Protopappas v. Hindin CA2/5

CourtListener 10587546Calctapp20.05.2025

Gesamter Gesetzestext

Filed 5/20/25 Protopappas v. Hindin CA2/5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FIVE

TONY PROTOPAPPAS as B338311
personal representative, etc.,
(Los Angeles County
Plaintiff and Appellant, Super. Ct. No.
21STCV19741)
v.

ROBERT M. HINDIN,

Defendant and Respondent.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Kevin C. Brazile, Judge. Affirmed.
Catanzarite Law Corporation and Kenneth J. Catanzarite
for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Park Law Firm and Mary M. Park for Defendant and
Respondent.
I. INTRODUCTION

In 2013, Kosmas Pappas obtained a $31,131.37 stipulated
judgment (the judgment) against M. Sadegh Namazikhah
(Namazikhah); M.S.Namazikhah D.M.D., a dental corporation
(N.Corp. 1); and Namazikhah DMD, Inc. (N.Corp. 2).1 In 2021,
plaintiff filed a first amended complaint against N.Corp. 1,
N.Corp. 2, Essential Endodontics, Inc. (EE Corp.), and Robert M.
Hindin (defendant) asserting various causes of action based on
their alleged improper efforts to thwart enforcement of the
judgment. The trial court granted defendant’s motion for
summary judgment or, alternatively, summary adjudication
(summary judgment motion)2 as to the single cause of action
against defendant—damages for fraudulent transfer.3 Plaintiff
appeals and we affirm.

1 Pappas died during the pendency of this action. His
brother, Tony Protopappas, as personal representative of and
successor in interest to Pappas’s estate was substituted in the
action as plaintiff. References to “plaintiff” include Pappas and
Protopappas.

2 N.Corp. 1 and EE Corp. separately moved for summary
judgment or, alternatively, summary adjudication. The court
denied their motion. This appeal concerns only the court’s ruling
on defendant’s summary judgment motion.

3 The first amended complaint also asserted an accounting
cause of action against defendant. Defendant’s respondent’s brief
asserts plaintiff waived his right to assert the accounting cause of
action against defendant when plaintiff elected not to file an
amended pleading after the court sustained defendant’s demurrer
to the first amended complaint with leave to amend. Defendant

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II. BACKGROUND

A. First Amended Complaint

On July 19, 2021, plaintiff filed the first amended
complaint asserting six causes of action: (1) to set aside
fraudulent transfer of property, (2) damages for fraudulent
transfer, (3) declaratory relief, (4) judicial foreclosure,
(5) appointment of a receiver, and (6) accounting.
The first amended complaint alleged plaintiff obtained
entry of a judgment on May 2, 2013, against Namazikhah,
N.Corp. 1, and N.Corp. 2.4 The judgment required payment of
$24,000 plus $3,631.37 in interest and $3,000 in attorney fees for
a total judgment of $31,131.37.5 None of these defendants made
any payments on the judgment. Since entry of judgment, $24,904
in additional interest accrued on the judgment, and plaintiff
incurred over $60,000 in attorney fees and costs that were
recoverable under the judgment.

does not provide adequate record support for this assertion.
Because plaintiff does not dispute the assertion and neither party
otherwise addresses the accounting cause of action in their briefs
on appeal, we accept the assertion as true.

4 The first amended complaint alleged there were other
defendants who were parties to the stipulated judgment but not
relevant to plaintiff’s current action. The only defendants
identified in the stipulated judgment plaintiff attached as an
exhibit to the first amended complaint, however, are
Namazikhah, N.Corp. 1, and N.Corp. 2.

