Wright v. Wright CA2/1

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Filed 5/23/25 Wright v. Wright CA2/1
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

PHILIP SPENCER WRIGHT, B327043

Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. 19STFL03890)
v.

IULIIA PLATOKHINA WRIGHT,

Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Wendy L. Wilcox, Judge. Reversed.
Oleg Volkov for Appellant.
Larson, Stephen G. Larson, Andrew J. Bedigian and
Kimberly E. Wilkinson for Respondent.

____________________________
Iuliia Platokhina Wright appeals from an order imposing
sanctions against her and her counsel, Oleg Volkov, in a
dissolution action between Iuliia and Philip Wright.1 The family
law court sanctioned Iuliia and Volkov for moving to set aside an
order granting Philip attorney fees while that same fees order
was pending on appeal.
We conclude Philip’s sanctions motion, strictly construed,
did not provide adequate notice of the grounds on which the
family law court imposed sanctions. Iuliia’s set-aside motion
asserted three bases for relief, only one of which the sanctions
motion unambiguously targeted as violating the stay imposed by
the pending appeal.
Accordingly, we reverse.

BACKGROUND
Our discussion of the proceedings below is necessarily
detailed because of the procedural challenges the parties asserted
below.
Philip and Iuliia married in February 2019 and separated
18 days later. During the subsequent dissolution proceeding,
Iuliia requested a domestic violence restraining order against
Philip. The family law court denied the request. Philip moved
for prevailing party fees and costs under Family Code section
6344. On March 3, 2022, the court granted Philip’s motion,

1 Because the parties share a last name, we refer to them
by their first names. No disrespect is intended.
This is the second appeal we have considered in this
matter. In the first, we reversed another sanctions order as well
as an order disqualifying Volkov as Iuliia’s counsel. (Wright v.
Wright (Aug. 23, 2024, B330901) [nonpub. opn.].)

2
awarding him $101,855.65. We will refer to that order as the fees
order. Iuliia filed a notice of appeal from the fees order on April
18, 2022.

1. Iuliia’s motion to set aside the fees order
On August 29, 2022, while the appeal from the fees order
was pending, Iuliia filed in the family law court a notice of
intention to move for an order under Code of Civil Procedure2
section 663 setting aside the fees order. On August 31, 2022,
Iuliia filed the motion itself, now stating the basis for relief was
section 473, and alternatively section 663 “or upon informal
suggestion to reconsider the order under Le Francois v. Goel
[(2005)] 35 Cal.4th 1094, 1008 . . . .” (Italics added.) The
memorandum of points and authorities in support of the motion
similarly invoked and discussed sections 473, subdivision (d)3
and 663, as well as the theory of an “informal suggestion” under
Le Francois.
Iuliia’s motion began with 10 numbered paragraphs
identifying purported errors justifying setting aside the fees
order: 1) Philip failed to file his fees request electronically and
the court failed to continue the hearing; 2) the fees request was

2Unspecified statutory citations are to the Code of Civil
Procedure.
3 The title of Iuliia’s motion as well as the notice of motion
referred to subdivision (c) of section 473, rather than
subdivision (d). We presume this was error—Iuliia’s
memorandum of points and authorities cited subdivision (d), and
both the notice of motion and the memorandum argued the fees
order should be set aside as void, a ground for relief found under
subdivision (d), not (c).

3
untimely; 3) the family law court wrongly found Iuliia’s ability to
pay was not relevant to the fees request; 4) Philip was not the
prevailing party; 5) the court erred in awarding fees arising from
Philip’s counsel’s acts in bad faith; 6) the court erred in awarding
fees arising from Philip’s own “frivolous competing [restraining
order] petition; 7) the court erred in awarding costs for certain
transcripts; 8) the court wrongly found Philip’s counsel’s hourly
rate reasonable; 9) the court relied on mutually inconsistent
declarations filed by Philip and his counsel; and 10) Philip’s fees
request misrepresented the facts and law. (Boldface omitted.)
Iuliia’s motion was calendared for hearing on December 21,
2022.

