CourtListener 10590040•People v. Camacho CA4/1
Gesamter Gesetzestext
Filed 5/22/25 P. v. Camacho CA4/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or
ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.
COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THE PEOPLE, D084023
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v. (Super. Ct. No. SWF2201671)
JOSE CAMACHO,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Riverside County,
Randolph Rogers, Judge. Affirmed as modified.
Marta I. Stanton, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Eric A.
Swenson and Heather M. Clark, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
I. INTRODUCTION
During a vehicle check, defendant Jose Camacho misidentified himself
to a sheriff’s deputy and dropped a loaded handgun magazine before running
from the deputy. Defendant was apprehended and a search of the vehicle
yielded an unloaded handgun tucked in defendant’s belongings. A jury
convicted defendant of possession of a firearm by a felon (Pen. Code,1
§ 29800, subd. (a)(1)), unlawful possession of ammunition (§ 30305,
subd. (a)(1)), presenting false identification to a peace officer (§ 148.9,
subd. (a)), and resisting arrest (§ 148, subd. (a)(1)). The trial court found
defendant had suffered a prior strike conviction.2 The court sentenced
defendant to 2 years 8 months on the firearm conviction (the low term of
16 months, doubled for the strike prior) and concurrent sentences on the
remaining convictions.
On appeal, defendant contends the trial court erred by denying his
motion to dismiss his strike prior in the interests of justice under People v.
Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497 (Romero) and section 1385.3
For reasons we will explain, we conclude the trial court acted within its
discretion in denying defendant’s Romero motion.
Defendant also contends the trial court erred by imposing a concurrent
sentence on the ammunition conviction instead of staying it under
section 654 as duplicative of the sentence on the firearm conviction. The
1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2 “We use the term ‘strike’ to describe a prior felony conviction that
qualifies a defendant for the increased punishment specified in the Three
Strikes law.” (People v. Fuhrman (1997) 16 Cal.4th 930, 932, fn. 2; see
§§ 667, 1170.12.)
3 Section 1385, subdivision (a) provides in part that a “judge or
magistrate may, either on motion of the court or upon the application of the
prosecuting attorney, and in furtherance of justice, order an action to be
dismissed.” “A Romero ‘motion’ is in fact a request that the court exercise its
authority under section 1385 to strike a prior felony conviction.” (People v.
Lee (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 124, 126, fn. 2, italics omitted.)
2
People concede the error. We agree that the sentence on defendant’s
ammunition conviction should be stayed under section 654, and modify the
judgment accordingly.
As so modified, the judgment is affirmed.
II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. Factual Background
On the morning of September 27, 2022, Riverside County Sheriff’s
Deputy Michael Pohlman observed two occupants in an SUV parked on a
dead-end street near a school. The deputy approached and requested the
occupants’ identification. The driver, Holly W., presented her driver’s license.
The passenger — defendant — told the deputy he had no identification but
that his name was “Javier Camacho” and his date of birth was June 7, 1970.
The deputy ran Holly’s and defendant’s information through the computer in
his patrol vehicle. The car in which the deputy saw Holly and defendant
belonged to Holly, its registration was expired, her driver’s license was
suspended, and she had an outstanding misdemeanor warrant. The name
and birthdate that defendant provided did not yield any exact matches, but
the name came back as an alias for Jose Camacho, whose actual birthdate is
June 27, 1972 (instead of June 7, 1970). Deputy Pohlman retrieved
additional records and saw a booking photograph that matched defendant.
The records revealed that defendant was on an active parole grant. Based on
defendant’s misidentification of himself and his parole status, Deputy
Pohlman radioed for backup.
Deputy Pohlman reapproached the SUV and asked defendant for his
name and birthdate again. Defendant provided the same false information as
before. Holly appeared calm but defendant appeared nervous. The deputy
3
asked defendant if he had ever been arrested and defendant responded, “not
that [I] kn[o]w of.” Deputy Pohlman asked defendant to exit the SUV and
defendant complied.
Outside the SUV, Deputy Pohlman instructed defendant to hold his
hands behind his back for a pat search for weapons. As defendant did so, the
deputy saw a loaded firearm magazine in defendant’s right hand. Defendant
dropped the magazine and Deputy Pohlman began to handcuff him. As the
deputy did so, defendant ran. The deputy gave chase and ultimately took
defendant to the ground near a childcare center. Defendant initially refused
to take his right arm out from under his body, which caused the deputy to be
concerned that defendant was armed. The deputy eventually handcuffed
defendant and placed him in a patrol vehicle.
