CourtListener 10591560•People v. Baker CA4/1
Gesamter Gesetzestext
Filed 5/23/25 P. v. Baker CA4/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THE PEOPLE, D084414
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v. (Super. Ct. No. SCE421524)
GARY LUMUNDI BAKER,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
John M. Thompson, Judge. Reversed in part and remanded with
instructions, and otherwise affirmed.
Michael Reed, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General,
Donald W. Ostertag and Robin Urbanski, Deputy Attorneys General, for
Plaintiff and Respondent.
After being held in presentence home detention, Gary Lumundi Baker
pled guilty to committing a hit and run resulting in death (Veh. Code,
§ 20001, subd. (b)(2); count 1), unlawfully driving another’s vehicle without
consent (§ 10851(a); count 2), receiving stolen property (Pen. Code, § 496d;
count 3), and dissuading a witness from testifying (§ 136.1(a)(1); count 4).
The court sentenced him to a total term of five years and four months in
prison and awarded 125 days of jailtime credit. When Baker’s counsel asked
about presentence home detention custody credits, the trial court responded
it would give Baker the credits requested by probation.
On appeal, Baker contends he is entitled to both custody and conduct
credits for his presentence home detention. The People concede as much.
Resolving this matter by memorandum opinion (see generally People v.
Garcia (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 847), we accept the People’s concession, reverse
in part, and remand with instructions. In all other respects, we affirm.
We review questions of legal principles de novo. (Fletcher v. Superior
Court (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 386, 390-391.)
Section 2900.5, subdivision (a) of the Penal Code states in relevant
part: “[W]hen the defendant has been in custody . . . all days of custody of the
defendant . . . credited to the period of confinement pursuant to Section 4019,
and days served in home detention pursuant to Section . . . 1203.018, shall be
credited upon his or her term of imprisonment.”
Section 4019 allows individuals to earn conduct credits—specifically
work performance and good behavior credits—under various circumstances.
People v. Yanez (2019) 42 Cal.App.5th 91, 93, concluded section 4019 applies
to individuals held in presentence home detention.
A defendant ordered to remain home for a specified period and comply
with statutory requirements is in home detention. (§ 1203.018(d).) A
defendant need not satisfy all the statutory requirements to be awarded
credits for home detention, however, so long as the terms of the defendant’s
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release are “as ‘custodial’” as the statutory home detention program. (People
v. Gerson (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 1067, 1089-1090.)
In Gerson, the court found the defendant satisfied the custodial nature
requirements of section 1203.018 even if he did not meet all the technical
statutory requirements because, despite having a few privileges, the
defendant had a curfew, wore a GPS monitoring device, signed a
Fourth Amendment waiver, was subject to regular drug testing, and had to
abstain from alcohol. (Gerson, 80 Cal.App.5th at p. 1087, fn. 17.) Similarly,
while not satisfying all section 1203.018’s technical requirements, Baker
could only leave his home to go to work or medical appointments, could not
drive, was subject to electronic monitoring and continuous alcohol
monitoring, and could not come within 100 yards of anyone involved with his
case. Failure to comply with these requirements would result in a warrant
for his arrest. As the People concede, Baker thus satisfies the custodial
nature requirements of section 1203.018. Accordingly, Baker is entitled to
custody credits during his presentence home detention.
As the People also concede, the trial court should determine if Baker
earned any section 4019 conduct credits during his presentence home
detention. (See Yanez, 42 Cal.App.5th at p. 94.)
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DISPOSITION
We reverse in part and remand to the trial court to (1) calculate Baker’s
section 2900.5 custody credits earned during his presentence home detention
and (2) determine Baker’s eligibility for section 4019 conduct credits and, if
so, calculate Baker’s conduct credits earned during his presentence home
detention. The court shall forward a certified copy of the amended abstract of
judgment to the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation. In
all other respects, we affirm the judgment.
CASTILLO, J.
WE CONCUR:
HUFFMAN, Acting P. J.
DO, J.
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