2. Philip’s service of an unfiled sanctions motion
According to a proof of service, Philip served an unfiled
sanctions motion under section 128.7 on Iuliia on
September 29, 2022. The motion was unfiled because of statutory
safe harbor requirements.
In the motion, Philip sought to strike Iuliia’s motion to set
aside the fees order, and impose monetary sanctions on Volkov of
$72,259.50, or $55,969.50 if the court struck Iuliia’s motion. In
the “Introduction” of the supporting memorandum of points and
authorities, Philip contended, “Due to his filing of the appeal [of
the fees order], the Court is without jurisdiction to vacate or set-
aside the [fees order], and therefore Iuliia’s [motion to set aside]
is frivolous as a matter of law.” (Boldface, underscoring, & some
capitalization omitted.)
In the “Argument” section of the sanctions motion, Philip
argued the family law court had no jurisdiction to grant relief
under section 663 while the appeal was pending. (Boldface,
underscoring, & some capitalization omitted.) Assuming the

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court had jurisdiction, Philip argued section 663 only authorizes
reexamination of issues of law, but Iuliia’s motion improperly
sought reexamination of factual findings as well. Philip further
argued Iuliia’s motion was untimely under the express terms of
section 663, which requires filing of the motion within 15 days of
notice of entry of the order sought to be set aside, and resolution
of the motion within 75 days.
As to Iuliia’s challenge under section 473, subdivision (d),
Philip argued the family law court had subject matter jurisdiction
over the fees order and therefore it was impossible for the fees
order to be void. Philip contended Iuliia’s motion was in fact a
“veiled motion for reconsideration under [section] 1008. Such a
characterization is supported by the fact that Mr. Volkov, as
discussed above, improperly seeks reconsideration of factual
findings under [section] 663, and plies the Court with [the]
‘informal suggestion’ to reconsider the Fee Order (of course,
formally presented by filing and serving Iuliia’s [set-aside
motion]).” Philip argued Iuliia’s motion did not comply with
section 1008 because it was filed past the 10-day deadline and did
not include the required affidavit indicating the new or different
facts, circumstances or law on which the motion was based.
Philip thus contended the improper motion was independently
sanctionable under section 1008, subdivision (d).
In the “Conclusion” of the sanctions motion, Philip
characterized Iuliia’s set-aside motion as “frivolous, harassing,
filing abuse. For the reasons discussed above, it is objectively
devoid of legal and factual merit, and is submitted for the
improper purpose of harassing Philip and his counsel. The court
is without jurisdiction to vacate or set-aside [sic] the fee order, as

5
Mr. Volkov requests, because he has already appealed same.”
(Boldface, underscoring, & some capitalization omitted.)

3. Iuliia’s request to withdraw set-aside motion
On October 19, 2022, Iuliia filed a request to “withdraw[ ]
her motion” to set aside the fees order under sections 473 and
663. In that request, Iuliia stated, “[T]he Motions appear to be
moot, or, at least, judicially inefficient within current
proceedings.”
Iuliia gave several specific reasons for her request to
withdraw. She explained the family law court would lose
jurisdiction pursuant to section 663 on December 21, 2022, yet
the court had “refused to advance the hearing date.” Iuliia
disputed Philip’s claim that her section 663 motion was untimely,
calling Philip’s proof of service of the notice of entry of the fees
order “unreliable, especially taking into consideration[ ] prior
misconduct of Philip’s legal team.” She conceded, however, that
“if the Court accepts Philip’s proof of service as reliable[,] the
motion under [section] 663 becomes untimely.” Iuliia agreed
“some of the arguments and grounds” under section 663 “may not
be considered because of the pending appeal.” Finally, Iuliia
argued her original request to set aside the fees order was
intended to “sav[e] the Court’s and parties’ resources by avoiding
the further maintenance of the appeal,” but Philip had “negated”
any benefit through his threatened sanctions motion, responding
to which “would require substantial resources and would not
necessarily result in the vacating of [the fees order].”
Iuliia, “[f]or the avoidance of any confusion,” stated she was
withdrawing her notice of intention to move for a set-aside order,
the set-aside motion itself, and Volkov’s declaration filed in
support of the motion. In boldface lettering, she stated, “Request

