In re A.K. CA1/5

CourtListener 10590043Calctapp22.05.2025

Gesamter Gesetzestext

Filed 5/22/25 In re A.K. CA1/5

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not
certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been
certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FIVE

In re A.K., a Person Coming Under
the Juvenile Court Law. A170918
HUMBOLDT COUNTY
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH & (Humboldt County
HUMAN SERVICES, Super. Ct. Nos. JV2300107,
Plaintiff and Respondent, JV2300108

v.
E.B.,
Defendant and Appellant.

Defendant E.B. appeals from the juvenile court’s orders denying his
postconviction petitions for access to juvenile records pursuant to Welfare
and Institutions Code1 section 827. E.B. was found guilty of attempted
murder, assault with a deadly weapon, and burglary following a jury trial in
2019. In People v. Battersby (Nov. 20, 2020, A159213) [nonpub. opn.]
(Battersby), we stayed E.B.’s conviction for burglary pursuant to Penal Code
section 654 but otherwise affirmed the judgment. He has since filed
numerous habeas petitions in different courts, claiming ineffective assistance

1 All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions

Code unless otherwise specified.

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of counsel and prosecutorial misconduct. In connection with one such
petition he filed below, E.B. sought access to certain juvenile records, arguing
that they contain information that “impeaches [a] key prosecution witness . . .
and proves [the witness] perjured himself at [E.B.’s] trial.” The trial court
denied E.B.’s request for an in camera review of those records and held that
he had not shown good cause for their release. We disagree and reverse.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Facts and Prior Appeal2
The following facts are taken from our opinion in Battersby:3 We have
only included those facts relevant to this appeal.
“A. People’s Case
“On December 2, 2016, victim [J.M.] met [L.L.], who allowed [J.M.] to
sleep on his living room couch. At approximately 11:30 p.m., [J.M.] went to
sleep. [¶] Around 5:00 a.m. on December 3, 2016, [J.M.] awoke, finding [E.B.]
with his arm on [J.M.’s] chest and a knife to [J.M.’s] throat. [E.B.]
threatened [J.M.]: ‘I'm going to kill you for what you've done to our family,
what you've put me through.’ ([E.B.] was dating [J.M.’s] daughter, [Ji.M.].)
“With his left hand, [J.M.] grabbed [E.B.’s] right hand, which was
holding the knife; and with his right hand, [J.M.] grabbed [E.B.’s] testicles.
[E.B.] tried to gouge [J.M.’s] eye out with his left hand. [J.M.] took the knife
from [E.B.] and ‘put [him] on the floor,’ where the two fought . . . [¶] [L.L.]
entered the living room, grabbed [J.M.], and asked [J.M.] what he was doing.
[J.M.] replied that [E.B.] was ‘that piece of shit that I've been telling you
about.’ [L.L.] let go of [J.M.], grabbed [E.B.], and kneed him in the face . . .

2 We deny respondent’s request for judicial notice of various “appellate

and writ matters” in other court files because the request was not made by
separate motion. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.252(a).)
3 The parties do not dispute the accuracy of this statement of facts.

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Eventually, [L.L.] and [J.M.] got off of [E.B.] and threw him out the front
door. [¶] [J.M.] sustained a cut extending from his Adam’s apple to his ear,
along with abrasions to his face, a swollen eye, a bloody nose, and multiple
lacerations.
“B. Defense Case
“[E.B.] testified that he first met [J.M.] when [J.M.] arrived
unannounced at his and [Ji.M.’s] house in December 2015. [J.M.] stayed for
less than a week on the couch. The next time [J.M.] visited was Father’s Day
2016, again unannounced, staying nearly a month. During this visit, [J.M.]
became aware that [E.B.] and [Ji.M.] were using heroin and confronted them
about it. According to [E.B.], [J.M.] was ‘very abusive, hostile and
threatening’ and threatened [E.B.’s] life more than once . . . .
“By [E.B.’s] account, in the morning hours of December 3, 2016, [he]
and [Ji.M.] purchased and injected heroin. Around 4:00 a.m., [E.B.] received
a phone call from [L.L.], his cocaine dealer, and made plans to go to [L.L.’s]
residence around 5:45 a.m. . . . [E.B.] drove to [L.L.’s] residence without
[Ji.M.]. When he got there, [E.B.] and his dog got out of the car, and [E.B.]
unleashed the dog inside a fenced area. [E.B.] followed [L.L.] to his bedroom,
where [L.L.] handed [him] an ‘eight ball’ bag of cocaine in exchange for $240
and a pound of pot. [E.B.] dumped some of the cocaine onto a mirror . . .
which [E.B.] and [L.L.] consumed.
“[E.B.] then heard his dog barking viciously in the front yard. He left
the room to check on the dog and saw a figure in front of the door. The
person asked, ‘Where is [Ji.M.]?’ [E.B.] recognized [J.M.’s] voice. [E.B.]
headed for the door and tried to get around [J.M.], but [J.M.] pushed [E.B.]
back. [E.B.] tried to get past [J.M.] again, but [J.M.] hit [E.B.] with a hard
object, knocking him to the floor. [J.M.] started beating [E.B.]. At least one

