CourtListener 10590036•People v. Stone CA1/5
Gesamter Gesetzestext
Filed 5/22/25 P. v. Stone CA1/5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FIVE
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, A166913
v.
PHILLIP STONE II, (Contra Costa County
Defendant and Appellant. Super. Ct. No. 04002035020)
This is an appeal from final judgment after a jury convicted defendant
Phillip Stone II of multiple felony and misdemeanor offenses relating to his
assault on his wife and his abuse of his children. The jury also found true
several aggravating factors, after which the trial court sentenced defendant
to 15 years in prison.
Before defendant’s first trial, defense counsel raised a concern as to his
mental competency. A mistrial was declared, and proceedings were held
pursuant to Penal Code section 1368.1 Afterward, the trial court found
defendant competent and a second trial began. During defendant’s second
trial, his counsel continued to raise doubts as to his competency. However,
the court resolutely declined to hold further section 1368 proceedings.
1 Unless otherwise stated, all statutory citations herein are to the Penal
Code.
1
On appeal, defendant contends the court’s competency ruling as well as
its subsequent refusal to hold further proceedings under section 1368 after
his counsel continued to raise a doubt as to his competency during trial were
erroneous and require reversal. Defendant also contends two instructional
errors made in connection with count 1, child abuse in violation of section
273a, subdivision (a), were prejudicial error also requiring reversal. We
affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On May 2, 2022, an amended information was filed charging defendant
with five felonies: child abuse (§ 273a, subd. (a); count 1); discharging a
firearm with gross negligence (§ 246.3, subd. (a); count 2); assault with a
firearm (§ 245, subd. (a)(2); count 3); possession of a firearm by a felon
(§ 29800, subd. (a)(1); count 4); and unlawful possession of ammunition
(§ 30305, subd. (a)(1); count 5). It was alleged that defendant personally used
a firearm during the commission of counts 1 and 3 (§ 12022.5, subd. (a)) and
that multiple other aggravating factors were present. The amended
information also charged defendant with a misdemeanor, child cruelty
(§ 273a, subd. (b); count 6).
I. Competency Proceedings and Jury Trial.
Defendant’s first jury trial began on May 2, 2022. However, the trial
court declared a mistrial the next day after defendant refused to attend the
trial and his counsel expressed a doubt as to his mental competency.
A competency hearing was held on September 13, 2022, at which
Dr. Hoang, a faculty psychiatrist with the University of California, testified.
Afterward, the trial court declared defendant competent to stand trial.
On October 31, 2022, defendant’s second jury trial began, with a
different judge presiding. Throughout trial, defense counsel expressed doubts
2
as to defendant’s competency. The trial court, however, declined to hold
further competency proceedings. Defendant, in turn, made multiple motions
for new counsel under People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118 and requested
to proceed in propria persona—all of which the court denied. Defendant also
requested a speedy trial, yet multiple continuances ensued. However, his
trial went forward, and the following evidence was presented.
Defendant and the confidential victim (C.V.) have been married since
2018 and have three children together, including a baby, Jane Doe No. 1.
C.V. also has a firstborn daughter, Jane Doe No. 2, whom defendant cared for
as if he were her father.
A. Counts 1–5: December 2, 2021.
On December 2, 2021, approximately 7:00 p.m., Antioch Police Officer
Chandler responded to a 911 caller who reported hearing a gunshot and a
woman screaming at Mountaire Park. After Officer Chandler arrived, he
found C.V. holding Jane Doe No. 1, an infant, while standing next to a vehicle
that matched the 911 dispatcher’s description. C.V. told the officer that she
had been arguing with defendant, who was “on drugs” and threatening to kill
himself. During their argument, defendant was seated in the vehicle’s
driver’s seat with Doe No. 1 in his arms. He pulled out a gun, which
accidentally “went off.” According to C.V., defendant was in “the worst” state
that she had ever seen him in and he could have shot their baby. Afterward,
defendant drove recklessly away from the park, with Doe No. 1 still in his
arms. Defendant eventually left the vehicle and fled the area on a scooter.