6
to kindly keep the hearing date of December 21, 2022 for
Informal suggestion to vacate [the fees order] on the Court’s own
motion or set a new date for the hearing on Iuliia’s informal
suggestion to vacate [the fees order] on the Court’s own motion,
or vacate [the fees order] on the Court’s own motion upon Iuliia’s
informal suggestion without setting a date for the hearing.”
Iuliia stated her “informal suggestion” was pursuant to
Le Francois, and indicated she would “fil[e] the relevant informal
suggestion and [m]emorandum of points and authorities in
support of such informal suggestion concurrently or slightly
subsequently.” She continued, “It shall be noted that the Court
has discretion not to . . . set the informal suggestion for hearing
and the opposing party (Philip) is not required to oppose/respond
to such informal suggestion without the court’s direction to do so.
[¶] Iuliia’s informal suggestion should not be considered a motion
for reconsideration or any other motion . . . because the Court has
the discretion [to] not set the hearing for Iuliia’s informal
suggestion, Philip is not required to answer to the said
suggestion, and the Court may ignore (‘deny’) Iuliia’s informal
suggestion or may vacate [the fees order] upon Iuliia’s informal
suggestion without setting a date for the hearing and without
directing Philip to address Iuliia’s informal suggestion.”4

4 On October 21, 2022, two days after filing her
withdrawal request, Iuliia filed a document entitled “Informal
Suggestion to Set Aside [the Fees Order] Upon Court’s Own
Motion Under Le Francois v. Goel . . .” (Some capitalization
omitted & italics added.) Iuliia asserted the same 10 reasons to
vacate the order she had listed in her original set-aside motion.
On October 24, 2022, Iuliia filed a 25-page memorandum of
points and authorities in support, accompanied by a declaration

7
4. Sanctions motion and opposition
On October 21, 2022, Philip filed the sanctions motion he
had served on Iuliia on September 29, the contents of which we
have already summarized in part 2 of this Background section,
ante.
On November 18, 2022, Iuliia filed an objection to the
sanctions motion contending Philip had not properly served the
sanctions motion nor complied with safe harbor requirements.
On November 21, 2022, Iuliia filed an opposition to the
sanctions motion. In the opposition, she reiterated her objection
to Philip’s service and safe harbor compliance. She additionally
argued, inter alia, that Philip had misrepresented the applicable
standard for sanctions under section 128.7. She argued the
purpose of her set-aside motion was not to harass Philip, but to
vacate the fees order “without incurring substantial attorney fees
at the appeal level that Iuliia cannot afford.” (Italics omitted.)
She contended Philip’s motion accused her of seeking
reconsideration of factual findings, yet Philip failed to specify the
factual findings of which Iuliia improperly sought
reconsideration. Iuliia conceded Volkov had made “honest and
excusable” mistakes in his understanding of the definition of
“void” for purposes of section 473, subdivision (d), as well as his
understanding of the effect of a pending appeal on a section 663
motion, but those mistakes did not warrant sanctions. As to
Philip’s statutory arguments regarding section 663, Iuliia argued

from Volkov attaching over 600 pages of exhibits. These filings
all postdate Philip’s sanctions motion and therefore are not
within the scope of that motion, nor did the family law court
discuss them at the hearing on the sanctions motion. We do not
address them further.

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her set-aside motion was timely under that statute, and Philip
had waived opposition to the section 663 motion.5 (Italics
omitted.)
Philip’s counsel filed a declaration in reply to Iuliia’s
opposition. Counsel contended Iuliia had not withdrawn her
set-aside motion within the safe harbor period, because the
shipping label attached to the withdrawal request indicated it
had been mailed on October 20, 2022, with a delivery date of
October 21, 2022, contrary to Iuliia’s proof of service indicating
service on October 19, 2022.
Counsel further asserted Iuliia’s request to withdraw her
motion was ineffective because in that request, Iuliia nonetheless
asked the court to keep her hearing date on calendar and sought
the same relief through an informal request. Counsel stated,
“This is not a withdrawal. Mr. Volkov misses the point; as set
forth in Philip’s moving papers, due to Iuliia’s perfected appeal of
the Fee Order, the Court is without jurisdiction to reconsider or
set-aside [sic] the Fee Order—whether by formal suggestion,
informal suggestion, or otherwise. This lack of jurisdiction to
reconsider or set-aside [sic] is the very crux of what makes Iuliia’s
[set-aside motion] frivolous in whole.” “In sum: to the extent
that Mr. Volkov attempted to withdraw Iuliia’s [set-aside
motion], the withdrawal was delivered after the expiration of the
safe-harbor period, and it fails to withdraw at least one frivolous
request from Iuliia’s [set-aside motion] (the ‘informal
suggestion’).”