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other person, who sounded like [L.L.], beat him as well. [J.M.] said, ‘I'm
going to kill this junkie piece of shit.’ [E.B.] ran out the front door.
“C. People’s Rebuttal
“Deputy Luke Mathieson testified that he did not find controlled
substances in [L.L.’s] house, and no one in the house indicated there were
any. Nor did Mathieson find the $240 [E.B.] supposedly gave [L.L.].
“On the day of the incident, [E.B.] and [Ji.M.] had given Deputy
Mathieson a different account of what occurred. They claimed that [E.B.] had
gone to [L.L.’s] house to ask [J.M.] for [Ji.M.’s] hand in marriage. [E.B.]
knocked on the front door, and [J.M.] opened it. When [E.B.] asked [J.M.] for
[Ji.M.’s] hand in marriage, [J.M.] responded, ‘Hell no, junkie chomo’ and
‘jumped’ [E.B.], punching him repeatedly. However, the deputy examined
[J.M.’s] hands and did not see any wounds consistent with having punched
anyone.
“D. Verdict and Sentence
“The jury found [E.B.] guilty of attempted murder, assault with a
deadly weapon, and first degree burglary. [¶] The court sentenced [E.B.] to
prison for seven years to life on the attempted murder conviction. [Citation.]
The court also imposed a four-year term for assault with a deadly weapon . . .
and a six-year term for burglary . . . , ordering those terms to be served
concurrently with the indeterminate term. The term on the assault was
stayed pursuant to [Penal Code] section 654; the term on the burglary was
not.” (Battersby, supra, A159213.)
B. Petitions for Writ of Habeas Corpus
In May 2022, E.B. filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the
United States District Court for the Northern District of California,
challenging his state court convictions. The petition included claims of

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ineffective assistance of his trial and appellate counsel as well as the
“suppression of various exculpatory evidence by the prosecution.” In January
2023, the district court stayed this action at E.B.’s request so he could
“exhaust[] all claims in the state courts.”
Roughly one month later, E.B. filed another petition for writ of habeas
corpus in the trial court (subject petition). As relevant to this appeal, the
petition argued that E.B.’s trial counsel was ineffective in failing to obtain
exculpatory and impeachment evidence contained in juvenile records.
According to the petition, J.M. testified at trial that he had reported Ji.M.,
his daughter, and E.B., her boyfriend, to child welfare services (CWS). As a
result, his grandchildren, A.K. and C.K., were removed from Ji.M. and E.B.’s
home.4 The petition continued that the prosecution’s theory at trial was that
this report to CWS supplied the motive for E.B.’s attempted murder of J.M.
E.B. argued that information in the juvenile records would have shown that
the CWS report was made anonymously and that A.K. and C.K. were not
removed from Ji.M. and E.B.’s home, thereby impeaching J.M. The petition
further alleged that the prosecutor committed misconduct by suppressing this
Brady5 exculpatory evidence.
The following month, E.B. filed a petition for writ of mandamus in the
trial court, requesting that the prosecution fully comply with the court’s prior
order granting postconviction discovery under Penal Code section 1054.9 and
for a stay of the subject petition until the prosecution complied. The court
denied the petition on the grounds that the prosecution did not possess the
requested records and was not obligated to “rebuild [E.B.’s] case file.” The
court noted that the prosecution “has complied with the discovery requests