C.V.’s 911 call was played for the jury. During this call, C.V.
repeatedly told defendant to get out of the car and asked whether he was
going to kill himself. C.V. also asked defendant why he had his hand on their
baby’s mouth. A gunshot can be heard, along with C.V. crying and Doe No. 1
3
screaming. C.V. then yelled that defendant “could’ve shot [their] child” and
demanded that he give her the baby.
Officer Chandler later searched the vehicle and found a fresh bullet
hole in the front passenger seat that extended through the passenger side
door to the vehicle’s exterior. The officer did not find the accompanying
bullet or ejected shell casing.
B. Count 6: Misdemeanor Child Cruelty, August 30, 2021.
On August 30, 2021, approximately 4:37 a.m., Antioch Police Officer
Duff responded to two 911 calls made by 12-year-old Jane Doe No. 2. In this
911 call, Doe No. 2 reported that defendant had attacked her mother, C.V., by
pinning her to the floor and choking her. When Officer Duff arrived at the
family residence shortly thereafter, Jane Doe No. 2 let him inside. Officer
Duff saw defendant attempting to leave through a side door and instructed
him to stop. As Officer Duff ran after defendant, defendant turned toward
him while reaching for his waistband. Officer Duff, concerned that defendant
was armed, drew his service weapon, pointed it toward defendant, and
ordered defendant to show his hands. Defendant ignored his command and
escaped through the garage rafters.
C. Prior Uncharged Acts.
The jury also heard evidence relating to defendant’s prior uncharged
acts of domestic violence that occurred on December 30 and April 19, 2021.
4
II. Verdict, Sentence and Appeal.
On December 1, 2022, the jury found defendant not guilty on count 2
but otherwise guilty as charged. The jury also found true all but one of the
alleged aggravating factors.2
On December 9, 2022, the trial court sentenced defendant to a total
prison term of 15 years. This timely appeal followed.
DISCUSSION
On appeal, defendant contends the trial court prejudicially erred in
(1) finding him competent to stand trial; (2) relying on its initial competency
finding and declining to hold further competency proceedings after his
counsel raised a bona fide doubt during trial as to his ability to rationally
assist in his defense; (3) inadequately instructing the jury on the requisite
mens rea to convict on count 1, felony child abuse in violation of section 273a,
subdivision (a); and (4) failing to sua sponte instruct the jury on juror
unanimity. We address each issue in turn post.
I. The Trial Court’s Competency Finding Stands.
Defendant first contends substantial evidence does not support the trial
court’s finding that he was competent to stand trial. We disagree.
The constitutional guarantee of due process forbids a court from trying
or convicting a mentally incompetent criminal defendant. (People v. Bloom
(2022) 12 Cal.5th 1008, 1030.) “A defendant is incompetent to stand trial
when ‘as a result of a mental health disorder or developmental disability, the
defendant is unable to understand the nature of the criminal proceedings or
to assist counsel in the conduct of a defense in a rational manner.’ (§ 1367,
2 The jury found not true the allegation that the manner in which
defendant committed the offenses indicated planning, sophistication or
professionalism (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.421(a)(8)).
5
subd. (a); see People v. Wycloff (2021) 12 Cal.5th 58, 81–82 [283 Cal.Rptr.3d
1, 493 P.3d 789] (Wycloff).)” (People v. Parker (2022) 13 Cal.5th 1, 28.)
“If at any time during a criminal proceeding a doubt arises regarding
the defendant’s competence to stand trial, the court must hold a competency
hearing. (§§ 1368, 1369.)” (People v. Carr (2021) 59 Cal.App.5th 1136, 1143.)
“ ‘[S]ection 1369 sets forth the procedures for the trial in which the question
of the mental competence of the defendant is to be determined. It provides
that such a trial may be made ‘by court or jury’ [citation] . . . . It also
provides for the appointment by the court of one or more experts to examine
the defendant [citation], the introduction of evidence by the defendant and
the People [citation], and the presentation of argument by each thereafter
[citation].’ ” (People v. Carr, supra, at p. 1143.)
