People v. Rodriguez CA2/4

CourtListener 10590153Calctapp22.05.2025

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Filed 5/22/25 P. v. Rodriguez CA2/4
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FOUR

THE PEOPLE, B336343

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. BA298155)
v.

JOVANY RODRIGUEZ,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County,
Ronald S. Coen, Judge. Affirmed.
Sandra Gillies, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant Attorney General,
Idan Ivri, Supervising Deputy Attorney General, and Theresa A. Patterson,
Deputy Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
INTRODUCTION
Appellant Jovany Rodriguez (Rodriguez) was convicted of murder and
attempted murder in 2010. Rodriguez twice petitioned for resentencing
under former Penal Code section 1170.95,1 which has since been renumbered
as section 1172.6. (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 4; Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 10.) The
trial court denied the first petition in 2020, and the second in 2023. The
present appeal is from the second denial. We conclude Rodriguez is ineligible
for relief under section 1172.6 and therefore affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On the afternoon of January 7, 2006, two cars pulled up next to each
other at an intersection in Los Angeles. One was a white sport utility vehicle,
occupied by Miguel Padilla (Padilla), Patricia Quiroa (Quiroa), and Denise
Rivera. The other was a gray car with tinted windows, occupied by three
individuals and positioned on the passenger side of the white vehicle.
Someone from the gray car fired a gun at the white car, killing Padilla and
wounding Quiroa.
Testimony from Quiroa and a ballistics expert established that bullets
traveled from the driver’s side of the gray car through the front passenger
window of the white car; four casings were found, and one bullet was
recovered from the passenger door of the white car. Quiroa identified Eric
Rosas as the shooter. Another witness, Vanessa Vallejo, said the occupants
of the gray car were William Rosas (a cousin of Eric Rosas), Michael Garcia
(Garcia), and Rodriguez.

1 All future statutory references are to the Penal Code, unless otherwise
stated.

2
Almost a week later, on the evening of January 13, 2006, Linda Arvizu
(Arvizu) and Gabriel Martinez Manzo (Manzo) were at their home on 48th
Street in Los Angeles. Arvizu spotted Garcia hiding in the back yard. Manzo
and Arvizu pushed Garcia out of their yard toward the street. They heard
Garcia tell a second person, who was standing in the street, to shoot them.
This second person told Arvizu to take Manzo inside or Manzo would be shot.
The person then fired his gun multiple times, hitting Manzo’s pants but
missing his body. Arvizu and Manzo both later identified Rodriguez as the
shooter. A ballistics expert testified the same gun was used in both incidents.
William Rosas, Garcia, and Rodriguez were charged together, but the
charges against Rodriguez were severed and tried separately. A jury
convicted Rodriguez of the murder of Padilla (§ 187, subd. (a)) and attempted
murder of Quiroa (§§ 664/187, subd. (a)), as well as premeditated attempted
murder of Manzo (§§ 664/187, subd. (a)).2 The trial court sentenced
Rodriguez to three consecutive terms of 25 years to life. This court affirmed
that result.3
In January 2020, Rodriguez petitioned the trial court for relief under
former section 1170.95. He argued he was not the actual killer or a major
participant in the murder of Padilla. The trial court denied the petition in
February 2020, observing that the jury was not instructed on either felony
murder or the natural and probable consequences doctrine. No appeal was
taken from that ruling.

2 The jury also found true a series of enhancements.
3 The prior panel modified the abstract of judgment to properly reflect
Rodriguez’s custody credit and the term for one of the enhancements, and to
correct a clerical error.

3
In October 2022, Rodriguez filed another petition for resentencing
under former section 1170.95. The trial court appointed counsel and solicited
briefing. The District Attorney filed a response opposing the petition, and
after obtaining the trial transcripts, Rodriguez’s counsel elected not to file a
reply. In November 2023, the trial court held the required hearing under
section 1172.6, subdivision (c), and determined Rodriguez had not made a
prima facie case for relief. The court ruled that the jury had not been given
any implied malice instructions, only instructions on direct aiding and
abetting and express malice, therefore Rodriguez was not eligible for
resentencing.
Rodriguez timely appealed.