5 We do not summarize Iuliia’s other arguments in
opposition, which Iuliia does not reassert on appeal, nor are they
pertinent to our resolution of this appeal.

9
5. Grant of sanctions motion
The family law court held a hearing on the sanctions
motion on December 5, 2022. The court began by stating its
ruling, without hearing argument from the parties.6 The court
found Philip had complied with the safe harbor requirement.
Volkov asked to “address the safe harbor issue very briefly,” and
the court said, “No. I’m not done yet, sir. Just one second.”
The court further found Iuliia had never withdrawn her
set-aside motion, because in her withdrawal request, she “still
asserts keeping that hearing date and going forward herself
under this informal suggestion way or on the court’s own motion.”
The court did not reach Philip’s contention in reply that Iuliia
had not filed her withdrawal request within the safe harbor
period. Rather, it stated, “[E]ven if [the request was made
within] the 21 days, it’s irrelevant because [the set-aside motion]
was never taken off calendar.”
As to the merits of the sanctions motion, the court
summarized Philip’s arguments, in particular that the court had
no jurisdiction to decide a section 663 motion when the
challenged order was on appeal, the requested relief was both
“impossible” and untimely under section 663, there was no legal
of factual basis for relief under section 473, and Iuliia’s motion
was a veiled motion for reconsideration in violation of
section 1008.
The court noted that in her withdrawal request, Iuliia had
“conceded” that “some of the arguments and grounds for the [fees]

6 The family law court did not state its ruling was
tentative. The minute order describing the hearing, however,
states, “The Court gives its oral tentative ruling.”

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order to be vacated under [section] 663 may not be considered
because of the pending appeal.” Thus, “[w]ith respect to that
motion to set aside filed on August 31, 2022, . . . it’s undisputed
on both sides that it’s not appropriate because this court doesn’t
have jurisdiction to hear it because there’s a pending appeal.
And [Iuliia] continues to move forward with it. And does so in a
way where on the one hand she says that she’s complying
because she’s requesting to take it off, on the other hand there is
no compliance because she continues to want it to go forward and
suggests this [informal] suggestion, which I’m not familiar with,
or on the court’s own motion, which I don’t find appropriate
because the court doesn’t have jurisdiction; which [Iuliia]
concedes.” “On that argument alone, it’s objectively unreasonable
to continue with this motion, not take it off calendar, and argue
in a request to withdraw it, to keep it on calendar, either under
this informal suggestion vehicle or on the court’s own motion,
[when] the court doesn’t have jurisdiction. That’s objectively
unreasonable conduct, I find.” The court continued, “[T]hose
other arguments that [Philip] argued, that I stated on the record,
I find have merit, with the fact that [the set-aside motion is]
untimely.”
The court struck Iuliia’s set-aside motion and took the
December 21, 2022 hearing off calendar. The court found Philip’s
requested attorney fees sanction “reasonable,” but concluded
granting over $50,000 in fees would be “punitive.” The court
therefore “sanction[ed Iuliia] and [Iuliia’s] counsel $25,000,”
“[b]ecause all of this could have been avoided, and instead, it has
been moving forward with lots of papers, either on nonsensical
arguments or arguments that [Iuliia] knows are not appropriate
because this court doesn’t have jurisdiction.”