4 E.B. is not the father of A.K. or C.K.

5 Brady v. Maryland (1963) 373 U.S. 83.

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and represented . . . that it has provided all the records that it possesses.”
E.B. then filed several requests for an order to show cause and for a judgment
of contempt against the prosecution. He continued to request a stay of the
subject petition. The court denied these requests on the grounds that E.B.
presented no evidence that the prosecution violated the postconviction
discovery order and that he filed this request two years after the original
discovery order was issued.
In September 2022, the prosecution filed an informal response to the
subject petition, denying it had suppressed any evidence and arguing that
“[n]one of the requested [Brady] items were in [its] actual or constructive
possession.” The response further contended that the “[d]efense had equal
access to any of the requested materials in that they could have filed an 827
petition for CWS records.” E.B. requested several extensions to file his reply
brief, arguing that he needed additional time to enforce the postconviction
discovery order so he could properly reply to the prosecution’s response. The
trial court granted numerous extensions, the latest of which was until
September 26, 2023. E.B. thereafter attempted to file two further requests
for an extension, which were rejected by the court clerk. It is unclear
whether the court granted any further extensions.
C. Section 827 Petitions
In or around June 2023, E.B. filed two section 827 petitions—one
requesting access to A.K.’s juvenile records and the other requesting access to
C.K.’s records. In the petitions, E.B. contended that those records contained
information needed to support his ineffective assistance of counsel and Brady
violation claims in the subject petition. On July 28, 2023, the juvenile court
summarily denied the petitions, holding that E.B. failed to show “good cause
for the release of the requested records” and “has not met the notice

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requirements of rule 5.552(c) of the California Rules of Court.”6 The court
further found that the “[r]equest for records is overbroad or records sought
are insufficiently identified.”
E.B. filed a petition for writ of mandamus in this court, challenging the
juvenile court’s summary denials. We denied the petition because E.B. had
“not demonstrated the propriety of reviewing those orders by extraordinary
writ” and because the “challenged orders were appealable.” (Battersby v.
Superior Court, Oct. 26, 2023, A168934.) We noted that E.B. could also file “a
new section 827 petition that address[ed] the deficiencies outlined in the
[trial] court’s July 28, 2023 order” as another possible remedy.
Following our order denying the writ petition, E.B. filed two new
section 827 petitions, which requested, among other items, all documents
from CWS concerning (1) a complaint made by J.M. that “[A.K.] and [C.K.]
were subject to neglect and unsafe living conditions while living with” Ji.M.
and E.B., and (2) the investigation of the complaint, including “that there was
no conclusive evidence of abuse, neglect, or unsafe living conditions found”
and that A.K. and C.K. were not removed from their home. He further
sought records “demonstrating that the complaint was reported to [Ji.M. and
E.B.] as an anonymous complaint.” E.B. reiterated that this information
would impeach J.M.’s testimony and destroy the prosecution’s theory on
motive.
Respondent Humboldt County Department of Health & Human
Services (Department) objected, arguing that while E.B.’s new requests were
narrower than his previous requests, they were still vague and overly broad.
The Department further argued that access to these records “would result in
an unwarranted invasion of the children’s privacy” and that “an in camera

6 Further references to rules are to the California Rules of Court.

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review . . . would be a waste of judicial resources as [E.B.] is not entitled to
the records.”
On May 10, 2024, the juvenile court again summarily denied the
section 827 petitions without an in camera review on the ground that “[E.B.]
has not shown good cause for the release of the requested records.” E.B. filed
a notice of appeal that was received by the court on July 11, 2024.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Timeliness of Appeal
The Department initially contends that E.B.’s appeal may not be timely
because his notice of appeal was filed on July 11, 2024—62 days after the
juvenile court denied his section 827 petitions. We are unpersuaded.
Generally, “a notice of appeal must be filed within 60 days after the
rendition of the judgment or the making of the order being appealed.”
(Rule 8.406(a)(1).) However, if a notice of appeal is mailed for filing by an
inmate, it is deemed timely if “the envelope shows that the document was
mailed or delivered to custodial officials for mailing within the period for
filing the document.” (Rule 8.25(b)(5).) Here, the proof of service for E.B.’s
notice of appeal shows that it was mailed within the 60-day period on July 9,
2024. The Department counters that there is a discrepancy as to when the
notice was mailed because the date stamp on the accompanying envelope
appears to read July 10, 2024. But it is well established, with respect to the
filing of a notice of appeal, that any “[d]oubts should be resolved in favor of
the right to appeal.” (People v. Tucker (1964) 61 Cal.2d 828, 832.) Indeed,
the jail may not have processed E.B.’s notice of appeal for mailing until July
10 even though E.B. gave it to jail staff on July 9. We therefore find E.B.’s
appeal timely.