DISCUSSION
I. Governing Law
In 2019, the legislature updated the murder statutes to limit vicarious
liability for that offense. (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, §§ 1-3; see People v. Lewis
(2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 959 (Lewis).) The legislature also provided a
procedure for defendants to request resentencing if they had been convicted
under previous versions of the law. (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 4; see Lewis,
supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 959.) These changes were later expanded to cover
convictions for attempted murder as well. (Stats. 2021, ch. 551.)
A person convicted of murder is eligible for resentencing if they were
convicted of felony murder, or under the natural and probable consequences
doctrine, or on any “other theory under which malice is imputed to a person
based solely on that person’s participation in a crime.” (§ 1172.6, subd. (a).)
However, a person convicted of attempted murder is only eligible for
resentencing if they were convicted under the natural and probable

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consequences doctrine. (Ibid.; People v. Lovejoy (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 860,
865.)
“[U]nder the natural and probable consequences doctrine, an
accomplice is guilty not only of the offense he or she directly aided or abetted
(i.e., the target offense), but also of any other offense committed by the direct
perpetrator that was the ‘natural and probable consequence’ of the crime the
accomplice aided and abetted.” (People v. Gentile (2020) 10 Cal.5th 830, 843
(Gentile).) A prosecution under that doctrine must show the defendant aided
and abetted one crime, which foreseeably led to another. (Id. at pp. 843–844.)
In the context of murder, a petition seeking resentencing under section
1172.6 must demonstrate (1) that the charging document filed against the
defendant “allowed the prosecution to proceed under a theory of felony
murder, murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine or
other theory under which malice is imputed to a person based solely on that
person’s participation in a crime,” (2) that the petitioner was either convicted
of murder or accepted a plea offer in lieu of a trial where they could have
been convicted of murder, and (3) that the petitioner could not presently be
convicted of murder due to the changes in section 188 or 189. (§ 1172.6, subd.
(a).)
In the context of attempted murder, a petition seeking resentencing
under section 1172.6 must demonstrate (1) that the charging document filed
against the defendant permitted the prosecution to proceed under the natural
and probable consequences doctrine, (2) that the petitioner was convicted of
attempted murder, and (3) that the petitioner could not presently be
convicted of attempted murder due to the changes in section 188 or 189.
(§ 1172.6, subd. (a).)

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Upon receipt of a facially compliant petition, the trial court must hold a
hearing “to determine whether the petitioner has made a prima facie case for
relief.” (§ 1172.6, subd. (c).) The court may examine the record of conviction
in determining whether the showing has been made, but must accept the
petitioner’s allegations as true unless the court’s own documents contain facts
refuting those allegations. (Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 971.)
We review the trial court’s inquiry de novo. (People v. Williams (2022)
86 Cal.App.5th 1244, 1251.)

II. Analysis
Nothing in the record suggests, and Rodriguez does not argue, that his
prosecution proceeded expressly under the felony murder or natural and
probable consequences doctrines. No jury instructions were given on either
doctrine. Instead, Rodriguez contends the presence of a “kill zone”
instruction, combined with the aiding and abetting instructions, permitted
the jury to impute the principal shooter’s intent to Rodriguez. We are not
persuaded.

A. Instructions
The instructions relevant here were given to the jury in the following
sequence. First, the court defined the term “principals”: “[p]ersons who are
involved in committing a crime are referred to as principals in that crime.
Each principal, regardless of the extent or manner of participation is equally
guilty. Principals include: [¶] 1. Those who directly and actively commit
the act constituting the crime, or [¶] 2. Those who aid and abet the
commission of the crime.” Next, the court described aiding and abetting: “[a]
person aids and abets the commission of a crime when he or she: [¶] (1)

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[w]ith knowledge of the unlawful purpose of the perpetrator, and [¶] (2)
[w]ith the intent or purpose of committing or encouraging or facilitating the
commission of the crime, and (3) [b]y act or advice aids, promotes, encourages
or instigates the commission of the crime.”
The instructions told the jury both murder and attempted murder
required a finding of malice, and defined malice as “either express or implied.
[¶] Malice is express when there is manifested an intention unlawfully to kill
a human being.” Then came the “kill zone” instruction: “[a] person who
primarily intends to kill one person, may also concurrently intend to kill
other persons within a particular zone of risk. This zone of risk is termed the
‘kill zone.’ The intent is concurrent when the nature and scope of the attack,
while directed at a primary victim, are such that it is reasonable to infer the
perpetrator intended to kill the primary victim by killing everyone in that
victim’s vicinity. [¶] Whether a perpetrator actually intended to kill the
victim, either as a primary target or as someone within a zone of risk is an
issue to be decided by you.”

B. Application
Rodriguez argues the jury could have found he intended to aid and abet
an attempt to kill someone, is therefore a principal “equally guilty” with the
original perpetrator, and is thus responsible for the perpetrator’s concurrent
intent to kill the other victims in the “kill zone,” even if Rodriguez himself did
not intend to kill those other victims. In other words, the jury might have
found Rodriguez intended the death of only one victim, then held him
responsible for the actual shooter’s method of killing.