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Volkov asked, “Will you allow me to address it?” The court
stated, “No. I’ve read all the papers. I’ve considered everything.
I’m going to sign the minute order. That’s the court order. And I
appreciate your time. And we’re done.”
The court reported its sanctions order to the State Bar.
Iuliia timely appealed. Philip filed a letter in which he took no
position on Iuliia’s arguments on appeal, citing a settlement
agreement between the parties executed in April 2024.7

DISCUSSION

A. Section 128.7
Section 128.7, subdivision (b), provides, in relevant part,
that an attorney who signs, files, submits, or advocates “a
pleading, petition, written notice of motion, or other similar
paper,” thereby certifies to the court “that to the best of the
person’s knowledge, information, and belief, formed after an
inquiry reasonable under the circumstances,” certain conditions
are met. Those conditions are: “(1) [The filing] is not being
presented primarily for an improper purpose, such as to harass or
to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of
litigation. [¶] (2) The claims, defenses, and other legal
contentions therein are warranted by existing law or by a
nonfrivolous argument for the extension, modification, or reversal
of existing law or the establishment of new law. [¶] (3) The
allegations and other factual contentions have evidentiary
support or, if specifically so identified, are likely to have
evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity for further

7 The parties have not indicated the settlement affects the
sanctions order or this appeal.

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investigation or discovery. [¶] (4) The denials of factual
contentions are warranted on the evidence or, if specifically so
identified, are reasonably based on a lack of information or
belief.” (§ 128.7, subd. (b).)
Section 128.7, subdivision (c) allows a court to impose
sanctions for violations of subdivision (b) “after notice and a
reasonable opportunity to respond.” (§ 128.7, subd. (c).) The
court may do this on its own motion or on a party’s motion.
(Ibid.)
A party’s motion for sanctions “shall describe the specific
conduct alleged to violate subdivision (b).” (§ 128.7, subd. (c)(1).)
The party must provide a safe harbor period by serving the
motion on the party to be sanctioned, then waiting at least
21 days before filing the motion with the court. (See ibid.) The
motion may be filed only if “the challenged paper, claim, defense,
contention, allegation, or denial is not withdrawn or
appropriately corrected” within the 21-day safe harbor period.
(Ibid.)
Similarly, if the court wishes to impose sanctions on its own
motion, it must first “enter an order describing the specific
conduct that appears to violate [section 128.7,] subdivision (b),”
then direct the offending party “to show cause why it has not
violated subdivision (b), unless, within 21 days of service of the
order to show case, the challenged paper . . . is withdrawn or
appropriately corrected.” (§ 128.7, subd. (c)(2).)
A court imposing sanctions “shall describe the conduct
determined to constitute a violation of this section and explain
the basis for the sanction imposed.” (§ 128.7, subd. (e).) The
sanctions may be monetary and/or nonmonetary. (Id., subd. (d).)
Monetary sanctions “may not be awarded against a represented

13
party for a violation of paragraph (2) of subdivision (b),” i.e., the
provision requiring that legal contentions be warranted and
nonfrivolous. (Id., subd. (d)(1).)
Normally, we review a section 128.7 sanctions order for
abuse of discretion. (Kumar v. Ramsey (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th
1110, 1121 (Kumar).) Here, however, the validity of the
sanctions order turns on whether Philip satisfied statutory notice
and safe harbor provisions, a question that does not require
resolution of any factual disputes. Our review, therefore, is
de novo. (See CPF Vaseo Associates, LLC v. Gray (2018)
29 Cal.App.5th 997, 1005 (CPF Vaseo) [“Since ‘[t]here is no
factual dispute that [the movants] filed and served [their] request
for sanctions on the same date,’ the issue of compliance with the
safe harbor provision ‘presents a pure question of law[,]’ ”
second bracketed insertion added]; Shewry v. Begil (2005)
128 Cal.App.4th 639, 642 [“Matters presenting pure questions of
law, not involving the resolution of disputed facts, are subject to
de novo review.”].)