5 Based on the numbers the first amended complaint
provided, our math shows a total judgment of $30,631.37.

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On September 15, 2015, Namazikhah filed a personal
Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition. In that proceeding, he listed as
personal property N.Corp. 1, which he valued at $28,000.
On July 6, 2017, plaintiff filed with the California
Secretary of State a UCC Filing Acknowledgement for the
judgment.
On August 15, 2017, plaintiff filed an objection to
Namazikhah’s Disclosure Statement and Plan in his bankruptcy
proceeding stating “the [j]udgment had to be taken into account
related to the payments of salary Namazikhah was taking from
[N.Corp. 1] given [p]laintiff’s lien rights and amount due of
$62,000.”
On August 31, 2017, Namazikhah filed amended schedules
that again listed N.Corp. 1 at a value of $28,000.
On May 18, 2018, Namazikhah filed his First Amended
Disclosure Statement and Plan in his bankruptcy proceeding. He
stated he expected “‘[t]he plan will be funded by the following:
. . . (b) employment income ranging between $25,000.00 to
$35,000.00 per month; . . .’ . . . and provided that such income
would be from [N.Corp. 1].” (Emphasis omitted.)
On November 6, 2019, the bankruptcy court denied
Namazikhah’s Fourth Amended Disclosure Statement and Plan.
On December 20, 2019, the court converted Namazikhah’s case to
a Chapter 7 case and ordered a trustee appointed.
Faced with plaintiff’s July 6, 2017, Secretary of State filing
and plaintiff’s August 15, 2017, opposition to Namazikhah’s
bankruptcy plan, Namazikhah and defendant, his attorney,
“hatch[ed] [a] plan and scheme to transfer [N.Corp. 1’s] assets
without fair and adequate consideration to [EE Corp.], all in an
effort to avoid [p]laintiff’s [j]udgment lien.” Defendant was aware

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of the judgment and plaintiff’s efforts to collect the judgment and
“advised Namazikhah to pursue [a] fraudulent strategy of a
bogus transfer of [N.Corp. 1’s] assets to a new corporation that he
would form for that purpose.”
On September 15, 2017, consistent with the “hatched plan
and scheme,” defendant formed EE Corp. Also, as part of the
plan and scheme, on November 17, 2017, Namazikhah caused to
be filed a Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition for N.Corp. 1. The
bankruptcy filing listed gross revenue of $486,000 in 2016, which
meant N.Corp. 1 had assets and income earning ability that was
more than sufficient to pay the judgment in full.
On June 5, 2018, the Chapter 7 trustee for Namazikhah
filed a motion to approve the sale of all of N.Corp. 1’s assets to EE
Corp. for $7,500, and attached an Asset Purchase Agreement
signed by Namazikhah for EE Corp. On June 13, 2018, plaintiff
filed an opposition to the proposed sale, arguing the sale was for
less than fair and adequate consideration and was designed to
cheat Namazikhah’s creditors, including plaintiff. On June 21,
2018, the Chapter 7 trustee withdrew her motion to approve the
sale. The bankruptcy proceeding closed on August 31, 2020.
At a judgment debtor exam on May 21, 2021, Namazikhah,
supported by defendant’s speaking objections, falsely testified he
sold all of N.Corp. 1’s assets to EE Corp. for $7,500, a price
agreed upon with the Chapter 7 trustee, and was practicing
dentistry through EE Corp. “[H]aving failed in an attempt to
insulate” the transfer of N.Corp. 1’s assets to EE Corp.,
Namazikhah and defendant “made the transfer anyway without
court approval and without fair and adequate consideration by
[EE Corp.] to [N.Corp. 1] and transferred the going concern value
of the Namizakhah [sic] dental practice assets, goodwill,

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contracts, receivables and work in progress to [EE Corp.] all with
the specific purpose [to] hinder, delay and defraud [p]laintiff.”
The second cause of action for damages for fraudulent
transfer alleged defendant conspired with N.Corp. 1, N.Corp. 2,
and EE Corp. to transfer N.Corp. 1’s assets to EE Corp. to
prevent plaintiff from accessing those assets to satisfy the
judgment and to defraud him of his right to collect “monies duly
awarded by this Court.” The asset transfer resulted from
discussions and an agreement between Namazikhah as a
shareholder, director, and officer of both N.Corp. 1 and EE Corp.
and defendant who was simultaneously counsel for Namazikhah,
N.Corp. 1, and EE Corp. The transfer was made in secret
without documentation after plaintiff’s opposition to the Chapter
7 trustee’s motion to sell all of N.Corp. 1’s assets caused the
trustee to withdraw the motion. Defendant knew about the
judgment, plaintiff’s effort to collect the judgment, and the
attempt to sell N.Corp. 1’s assets in the Chapter 7 bankruptcy
proceeding. The net fair market value of N.Corp. 1’s assets was
$400,000.