“A defendant is presumed competent unless the contrary is proven by a
preponderance of the evidence.” (People v. Lawley (2002) 27 Cal.4th 102,
131.) It is the defendant’s burden to prove incompetence. (People v. Marks
(1988) 45 Cal.3d 1335, 1342.) On appeal, we review a trial court’s
competency finding for substantial evidence, viewing the evidence in a light
most favorable to the court’s judgment, giving it the benefit of every
reasonable inference and resolving all conflicts in its favor. (People v. Lawley,
supra, at p. 131.) “If the circumstances reasonably justify the [court]’s
findings, reversal of the judgment is not warranted simply because the
circumstances might also reasonably be reconciled with a contrary finding.
[Citation.] ‘A reviewing court neither reweighs evidence nor reevaluates a
witness’s credibility.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Albillar (2010) 51 Cal.4th 47,
60.)
Here, the judge in defendant’s first trial declared a mistrial and
suspended proceedings on May 3, 2022, after he refused to attend court and
6
his counsel raised a doubt as to his competence. The next day, the court
appointed two doctors to evaluate defendant. Both doctors submitted reports
in anticipation of the competency hearing. One doctor, Dr. Zhang, was
unable to form an opinion because defendant declined to participate in his
assessment. As such, Dr. Zhang recommended that defendant be referred to
the regional center for diagnostic assessment and evaluation.
However, the second doctor, Dr. Hoang, diagnosed defendant with
delusional disorder and depressive disorder.3 Dr. Hoang evaluated defendant
and reviewed his records, which included his psychiatric treatment records.
At the hearing, Dr. Hoang testified that defendant had some understanding
of the criminal proceedings and the individuals involved. However, he opined
defendant had “fixed false beliefs” that he was being “railroaded” by the
criminal justice system, including by his own attorneys, which impacted his
cognitive ability to assist counsel in a rational manner.
As one example of defendant’s delusional thinking, Dr. Hoang testified
that defendant told him that his wife was having “intimate sexual relations”
with a police officer involved in the case. Defendant, seated with counsel,
reacted angrily, emphatically denying having said such a thing and asking to
be excused so as not to have to “hear his bullshit.” Dr. Hoang thereafter
repeated his testimony; however, when pressed by defense counsel,
Dr. Hoang eventually “backtrack[ed].” The doctor acknowledged that his
report and notes made no mention of defendant’s alleged statement about
sexual relations between his wife and an officer. And, on his second day of
testimony, Dr. Hoang finally admitted that he “might have misremembered
that.”
3 Dr. Hoang also diagnosed defendant with two drug use disorders that
were in remission.
7
Dr. Hoang also acknowledged having no information regarding
defendant’s conversations or interactions with his attorneys. As such, the
doctor did not know whether the attorneys had been responsive to defendant
or diligent in handling his case. In addition, Dr. Hoang acknowledged that
his report described defendant as attentive with linear thought processes, fair
judgment, fair recall, “a good ability at abstraction,” and insight into his legal
situation. The report also noted that defendant was highly motivated to help
himself in the legal process, as evidenced by his visits to the law library and
efforts to find a new attorney.
Finally, Dr. Hoang acknowledged that defendant did not report
previously having been diagnosed with a delusional (or other psychotic)
disorder. Yet, Dr. Hoang nonetheless stood by his initial diagnosis of
delusional disorder.
Before ruling, the trial court criticized Dr. Hoang’s testimony as
“sloppy.” The court noted that Dr. Hoang effectively threw “a Molotov
cocktail in the middle of an investigation” by testifying “several times” that
defendant told him that his wife had sexual relations with a police officer.
Moreover, “[Dr. Hoang] didn’t correct the mistake. He waffled his way
backwards, repeatedly, on that same day in testimony. And, then, completely
recanted it in the second day.” According to the court, “frankly, [the court]
could understand [defendant’s] reaction to that, especially if it was patently
untrue—it’s incendiary.”