B. The Family Law Court Imposed Sanctions on a Basis
for Which Philip Did Not Provide Adequate Notice
Subject to certain exceptions, “the perfecting of an appeal
stays proceedings in the trial court upon the judgment or order
appealed from or upon the matters embraced therein or affected
thereby . . . .” (§ 916, subd. (a).) “ ‘The effect of the appeal is to
remove the subject matter of the order from the jurisdiction of the
lower court. . . . ’ [Citation.]” (Varian Medical Systems, Inc. v.
Delfino (2005) 35 Cal.4th 180, 197.)
In the instant case, the family law court imposed sanctions
because Iuliia had moved to set aside the fees order despite the
court having no jurisdiction due to the pending appeal. Iuliia

14
contends this was error because the sanctions motion invoked the
section 916 stay only as to her arguments under 663, whereas her
set-aside motion also was based on section 473 and Le Francois.
Iuliia argues she therefore had no notice or opportunity to
address the stay as it applied to those other bases, a problem
exacerbated by the family law court’s refusal to allow argument
from her counsel at the sanctions hearing. We agree.
Case law emphasizes the importance of proper notice when
imposing sanctions. Section 128.7 “is designed to be remedial,
not punitive.” (Li v. Majestic Industry Hills LLC (2009)
177 Cal.App.4th 585, 591.) The statute’s notice and safe harbor
requirements are “ ‘intended to foster compliance . . . and to
conserve judicial resources otherwise spent adjudicating a
sanctions motion by affording a prescribed period of time during
which a party may correct or withdraw a frivolous or improper
pleading or motion without any penalty.’ [Citations.]”
(CPF Vaseo, supra, 29 Cal.App.5th at p. 1003; see Cromwell v.
Cummings (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th Supp. 10, 14–15 [“the central
purpose of the ‘safe harbor’ provision is to provide an adequate
opportunity for withdrawal (i.e., voluntary dismissal)
without penalty once the impropriety of the pleading and the
consequence of nonwithdrawal have been made clear”].) “ ‘By
withdrawing specious or meritless legal contentions, pointless
and time-consuming litigation is avoided. . . .’ [Citation.]”
(Shenefield v. Shenefield (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 619, 635
(Shenefield).)
As cases have recognized, the goal of avoiding unnecessary
litigation is ill-served by sanctions motions that do not provide
adequate notice and safe harbor: “ ‘Failing to comply with
procedures designed to minimize or reduce meritless litigation,

15
in effect promotes it.’ [Citation.]” (Shenefield, supra,
75 Cal.App.5th at p. 635.) “Accordingly, notice requirements are
strictly construed.” (Ibid.) Thus, for example, a letter contending
a complaint is without merit, but that does not “explain how or
why the complaint was frivolous,” does not provide adequate
notice. (Barnes v. Department of Corrections (1999)
74 Cal.App.4th 126, 135.) Similarly, it is improper to file a
sanctions motion that is not identical to the unfiled motion that
triggered the safe harbor period. (Hart v. Avetoom (2002)
95 Cal.App.4th 410, 414.) Hart concluded the safe harbor
requirement had not been met because the filed motion
“contained additional declarations and supplemental points and
authorities not present in the original version”; “ ‘[c]lose’ is good
enough in horseshoes and hand grenades, but not in the context
of the sanctions statute.” (Id. at p. 414.)
Beyond the statute itself, constitutional principles of due
process similarly require adequate notice. “When sanctions are
at issue, due process can be satisfied if the court gives a clear
warning identifying the anticipated grounds for the sanctions or
if those grounds are identified by the opposing party, and the
court provides counsel with an opportunity to respond at least
orally.” (Shenefield, supra, 75 Cal.App.5th at pp. 631–632.)
Strictly construed, Philip’s sanctions motion did not
adequately notify Iuliia of the grounds upon which the family law
court ultimately imposed sanctions. To recap, Iuliia’s set-aside
motion asserted three independent bases to vacate or reconsider
the fees order: section 663, section 473, subdivision (d), and
Le Francois.
Section 663, in relevant part, allows a court to “set aside
and vacate” “[a] judgment or decree” if there is an “[i]ncorrect or

