People v. Jackson CA5

CourtListener 10588250Calctapp21.05.2025

Gesamter Gesetzestext

Filed 5/21/25 P. v. Jackson CA5

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

THE PEOPLE,
F088286
Plaintiff and Respondent,
(Super. Ct. No. CF91451754)
v.

CHRISTOPHER JACKSON, OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Fresno County. Gary R.
Orozco, Judge.
Laura Arnold, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General,
Kimberley A. Donohue, Assistant Attorney General, Amanda D. Cary, Kari Ricci Mueller
and Hannah Janigian Chavez, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
-ooOoo-
INTRODUCTION
Appellant Christopher Jackson filed an appeal from a trial court order summarily
denying his request for recall of his sentence and for resentencing under Penal Code
section 1172.1.1 Appellant maintains the trial court’s denial is an appealable order under
section 1237, and the trial court abused its discretion in failing to give due consideration
to all the postconviction evidence he offered in support of resentencing. Respondent
maintains appellant has no right to appeal because the trial court’s denial did not affect
appellant’s substantial rights within the meaning of section 1237. Having considered the
parties’ arguments, we agree with respondent and conclude the trial court’s summary
denial of appellant’s unauthorized request for relief under section 1172.1 is not an
appealable order. As such, the appeal must be dismissed.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
After weeks of planning to rob an armored truck guard during his regular pickup at
a bank, appellant and his armed confederate (Sherman) staked out the bank, and when the
guard arrived on his rounds, appellant pointed a gun at the guard and reached for the
guard’s weapon. A struggle ensued, and appellant called to Sherman for help; Sherman
proceeded to shoot and kill the guard. Appellant and Sherman absconded with what they
later discovered was an empty money bag the guard had dropped, and they fled.2
Appellant subsequently pled guilty to second degree murder, robbery, and
admitted a firearm enhancement allegation under section 12022.5, subdivision (a). As
part of the plea agreement, appellant stipulated to a sentence of 10 years determinate (the
aggravated five-year terms (at the time of the offense) for second degree robbery and the

1 All undesignated references are to the Penal Code unless indicated otherwise.
2 A detailed recitation of the facts was provided in our previous nonpublished opinion,
People v. Jackson (June 10, 2024, F084170), review granted August 28, 2024, S286085, which
affirmed the trial court’s denial of appellant’s section 1172.6 petition following an evidentiary
hearing.

2.
§ 12022.5, subd. (a), firearm enhancement) plus an indeterminate term of 15 years to life
for second degree murder. (Stats. 1986, ch. 1428, § 4, pp. 5123–5124 [robbery]; Stats.
1990, ch. 41, § 3, pp. 245–247 [firearm enhancement].)
In May 2024, appellant filed a petition for resentencing under section 1172.1. The
trial court issued an order denying the petition. The order acknowledged receipt of
appellant’s petition, but noted “Penal Code section 1172.1, subdivision (c) clearly states
that ‘[a] defendant is not entitled to file a petition seeking relief from the court under this
section.’ Therefore, [appellant’s] request for recall of sentence and resentencing is
denied.”
DISCUSSION
Respondent argues section 1172.1 expressly provides that a defendant has no right
to file a request for relief under the statute, and the trial court is under no obligation to
take any action on such a request. Respondent contends that because there is no
cognizable right to resentencing upon a defendant’s unauthorized request for relief, the
trial court’s denial of such a request does not affect any substantial right of appellant
within the meaning of section 1237, subdivision (b), and the appeal is subject to
dismissal.
Section 1172.1 permits various government actors such as prison officials, the
Board of Parole Hearings, and prosecutorial agencies to petition for the recall of a
defendant’s sentencing and resentencing. (Id., subd. (a)(1).) Effective January 1, 2024,
section 1172.1, subdivision (a)(1), now permits a trial court to resentence a defendant “on
its own motion” when “applicable sentencing laws at the time of original sentencing are
subsequently changed by new statutory authority or case law .…” (Ibid., as amended by
Stats. 2023, ch. 795, § 1.5.) Before this amendment, a trial court had jurisdiction under
this statute only to recall a sentence on its own motion and resentence a defendant within
120 days of the date of judgment. (§ 1172.1, former subd. (a)(1).)