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B. Section 827 Petitions
Turning to the merits, E.B. contends that the juvenile court erred in
denying his section 827 petitions without conducting an in camera review of
the requested juvenile records for Brady exculpatory and impeachment
evidence. We agree.
1. Law and Standard
“To comply with Brady constitutional due process requirements, the
prosecution must disclose exculpatory and impeachment evidence that is
favorable to the accused and material on the issue of guilt or punishment.”
(J.E. v. Superior Court (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 1329, 1334 (J.E.).)
“[E]xculpatory evidence is evidence that tends to exonerate the defendant
from guilt” while impeachment evidence is evidence “that might undermine
a prosecution witness’s credibility.” (Id. at p. 1335.) “Although the
government’s Brady obligations are typically placed upon the prosecutor, the
courts have recognized that the Brady requirements can also be satisfied
when a trial court conducts an in camera review of documents containing
possible exculpatory or impeachment evidence.” (J.E., at p. 1336.)
Section 827, subdivision (a)(1)(Q) governs access to confidential juvenile
records and permits an unauthorized person to petition the juvenile court for
access to these records. “The court must review the petition and, if
petitioner does not show good cause, deny it summarily.” (Rule 5.552(d)(1).)
“If petitioner shows good cause, the court may set a hearing.”
(Rule 5.552(d)(2).) But regardless of whether a hearing is set, “if the court
determines that there may be information or documents in the records
sought to which the petitioner may be entitled, the juvenile court . . . must
conduct an in camera review of the juvenile case file and any objections and
assume that all legal claims of privilege are asserted.” (Rule 5.552(d)(3),

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italics added.) In determining whether to authorize disclosure, the court
“must balance the interests of the child . . . , the interests of the petitioner,
and the interests of the public” (rule 5.552(d)(4)) and may permit access
“only insofar as is necessary, and only if petitioner shows by a
preponderance of the evidence that the records requested are necessary and
have substantial relevance to the legitimate need of the petitioner” (rule
5.552(d)(6)).
“Generally, a juvenile court has broad and exclusive authority to
determine whether and to what extent to grant access to confidential
juvenile records pursuant to section 827.” (In re Elijah S. (2005)
125 Cal.App.4th 1532, 1541.) We review the juvenile court’s order for abuse
of discretion. (Ibid.)
2. Analysis
In support of his section 827 petitions, E.B. argues that there is
evidence in the requested juvenile records that would have discredited J.M.’s
trial testimony and weakened the prosecution’s theory regarding E.B.’s
motive for attempting to murder J.M.7 Specifically, he contends the
requested records contain evidence that, consistent with his testimony and
contrary to J.M.’s trial testimony, J.M.’s CWS report was anonymous, his
report was determined to be unfounded, and the children were never
removed from Ji.M. and E.B.’s home. E.B. further explains that this
impeachment evidence supports his pending petition for habeas relief based
on ineffective assistance of counsel and Brady violations. On their face,
E.B.’s section 827 petitions appear to allege facts sufficient to establish that

7 Although E.B. further argued that the prosecution failed to provide

him these files pursuant to the trial court’s postconviction discovery order, we
note that the prosecution was prohibited from doing so absent approval by
the juvenile court. (§ 827, subd. (a)(4).)