The court also described “[Dr. Hoang’s] testimony [as] strikingly
different between day one and day two. Day one, he was ad-libbing quite a
bit. Not just about the issue of defendant’s wife or partner, and the police
officer; but, about other things that were not found in either his report or his
notes.”
8
Ultimately, the trial court concluded that “in order to find [defendant]
incompetent, at this point, I would have to rely on the doctor’s report and his
testimony; and, there’s too much that concerns me about it to allow me to do
that in this particular case. [Defendant] may or may not be delusional or
incompetent; but, I cannot rely on the doctor’s testimony and report. . . . I
think it would be inappropriate to do so. [¶] I think there’s evidence, in some
fashion, that [defendant] was misinformed and not necessarily delusional. I
think that he clearly believes that people are after him. There’s a paranoia
level in there.· Whether that paranoia rises to delusional—delusions, without
the doctor’s evaluation, I can’t fairly say it falls on one side or the other. [¶] I
think there is an issue of whether or not he can’t assist his attorney, versus
him not—him choosing not to assist his attorney. . . . But I can’t say, by a
preponderance of the evidence . . . that [defendant] is incompetent and that
the defense has met their burden.”
On this record, there is no basis to override the trial court’s competency
ruling, including its rejection of Dr. Hoang’s opinions for lack of credibility.
(People v. Albillar, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 60.) Even Dr. Hoang acknowledged
defendant appeared capable of understanding the criminal proceedings.
(§ 1367, subd. (a).) Indeed, defendant told Dr. Hoang that he had visited the
prison law library to work on his case and had been searching for a new
attorney because he did not believe he was well represented by current
counsel. Further, as the court noted, it was unclear from the record whether
defendant was unable to assist his counsel due to a mental condition or was
simply unwilling to work with counsel because defendant was unhappy with
the representation. Without a “causal relationship between the defendant’s
mental condition and his . . . trial-related functional abilities,” the standard
for incompetence under section 1367 was not met. (People v. Buenrosto
9
(2018) 6 Cal.5th 367, 388–389; People v. Nelson (2016) 1 Cal.5th 513, 560
[record must show the defendant is, due to a mental condition, “incapable of
understanding the nature of the proceedings or unable (as opposed to
unwilling) to assist counsel”].) As the California Supreme Court explains,
“ ‘[a] defendant who refuses to work with his lawyer out of spite alone is not
incompetent,’ . . . ‘even if that defendant has a serious mental disease or
defect.’ ” (People v. Buenrosto, supra, at p. 389.)
Defendant counters that, even accepting the trial court’s finding that
Dr. Hoang’s testimony lacked credibility, the record as a whole, including
medical reports, transcripts, and jail calls, “all evidenced [his] paranoid belief
that everyone was against him and supported the doctor’s diagnosis.”
Defendant confuses our legal standard. As stated ante, we view the
evidence on appeal in a light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling, giving
it the benefit of every reasonable inference and resolving all conflicts in its
favor. (People v. Lawley, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 131.) Under this standard,
substantial evidence exists in the record to support an inference that
defendant was acting rationally, even while erupting in anger and refusing to
assist his attorney. For one, Dr. Hoang, the expert witness hired to assess
defendant’s competency, told an unfounded, inaccurate story to the court
about his allegedly delusional beliefs, rightly enraging defendant. In
addition, defendant’s attorneys, despite his repeated requests for a speedy
trial, sought and obtained continuances. And finally, defendant’s multiple
motions for new counsel under People v. Marsden, supra, 2 Cal.3d 118, and
his request to proceed in propria persona were all denied. All of these actual
circumstances could have engendered a rational belief in defendant that the
legal system was working against him, such that he had little to gain by
cooperating with it. On this record, no basis exists to disturb the court’s
10
competency finding. (See People v. Mai (2013) 57 Cal.4th 986, 1035–1036
[no substantial evidence of incompetence when “defendant’s anger and
resentment were often connected in an understandable way to the trial
proceedings”].) As the high court instructs: “If the circumstances reasonably
justify the [court]’s findings, reversal of the judgment is not warranted simply
because the circumstances might also reasonably be reconciled with a
contrary finding.” (People v. Albillar, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 60.)