16
erroneous legal basis for the decision, not consistent with or not
supported by the facts.” Section 663a imposes timing
requirements for both filing and adjudicating section 663
motions—filing generally must occur within 15 days of specified
triggering events, and the court loses jurisdiction to rule on the
motion 75 days past specified triggering events. (See § 663a,
subds. (a)–(b).)
Section 473, subdivision (d), provides, in relevant part,
“The court . . . may, on motion of either party after notice to the
other party, set aside any void judgment or order.”
Le Francois held a trial court has authority to reconsider
its interim orders on its own motion, and need not comply with
the requirements in section 1008, which govern party motions for
reconsideration. (Le Francois v. Goel (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1094,
1096–1097, 1108 (Le Francois). Le Francois further held that,
although the court must exercise this power on its own motion, it
may do so “in response to a party’s suggestion.” (Id. at p. 1108;
see ibid. [“If a court believes one of its prior interim orders was
erroneous, it should be able to correct that error no matter how it
came to acquire that belief.”].) That “suggestion,” however, has
no “procedural significance” absent compliance with section 1008,
and therefore “[t]he court need not rule on any suggestion . . .
and, without more, another party would not be expected to
respond to such a suggestion.” (Le Francois, at p. 1108.)
Philip’s sanctions motion was confusing as to how it
addressed the three bases asserted in Iuliia’s set-aside motion.
On the one hand, Philip’s motion stated in both its introduction
and conclusion that the pending appeal of the fees order deprived
the family law court of jurisdiction to vacate or set aside that
order. On the other hand, the “Argument” section of the motion

17
invoked the section 916 stay only in its discussion of Iuliia’s
argument under section 663. Philip raised a different challenge
to Iuliia’s section 473 argument, namely that the fees order was
not “void” as required by section 473, subdivision (d). Philip’s
motion did not mention the section 916 stay when addressing
section 473, subdivision (d).
Philip also argued Iuliia’s set-aside motion was a “veiled
motion for reconsideration” that did not comply with the
requirements of section 1008, but again did not mention the
section 916 stay.
Philip’s motion hardly addressed Iuliia’s “informal
suggestion” under Le Francois at all. The only mention was in
Philip’s argument that Iuliia’s set-aside motion was actually a
veiled motion for reconsideration under section 1008. Philip
argued this “characterization is supported by the fact that
Mr. Volkov . . . plies the Court with his ‘informal suggestion’ to
reconsider the Fee Order (of course, formally presented by filing
and serving Iuliia’s [set-aside motion]).” Philip’s motion did not
cite or discuss Le Francois, nor explain why Iuliia’s “informal
suggestion” pursuant to that case was sanctionable.
None of this adequately notified Iuliia that Philip was
challenging her entire set-aside motion based on the pending
appeal. The motion’s terse general assertion of the section 916
stay in the introduction and conclusion was undercut by the
“Argument” section, which limited discussion of the stay to
section 663. The motion further was ambiguous as to whether it
was challenging Iuliia’s Le Francois request at all, which the
motion mentioned only to support an argument the set-aside
motion was a veiled motion for reconsideration. The purpose of
section 128.7’s notice and safe harbor requirements is to provide

18
notice of the specific improprieties meriting sanctions and time
for the offending party to withdraw the filing without penalty.
Rather than clearly setting forth the section 916 stay as a basis
for sanctions as to all Iuliia’s arguments in her set-aside motion,
Philip’s sanctions motion muddled the issue.
It is not surprising, therefore, that Iuliia’s response to the
sanctions motion, set forth in her withdrawal request and
opposition, addressed the section 916 stay solely in the context of
section 663, the only context in which the sanctions motion
specifically invoked the stay. Iuliia continued to press her Le
Francois argument, which, again, the sanctions motion had not
expressly targeted as a basis for sanctions. Iulia’s response was
reasonable given the ambiguities in Philip’s motion.
It was not until the reply declaration in support of the
sanctions motion that Philip’s counsel clearly connected the dots
in arguing, “[D]ue to Iuliia’s perfected appeal of the Fee Order,
the Court is without jurisdiction to reconsider or set-aside [sic]
the Fee Order—whether by formal suggestion, informal
suggestion, or otherwise. This lack of jurisdiction to reconsider or
set-aside [sic] is the very crux of what makes Iuliia’s [set-aside
motion] frivolous in whole.”
Philip’s belated reply argument cannot remedy the
inadequate notice in his original sanctions motion. By raising the
argument in reply, Iuliia had no opportunity to respond, a
deficiency the family law court compounded by refusing to allow
her counsel to argue at the sanctions hearing. Nor can the reply
itself be construed as a sanctions motion when it was not served
on Iuliia unfiled and did not invoke the required safe harbor
period.