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the records may contain information to which he is entitled, and that the
juvenile court should have conducted an in camera review of those records
before ruling on these petitions. (Rule 5.552(d)(3).) Indeed, “in camera
review under section 827 is a proper mechanism to resolve a defense Brady
disclosure request involving information in a juvenile file.” (J.E., supra, 223
Cal.App.4th at p. 1338.)
The Department counters that the juvenile court could have concluded
that E.B. failed to show good cause for the release of the juvenile records for
many reasons. We are unpersuaded, noting that the court never explained
why it declined to conduct an in camera review.
The Department first argues that the juvenile court could have found
“that the information and exhibits submitted by E.B. were incomplete and/or
inadequate” because E.B. did not attach the full subject petition with all
supporting exhibits and only provided select excerpts from the trial
transcripts in his underlying criminal case. But the documents E.B. did
submit in support of his section 827 petitions made clear that he had a
pending habeas petition that alleged claims of ineffective assistance of
counsel and Brady violations based on the alleged suppression of evidence.
Those documents also established that the prosecution’s theory at trial was
that E.B. attempted to murder J.M. because J.M. reported him and Ji.M. to
CWS and tried to get CWS to remove A.K. and C.K. from their home. E.B.
denied this and testified at trial that the CWS complaint was made
anonymously. Thus, documents in the juvenile records regarding the
anonymity of the CWS complainant; what, if anything, CWS told Ji.M and
E.B. about that complainant; and whether CWS removed any children from
Ji.M. and E.B.’s home, could provide exculpatory and impeachment
evidence.

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The Department next argues that the juvenile court could have found
that the records were not “necessary” or did not “have substantial relevance
to the legitimate need of [E.B.]” because he presented no evidence of a Brady
violation. (Rule 5.552(d)(6).) But as E.B. points out, this argument “puts the
cart before the horse.” Indeed, E.B. requested access to the juvenile records
in order to support the claim in his habeas petition that a Brady violation
occurred. In any event, the juvenile court is obligated to conduct an in
camera review if “there may be information or documents . . . to which [E.B.]
may be entitled.” (Rule 5.552(d)(3), italics added.)
The Department also contends that the juvenile court could have
concluded that the information sought by E.B. was redundant or extraneous
because E.B. already testified at trial that the CWS complaint was made
anonymously and that A.K. and C.K. were not removed from their home by
CWS. E.B.’s and J.M.’s accounts of what occurred during the night of the
attempted murder were quite different, and the jury necessarily found J.M.,
the key witness at E.B’s trial, more credible in finding E.B. guilty of
attempted murder. Evidence corroborating E.B.’s testimony and, in turn,
undermining J.M.’s credibility with respect to the CWS report and CWS’s
actions in response to that report constitutes impeachment evidence,
regardless of whether it is “redundant” of E.B.’s testimony. (J.E., supra,
223 Cal.App.4th at p. 1335.)
The Department further asserts that the juvenile court could have
determined there was no “legitimate need” for the requested records because
the prosecution did not contradict or attack E.B.’s testimony during trial.
But J.M., the prosecution’s primary witness at trial, did contradict E.B.’s
testimony. Moreover, the prosecution did question E.B.’s testimony. In the
trial excerpts provided by E.B., the prosecution questioned E.B. about CWS

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removing the children from his and Ji.M.’s home and E.B.’s attempt to kill
J.M. after J.M. made his report to CWS. The prosecution also argued during
closing that “[J.M.] reported [Ji.M. and E.B.] to [CWS] and that made them
upset . . . [E.B.] entered to try to kill [J.M.]. He said, ‘I’m going to kill you for
what you did to us.’ ”
Lastly, the Department argues that the juvenile court could have
determined that two of the cases cited by E.B. below, J.E., supra,
223 Cal.App.4th 1329 and In re Jenkins (2023) 14 Cal.5th 493, were
factually distinguishable. We are again unpersuaded and do not see how
those distinctions, if the court even drew them, would justify the court’s
failure to conduct an in camera review. For example, the Department
highlights that in J.E., the request for juvenile records occurred “while the
criminal trial was pending, and not in connection with a habeas corpus
petition.” But our high court in Jenkins acknowledged that section 827 is
the proper procedure for accessing juvenile records necessary to support a
habeas petition alleging Brady violations. (Jenkins, at p. 526.) Nor does the
fact that the juvenile records in Jenkins “belonged to the victim and key
witness” have any bearing on whether the juvenile court was obligated to
conduct an in camera review in this case. That the records here belong to
third parties (A.K. and C.K.) does not change the fact that they contain
potentially exculpatory or impeachment evidence to which E.B. may be
entitled.
III. DISPOSITION
The May 10, 2024 orders denying E.B.’s section 827 petitions are
reversed, and the juvenile court is directed on remand to conduct an in
camera review of the requested juvenile records. We take no position on
whether the petitions should ultimately be granted.

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CHOU, J.

WE CONCUR:

SIMONS, ACTING P. J.

BURNS, J.

A170918
In re A.K.

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