Renderos v. Clearview AI CA1/4

CourtListener 10590150Calctapp22.05.2025

Gesamter Gesetzestext

Filed 5/22/25 Renderos v. Clearview AI CA1/4
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or
ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FOUR

Steven Renderos et al.,
Plaintiffs and Respondents, A167179
v.
Clearview AI, Inc., (Alameda County
Defendant and Appellant. Super. Ct. No. RG21096898)

Defendant Clearview AI, Inc. (Clearview) sells a facial recognition
service. To create the service, Clearview “scraped” billions of photographs of
people from the internet and applied a proprietary algorithm to generate a
“facial vector”—or “faceprint,” in plaintiffs’ terminology—for each face.
Clearview maintains a database that includes this biometric information.
The company’s customers, which it says are now limited to government
entities (and are “predominantly” law enforcement agencies), upload a
“probe” photo of an individual’s face into Clearview’s application and it
returns any images in the database that have a “close” facial-vector match—a
matching faceprint—along with the address (i.e., the URL) of the webpage at
which each such image was obtained.
Plaintiffs are two organizations and four individuals who have sued
Clearview for common law appropriation of likeness, invasion of the right to
privacy under article 1, section 1 of the California Constitution, and violation

1
of the Unfair Competition Law (Bus. & Prof. Code, §§ 17200 et seq.). The
case comes to us after the trial court denied Clearview’s motion to strike the
complaint under the anti-SLAPP statute (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16),
concluding that the conduct giving rise to plaintiffs’ claims was not protected
activity within the meaning of the statute.1 We affirm.
BACKGROUND
I.
Our recitation of the facts is based primarily on the allegations of
plaintiffs’ complaint, a declaration by Clearview’s general counsel submitted
in support of the motion to strike, and deposition testimony of the declarant
submitted by plaintiffs in opposition.
According to Clearview, it collects only publicly available images from
the internet, along with the associated webpage URL and image metadata.
Plaintiffs allege in their complaint that the collection is nonetheless done in
violation of many websites’ terms of service, and without notice to, or consent
by, the individuals who are depicted in the photos. Clearview populates a
database with the collected information and with the “facial vectors” or
biometric identifiers Clearview has created by applying its machine-learning
algorithm to the images. The database is accessible by an application (app)
available to licensed users. When the user uploads a probe photo to the app,
the app applies its algorithm to the photo to create a facial vector that it
compares against those in the database, and then returns potential matching
images with their associated webpage URLs. According to the complaint, by
default Clearview retains the probe images on its servers indefinitely.

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure.

SLAPP stands for “ ‘strategic lawsuit against public participation.’ ”
(Navellier v. Sletten (2002) 29 Cal.4th 82, 85 & fn. 1.)

2
Clearview’s general counsel stated in his declaration that the company does
not add the probe images or the facial vectors derived from them to its
searchable database, and that its website allows California residents to
access and prevent photographs of themselves from being returned as search
results in Clearview’s app. However, the images are not removed from the
database.
According to the complaint, by February 2020 Clearview had shared its
technology with “more than 2,200 law enforcement departments, government
agencies, and private companies across 27 countries.” In 2022, Clearview
settled litigation in Illinois with a consent judgment that, with narrow
exceptions not at issue here, limited its customers in the United States to
governmental entities. In his declaration, Clearview’s general counsel stated
that the company’s customers are “predominantly, if not exclusively, in law
enforcement,” and that to his knowledge no private entity has used the app
since about August 1, 2020. He added that customers are permitted to use
the app “only for law-enforcement and investigative purposes,” and that each
individual user “must be expressly authorized to do so by a government
agency.” The purpose of the app, he wrote, “is to help law enforcement
entities identify criminal suspects, victims, and persons of interest as quickly
and as accurately as possible.”
Users are required to enter a case number and crime type to identify
each search on the app, which can be reviewed by the governmental
organization’s administrative users, but neither those entries nor the
uploaded probe photos are visible to Clearview itself. Clearview thus relies
on the government agency to ensure that searches are being run for
appropriate purposes. Clearview’s terms of service prohibit users from
disclosing “the Services”—defined to include the app and the database—“[t]o