B. Summary Judgment Proceedings

1. Defendant’s Summary Judgment Arguments and
Supporting Evidence

On October 24, 2023, defendant filed his summary
judgment motion. He argued, among other things, there was no
evidence he participated in a civil conspiracy to transfer
fraudulently N.Corp. 1’s assets to EE Corp.

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In support of his summary judgment motion, defendant
submitted, among other evidence, his declaration in which he set
forth his legal representation of Namazikhah and his
involvement with EE Corp. He declared that in 2012,
Namazikhah sold his dental practices to Abraham Ghorbanian.
After selling his practices, Namazikhah agreed to work in
partnership with Ghorbanian, but the relationship “soured”—
Ghorbanian sued Namazikhah for breach of contract and
Namazikhah countersued Ghorbanian (together, the Ghorbanian
action). Defendant represented Namazikhah in that action.
In the course of his representation in the Ghorbanian
action, defendant learned Ghorbanian contacted 2,500 dentists in
Southern California by letter (Ghorbanian letter) and falsely
disparaged Namazikhah’s endodontic practice, damaging
Namazikhah’s reputation. As a result, Namazikhah lost
significant business. At Namazikhah’s request, defendant
referred him to a bankruptcy attorney.
On September 20, 2015, Namazikhah filed for Chapter 11
bankruptcy. The bankruptcy court appointed defendant as
special counsel to handle two personal injury matters and to
defend Namazikhah in the Ghorbanian action.
On November 17, 2017, Namazikhah’s dental corporation
filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy. In late 2017, Namazikhah asked
defendant to form EE Corp. so he could practice endodontics.
Namazikhah explained the Ghorbanian letter caused him to lose
all of his business and a new business that did not bear his name
would allow him to rebuild his practice. Defendant formed EE
Corp. for a flat fee of $1,500 plus filing fees.
Namazikhah did not ask defendant to form EE Corp. so he
could evade creditors. Namazikhah was already in personal

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bankruptcy and had identified plaintiff as a creditor.
Namazikhah never asked defendant for advice about asset
protection management and defendant never gave him such
advice. Defendant did not advise Namazikhah to commit a fraud
or hide assets from creditors, including plaintiff, and did not
provide Namazikhah a plan to defraud his creditors through
“‘bogus’ transfers.” After forming EE Corp., defendant did not
provide any legal advice to, represent, or have any contact or
involvement with EE Corp.
In mid-2018, defendant was invited to a meeting with
Namazikhah and his bankruptcy attorneys. In that meeting,
defendant first learned about the failed attempt of EE Corp. to
purchase N.Corp. 1’s used dental office furniture and equipment
for $7,500 in the bankruptcy proceeding. He also then first heard
of plaintiff and learned about the judgment lien. Defendant was
not involved in the proposed bankruptcy sale of N.Corp. 1’s
assets.

2. Plaintiff’s Argument Opposing Summary Judgment
and Supporting Evidence

In opposing defendant’s summary judgment motion,
plaintiff argued there was evidence from which a jury could infer
that defendant had actual knowledge of the formation and
operation of a conspiracy to transfer fraudulently N.Corp. 1’s
assets to EE Corp. for $7,500. He supported his argument with
the following claimed evidence:
a. Defendant represented Namazikhah and N.Corp. 1 in
the Ghorbanian action in which Ghorbanian valued N.Corp. 1’s
“going concern business and assets including goodwill” at “over