II. The court did not abuse its discretion in declining to hold
further competency proceedings during defendant’s second trial.
Defendant further contends that in his second trial, the trial court,
presided over by a different judge, erred by not suspending trial and ordering
further competency proceedings. He is again mistaken.
“The trial court’s ‘duty to assess competence is a continuing one.’
[Citation.] The obligation to suspend proceedings and hold a competency
trial is triggered whenever ‘ “the court is presented with substantial evidence
of incompetence, that is, evidence that raises a reasonable or bona fide doubt
concerning the defendant’s competence to stand trial.” ’ ” (People v. Parker,
supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 28.) However, when, as here, a defendant has
previously been found competent, “a trial court need not suspend proceedings
to conduct a second competency hearing unless it ‘is presented with a
substantial change of circumstances or with new evidence casting a serious
doubt on the validity of that finding.” (People v. Jones (1991) 53 Cal.3d 1115,
1153.) Thus, “the duty to suspend is not triggered by information that
substantially duplicates evidence already considered at an earlier, formal
inquiry into the defendant’s competence; when faced with evidence of
relatively minor changes in the defendant’s mental state, the court may rely
on a prior competency finding rather than convening a new hearing to cover
largely the same ground.” (People v. Rodas (2018) 6 Cal.5th 219, 234–235.)
11
“We review for substantial evidence the trial court’s finding of no
substantial change of circumstances or no new evidence casting serious doubt
on the initial competency determination [citation], and we review its decision
not to reinstate competency proceedings for an abuse of discretion.” (People
v. Easter (2019) 34 Cal.App.5th 226, 243; accord, People v. Welch (1999) 20
Cal.4th 701, 742 [“When the evidence casting doubt on an accused’s present
competence is less than substantial . . . [i]t is within the discretion of the trial
judge whether to order a competence hearing”].)
Here, defense counsel renewed his concern that defendant could not
rationally assist in his defense daily during trial. Yet, counsel seemed to
acknowledge defendant was “essentially [engaging in] the same type of
behavior . . . that was exhibited prior to [the competency hearing].”
As defense counsel described it, defendant, as before, was “go[ing] between
being angry or not wanting to speak to me or not wanting to visit me, to a
range of emotions and reactions which makes it, in our opinion, difficult for
him to assist.”
In response to counsel’s concern, the trial court noted that on
November 10, 2022, defendant was “quite agitated” and referred to his
attorney using an offensive and derogatory term. Nonetheless, the court
observed the next day, “[Y]esterday I did not note any aberrant behavior, and
the Court will continue to be mindful and make any appropriate records as
necessary.” The trial court reiterated this observation the following day, and
again on several subsequent days.
On November 22, 2022, the trial court additionally noted that
defendant refused to be transported to court. The trial court explained,
however, its understanding that “[defendant] had been here all morning and
was hoping that his matter would have been heard this morning.” The trial
12
court then confirmed there had been no “behavior at all that indicates
[defendant] does not understand what is going on at this time.”
After the close of evidence, defense counsel reiterated his concern as to
defendant’s incompetency. The trial court remained unpersuaded: “I’m going
to make a record that throughout the trial, throughout the trial proceedings,
from the 402s through jury selection and with each witness, Mr. Stone has
not acted out in any way or done anything in open court which would indicate
he did not understand the proceedings. He has remained quiet and calm,
with no outbursts. [¶] The Court also observed at times Mr. Stone conferring
with counsel at counsel table. [¶] Yesterday when the Court took the waiver
of his right to testify, Mr. Stone understood and answered each question
appropriately. And when the Court asked a compound question that he did
not understand, he indicated such to the Court, and the Court then restated
the question and again he answered it appropriately.”