3
the extent legally permissible.” They further provide that search results “are
not intended nor permitted to be used as admissible evidence in a court of law
or any court filing,” and that users “must conduct further research and
investigation to verify the accuracy of any search result.”
II.
Plaintiffs filed their complaint in April 2021, describing themselves as
“two community-based organizations and four political activists,” among
them immigrants, “who have engaged in political speech critical of the police,
ICE, and immigration policy in both their personal and professional
capacities.” In their first cause of action, for common law appropriation of
likeness, plaintiffs allege that Clearview “knowingly and surreptitiously
collected Plaintiffs’ and Plaintiffs’ members’ names, photographs, biometric
information, and other identifiers . . . by scraping images from websites in
violation of many of the websites’ policies prohibiting such conduct,” and used
those things “to its advantage by copying them, saving them, and selling
access to them to private and government entities worldwide.”
In their second cause of action, for invasion of privacy under the state
constitution, plaintiffs allege that they have a reasonable expectation of
privacy in their names, photographs, biometric information, and other
identifiers, and have legally protected interests in preventing unwanted
access to their data and in conducting personal activities without
observation. The violation is “serious and highly offensive” because
Clearview’s conduct is surreptitious, in violation of websites’ terms of service
and cease-and-desist letters from the websites; because biometric information
is based on immutable physical characteristics, so that once it is entered into
the database, “that individual permanently loses anonymity and privacy”;
and because the violation places plaintiffs’ and plaintiffs’ members’ “lives and
livelihood[s] in danger, both from being misidentified to law-enforcement and
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immigration agencies and from being correctly identified and targeted for
retaliation for their public political stances.”
In their final cause of action against Clearview, plaintiffs allege that
the company engages in unlawful and unfair business practices because its
conduct violates the constitutional right to privacy, Penal Code section 502
(unauthorized access to computers, computer systems, and computer data),
the common law right against appropriation of likeness, and the terms of use
of the websites where Clearview scraped the data. They allege that they lost
money or property as a result of the wrongful conduct because Clearview “has
deprived them of the opportunity to profit by licensing” the use of their
likenesses and because they have “expended resources in understanding the
extent of Clearview’s misappropriation of their identities, images, likenesses,
and biometric data.”
The complaint seeks both injunctive relief and compensatory damages.
III.
After unsuccessfully attempting to remove the action to federal court
and transfer it to multidistrict litigation pending in Illinois, Clearview
responded to the complaint with a motion to strike under the anti-SLAPP
statute. (§ 425.16.) It argued that its “creation and use of its app” is
protected speech under the First Amendment, and that its delivery of search
results in connection with potential criminal investigations is protected under
subdivision (e)(2) of section 425.16 as a statement made in connection with an
official proceeding, or under subdivision (e)(4) as speech concerning an issue
of public interest. It further argued that plaintiffs cannot demonstrate a
probability of prevailing on their claims. The trial court found good cause to
permit plaintiffs to take limited discovery, and plaintiffs thereafter opposed
the motion.

5
In denying the motion, the court concluded that Clearview had not
carried its burden to show that plaintiffs’ claims arose from protected
activity. With respect to subdivision (e)(2) of section 425.16, the court found
that Clearview’s sale of information was “not for the purpose of supporting
the deliberation of a government body on an issue under consideration or
review,” and that it “would be a stretch to describe the police investigation of
each and every discrete crime as the ‘consideration or review’ of a matter by a
government entity.” In the court’s view, Clearview was simply selling “a law
enforcement tool” analogous to the sale of “cars, uniforms, and computer
systems to law enforcement.” With respect to subdivision (e)(4), the court
found that “the biometric analysis and maintenance of the database is not
‘speech,’ ” nor “an action ‘in connection with a public issue or an issue of
public interest.’ ” The court observed that, while crime is a public issue, “that
does not mean that any sale of any good or service to law enforcement is a
contribution to the public discussion about matters such as high crime rates,
the appropriate role of the police in providing social services, or
discriminatory enforcement of the law.” The court also concluded that “the
sale of the biometric data is not protected by the First Amendment,”
explaining that a person “does not have a first Amendment right to
appropriate a photograph or likeness of another person and then use it for a
profit-making business. This is not a situation where a bystander shows a
police officer a photograph taken on a phone of a suspect who was caught
fleeing from a crime scene. This is a business that is based on aggregating
and analyzing photographs of California residents and then selling the data
related to those images.” Having found that plaintiffs’ claims were not based
on protected activity, the court did not analyze whether plaintiffs had
established a probability of prevailing.