Deputy Pohlman and another responding deputy searched the SUV.
After searching for a few minutes, the other deputy found a backpack in the
SUV’s cargo area that contained an unloaded Ruger semiautomatic handgun
and male clothing. The handgun’s magazine well was empty. Deputy
Pohlman confirmed that the magazine defendant dropped fit into the
handgun’s magazine well. The magazine contained six rounds.
The parties stipulated that defendant was previously convicted of a
felony.
B. Procedural Background
Defendant was charged with one count each of possession of a firearm
by a felon (§ 29800, subd. (a)(1); count 1), unlawful possession of ammunition
(§ 30305, subd. (a)(1); count 2), presenting false identification to a peace
officer (§ 148.9, subd. (a); count 3), and resisting arrest (§ 148, subd. (a)(1);
count 4). The charging document alleged defendant had suffered a prior
strike conviction in March 2021 for making a criminal threat (§ 422).
4
A jury found defendant guilty on all counts and the trial court found
that defendant had suffered a prior strike conviction. The court denied
defendant’s Romero motion to dismiss the prior strike conviction.
The trial court sentenced defendant on the firearm charge to 2 years
8 months in prison, consisting of the low term of 16 months, doubled for the
prior strike conviction. The court imposed the same sentence, to be served
concurrently, on the ammunition conviction. The court imposed concurrent
sentences of 180 days on the false identification conviction and 360 days on
the resisting arrest conviction.
III. DISCUSSION
A. Romero Motion
Defendant contends the trial court erred by denying his Romero
motion. We disagree.
1. Background
a. Defendant’s Motion
Defendant filed a Romero motion seeking to strike his prior strike
conviction in the interests of justice under section 1385. He argued this relief
was appropriate for three reasons. First, defendant asserted “[t]he current
offense is related to childhood trauma leading to mental health and addiction
issues.” Specifically, defendant asserted he grew up in a “gang-controlled
neighborhood” where “[d]rugs and violence surrounded him daily,” which
ultimately resulted in his becoming addicted to methamphetamine and being
“routinely in trouble with the law.” He acknowledged, however, “that he was
blessed with a loving home environment.”
Second, defendant argued “[t]he punishment is disproportionate to the
severity of the current offense.” He reasoned the punishment was excessive
5
because the prior strike conviction would result in him serving 80 percent of
his sentence, and the offense was not very serious because his “actual
conduct . . . was passive” and the handgun was “secreted so deeply within the
numerous personal items in the rear of the vehicle that it took a protracted
methodical search to find it.”
Finally, defendant asserted he “has struggled with methamphetamine
addiction throughout his entire adult life and has tried repeatedly to clean
up” and was “willing[] to rehabilitate himself.”
b. The People’s Opposition
The People opposed the motion, arguing defendant falls within the
spirit of the “Three Strikes” law. The opposition noted that defendant’s
probation had been revoked in his prior strike conviction case, he had
reoffended six times between the strike conviction and the current case, and
he had an extensive criminal history. An exhibit attached to the People’s
opposition showed this criminal history:
• In 1989, when defendant was 17, he was adjudicated a ward of the
juvenile court for committing robbery (§ 211) and vehicle-taking
(Veh. Code, § 10851). He was committed to the California Youth
Authority for seven years.
• In 1994, defendant was convicted of felony cargo theft (§ 487h,
subd. (a)).
• In 1998, defendant was convicted of felony possession of a controlled
substance (Health & Saf. Code, § 11377, subd. (a)).4
• In 1999, defendant was convicted of a felony weapons offense (former
§ 12020, subd. (a)) and sentenced to 18 months in prison. He violated
parole 11 times.
4 Here and elsewhere, the criminal history cites Penal Code
section 11377, but it likely intended to cite Health and Safety Code
section 11377.
6
• In 2000, defendant was again convicted of a felony weapons offense
(former § 12020, subd. (a)) and sentenced to 32 months in prison. He
violated parole 11 times.