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$600,000” giving defendant “actual knowledge as to the value of
[N.Corp. 1’s] assets which were never conveyed to Ghorbanian in
alleged breach of contract.”
b. The court in Namazikhah’s personal bankruptcy
proceeding appointed defendant as special counsel to represent
Namazikhah in the Ghorbanian action, plaintiff was named as a
creditor in the bankruptcy proceeding, and defendant was listed
on the discharge in that bankruptcy proceeding.
c. During Namazikhah’s personal bankruptcy
proceeding “in view of [p]laintiff’s [j]udgment and the
Ghorbanian[ a]ction claims to [N.Corp. 1’s] business and assets
for $600,000 as of 2012, [defendant] was paid to from [sic] both
[N.Corp. 1] ($35,000 in 2016 and $9,000 in 2017) and [EE Corp.]
as a general business corporation on September 15, 2017 the
purpose for which [defendant] testified Namazikhah told him was
due to ‘some threats’ (i.e. [p]laintiff’s [j]udgment, the Ghorbanian[
a]ction, and [p]ersonal [bankruptcy].”
d. Namazikhah did not amend his personal bankruptcy
schedules to name EE Corp. and defendant was aware
Namazikhah was going to file for bankruptcy for N.Corp. 1.
e. Namazikhah testified that as soon as EE Corp. was
formed and before N.Corp. 1’s bankruptcy was filed, N.Corp. 1
transferred all its assets to EE Corp. including its going concern,
patient files, referral list, furniture, insurance, and goodwill. EE
Corp.’s improper receipt of collections was evidenced by tax
returns. Plaintiff’s expert valued the transferred assets at over
$446,000.
f. The transfer of N.Corp. 1’s assets to EE Corp. prior to
N.Corp. 1’s bankruptcy left N.Corp. 1 insolvent and led to its
bankruptcy.

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g. N.Corp. 1’s bankruptcy schedules stated it did not
own any accounts receivable, investments, inventory, machinery,
intangibles (goodwill), or any other assets when it filed for
bankruptcy.
h. Defendant represented Namazikhah during his
May 21, 2021, deposition.6

3. The Trial Court’s Ruling

The trial court granted defendant’s summary judgment
motion. It ruled plaintiff’s evidence that defendant represented
Namazikhah in the Ghorbanian action, knew N.Corp. 1 would file
for bankruptcy, was involved in Namazikhah’s personal
bankruptcy, and formed EE Corp. was insufficient to create a
triable issue of fact concerning the formation of a conspiracy. No
evidence showed defendant knew that any transfer from
N.Corp. 1 to EE Corp. would be without adequate consideration
and engineered to escape creditors.

III. DISCUSSION

Plaintiff contends the trial court erred when it granted
defendant’s summary judgment motion. He contends there is a
triable issue of material fact concerning whether defendant
conspired to transfer fraudulently N.Corp. 1’s assets to EE Corp.
We disagree.

6 The evidence plaintiff cites does not support this
proposition. Plaintiff included in this claimed factual basis for
denying defendant’s summary judgment motion a claim about the
applicability of legal authority defendant cited in his motion.

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A. Standard of Review

“A trial court properly grants summary judgment where no
triable issue of material fact exists and the moving party is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c,
subd. (c).) We review the trial court’s decision [on a summary
judgment motion] de novo, considering all of the evidence the
parties offered in connection with the motion (except that which
the court properly excluded) and the uncontradicted inferences
the evidence reasonably supports. [Citation.]” (Merrill v.
Navegar, Inc. (2001) 26 Cal.4th 465, 476.)
“[I]n moving for summary judgment, a ‘defendant . . . has
met’ his ‘burden of showing that a cause of action has no merit if’
he ‘has shown that one or more elements of the cause of action
. . . cannot be established, or that there is a complete defense to
that cause of action. Once the defendant . . . has met that
burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff . . . to show that a
triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to that cause
of action or a defense thereto.” (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co.
(2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 849.) “There is a triable issue of material
fact if, and only if, the evidence would allow a reasonable trier of
fact to find the underlying fact in favor of the party opposing the
motion in accordance with the applicable standard of proof.” (Id.
at p. 850, fn. omitted.) A party opposing summary judgment
“may rely upon inferences, but ‘those inferences must be
reasonably deducible from the evidence, and not such as are
derived from speculation, conjecture, imagination, or guesswork.
[Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (Santa Clara Valley Water Dist. v.
Century Indemnity Co. (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 1016, 1035 (Santa
Clara); Sinai Mem’l Chapel v. Dudler (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 190,

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196–197 (Sinai Mem’l) [conclusory assertions or mere
possibilities do not raise a triable issue of fact]; Buehler v. Alpha
Beta Co. (1990) 224 Cal.App.3d 729, 733 (Buehler) [an “opposition
to summary judgment will be deemed insufficient when it is
essentially conclusionary, argumentative or based on conjecture
and speculation”].)