3.
Relevant here, under section 1172.1, subdivision (c), “A defendant is not entitled
to file a petition seeking relief from the court under this section. If a defendant requests
consideration for relief under this section, the court is not required to respond.” (Ibid.)
Respondent argues the trial court’s summary denial pursuant to section 1172.1,
subdivision (c), is an unappealable order under section 1237, and the appeal must be
dismissed for lack of appellate jurisdiction.
“The right to appeal is statutory only, and a party may not appeal a trial court’s
judgment, order or ruling unless such is expressly made appealable by statute.” (People
v. Loper (2015) 60 Cal.4th 1155, 1159 (Loper).) Section 1172.1 itself contains no express
right to appeal, and therefore section 1237, which generally governs a defendant’s right to
appeal in criminal cases, controls whether the trial court’s decision in this case is
appealable. (People v. Hodge (2024) 107 Cal.App.5th 985, 992 (Hodge) [no portion of
§ 1172.1 explicitly establishes a right to appeal] (Hodge); Loper, supra, at p. 1159 [right
to appeal in criminal cases governed by § 1237].) Section 1237, subdivision (b), permits
a defendant to appeal “From any order made after judgment, affecting the substantial
rights of the party.”
Two Courts of Appeal have recently considered whether a trial court’s declination
to consider a defendant’s unauthorized request for recall and resentencing under
section 1172.1 constitutes an appealable order under section 1237. In Hodge, the Court
of Appeal was presented with an order nearly identical to the one issued in appellant’s
case summarily declining to consider the defendant’s unauthorized motion for
resentencing under section 1172.1. (Hodge, supra, 107 Cal.App.5th at p. 994.) Finding
the trial court’s written summary denial decision met the definition of a judicial order,
Hodge concluded it did not affect the defendant’s substantial rights. Hodge reasoned the
second sentence of section 1172.1, subdivision (c), “excuses the trial court from any
responsibility” to rule on an unauthorized motion by a defendant, “or even to respond.”
(Hodge, supra, at p. 996.) As such, “a defendant who chooses to file an unauthorized

4.
request for resentencing has no right to a ruling.” (Ibid.) While a defendant “may have a
liberty interest at stake in any decision as to whether they should remain incarcerated,” a
defendant “has no right to demand that the trial court actually make such a decision. If
the defendant has no right to a decision, the trial court’s choice not to make one does not
deprive the defendant of any right at all, much less a substantial one.” (Ibid.)
In People v. Faustinos (2025) 109 Cal.App.5th 687 (Faustinos), the defendant
petitioned for resentencing under section 1172.1, but the trial court took no action, stating
it “‘[did] not have jurisdiction to consider [the] motion.’” (Faustinos, supra, at p. 693.)
Faustinos held that because a defendant is not entitled to file a section 1172.1 petition or
to receive a ruling if he nevertheless files one, it follows “that an appeal from an order
acting on his petition (whether couched as a denial, dismissal, or any other statement that
the court is not acting) does not affect the defendant’s substantial rights.” (Faustinos,
supra, at p. 696.) As such, the court concluded it lacked “authority to rule on the merits
of appeals from orders filed in response to a defendant’s attempt to seek resentencing
under section 1172.1.” (Ibid.)
We agree with Hodge and Faustinos that a trial court’s written declination to
consider a defendant’s unauthorized request for recall and resentencing under
section 1172.1 does not affect a defendant’s substantial rights for purposes of
section 1237, and it is not an appealable order. Section 1172.1 expressly indicates the
trial court is under no obligation to consider a defendant’s unauthorized request for recall
and resentencing at all—indeed, it has no obligation even to respond to such a request—
and there are no criteria a court must consider in refusing to consider an unauthorized
request from a defendant. These facets of section 1172.1 set this case apart from the
circumstances in Loper and People v. Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367 (Carmony).
In Loper, the trial court denied the Department of Correction and Rehabilitation’s
(CDCR) recommendation that the defendant be granted compassionate release under
section 1170, subdivision (e), which the defendant appealed. (Loper, supra, 60 Cal.4th at

5.
pp. 1158–1159.) The Attorney General argued that because the defendant had no
standing under the statute to seek compassionate release, the trial court’s denial of
CDCR’s recommendation could not affect the defendant’s substantial rights. (Id. at
p. 1161.) In rejecting this argument, Loper noted that even though the defendant had no
independent right to initiate compassionate release proceedings, the trial court was
statutorily obligated to consider CDCR’s recommendation for release on its merits.
(Ibid., fn. 3.) The statute provided the trial court with discretion to consider a
recommendation from CDCR, and established eligibility criteria for doing so. (Ibid.)
Unlike CDCR’s recommendation in Loper, appellant’s request for recall and resentencing
is unauthorized, section 1172.1 expressly indicates the trial court is not obligated to
consider an unauthorized request from a defendant, and there are no statutory criteria a
court must consider in declining to act on an unauthorized request. (Id., subd. (c).)
Different from Loper, a summary denial under these circumstances does not affect any
substantial rights of appellant.
A defendant’s unauthorized request for recall and resentencing under
section 1172.1 is also different from inviting a trial court to exercise its power to dismiss
or strike a prior conviction under section 1385. As explained in Carmony, although the
defendant has no standing to request the court dismiss or strike a prior conviction under
section 1385, the defendant may invite the trial court to exercise its power to do so, and
the trial court is then required to consider whether dismissal is in furtherance of justice
and make a ruling. (Carmony, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 375 [if a defendant invites the court
to exercise its power under § 1385, “‘the court must consider evidence offered by the
defendant in support of his assertion that the dismissal would be in furtherance of
justice’”].) Dissimilar to the section 1385 context, section 1172.1 places no similar
obligation on the trial court to consider the merits of recall and resentencing when invited
to do so by the defendant—indeed, the Legislature has expressly stated the trial court is

