CourtListener 10595669•In re A.D. CA1/1
Gesamter Gesetzestext
Filed 5/30/25 In re A.D. CA1/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
In re A.D., a Person Coming Under
the Juvenile Court Law.
ALAMEDA COUNTY SOCIAL
SERVICES AGENCY,
Plaintiff and Respondent, A171683
v.
(Alameda County
P.W.,
Super. Ct. No. JD-03510-01,
Defendant and Appellant. 24FL084693)
Appellant P.W. (Mother) appealed after the juvenile court dismissed
dependency proceedings involving her son, A.D. She argues that the juvenile
court abused its discretion in issuing a final custody/visitation order because
it severely limits contact with the minor. Mother also claims that the
visitation order is impermissibly vague. We affirm.
I.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL
BACKGROUND
We summarized previous, and lengthy, proceedings in this case in In re
A.D. (Feb. 26, 2025, A169677, A170451) [nonpub. opn.] (A.D. I), and we
briefly recount them here. Mother started to show signs of mental distress
1
during the COVID-19 pandemic. Although there was no corroborating
evidence for her report, Mother believed that the minor suffered a head
injury in late 2020 at a park, and she began taking her son to excessive
medical appointments. This sometimes involved taking the minor out of
school early. The minor’s father (Father, who is not a party to this appeal)
agreed with medical personnel that Mother was requesting unnecessary tests
and lab work, but Mother continued to take the minor to medical
appointments and request invasive and unnecessary tests. She also began to
have possibly delusional thoughts about her son, and Father continued to be
concerned about Mother’s mental health. Mother became obsessed with the
minor’s food intake, and she also contacted law enforcement agencies with
concerns over her son.
In December 2022, respondent Alameda County Social Services Agency
(Agency) filed a dependency petition alleging that Mother had taken the
minor to 18 medical appointments in the previous year despite doctors saying
there was no medical necessity to do so and that the minor was healthy. The
Agency sought jurisdiction under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300,1
subdivisions (b)(1) (failure to protect) and (c) (serious emotional damage).
The minor was first placed with a paternal aunt. Within a few months,
Father secured housing separate from Mother. Before he was permitted to
have a trial 14-day overnight stay with his son, Father sought, and the
juvenile court granted, a temporary restraining order protecting both him
and the minor from Mother. The minor was placed with Father around
March 2023, where he has remained ever since.
A combined hearing was held on both jurisdiction/disposition and the
granting of a permanent restraining order protecting the minor. It lasted
1 All statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
2
over several days in June, July, August, September, November, and
December 2023. During that time, Mother was encouraged to undergo a
psychological evaluation and otherwise engage in services, but she did not do
so.
The juvenile court found by clear and convincing evidence that the
minor was a child described by section 300, subdivisions (b)(1) and (c). And
the court also entered a permanent restraining order directing Mother to stay
at least 100 yards away from the minor as well as his home, school, or
daycare. The order was to stay in effect until December 2026. Mother was
still permitted to have supervised visitation with her son at least once a
week. This court affirmed these orders in In re A.D. I, supra.
Proceedings continued in the juvenile court. The Agency again
submitted a referral for the Mother to receive a psychological evaluation and
spoke with her about the benefits of being evaluated, but Mother refused and
said she was “thriving in her life” and did not need it.
Mother also asked that the supervised visits with her son be held at her
house with her sister (a maternal aunt) supervising. The social worker
reminded Mother that the court previously had ordered that visits be held
either at the home of the material aunt or a paternal aunt, or at a third party
agency. Mother complained that the maternal aunt sometimes traveled,
which interfered with her supervising visits. She told the social worker
which agency used to supervise visits, and the social worker put in a request
to that agency to resume supervising visits between Mother and her son.
Counsel for the minor sought to limit Mother’s educational rights. At
the hearing on the request in March 2024, the juvenile court observed that
the only way for Mother to be involved with the minor’s educational rights
would be if the court modified the restraining order. But the court observed
3
that it had no indication that Mother was engaging in any services, and
Mother’s lack of understating or treating her mental-health challenges
“ma[de] it difficult for this Court to modify either the restraining order, or
allow the mother to retain educational rights.” Mother protested that she
“ha[d]n’t done anything wrong,” visitation with her son was “going great,”
and the minor “still ha[d] those problems” (referring to “bruises”).
The juvenile court questioned Father about the minor, and Father
explained that the minor scratched himself because Father did not trim his
fingernails, and it took about a week for a cut to heal. Mother said this was a
“complete lie,” asked to “speak the truth,” and proceeded to complain about
the proceedings. When the court tried to stop Mother, Mother accused the
court of having a “delusion problem” and being “sick.” When the court
directed Mother to leave the courtroom, Mother stated, “You are mentally
sick. I’m how you supervised [sic]—how you raise 17-year-old child [sic]. He
will suffering [sic] the same consequence. He will die.” Mother “was yelling
at the top of her voice, pointing at the Court,” according to county counsel,
and she jumped out of her chair and “was cursing as she left the room,” and
she had to be “helped out of the courtroom by the court officer/attendant.”
County counsel later described Mother’s level of agitation as “extreme,” and
the juvenile court agreed.