6
Clearview filed a timely notice of appeal.
DISCUSSION
I.
The anti-SLAPP statute authorizes a special motion to strike causes of
action arising from any act “in furtherance of the person’s right of petition or
free speech under the United States Constitution or the California
Constitution in connection with a public issue.” (§ 425.16, subd. (b)(1).) The
purpose of the law is “to protect against ‘lawsuits brought primarily to chill’
the exercise of speech and petition rights.” (FilmOn.com Inc. v. DoubleVerify
Inc. (2019) 7 Cal.5th 133, 143 (FilmOn).) It seeks to accomplish this purpose
by “allow[ing] defendants to request early judicial screening of legal claims
targeting free speech or petitioning activities.” (Wilson v. Cable News
Network, Inc. (2019) 7 Cal.5th 871, 880–881.) We review the trial court’s
order granting or denying an anti-SLAPP motion de novo. (Flatley v. Mauro
(2006) 39 Cal.4th 299, 325.)
Resolution of an anti-SLAPP motion proceeds in two steps. First, the
moving defendant must establish that the challenged claims arise from
activity protected by the statute. (Baral v. Schnitt (2016) 1 Cal.5th 376, 384
(Baral).) Second, for each claim based on protected activity, the plaintiff
must show that the claim has at least minimal merit. (Bonni v. St. Joseph
Health System (2021) 11 Cal.5th 995, 1009.)
When determining whether conduct is protected under the anti-SLAPP
statute, we “look not to First Amendment law, but to the statutory definitions
in section 425.16, subdivision (e).” (City of Montebello v. Vasquez (2016)
1 Cal.5th 409, 422.) The moving defendant must “demonstrate that the
defendant’s conduct by which plaintiff claims to have been injured falls within
one of the four categories described” in that subdivision. (Park v. Board of
Trustees of California State University (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1057, 1063 (Park).)
7
To evaluate whether allegedly protected conduct gives rise to a particular
claim, “courts should consider the elements of the challenged claim and what
actions by the defendant supply those elements and consequently form the
basis for liability.” (Park, at p. 1063.) “Allegations of protected activity that
merely provide context, without supporting a claim for recovery, cannot be
stricken under the anti-SLAPP statute.” (Baral, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 394.)
II.
Before we come to the two-step analysis, plaintiffs ask us to find that
their lawsuit falls under the public interest exception to the anti-SLAPP law.
(§ 425.17, subd. (b).) We would resolve that issue first if it were properly
before us, because the applicability of the exception would mean that there
was no legal basis for Clearview’s motion. (Takhar v. People ex rel. Feather
River Air Quality Management Dist. (2018) 27 Cal.App.5th 15, 24;
Tourgeman v. Nelson & Kennard (2014) 222 Cal.App.4th 1447, 1460.) But as
plaintiffs acknowledge, they did not raise the public interest exception in the
trial court, and we generally do not consider arguments or theories raised for
the first time on appeal. (Cordoba Corp. v. City of Industry (2023)
87 Cal.App.5th 145, 154.) While we may exercise our discretion to address a
new issue of law based on undisputed facts (Sheller v. Superior Court (2008)
158 Cal.App.4th 1697, 1709), plaintiffs have offered no explanation for their
failure to raise the argument before now.
Without deciding the question, we note that plaintiffs’ argument faces
an apparent difficulty. Among other requirements, the public interest
exception applies only if “[t]he plaintiff does not seek any relief greater than
or different from the relief sought for the general public or a class of which
the plaintiff is a member.” (§ 425.17, subd. (b)(1).) In their complaint,
however, plaintiffs seek not only injunctive relief but also compensatory
damages. They argue that in Batis v. Dun & Bradstreet Holdings, Inc. (9th
8
Cir. 2024) 106 F.4th 932, the court found the public exception applicable even
though the plaintiff was seeking damages. (Id. at pp. 936–937.) But Batis
was a putative class action. The plaintiff “requested all relief on behalf of all
members of the alleged class,” and the court found only that it did not matter
“whether all class members are likely to ultimately establish entitlement to
all forms of requested relief, as long as nothing in the complaint inherently
precludes them from doing so.” (Id. at p. 937.) Plaintiffs here do not seek to
represent a class, and there is nothing in the complaint that would make it
possible for members of the public to recover damages in this action. At a
minimum, this apparent problem may have led plaintiffs to decide against
raising the argument initially. In this context, we decline to excuse plaintiffs’
forfeiture.
III.
We turn, then, to the first step of the anti-SLAPP analysis—whether
plaintiffs’ claims are based on Clearview’s protected activity. On appeal,
Clearview renews its arguments that its conduct is protected under
subdivisions (e)(2) and (e)(4) of section 425.16. In this section, we take up
Clearview’s argument that the app’s delivery of images of potentially
matching faces and the associated webpage URLs in response to a probe
image uploaded by a law enforcement agency is protected as a statement “in
connection with an issue under consideration or review” by an “executive . . .
body” or by “any other official proceeding authorized by law.” (§ 425.16,
subd. (e)(2).)2