• In 2002, defendant was convicted of felony possession of a controlled
substance in prison (§ 4573.6, subd. (a)) and sentenced to 36 months in
prison. He violated parole seven times.
• In 2004, defendant was convicted of felony domestic violence (§ 273.5,
subd. (a)) and placed on three years’ formal probation. He violated
probation numerous times and was sentenced to prison. He then
violated parole five times.
• In 2005, defendant was convicted of misdemeanor battery (§ 242).
• In 2008, defendant was convicted in separate misdemeanor cases of
violating a restraining order (§ 273.6, subd. (a)) and resisting arrest
(§ 148, subd. (a)(1)).
• In 2010, defendant was convicted of felony possession of a controlled
substance (Health & Saf. Code, § 11377, subd. (a)) and placed on three
years’ formal probation. His probation was revoked and later
terminated. He was then sentenced to prison for 24 months and
thereafter violated parole.
• In 2011, defendant was convicted of a felony weapons offense (former
§ 12020, subd. (a)) and misdemeanor offenses for presenting false
identification to a peace officer (§ 148.9, subd. (a)) and possession of
drug paraphernalia (Health & Saf. Code, § 11364, subd. (a)). He was
sentenced to eight years in prison, violated parole once, and was
discharged to postrelease community supervision, which was revoked
twice.
• In 2017, defendant was convicted of misdemeanor possession of a
controlled substance (Health & Saf. Code, § 11377, subd. (a)) and
placed on three years’ summary probation.
• In 2018, defendant was convicted of felony domestic violence (§ 273.5,
subd. (a)) and placed on five years’ formal probation. He was
eventually released on postrelease community supervision, which was
revoked six times.
7
• In 2020, defendant was convicted of a misdemeanor for violating a
restraining order (§ 273.6, subd. (a)).
• In March 2021, defendant was convicted of the strike offense at issue
here — making a criminal threat (§ 422). Defendant was placed on two
years’ formal probation, which was revoked and terminated. He was
then sentenced to prison for 16 months and was on parole for this
conviction at the time he committed the current offenses.
• In June 2021, defendant was convicted of a misdemeanor restraining
order violation (§ 273.6, subd. (a)).
• In July 2021, defendant was convicted of misdemeanor offenses of
domestic battery (§ 243, subd. (e)(1)) and violation of a protective order
(§ 166, subd. (c)(1)).
• In 2022, defendant was convicted in one misdemeanor case of driving
with a blood-alcohol level of 0.08 percent or above (Veh. Code, § 23152,
subd. (b)) and driving without a valid driver’s license (id., § 12500,
subd. (a)), and in another misdemeanor case of willfully disobeying a
court order (§ 166, subd. (a)(4)).
c. The Probation Officer’s Presentence Report
The probation officer’s presentence report (probation report) in the
current matter described defendant’s family relationships and childhood
dynamics. According to the report, “defendant described his childhood as
good,” he “said his parents were always there for him,” and “he denied
experiencing any form of abuse.” Defendant claimed he was drunk at the
time of the charged offense. However, he completed substance abuse
treatment in 2009, denied currently being addicted to any substances, and
“[w]hen asked if he felt that his problems stemmed from alcohol use, he said
his problems stemmed from ‘trusting people I shouldn’t have.’ ” The
probation report indicated defendant was currently subject to two criminal
protective orders identifying Holly as a protected person.
8
The probation report stated there were no mitigating circumstances,
and the following aggravating circumstances: (1) the manner in which the
crime was carried out indicated planning, sophistication, or professionalism
(Cal. Rules of Court,5 rule 4.421(a)(8)) because defendant “provided false
identification and information to law enforcement to avoid apprehension” and
defendant’s criminal history and current probationary status suggested he
“had full knowledge of the consequences of . . . possessing a firearm and
ammunition”; (2) “defendant’s prior convictions as an adult or sustained
petitions in juvenile delinquency proceedings are numerous or of increasing
seriousness” (rule 4.421(b)(2)); (3) “defendant has served a prior term in
prison or county jail under section 1170(h)” (rule 4.421(b)(3)); (4) “defendant
was on probation, mandatory supervision, postrelease community
supervision, or parole when the crime was committed” (rule 4.421(b)(4)); and
(5) “defendant’s prior performance on probation, mandatory supervision,
postrelease community supervision, or parole was unsatisfactory”
(rule 4.421(b)(5)).