After Mother left the courtroom, the juvenile court observed, “I think
we should be cognizant of the fact that the mother’s mental health is
deteriorating. It has gotten worse than the last time we were here, which
was about maybe three months ago. That level of spiral makes me
uncomfortable, even potentially with the visitation.” The court also explained
that “[t]he reason I asked the father on the record whether or not he had
noticed bruising or other medical things about his son is because it is clear to
4
me that the mother is having some level of disconnect from reality at this
point, or psychotic break.” The court said Mother’s behavior “almost feels
like a psychotic—or looks like what I’ve seen in my 10 years of doing this,
close to a psychotic break.” Mother’s “higher level” of mental health
challenges made the decision to limit Mother’s educational rights “much
easier” for the court.
The juvenile court addressed Father, saying that it must be hard for
him and that the court knew Father loved Mother. Father said he had
benefited from multiple sessions of therapy, and he had encouraged Mother
to try it as well. And he further reported that visitation took place either at
an agency provided by the Agency or at a maternal aunt’s house. Visits went
well, but other times Mother “does not realize what she’s talking about or
what she’s saying.” The court granted the request to limit Mother’s
educational rights, and this court affirmed that order in In re A.D. I.
Father maintained stable housing at a confidential location separate
from Mother. Father was reportedly responsive and attentive with the
minor, and the two were doing well. He had completed a parenting class and
individual therapy sessions. Father said he planned to file for physical
custody of his son “to protect him at all times,” and he had bonded with the
minor as a single father. Whereas the Agency had initially been concerned
that Father was unwilling to protect his son from Mother’s excessive medical
appointments, that was no longer a concern as Father was meeting the
minor’s needs.
The Agency recommended in a status review report filed in May 2024
that the minor continue to live with Father, and that dependency proceedings
be dismissed. The Agency also recommended that Mother “continue to have
supervised visits with a third party Agency paid cost [sic] as arranged by the
5
parents, or supervised visits with an approved relative as arranged by the
parents.” The social worker reported that Mother did not agree to the
recommendation. The social worker explained to Mother that the proposed
custody order would “detail that she [Mother] continue to have third party
supervised visits cost arranged by both parents [sic], or arranged by approved
relative by both parents.” Under a section titled “VISITATION FOR NON-
CUSTODIAL PARENT,” the report identified the agency that was then
handling the “Court ordered supervised visitation at a minimum of two hours
per week as coordinated by the parents.” Mother engaged with the minor,
and visits went well. The proposed visitation form order submitted with the
review report stated: “[Mother] supervised visitation is two hours with the
minor per week. Both parents should agree on dates, times, and locations.”
At a brief hearing in July 2024, county counsel said she was submitting
on behalf of the Agency based on the review reports and proposed custody
orders, and both Father’s counsel and the minor’s counsel stated they agreed
with the recommendations and custody order. Mother’s counsel stated that
Mother objected to assigning sole legal and physical custody to Father, but
that he (the attorney) would not be presenting additional witnesses or
evidence. Counsel did not mention the proposed visitation order, let alone
object that it was vague or ambiguous.
The juvenile court stated that the custody orders were “appropriate
based upon the facts in this case as well as the lack of progress made by the
mother to address the reasons that the case came before the Court.” The
court adopted the Agency’s recommendations, concluded that conditions no
longer existed that justified the initial assumption of jurisdiction and would
not likely return if supervision was withdrawn, and terminated dependency
jurisdiction. The court entered a final custody order that awarded sole legal
6
and physical custody to Father. The court also entered the form visitation
order, which was unchanged from the proposed order submitted by the
Agency before the hearing (i.e., two hours of weekly supervised visitation). A
Family Law action was commenced in the trial court. (See § 362.4, subd. (c)
[if no action is pending in superior court when juvenile court terminates
jurisdiction over a minor, the termination order “may be used as the sole
basis for opening a file in the superior court of the county in which the
parent, who has been given custody, resides”].)
II.
DISCUSSION
A. This Court’s Opinion in In re A.D. I Renders Moot Some of Mother’s
Arguments.
Mother filed her opening brief in this appeal before we issued our
decision in In re A.D. I. She argued that if the court reversed the
jurisdictional findings, then the orders on review in this appeal should be
reversed as well for lack of jurisdiction. And Mother further contended that
even if we only partially reversed the restraining order or the jurisdictional
findings, then remand in this case would be appropriate in order for the
juvenile court to weigh custody and visitation orders without relying on
erroneous findings. By the time Mother filed her reply brief, A.D. I had
affirmed all orders in full, and in her reply brief she abandoned those
arguments.
B. The Juvenile Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion When Issuing the
Visitation Order.
Mother contends that we must reverse the custody and visitation
findings since insufficient evidence supports them. Her main challenge
appears to be to the terms of visitation, as she complains that there is no
justification for the “extremely limited supervised visitation.”