19
To the extent the family law court overlooked the lack of
notice because the court believed Iuliia had conceded her set-
aside motion was improper given the section 916 stay, this was
error. Iuliia made that concession solely as to her arguments
under section 663. She did not concede or even discuss the
applicability of the stay to her arguments under section 473 and
Le Francois given the ambiguities in Philip’s sanctions motion.
We note it is immaterial to our analysis whether the family
law court was correct that the section 916 stay barred the
entirety of Iuliia’s set-aside motion. Assuming arguendo the set-
aside motion was barred, Iuliia nonetheless was deprived of an
opportunity, before the court ruled, to withdraw her motion and
avoid sanctions. The sanctions motion failed to notify her of the
stay issue as to her section 473 and Le Francois arguments. To
the extent the family law court wished to impose sanctions on the
basis of the stay sua sponte, it was required under section 128.7,
subdivision (c)(2) to provide notice to Iuliia and a fresh safe
harbor period for her to withdraw her set-aside motion. That
never happened.
In sum, the family law court imposed sanctions on a basis
for which Iuliia received inadequate notice. This was error.
We recognize Philip made other arguments in his sanctions
motion. The family law court agreed with one of those
arguments, specifically that Iuliia’s contentions under section 663
were untimely under that statute. The court did not rule on
Philip’s other arguments, including that the fees order was not
void under section 473, subdivision (d), and that the set-aside
motion was an improper motion for reconsideration under section
1008.

20
Although in some contexts we may affirm an erroneous
ruling on an alternative basis, this is inappropriate in an appeal
“on the sensitive issue of sanctions.” (Patel v. Crown Diamonds,
Inc. (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 29, 41.) Kumar illustrates the latter
principle. There, the trial court granted sanctions against the
plaintiff solely because no reasonable attorney would believe the
plaintiff’s property claims were timely under the applicable
statute of limitations. (Kumar, supra, 71 Cal.App.5th at p. 1120.)
The appellate court disagreed. (Id. at p. 1126). The appellate
court also refused to consider the defendants’ alternative
arguments, which were not the bases for the trial court’s
sanctions award: “Because the trial court rested its decision on
only one ground, we cannot say how it might have exercised its
discretion had it considered these alternate grounds.” (Id. at
p. 1127.) The appellate court reversed the sanctions order
without remand for further consideration. (Ibid.)
Although here, the family law court agreed with Philip’s
alternative argument concerning Iuliia’s contentions under 663,
the court relied solely on the section 916 stay to impose sanctions
on Iuliia for her Le Francois request. We will not speculate how
the court would have exercised its discretion had it considered
Philip’s other arguments. This is especially so because, as
discussed, it was unclear whether Philip’s motion was targeting
the Le Francois request at all, much less whether his arguments
had merit.

21
Given our holding, we do not reach Iuliia’s other
arguments.8

DISPOSITION
The sanctions order is reversed. The parties shall bear
their own costs on appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

BENDIX, J.

We concur:

ROTHSCHILD, P. J.

M. KIM, J.

8 Iuliia additionally argues the family law court
improperly imposed monetary sanctions against her when the
sanctions motion requested sanctions only against her counsel;
the family law court did not sufficiently explain its reasons for
imposing sanctions; the family law court wrongly found Iuliia had
not withdrawn her contentions under sections 663 and 473;
Philip did not properly serve the sanctions motion; the sanctions
motion misrepresented the standard for imposing sanctions; and
Iuliia provided sufficient evidence her counsel had conducted a
reasonable inquiry and had a good faith belief in the merits of her
set-aside motion.

22

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