The probation officer recommended that the court sentence defendant
to a total term of four years in state prison, consisting of a four-year term on
the principal firearm conviction (the two-year middle term, doubled to four
years for the prior strike conviction); a concurrent four-year term (i.e., a
doubled middle term) on the ammunition conviction; a concurrent 180-day
sentence on the false identification conviction; and a concurrent one-year
term on the resisting arrest conviction.
5 Undesignated rule references are to the California Rules of Court.
9
d. The Sentencing Hearing
At the outset of the sentencing hearing, the trial court stated it had
reviewed the probation report but not the prosecutor’s opposition to
defendant’s Romero motion. The court announced its “inclination would be to
strike the strike and impose the midterm, which would be two years.” The
court acknowledged “[t]here were a fair number of aggravating
circumstances”: (1) defendant has “a very long rap sheet,” though “all things
are relative, and it’s not as bad as you see”; (2) defendant “doesn’t seem to be
able to keep himself free of the system”; (3) “he’s already gone to state prison,
and then he was out on parole”; and (4) “he seems to violate every time he’s
either on probation or parole.”
The prosecutor argued defendant did “not fall within the spirit of
Romero because his recent strike was for a [section] 422 that happened in
2021,” he was still on parole6 for that strike conviction when he committed
the current offenses, and he had reoffended six times since the strike
conviction.7
The court responded “frankly” that it had proposed granting
defendant’s motion because the court had overheard the parties’ preliminary
negotiations and understood that the prosecutor would be satisfied with any
state prison sentence. Recognizing that was not the case, the court weighed
the competing merits. On the one hand, the current principal conviction was
6 The prosecutor stated defendant was still on probation when he
committed the current offense. However, as stated ante, the court previously
revoked defendant’s probation status, sentenced him to prison, and at the
time of the instant offense, defendant was on parole.
7 The prosecutor misstated that six months elapsed between defendant’s
March 2021 prior strike conviction and the September 2022 charged offense.
In fact, about 18 months had elapsed.
10
for a felony; the court “[ha]dn’t realize[d] that” defendant was “actually on
parole” for the subject strike conviction “at the time of the [current] offense”;
and defendant “put peace officers at risk” by fleeing and resisting them. “On
the other hand,” the court acknowledged “this is . . . not the crime of the
century” and that defendant had kept the handgun and magazine “entirely
separate” such that the handgun was not immediately usable.
The prosecutor reiterated her view that the court should deny
defendant’s motion. Defense counsel submitted.
The trial court denied defendant’s Romero motion and imposed the low
term of 16 months, doubled to 2 years 8 months.
2. Relevant Legal Principles
A trial court has the discretion under section 1385, subdivision (a) to
dismiss or “strike” a prior strike conviction under the Three Strikes law “in
furtherance of justice.” (§ 1385, subd. (a); see Romero, supra, 13 Cal.4th at
p. 504.) In deciding whether to do so, “the court . . . must consider whether,
in light of the nature and circumstances of his present felonies and prior
serious and/or violent felony convictions, and the particulars of his
background, character, and prospects, the defendant may be deemed outside
the [Three Strikes law]’s spirit, in whole or in part, and hence should be
treated as though he had not previously been convicted of one or more serious
and/or violent felonies.” (People v. Williams (1998) 17 Cal.4th 148, 161
(Williams).)
The Three Strikes law “not only establishes a sentencing norm, it
carefully circumscribes the trial court’s power to depart from this norm . . . .
[T]he law creates a strong presumption that any sentence that conforms to
these sentencing norms is both rational and proper.” (People v. Carmony
(2004) 33 Cal.4th 367, 378 (Carmony).) “The court is presumed to have
11
considered all of the relevant factors in the absence of an affirmative record
to the contrary.” (People v. Myers (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 305, 310.)
We review the trial court’s ruling for an abuse of discretion. (Carmony,
supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 378.) “ ‘ “[T]he burden is on the party attacking the
sentence to clearly show that the sentencing decision was irrational or
arbitrary. [Citation.] In the absence of such a showing, the trial court is
presumed to have acted to achieve legitimate sentencing objectives, and its
discretionary determination to impose a particular sentence will not be set
aside on review.” ’ ” (Id. at pp. 376–377.)