2 Clearview focuses primarily on the reference to “any other official

proceeding authorized by law” and does not develop any argument that a
police investigation amounts to the consideration or review of an issue by an
executive body. In the trial court, Clearview pointed only to the “official
proceeding” prong.
9
To begin with, plaintiffs dispute that their claims seek to hold
Clearview liable for supplying facial matches to law enforcement in criminal
investigations. They contend that their claims and injury “rest on
Clearview’s collection, analysis, and storage of their likenesses and
identifying information for profit,” regardless of who Clearview’s customers
are and the purposes for which they use its service. If all references to law
enforcement were excised from the complaint, they argue, the claims asserted
against Clearview would remain exactly the same. (See Park, supra,
2 Cal.5th at p. 1068 [plaintiff “ ‘could have omitted allegations regarding
communicative acts of filing a grievance and still state the same claims’ ”];
Manlin v. Milner (2022) 82 Cal.App.5th 1004, 1020.)
It is Clearview’s burden to demonstrate that the activity it claims is
protected “supplies one or more elements of a plaintiff’s claims.” (Wilson,
supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 887; see Littlefield v. Littlefield (2024) 106 Cal.App.5th
815, 826–827.) Yet Clearview fails in its opening brief to identify the
elements of plaintiffs’ claims and show how its furnishing of information to
law enforcement agencies supplies one or more of those elements. Arguments
not raised in the opening brief are forfeited. (People v. Clark (2016)
63 Cal.4th 522, 552; Dameron Hospital Assn. v. AAA Northern California,
Nevada & Utah Ins. Exchange (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 971, 982.) Moreover,
Clearview’s principal argument on the point in its reply brief is that the
complaint “repeatedly states that [plaintiffs’] motivation in bringing this suit
is to prevent Clearview from speaking to law enforcement, in particular U.S.
Immigration and Customs Enforcement.” Plaintiffs’ motivation for filing suit
is not the relevant inquiry. (City of Cotati v. Cashman (2002) 29 Cal.4th 69,
78.) Not all people who believe themselves to be a victim of a tort respond
with a lawsuit, and the considerations that lead them do so in a given case