Defendant does not dispute the accuracy of the court’s observations.
Nor does he point to any substantial change of circumstances or new evidence
of incompetence that the court neglected. Instead, defendant argues there is
“no evidence in the record below that [he] chose to communicate with counsel
or was able to assist in the defense when it suited him or that he was
malingering.” According to defendant: “There would have been no reason for
defense counsel’s repeated claims that [he] was incompetent to stand trial,
unless he believed it to be true. This, along with other evidence known to the
Court, should have triggered a bona fide doubt about [his] competency to
stand trial.”
Defendant’s arguments uproot our standard of review. Defendant
essentially asks that we presume his incompetence based on little more than
his counsel’s repeated expressions of doubt. We cannot do that. Under well-
13
established appellate rules, we must presume that the trial court’s decision
not to hold additional competency proceedings was correct, and we affirm in
the absence of a proper showing that the decision was unsupported by
substantial evidence or was otherwise an abuse of discretion.4 (People v.
Lawley, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 131; People v. Easter, supra, 34 Cal.App.5th at
p. 243.) Simply put, “ ‘[t]he trial judge’s ruling regarding whether a
competency hearing is required should be given great deference. “An
appellate court is in no position to appraise a defendant’s conduct in the trial
court as indicating insanity, a calculated attempt to feign insanity and delay
the proceedings, or sheer temper.” ’ ” (People v. Weaver (2001) 26 Cal.4th 876,
953.) Thus, because defendant has not made the requisite showing on
appeal, we decline to disturb the trial court’s superior judgment as to his
competency.
III. The jury was properly instructed on the mens rea for count 1,
felony child abuse (§ 273a, subd. (a)).
Defendant contends the trial court committed prejudicial error by
giving the instruction on indirect infliction of child abuse in violation of
4 Defendant correctly notes that a new judge, Judge Lee, presided over
his trial. Defendant claims there “is no indication in the record that Judge
Lee was aware of the reason for Judge Brady’s [pretrial competency] ruling.”
We decline to assume Judge Lee was ignorant of the record relating to
defendant’s competency proceedings. (People v. Mancha (1963) 213
Cal.App.2d 590, 594 [appellate court presumes the trial court was familiar
with case history].) In any event, it is undisputed that Judge Lee “had an
opportunity to observe, and converse with, defendant throughout the trial
itself and the posttrial proceedings . . . [and that Judge Lee] appropriately
considered these observations in concluding that defendant’s condition was
essentially unchanged from the start of trial, when the [previous judge] found
him competent.” (People v. Jones, supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 1153.) As such, as
stated, Judge Lee’s ruling stands.
14
section 273a, subdivision (a) because the instruction failed to advise the jury
on the correct mens rea. We disagree.
“ ‘A trial court must instruct the jury on every theory that is supported
by substantial evidence, that is, evidence that would allow a reasonable jury
to make a determination in accordance with the theory presented under the
proper standard of proof.’ [Citation.] An appellate court reviews the trial
court’s decision to give a particular instruction de novo. [Citation.] In doing
so, we must determine whether there was sufficient evidence to support the
challenged instruction [citation], and whether the instructions delivered a
correct statement of the law (People v. Fiu (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 360, 370
[citation] [‘the instructions must be complete and a correct statement of the
law’]).” (People v. Stinson (2019) 31 Cal.App.5th 464, 476.)
Count 1 charged a violation of the child abuse statute, section 273a,
which violation may be either direct or indirect. (People v. Burton (2006) 143
Cal.App.4th 447, 454.) “When the harm to a child is directly inflicted, the
requisite mental state for the section 273a offense is general criminal intent.
([Citation] [general criminal intent is the intent to do the proscribed act].)
When that harm is indirectly inflicted, the requisite mental state is criminal
negligence. ([Citation]; see also § 20 [in every crime there must exist act and
intent, or act and criminal negligence].) Criminal negligence is aggravated,
culpable, gross or reckless conduct that is such a departure from that of the
ordinarily prudent or careful person under the same circumstances as to be
incompatible with a proper regard for human life. [Citation.] A defendant
may be deemed to be criminally negligent if a reasonable person in his or her
position would have been aware of the risk.” (People v. Burton, supra,
at p. 454.)