3. Analysis
Defendant has not met his “burden . . . to clearly show that the
sentencing decision was irrational or arbitrary.” (Carmony, supra, 33 Cal.4th
at p. 376.) The record shows he has an extensive history of significant
criminal activity that has gone largely uninterrupted since he committed his
first felony at age 17. His criminal history includes convictions for numerous
weapons, domestic violence, and restraining/protective order offenses. When
previously shown leniency through probation, parole, or postrelease
community supervision, defendant performed poorly. Indeed, at the time he
committed the current offenses, defendant was still on parole for the prior
strike conviction he now seeks to strike. On this record, the trial court did
not abuse its discretion in concluding defendant falls within the spirit of the
Three Strikes law.
Defendant argues the trial court acted unreasonably because he
“suffers from childhood trauma and substance abuse problems that may
account at least in part for his criminal history.” We are not persuaded.
First, the record contradicts defendant’s claim of childhood trauma.
According to the probation report, defendant had a “good” childhood, “his
12
parents were always there for him,” and he “denied experiencing any form of
abuse.”
Second, the record undermines defendant’s claim that substance abuse
may have contributed to his criminal history. When asked by the probation
officer about the potential sources of his “problems,” defendant “said his
problems stemmed from ‘trusting people I shouldn’t have.’ ” Defendant
denied any current addictions or that alcohol contributed to his problems. In
addition, even assuming substance abuse was a contributing factor to
defendant’s criminal history, his apparent failure to address the issue since
his successful treatment in 2009 supports the trial court’s denial of his
Romero motion. (See, e.g., People v. Martinez (1999) 71 Cal.App.4th
1502, 1511 [“drug addiction is not necessarily regarded as a mitigating factor
when a criminal defendant has a long-term problem and seems unwilling to
pursue treatment”]; People v. Gaston (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 310, 322
[“Although ‘drug use appears to be an underlying factor in [appellant’s]
criminal behavior, and in fact may be the root cause thereof,’ the record is
barren of any attempts by [defendant] to ‘root out’ such destructive drug
dependency. Accordingly, his drug dependency does not fall into the category
of mitigating circumstances.”]; Williams, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 163 [“But
neither can we ignore the fact that [defendant] . . . did not follow through in
efforts to bring his substance abuse problem under control.”].)
Defendant also cites the trial court’s favorable comments during the
sentencing hearing after the court announced its initial inclination to grant
defendant’s motion. However, the court explained the limited information
upon which it had based its initial assessment, and the court’s favorable
comments were far outweighed by the court’s unfavorable comments about
13
defendant’s criminal history, aggravating circumstances, and the dangerous
circumstances of the current offenses.
In sum, the trial court acted within its discretion in denying
defendant’s Romero motion.
B. Section 654 Stay
Defendant contends the trial court’s imposition of a concurrent
sentence on the unlawful possession of ammunition conviction violates
section 654’s prohibition on double punishment. The People concede this was
error. We agree the sentence on the ammunition conviction should have been
stayed under section 654.
1. Background
At the sentencing hearing, the trial court and counsel debated whether
the firearm and ammunition counts should have been charged separately.8
The court viewed this as “a close question” because the court understood that
the charges could not have been brought separately had the magazine been
loaded in the handgun. The prosecutor acknowledged she could not have
separately charged both offenses if the gun had been loaded, but maintained
that “because it was unloaded, those are two separate offenses.” The trial
court explained why it considered the prosecutor’s view “hypertechnical”:
[T]here was only a single clip that belonged to th[e]
Ruger that was not in the gun[,] . . . the Ruger wasn’t, in
[the court’s] view, a complete firearm, absent the clip.
[¶] . . . [¶] It’s not like you’ve got multiple clips out
there.· It’s not like this Ruger had a clip in it without
bullets in it and there was a separate clip with bullets in
8 This debate arose in the context of concurrent versus consecutive
sentencing, but the colloquy nevertheless is informative with respect to
defendant’s section 654 challenge.
14
it so that you had . . . a distinct firearm and a distinct
clip with bullets in it. [¶] In fact, what you had was the
Ruger without the clip, and the clip was separate . . . .