6.
under no obligation to even respond to a defendant’s request that the court exercise its
power to recall and resentence. (Id., subd. (c).)
Moreover, because the trial court’s power under section 1172.1 to decline action
on a defendant’s request for resentencing or to act on its own motion is subject to no
specific criteria, such a denial leaves nothing to review on appeal. “Discretionary
decisions by the trial court are generally subject to appellate review under the abuse of
discretion standard to determine if they were within the bounds of some applicable legal
criteria. [Citation.] In particular, a trial court’s discretionary sentencing decision may be
reviewed to determine if the court acted to achieve legitimate sentencing objectives or if
the decision was merely irrational or arbitrary. [Citation.] Here, however, the trial court
did not make a sentencing decision: It simply declined to reconsider a decision it had
already made. There are no discernable criteria for an appellate court to evaluate a trial
court’s decision not to reconsider a sentence on its own motion under section 1172.1.”
(Hodge, supra, 107 Cal.App.5th at p. 998.)
While the trial court could consider an unauthorized request on its own motion
(§ 1172.1, subd. (a)), nothing indicates the court did so in this case. The statute requires
that when the trial court considers the merits of recall and resentencing on its own
motion, the trial court “shall consider postconviction factors” and “evidence that reflects
that circumstances have changed since the original sentencing so that continued
incarceration is no longer in the interests of justice.” (Id., subd. (b)(5).) Additionally, a
hearing must be held unless the parties have stipulated otherwise—and then only if
resentencing is granted (id., subd. (a)(8)(A) & (9)), and the trial court is obligated to state
“on the record the reasons for its decision to grant or deny recall and resentencing” (id.,
subd. (a)(7)).
The trial court’s summary denial did not examine postconviction factors, no
hearing was held, and no statement of reasons supported the summary denial other than
indicating the request was unauthorized. Had the trial court considered appellant’s

7.
request on its own motion, it would have been obligated to follow the statute’s procedural
steps and consider the relevant evidence. Because the trial court did not do so, we must
presume the summary denial referencing section 1172.1, subdivision (c), did not reflect
an exercise of the court’s own motion power. (See People v. Stowell (2003) 31 Cal.4th
1107, 1114 [a trial court is presumed to have been aware of and followed the applicable
law]; Denham v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 564 [a judgment or order of the
lower court is presumed correct, and all intendments and presumptions are indulged to
support it on matters to which the record is silent].)
Appellant argues the record raises concerns the superior court has a policy not to
review any section 1172.1 requests whatsoever when made by defendants. Appellant
points out the summary denial he received appears to be a fillable form order with
language that denies every petition or request initiated by a defendant, regardless of the
equities weighing in favor of an exercise of judicial discretion in any particular case. We
find nothing in the order that indicates a blanket policy never to consider any
section 1172.1 petitions filed by defendants. It appears the trial court issued the order as
an administrative courtesy to alert appellant that his request had been received, but that it
would not be considered pursuant to section 1172.1, subdivision (c), an election the trial
court was statutorily empowered to make.
In sum, because appellant had no right to a ruling on his unauthorized request for
recall and resentencing under section 1172.1, the trial court’s summary denial did not
affect appellant’s substantial rights. Nothing obligated the trial court to reach appellant’s
request on the court’s own motion, nor is there any indication it did so. As such, this
court does not have appellate jurisdiction pursuant to section 1237 to review the trial
court’s summary denial, and the appeal must be dismissed. (Hodge, supra, 107
Cal.App.5th at p. 999; Faustinos, supra, 109 Cal.App.5th at p. 697.)

8.
DISPOSITION
The appeal is dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

MEEHAN, J.
WE CONCUR:

LEVY, Acting P. J.

DeSANTOS, J.

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