10
may not overlap with the elements of the cause of action. (See Park, supra,
2 Cal.5th at p. 1064.)
Instead of showing how the furnishing of images to law enforcement
supplies an element of plaintiffs’ claims, Clearview’s opening brief argued
that claims targeting its creation and maintenance of the database are proper
subjects of an anti-SLAPP motion because Clearview cannot offer its facial
recognition service without the database. But Clearview has not identified
any authority holding that an anti-SLAPP motion lies against claims
challenging unprotected activity if the activity is a precursor to subsequent
conduct that is protected under subdivision (e)(2). In its opening brief, it
cited Buehrle v. City of Key West (11th Cir. 2015) 813 F.3d 973, which held
that both the act of tattooing and the wearing of a tattoo are protected by the
First Amendment. The analogy is not entirely on point—the court found that
the practice of tattooing is itself expressive conduct, and thus not protected
simply as a necessary precursor to wearing a tattoo (Buehrle, at p. 978)—and
in any event, it ignores the rule that protected status is determined by the
definitions in the anti-SLAPP statute rather than by First Amendment law.
(City of Montebello v. Vasquez, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 422.) In its reply brief,
Clearview cites Iloh v. Regents of University of California (2023)
94 Cal.App.5th 947, 959 and Ojjeh v. Brown (2019) 43 Cal.App.5th 1027,
1041, but those cases were applying subdivision (e)(4) of section 425.16, not
subdivision (e)(2). Subdivision (e)(4) is broader than the other subdivisions
insofar as it reaches conduct “in furtherance of ” the right of petition or of free
speech, but it is narrower insofar as it requires the moving party to show that
the speech the conduct furthers is in connection with an issue of public
interest. As we discuss in the next section, Clearview fails to make that

11
showing. We decline to expand subdivision (e)(2) beyond its plain language
as Clearview would have us do.
Because Clearview has forfeited any argument that its communications
with law enforcement supply one or more elements of plaintiffs’ claims, we
need not decide the applicability of subdivision (e)(2) on the merits. We find
inapposite, however, Clearview’s reliance solely on cases involving
communications with law enforcement about a potential violation of the law,
which held such communications protected by analogizing to the scope of the
litigation privilege. (See Dickens v. Provident Life & Accidents Ins. Co. (2004)
117 Cal.App.4th 705, 714–715; Dove Audio, Inc. v. Rosenfeld, Meyer &
Susman (1996) 47 Cal.App.4th 777, 784.)3 “ ‘[T]he purpose of [section
425.16,] subdivision (e)(1) and (2) is essentially to protect the activity of
petitioning the government for redress of grievances and petition-related
statements and writings.’ ” (Doe v. Ledor (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 731, 743
(Doe).) Unlike the cases on which it relies, Clearview is neither reporting a
crime nor asking the government to do anything. It does not articulate any
particular interest in being heard. For these reasons, were we to reach the
merits, we would find that Clearview’s furnishing of photos and webpage
URLs to government entities that subscribe to its service does not qualify for
protection under subdivision (e)(2) of section 425.16. (See FilmOn, supra,
7 Cal.5th at p. 144 [“we interpret statutory language within its context, and

3 Clearview also cites Anders v. Cuevas (6th Cir. 2021) 984 F.3d 1166,

1185 for the proposition that “[c]ooperation with law enforcement—even for a
discreet investigation—is constitutionally protected activity,” but that case
does not concern the reach of the anti-SLAPP law and also involved a report
of suspected unlawful conduct: The owner of a towing company identified to
an internal affairs investigator state troopers to whom he had given tickets to
sporting events. (Id. at p. 1171.)
12
in light of its structure, analogous provisions, and any other appropriate
indicia of its purpose”].)
IV.

We consider next Clearview’s argument that its activities in creating
and maintaining its database are protected as “any other conduct in
furtherance of the exercise of the constitutional right of petition or the
constitutional right of free speech in connection with a public issue or an
issue of public interest.” (§ 425.16, subd. (e)(4).)
A.