15
Our jury was instructed for purposes of count 1 on a theory of indirect
infliction of child abuse based upon criminal negligence in violation of section
273a, subdivision (a). With both parties’ consent, the court gave a modified
version of CALCRIM No. 821 (Child Abuse Likely to Produce Great Bodily
Harm or Death), which stated in relevant part: “The defendant is charged in
Count 1 with child abuse likely to produce great bodily harm or death in
violation of Penal Code section 273a(a).
“To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must
prove that:
“1. The defendant, while having care or custody of a child, willfully
caused or permitted the child to be placed in a situation where the child’s
person or health was endangered;
“2. The defendant caused or permitted the child to be endangered under
circumstances or conditions likely to produce great bodily injury or death.
“AND
“3. The defendant was criminally negligent when he caused or
permitted the child to be endangered.
“Someone commits an act willfully when he or she does it willingly or
on purpose. [¶] . . . [¶]
“Criminal negligence involves more than ordinary carelessness,
inattention, or mistake in judgment. A person acts with criminal negligence
when:
“1. He or she acts in a reckless way that is a gross departure from the
way an ordinarily careful person would act in the same situation;
“2. The person’s acts amount to disregard for human life or indifference
to the consequences of his or her acts;
“AND
16
“3. A reasonable person would have known that acting in that way
would naturally and probably result in harm to others.”
There is no dispute this instruction delivered a correct statement of the
law. (People v. Burton, supra, 143 Cal.App.4th at p. 454.) Instead, defendant
wrongly claims the court gave CALCRIM No. 823 (Misdemeanor Child
Abuse) for purposes of count 1. Not so. The court gave CALCRIM No. 823 for
purposes of count 6 and gave CALCRIM No. 821 for purposes of count 1.
Because defendant acquiesced to the court’s giving CALCRIM No. 821, he has
no right to challenge it on appeal. (Green v. Healthcare Services, Inc. (2021)
68 Cal.App.5th 407, 419 [“a party who acquiesces in the giving of a jury
instruction may not later appeal the giving of that instruction”]; A.H. v.
Tamalpais Union High School Dist. (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 340, 354.)
In any event, forfeiture aside, the record reflects that the court’s
modified version of CALCRIM No. 821 aligned with both the charge in
count 1 and the evidence offered in support of it. Specifically, the evidence
proved defendant, during an argument, wielded a gun at C.V. while holding
Doe No. 1 in his arms. The gun accidentally discharged while defendant was
still holding Doe No. 1, putting the baby in grave danger of great bodily harm
or death. Defendant then endangered Doe No. 1 again by driving recklessly
away, still screaming at C.V. and ignoring her pleas to give her the baby.
Ignoring this evidence, defendant insists the prosecutor “argued a
combination of both direct and indirect harm” and, thereby, confused the
mens rea required for count 1. We disagree. The prosecutor argued
defendant’s child abuse of Doe No. 1 was an indirect result of his assault on
C.V. in that, while committing the assault, he negligently discharged a gun
with Doe No. 1 in his arms—an act that could have resulted in great bodily
17
injury or death to the baby. He then recklessly drove off, still screaming at
C.V., with the baby unrestrained, further endangering her.
Thus, the prosecutor’s theory was that defendant directed his acts of
domestic violence toward C.V. In doing so, defendant placed the baby in
danger even though he did not direct any criminal acts toward the baby. This
theory, consistent with the evidence, was proper: “When a charge of child
abuse is based on the mental suffering resulting from a child being exposed to
physical abuse by one parent against the other, the theory at issue is indirect
child abuse, for which criminal negligence is the requisite mental state.”
(People v. Hamlin (2009) 170 Cal.App.4th 1412, 1441; accord, People v.