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This argument is not convincing for the reasons given below, but even if
it were, it would only apply to Rodriguez’s murder conviction.4 As noted
above, section 1172.6 applies to attempted murder convictions only where
they were secured under the natural and probable consequences doctrine.
Rodriguez argues that inferring concurrent intent from a kill zone instruction
is substantially the same as applying the natural and probable consequences
doctrine. It is not. The natural and probable consequences doctrine applies if
the accomplice intends to aid and abet one crime, the target offense, which
foreseeably leads to another crime. (Gentile, supra, 10 Cal.5th at pp. 843–
844.) Rodriguez describes a situation where the accomplice intends to aid
and abet the crime committed but does not anticipate the method by which it
was carried out.
More fundamentally, the jury instructions do not permit the line of
thinking Rodriguez suggests. The jury was given two categories into which
Rodriguez could fall: the person who committed the criminal act, or an aider
and abettor. Then they were told being an aider and abettor means both
knowledge of the actual perpetrator’s intent and the specific intent to assist
in the crime. They were instructed that both murder and attempted murder
require intent to kill. Finally, they were told they had to separately
determine whether the actual perpetrator intended to kill each victim.
Therefore, to convict Rodriguez under these instructions, the jury was
required to determine whether he was the actual shooter, and if not, whether
he shared the shooter’s intent to kill each victim. “[W]e presume a jury

4 Everything in the record suggests Rodriguez was the actual shooter in
the attempted murder of Manzo. For that additional reason, Rodriguez’s
argument does not apply to that conviction, which Rodriguez does not discuss
in the argument sections of his briefing.

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understands and follows the court’s instructions.” (People v. Cortes (2022) 75
Cal.App.5th 198, 205.)
Rodriguez cites People v. Adams (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 1009 (Adams)
for the proposition that a kill zone instruction is just another form of the
natural and probable consequences doctrine. But that is not what Adams
holds. Adams discussed a situation where a woman had set fire to the front
and back entrances of a house, trying to kill one of the occupants, then
argued she could not be convicted of attempted murder of the other occupants
unless she knew each of them was there. (Id. at pp. 1019–1023.) Rejecting
that argument, the panel explained that a kill zone theory enabled a jury to
infer the defendant’s intent from the “natural and probable consequence” of
the defendant’s own actions. (Id. at p. 1023.) Adams did not discuss aiding
and abetting or any other form of accomplice liability.
In addition, Rodriguez relies on People v. Langi (2022) 73 Cal.App.5th
972 (Langi) and People v. Maldonado (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 1257
(Maldonado), though he admits those cases do not involve “the same
constellation of charges or instructions.” The victim in Langi died when a
blow to the face caused him to fall and hit his head. (Langi, supra, 73
Cal.App.5th at p. 976.) As phrased, the instructions permitted the jury to
find the defendant guilty of murder if he aided and abetted the punch,
regardless of whether he intended death to result. (See id. at pp. 980–981.)
But the “central” instruction in Langi, CALJIC No. 8.31, which defined
murder as a killing resulting from an “intentional act” with “natural
consequences” that are “dangerous to human life,” was not given here. (Id. at
p. 981.)
In Maldonado, the victim was found stuffed in a storage locker with
multiple stab wounds; the prosecution proceeded on the theory that the

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defendant either killed the victim or helped someone else do it, and the
murder was committed by lying in wait. (Maldonado, supra, 87 Cal.App.5th
at pp. 1259–1260.) The jury was instructed that malice could be implied from
the intentional commission of an act “the natural and probable consequences”
of which were “dangerous to human life.” (Id. at p. 1264.) They were also
instructed that “lying in wait” simply meant hiding with an intent to make a
surprise attack on the person killed. (Ibid.) The jury found the defendant
guilty of murder, but found he was not guilty of lying in wait. (Id. at p. 1260.)
This left open the possibility that the jury found the defendant had aided and
abetted the actual perpetrator’s lying in wait but had not intended the
victim’s death. (Id. at pp. 1265–1267.) Here, there is no issue of lying in
wait, nor was there an instruction on implied malice.
In sum, the instructions told the jury to decide whether Rodriguez was
the actual perpetrator or an aider and abettor. If he was an aider and
abettor, they had to determine whether he knew about and shared the actual
perpetrator’s intent. Finally, they had to determine whether the actual
perpetrator intended to kill each victim. This is not a situation where the
jury had an option to find Rodriguez guilty without intent to kill, as in Langi
and Maldonado. The jury was not instructed on implied malice, felony
murder, or the natural and probable consequences doctrine. Nor is the kill
zone instruction equivalent to a natural and probable consequences
instruction.
Rodriguez was not convicted on a felony murder theory, under the
natural and probable consequences doctrine, or under an implied malice
theory. He is not eligible for relief under section 1172.6.

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DISPOSITION
The order of the trial court is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

ZUKIN, Acting P. J.

WE CONCUR:

MORI, J.

DAUM, J.*

*Judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice
pursuant to article IV, section 6 of the California Constitution.

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