For the purposes of analyzing the applicability of this subdivision, the
parties agree that plaintiffs’ claims are based on Clearview’s creation and
maintenance of its database, disagreeing only about whether those activities
qualify for protection. Plaintiffs cite a federal decision in related
multidistrict litigation holding that, while capturing publicly available
photographs from the internet may be considered speech, Clearview’s
harvesting of an individual’s unique (and nonpublic) biometric data is not.
(In re Clearview AI, Inc., Consumer Privacy Litig. (N.D.Ill. 2022)
585 F.Supp.3d 1111, 1120.) As noted above, however, subdivision (e)(4) of
section 425.16 protects conduct “in furtherance” of the right of free speech, so
Clearview does not have to show that the conduct giving rise to plaintiffs’
claims is itself speech. (Bonni v. St. Joseph Health System, supra, 11 Cal.5th
at p. 1020.) For example, in Ross v. Seyfarth Shaw LLP (2023)
96 Cal.App.5th 722, the court held that subdivision (e)(4) of section 425.16
protected not only a report to officials at a public university but also the
defendants’ “noncommunicative investigative conduct” that furthered the
report’s preparation. (Id. at p. 739.)

13
Plaintiffs do not appear to dispute that the app’s delivery of search
results to law enforcement agencies can be considered an exercise of
Clearview’s right of free speech, but they argue that “incidental speech at the
endpoint of the process for some customers is a tail that cannot wag the dog
of Clearview’s unlawful biometric harvesting and maintenance conduct.”
They point to the Supreme Court’s statement that “a claim may be struck
only if the speech or petitioning activity itself is the wrong complained of, and
not just evidence of liability or a step leading to some different act for which
liability is asserted.” (Park, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 1060.) But Park involved a
different scenario: The court found that the plaintiff’s claims were based on a
later unprotected act (the denial of tenure) and not on the precursor acts of
alleged protected activity (the deliberations that led to the tenure decision).
(Park, supra, 2 Cal.5th at pp. 1067–1071.) Here, plaintiffs’ claims are based
on activities that are necessary precursors to Clearview’s speech (i.e., the
app’s delivery of search results). As Park elsewhere explained, “ ‘the
defendant’s act underlying the plaintiff’s cause of action must itself have been
an act in furtherance of the right of petition or free speech.’ ” (Id. at p. 1063.)
Here, plaintiffs’ claims arise from Clearview’s “act” of creating and
maintaining its database, and that act is “in furtherance of ” its right of free
speech. In this context, we disagree with plaintiffs’ characterization of
Clearview’s speech as “incidental” to the database. Without the ability to sell
search results, Clearview would have no reason to create the database in the
first place.
B.
Having concluded that plaintiffs’ claims arise from conduct in
furtherance of Clearview’s exercise of its right to free speech, we must next
analyze whether the app’s delivery of photos and webpage URLs to law
enforcement agencies constitutes speech “in connection with a public issue or
14
an issue of public interest.” (§ 425.16, subd. (e)(4).) The parties agree that
the resolution of that issue requires us to apply the two-part test in FilmOn,
supra, 7 Cal.5th 133. “First, we ask what ‘public issue or . . . issue of public
interest’ the speech in question implicates—a question we answer by looking
to the content of the speech. [Citation.] Second, we ask what functional
relationship exists between the speech and the public conversation about
some matter of public interest.” (Id. at pp. 149–150.)
Answering the first question, Clearview proposes that its
communications implicate the “public interest in identifying, locating, and
apprehending suspected criminals, victims, and persons of interest.”
Plaintiffs point out that not every crime is the subject of widespread public
attention (see Anderson v. Geist (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 79, 87), but we do not
understand Clearview’s position to depend on the notoriety of any particular
crime or the degree of interest in the progress of any particular investigation
(which may be conducted confidentially). It is fair to say that the public
generally has an interest in the identification and apprehension of people
who are suspected of criminal activity, including crimes that are minor or
otherwise do not receive significant notice. Beyond the harm to any
individual victims, crimes are offenses committed against the public (People
v. Hall (1933) 133 Cal.App. 40, 45), and society has an “interest in seeing that
criminals are properly punished” (In re Saul S. (1985) 167 Cal.App.3d 1061,
1067). In our view, the public has a sufficient interest in the identification of
individuals who are suspected of committing crimes, or of witnesses who may
be able to help the police solve them, to satisfy FilmOn’s first step.
To answer FilmOn’s second question, we must address “the specific
nature of defendant’s speech and its relationship to the matters of public
interest.” (FilmOn, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 152.) We consider the context,