B. Analysis

“‘Conspiracy is not a cause of action, but a legal doctrine
that imposes liability on persons who, although not actually
committing a tort themselves, share with the immediate
tortfeasors a common plan or design in its perpetration.’
[Citation.]” (AREI II Cases (2013) 216 Cal.App.4th 1004, 1021.)
To prove a claim for civil conspiracy, a plaintiff must provide
“substantial evidence of three elements: (1) the formation and
operation of the conspiracy, (2) wrongful conduct in furtherance
of the conspiracy, and (3) damages arising from the wrongful
conduct.” (Kidron v. Movie Acquisition Corp. (1995) 40
Cal.App.4th 1571, 1581.)
“It is well settled that ‘“[b]are” allegations and “rank”
conjecture do not suffice for a civil conspiracy.’ [Citation.] A
party seeking to establish a civil conspiracy ‘must show that each
member of the conspiracy acted in concert and came to a mutual
understanding to accomplish a common and unlawful plan, and
that one or more of them committed an overt act to further it.
[Citation.] It is not enough that the [conspirators] knew of an
intended wrongful act, they had to agree—expressly or tacitly—to
achieve it.’ [Citation.] It must be recognized, however, that
because of the very nature of a conspiracy, ‘its existence must

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often be inferentially and circumstantially derived from the
character of the acts done, the relations of the parties and other
facts and circumstances suggestive of concerted action.’
[Citation.]” (AREI II Cases, supra, 216 Cal.App.4th at p. 1022.)
In support of his summary judgment motion, defendant
presented evidence that showed in late 2017 Namazikhah asked
him to form EE Corp. so Namazikhah could practice endodontics.
Namazikhah told defendant he needed a new corporation that did
not bear his name because the Ghorbanian letter damaged his
reputation and caused him to lose all of his business.
Namazikhah did not ask defendant to form EE Corp. so he could
evade creditors and defendant did not advise Namazikhah to
commit a fraud or hide assets from creditors. After forming EE
Corp., defendant did not provide it with any legal advice,
represent it, or have any contact or involvement with it.
In rebuttal, plaintiff presented evidence that showed
defendant represented Namazikhah and N.Corp. 1 in the
Ghorbanian action in which Ghorbanian claimed N.Corp. 1
improperly retained assets worth $600,00 from his purchase of
Namazikhah’s his dental practices; defendant formed EE Corp.;
as soon as EE Corp. was formed and before N.Corp. 1 filed for
bankruptcy, N.Corp. 1 transferred all its assets to EE Corp.;
defendant was involved in Namazikhah’s personal bankruptcy;
plaintiff’s expert valued N.Corp. 1’s assets at $446,000; and
N.Corp. 1 it sold its assets to EE Corp. for $7,500.
Plaintiff’s evidence may have been sufficient to create a
triable issue of fact about whether the assets N.Corp. 1
transferred to EE Corp. were worth more than $7,500. It was
not, however, sufficient to create a triable issue of fact about
whether defendant conspired to transfer fraudulently those

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assets to prevent plaintiff from satisfying the judgment. Plaintiff
presented no evidence from which reasonable inferences could be
drawn that defendant was involved in or even knew of the asset
transfer. Accordingly, plaintiff’s argument that defendant
conspired to fraudulently transfer N.Corp. 1’s assets to EE Corp.
is speculation and conjecture insufficient to defeat summary
judgment. (Santa Clara, supra, 89 Cal.App.5th at p. 1035; Sinai
Mem’l, supra, 231 Cal.App.3d at pp. 196–197; Buehler, supra, 224
Cal.App.3d at p. 733.)

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IV. DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed. Defendant is entitled to his
costs on appeal.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

KIM (D.), J.

We concur:

MOOR, Acting P. J.

WILLIAMS, J.*

* Judge of the Santa Clara County Superior Court, assigned
by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the
California Constitution.

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