[¶] . . . [¶] One firearm. The clip happened to be out of
it.
The trial court then sentenced defendant on the principal firearm
conviction and imposed a concurrent sentence on the ammunition conviction.
2. Relevant Legal Principles
“Section 654 prohibits punishment for two offenses arising from the
same act or from a series of acts constituting an indivisible course of
conduct.” (People v. Sok (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 88, 99 (Sok), fn. omitted; see
§ 654, subd. (a) [“An act or omission that is punishable in different ways by
different provisions of law may be punished under either of such provisions,
but in no case shall the act or omission be punished under more than one
provision.”]; People v. Corpening (2016) 2 Cal.5th 307, 311 (Corpening).)
“ ‘Whether a course of criminal conduct is divisible and therefore gives rise to
more than one act within the meaning of section 654 depends on the intent
and objective of the actor. If all of the offenses were incident to one objective,
the defendant may be punished for any one of such offenses but not for more
than one.’ ” (People v. Britt (2004) 32 Cal.4th 944, 951–952 (Britt), quoting
Neal v. State of California (1960) 55 Cal.2d 11, 19.) If, on the other hand, a
defendant harbored “ ‘multiple criminal objectives,’ which were independent
of and not merely incidental to each other, he may be punished for each
statutory violation committed in pursuit of each objective, ‘even though the
violations shared common acts or were parts of an otherwise indivisible
course of conduct.’ ” (People v. Harrison (1989) 48 Cal.3d 321, 335.)
Several Courts of Appeal have held that section 654 precludes multiple
punishments for the offenses of felon in possession of a firearm and unlawful
15
possession of ammunition where all the ammunition is loaded in the firearm.
(See People v. Lopez (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 132, 138 [“Where, as here, all of
the ammunition is loaded into the firearm, an ‘indivisible course of conduct’ is
present and section 654 precludes multiple punishment.”]; Sok, supra,
181 Cal.App.4th at p. 100 [where “the ammunition at issue in [the firearm
and ammunition counts] was either loaded into [the defendant]’s handgun or
had been fired from that gun,” § 654 precluded separate punishments
because there was “no evidence in the record . . . that . . . [the defendant] had
different or multiple objectives in possessing the loaded firearm and
possessing the ammunition in the gun itself”].) The Lopez court reasoned
that to conclude otherwise would contravene our Supreme Court’s guidance
“that the appellate courts should not ‘parse[] the objectives too finely.’ ”
(Lopez, at p. 138, quoting Britt, supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 953].)
3. Analysis
Although this case presents a slightly different scenario than the
loaded-firearm precedents, the People concede “[t]here was no evidence
[defendant] had multiple intents or objectives in possessing the unloaded
firearm separately from its loaded magazine.” We agree. Indeed, the court’s
statements that it viewed the handgun and magazine collectively as “[o]ne
firearm” that was not “a complete firearm, absent the clip,” suggest the court
implicitly found that defendant’s possession of the handgun and the
magazine “reflects a single ‘intent and objective’ ” (Corpening, supra,
2 Cal.5th at p. 311) to possess a loaded firearm.
Accordingly, the sentence on defendant’s unlawful possession of
ammunition conviction shall be stayed. (See People v. Duff (2010) 50 Cal.4th
787, 796 [“ ‘[I]mposition of concurrent sentences is precluded by section 654
[citations] because [under such a sentence] the defendant is deemed to be
16
subjected to the term of both sentences although they are served
simultaneously.’ [¶] . . . [¶] Accordingly, . . . when a court determines that a
conviction falls within the meaning of section 654, it is necessary to impose
sentence but to stay the execution of the duplicative sentence.” (Citations
omitted.)]; People v. Mesa (2012) 54 Cal.4th 191, 195 [to avoid double
punishment, “ ‘[e]xecution of the sentence for one of the offenses must be
stayed’ ”].)
IV. DISPOSITION
The judgment is modified to stay the 2-year 8-month concurrent
sentence on the unlawful possession of ammunition conviction (count 2)
pursuant to section 654. The trial court shall amend the abstract of
judgment accordingly and forward copies of the amended abstract to the
Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation. As so modified, the judgment
is affirmed.
RUBIN, J.
WE CONCUR:
McCONNELL, P. J.
IRION, J.
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