15
“including audience, speaker, and purpose.” (Id. at pp. 151–152.) To begin
with, Clearview is a for-profit corporation, and whatever investigative
purposes its government customers may have, Clearview’s purpose in offering
a facial recognition service is a commercial one, with its customer base
defined by a consent judgment entered in the settlement of litigation.
Moreover, Clearview delivers its search results in confidence, expressly
prohibiting any public disclosure of them, including later use in court. These
factors weigh against a conclusion that its speech is in connection with an
issue of public interest. (See, e.g., id. at p. 153 [reports issued to paying
clients that were not intended to enter the public sphere were not protected];
Doe, supra, 97 Cal.App.5th at p. 747 [no evidence that sender of emails
intended them to reach the public sphere or that they did reach it].) But
while these considerations are relevant, they are not dispositive. (FilmOn,
supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 148.) Unlike cases in which the statements are
intended only for the recipient’s private use, here law enforcement agencies
use the information Clearview supplies for a purpose that serves a public
interest—the potential identification of individuals who are suspected of
committing crimes or who may have information that could assist the law
enforcement agency in solving them.
As the court wrote in FilmOn, however, “[w]e are not concerned with
the social utility of the speech at issue, or the degree to which it propelled the
conversation in any particular direction; rather, we examine whether a
defendant—through public or private speech or conduct—participated in, or
furthered, the discourse that makes an issue one of public interest.”
(FilmOn, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 151.) As a tool that can potentially assist law
enforcement agencies in solving crimes, Clearview’s app may have social
utility, but that fact alone does not make it a contribution to public discourse

16
or mean that the search results convey an opinion or viewpoint on a public
issue. (See Geiser v. Kuhns (2022) 13 Cal.5th 1238, 1255 [defendants’
conduct was protected because it “furthered public discussion of the public
issues it implicated”]; Wilbanks v. Wolk (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 883, 898 [“the
statement must in some manner itself contribute to the public debate”].)
Even accepting Clearview’s contention that its app supplies information
(unlike the trial court’s examples of “cars, uniforms, and computer systems”),
Clearview identifies no authority to support a conclusion that every
informational input or datum that facilitates routine policework is, simply for
that reason, speech concerning a public issue within the meaning of
subdivision (e)(4) of section 425.16.
Again, Clearview does not know what investigation the government
entity is conducting. It cannot see the searches that are run on the app.
While data from the app may help law enforcement agencies identify
individuals who are of interest to them, Clearview does not purport to provide
substantive information about the people depicted in the search results,
including their connection to any possible crime. Combining these
considerations with Clearview’s commercial purpose and its prohibition on its
customers’ public disclosure of the app or its search results, we conclude that
Clearview is not engaged in speech in connection with a public issue or issue
of public interest under subdivision (e)(4) of section 425.16. In FilmOn’s
words, the confidential search results delivered by Clearview’s app “are too
tenuously tethered to the issues of public interest they implicate, and too
remotely connected to the public conversation about those issues, to merit
protection under the catchall provision.” (FilmOn, supra, 7 Cal.5th at
p. 140.)

17
V.
Because we conclude that Clearview failed to carry its burden at the
first step of the anti-SLAPP analysis, we have no reason to reach the second.
(Littlefield v. Littlefield, supra, 106 Cal.App.5th at p. 824.)
DISPOSITION
The order denying Clearview’s anti-SLAPP motion is affirmed.
Plaintiffs are entitled to recover their costs on appeal.
GOLDMAN, J.

WE CONCUR:

BROWN, P. J.
SIGGINS, J. *

* Retired Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeal, First Appellate District,

assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the
California Constitution.

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