an evidentiary hearing
because he could have been prosecuted and/or convicted for
second degree murder under a now invalid felony-murder theory.
9
We disagree. The preliminary hearing transcript discloses no
evidence of a felony that could have supported a felony-murder
theory at the time of his conviction. The only crime other than
murder the transcript indicates is that Rios initially lied to police
about how the murder occurred. Putting aside that such a crime
is generally not a felony but a misdemeanor (e.g., § 148.5,
subd.(a)), it could not provide a basis for a felony-murder
prosecution as those false statements occurred after the murder
and were not inherently dangerous to human life. (E.g., People v.
Patterson (1989) 49 Cal.3d 615, 620-621 [former second degree
felony murder required the commission of felony inherently
dangerous to life that directly caused the homicide].) Rios’s
reliance on People v. DeHuff (2021) 63 Cal.App.5th 428 is
inapposite because the defendant in that case was charged with
“second degree felony murder based on evading an officer by
driving with reckless disregard for the safety of persons or
property” in violation of Vehicle Code section 2800.2, subdivision
(a). (DeHuff, at p. 442.) The court held the defendant “could not
be convicted of second degree felony murder based on a violation
of [Vehicle Code] section 2800.2, subdivision (a)” under present
law because that statute “is not among the enumerated crimes in
section 189, subdivision (a) that may still serve as a basis for a
felony-murder conviction under certain circumstances.” (Ibid., fn.
omitted.) Thus, the defendant could no longer be convicted of
murder based on an underlying violation of Vehicle Code section
2800.2, subdivision (a) even though he was the actual killer in
that he personally caused the victim’s death by driving
recklessly.
At the time Rios filed his appeal, there was a split of
authority concerning the extent to which a trial court could
10
consider a preliminary hearing transcript in determining
whether a petitioner has made a prima facie showing of eligibility
for relief under section 1172.6. Rios, relying on one line of
authority, contended that his petition could not be denied based
on facts from the preliminary hearing transcript. After oral
argument, however, our high court issued Patton, which decided
the issue adversely to Rios. (People v. Patton, supra, 17 Cal.5th
at p. 564.) In that case, Patton pleaded no contest to attempted
murder and later petitioned for resentencing under section
1172.6. (Patton, at pp. 557, 559.) The trial court and the Court of
Appeal denied the petition at the prima facie stage because the
preliminary hearing transcript demonstrated Patton was the sole
participant in the attempted murder, he admitted discharging a
firearm in the commission of the crime, and he did not allege any
contradictory facts or inferences in his petition to show he did not
act alone. (Id. at pp. 557, 559-560.) The Supreme Court agreed.
It confirmed that “the record of conviction the parties may
consult at the prima facie stage includes a preliminary hearing
transcript preceding a guilty plea” (id. at p. 568) and held that
“statements within Patton’s preliminary hearing transcript
contributed specific factual assertions about his conviction—
namely, that it was premised on him being the sole shooter.” (Id.
at p. 569.) Therefore, the trial court had not engaged in
“impermissible factfinding and correctly concluded Patton had
not, on the record before it, made a prima facie showing.” (Ibid.)
The court held, “petitioners confronting a record of conviction
that demonstrates relief is unavailable have the burden of
coming forward with nonconclusory allegations to alert the
prosecution and the court to what issues an evidentiary hearing
would entail.” (Id. at p. 567.)
11
Patton dictates the conclusion that Rios has failed to make
a prima facie showing he is entitled to relief under section 1172.6.
Rios pleaded no contest to second degree murder and the
preliminary hearing transcript shows his conviction “was
premised on him being the sole shooter.” (People v. Patton,
supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 569.) Rios did not allege any facts or
differing inference in his petition to contradict this conclusion.6
C. Remand to Allow Rios an Opportunity to Plead
Additional Facts
The Patton court, acting “out of an abundance of caution”
and in response to Patton’s request at oral argument “to be
permitted to plead additional facts,” “order[ed] a remand to the
superior court with directions for that court to consider an
amended petition should Patton, within 30 days of that remand,
seek to file one.” (People v. Patton, supra, 17 Cal.5th at pp. 569-
570.) We solicited supplemental briefing from the parties
regarding the possibility of allowing Rios an opportunity to plead
6 Rios contends that the summary denial of his petition
violated his constitutional procedural due process rights.
However, he presents no argument or authority to support the
proposition that the process he was afforded, which included the
ability to file a petition with the trial court and, with the
assistance of appointed counsel, a reply, and to present argument
and evidence to the court in a hearing, and which we conclude
complied with California law as set out in section 1172.6, was
constitutionally inadequate. Thus, we consider this argument to
be abandoned. (See Benach v. County of Los Angeles (2007) 149
Cal.App.4th 836, 852 [appellate court may “treat [an] issue as
abandoned” where a party makes a “conclusory presentation,
without pertinent argument or an attempt to apply the law to the
circumstances of this case”].)
12
additional facts. In response, Rios requested such an
opportunity, arguing that we should grant his request because
the Supreme Court granted a similar request in Patton. The
People contend that “no new factual averments that [Rios] may
make will render him eligible for relief [under section 1172.6],”
but state they “do[] not oppose [Rios]’s request to remand so that
he may supplement his petition.” We accordingly will remand to
the superior court to give Rios the opportunity to provide
additional facts to show that, contrary to the facts established by
the preliminary hearing transcript, he was not prosecuted as the
actual killer. (See People v. Glass (2025) 110 Cal.App.5th 922,
930 [remanding to provide the § 1172.6 petitioner an opportunity
to plead additional facts because he “did not have the benefit of
Patton’s guidance during the prima facie stage before the trial
court”].)
13
DISPOSITION
The order denying Rios’s resentencing petition is
conditionally affirmed. If Rios files an amended petition for
resentencing within 30 days after remand that pleads additional
facts, the court shall vacate its order denying the original petition
and consider the additional facts in determining whether Rios
has made a prima facie case for relief under section 1172.6; if
Rios fails to file an amended petition, the order denying the
resentencing petition shall be final.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
WEINGART, J.
We concur:
ROTHSCHILD, P. J.
M. KIM, J.
14
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