Burton, supra, 143 Cal.App.4th at pp. 454–455 [the correct theory was
indirect child abuse when “the minor was on the scene while the attack took
place and witnessed its bloody immediate aftermath,” yet “there is no
suggestion that defendant intended to directly inflict suffering on his son”].)
Accordingly, we conclude the modified version of CALCRIM No. 821
given to the jury was both a correct statement of law and supported by
substantial evidence. As such, there was no error, much less prejudicial
error, in giving it. (People v. Stinson, supra, 31 Cal.App.5th at p. 476.)
IV. A juror unanimity instruction was not required.
Defendant finally contends the trial court erred by failing to sua sponte
instruct the jury on juror unanimity. In a criminal case, a jury verdict must
be unanimous. (People v. Russo (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1124, 1132.) “Additionally,
the jury must agree unanimously the defendant is guilty of a specific crime.
[Citation.] Therefore, cases have long held that when the evidence suggests
more than one discrete crime, either the prosecution must elect among the
crimes or the court must require the jury to agree on the same criminal act.
[Citations.]” (Ibid., italics omitted.) When the prosecution does not elect
18
among crimes, “[a] unanimity instruction is appropriate ‘when conviction on a
single count could be based on two or more discrete criminal events,’ but not
‘[when] multiple theories or acts may form the basis of a guilty verdict on one
discrete criminal event.’ ” (Id. at pp. 1134–1135; accord, People v. Hernandez
(2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 559, 569.)
“ ‘ “Neither instruction nor election are [sic] required, however, if the
case falls within the continuous course of conduct exception.” ’ ” (People v.
Leonard (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 465, 491.) This exception applies “ ‘ “when
the acts alleged are so closely connected as to form part of one continuing
transaction or course of criminal conduct,” ’ or ‘ “ ‘when the defendant offers
essentially the same defense to each of the acts, and there is no reasonable
basis for the jury to distinguish between them.’ [Citations.]” [Citation.]’
[Citations.] The justification for the exception is that there is no need for an
instruction when there is a single course of conduct because members of the
jury cannot distinguish between the separate acts. Further, the instruction
is unnecessary when the defendant proffers the same defense to multiple acts
because a guilty verdict indicates that the jury rejected the defendant’s
defense in toto.” (People v. Hernandez, supra, 217 Cal.App.4th at p. 572;
accord, People v. Fish (2024) 102 Cal.App.5th 730, 738 [failure to give
unanimity instruction is harmless error when “the record provides no
rational basis, by way of argument or evidence, for the jury to have
distinguished between the two acts offered in support of the crime”].)
Despite defendant’s contrary claims, this case falls squarely within the
continuous course of conduct exception. As one appellate court has observed:
“Although the child abuse statute may be violated by a single act [citation],
more commonly it covers repetitive or continuous conduct. [Citations.]”
(People v. Ewing (1977) 72 Cal.App.3d 714, 717.) Here, the information
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alleged a course of conduct for purposes of count 1, child abuse in violation of
section 273a, subdivision (a), that occurred on the evening of December 2,
2021. Thus, as in Ewing, the issue before the jury was whether defendant
was guilty of a course of conduct that began when, during an argument, he
“pulled a gun” on C.V. while holding Doe No. 1; continued with his
accidentally firing the gun while still holding Doe No. 1; and ended when he
recklessly drove off with Doe No. 1 unrestrained in the vehicle. The issue
was not whether he committed a particular act on a particular day. (See
Ewing, supra, 72 Cal.App.3d at p. 717; see also People v. Hernandez, supra,
217 Cal.App.4th at p. 573 [“a continuous course of conduct exists when the
same actor performs the same type of conduct at the same place within a
short period of time, such that a jury cannot reasonably distinguish different
instances of conduct”].) As such, an instruction requiring jury unanimity as
to any particular act would have been inappropriate, and its omission was
not error.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
Jackson, P. J.
WE CONCUR:
Simons, J.
Burns, J.
A166913/People v. Phillip Stone II
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