7
Where a dependent minor has been removed but is currently placed
with a parent, section 364, subdivision (c), authorizes the juvenile court to
terminate jurisdiction if court supervision is no longer necessary. “When
terminating its jurisdiction over a child who has been declared a dependent
child of the court, section 362.4 authorizes the juvenile court to issue a
custody and visitation order (commonly referred to as an ‘exit order’) that will
become part of the relevant family law file and remain in effect in the family
law action ‘until modified or terminated by a subsequent order.’ When
making a custody determination under section 362.4, ‘the court’s focus and
primary consideration must always be the best interests of the child.’ ” (In re
T.S. (2020) 52 Cal.App.5th 503, 513, fn. omitted; see also In re John W. (1996)
41 Cal.App.4th 961, 974 [court must use “strict best interest standard”].)
“ ‘[T]he juvenile court has broad discretion to make custody [and visitation]
orders when it terminates jurisdiction in a dependency case (§ 362.4).’
[Citation.] We review the juvenile court’s exit orders for an abuse of that
discretion. [Citations.] We will not disturb the juvenile court’s decision
‘ “ ‘unless the trial court has exceeded the limits of legal discretion by making
an arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd determination.’ ” ’ ” (In re J.M.
(2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 95, 112–113; see also In re Stephanie M. (1994)
7 Cal.4th 295, 318 [juvenile court’s custody determinations reviewed for
abuse of discretion].)
Mother argues that the juvenile court abused its discretion since the
“extremely limited supervised visitation” allowed by the order does not serve
the minor’s best interests. She proceeds to summarize all the evidence
favorable to her: The minor spoke favorably of visits in February and March
2023 (when he was still in the care of his aunt), Father testified in
September 2023 that joint visitation went well, Mother reported during a
8
November 2023 hearing that visits went well, and a May 2024 status report
stated that visits went well. But we of course view the record in the light
most favorable to the juvenile court’s order, and there is abundance evidence
supporting the order.
This court’s previous affirmance of the protective order detailed
Mother’s delusional behavior toward the minor, including taking him to an
office of the Federal Bureau of Investigation to discuss his health and the
way his friends and their parents treated him, and the ways he suffered by
frequently being taken out of school for unnecessary medical appointments.
The Agency and juvenile court repeatedly encouraged Mother to undergo a
psychological evaluation and engage in services in order to appreciate the
effect she was having on her son and address what appeared to be an
undiagnosed mental-health condition, but she did not do so. The concern
with Mother refusing to seek help appeared only to increase as the case
proceeded, to the point where the juvenile court was concerned Mother might
be suffering a psychotic break. With all the evidence supporting the
protective order against Mother, it is reasonable to assume that it continues
to be in the minor’s best interest to have his contact with Mother limited.
Given all the evidence, we cannot say that the juvenile court’s visitation
order was an abuse of discretion.
C. Mother Forfeited Her Argument that the Visitation Order is Vague
and Ambiguous.
We also reject Mother’s argument that we must reverse the visitation
order on the ground it is vague and ambiguous, because she failed to object
on this ground in the juvenile court.
“[A] reviewing court ordinarily will not consider a challenge to a ruling
if an objection could have been but was not made in the trial court.
9
[Citation.] The purpose of this rule is to encourage parties to bring errors to
the attention of the trial court, so that they may be corrected. [Citation.]
[¶] Dependency matters are not exempt from this rule.” (In re S.B. (2004)
32 Cal.4th 1287, 1293, fn. omitted.)
The record reflects that Mother was given notice about the Agency’s
proposed visitation order, and the social worker also discussed future
visitation with Mother. It appears that future visits would be consistent with
the family’s then-current routine, which had gone smoothly and resulted in
positive visits between Mother and her son. Had mother been concerned that
the proposed order was “impermissibly vague and ambiguous as to who is the
authorized supervisor(s) of the visitation and who approves the supervisor,”
as she claims on appeal, she could have raised this issue in the juvenile court.
Mother argues in her reply brief that we should not consider the issue
forfeited since it is a legal question that “requires no reference to the
underlying record.” (E.g., In re Sheena K. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 875, 888
[challenge to probation condition as facially vague and overbroad was pure
question of law that was “easily remediable on appeal by modification of the
condition”]; In re I.V. (2017) 11 Cal.App.5th 249, 261 [claim that definition of
term in search conditions was unconstitutionally vague was not subject to
forfeiture since it could be addressed without examining record].) Mother
complains that the order is vague because it is unclear “who are the
authorized supervisors of the visitation and who approves the supervisors.”
But this is precisely the type of question that would require a review of the
record to decide what further detail, if any, would be appropriate for the
visitation order. (I.V., supra, at pp. 260–261 [appellant forfeited overbreadth
claim because whether search condition served a rehabilitative purpose
would require review of record].)
10
The court appreciates the legislative directive, highlighted by Mother,
that exit orders be sufficiently detailed to permit the family court to enforce
them. (See In re Anna T. (2020) 55 Cal.App.5th 870, 878–879.) Should
conflict arise over the visitation order, the parties may seek redress in family
court.
III.
DISPOSITION
The juvenile court’s order dismissing jurisdiction and entering a
custody/visitation order is affirmed.
11
_________________________
Humes, P.J.
WE CONCUR:
_________________________
Banke, J.
_________________________
Langhorne Wilson, J.
In re A.D. A171683
12
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