CourtListener 10587448•People v. Sanchez CA2/2
Gesamter Gesetzestext
Filed 5/20/25 P. v. Sanchez CA2/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
THE PEOPLE, B336869
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. PA056134)
v.
DAVID ERNESTO SANCHEZ,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Hayden A. Zacky, Judge. Reversed and
remanded.
James R. Bostwick, Jr., under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Robin Davis and Melanie Dorian, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
______________________________
Defendant and appellant David Ernesto Sanchez appeals
from the trial court’s February 8, 2024, order denying his petition
for recall and resentencing pursuant to Penal Code section 1170,
subdivision (d).1 The People concede that the court erred. We
agree with the parties. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s
order and remand the matter for further proceedings.
BACKGROUND
I. Conviction and Sentencing
In 2008, a jury found defendant guilty of three counts of
attempted murder (§§ 664, 187, subd. (a); counts 1–3), one count
of shooting at an inhabited dwelling (§ 246; count 4), and three
counts of assault with a semiautomatic firearm (§ 245, subd. (b);
counts 5–7). As to all counts, the jury found true the allegation
that defendant committed the offenses for the benefit of, at the
direction of, or in association with a criminal street gang
(§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)). As to counts 1 through 3, the jury found
that defendant committed the attempted murders willfully,
deliberately, and with premeditation within the meaning of
section 664, subdivision (a); that a principal used a firearm
within the meaning of section 12022.53, subdivisions (b), (c), and
(e)(1); and that defendant personally used a firearm within the
meaning of section 12022.53, subdivisions (b) and (c). In
1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code
unless otherwise indicated.
2
connection with counts 5 through 7, the jury found true the
allegation that defendant personally used a firearm within the
meaning of section 12022.5, subdivision (a).
The trial court sentenced defendant to an aggregate term of
60 years plus 45 years to life in state prison. The sentence was
comprised of three consecutive terms of life with the possibility of
parole after 15 years for the attempted murders, plus three
consecutive 20-year terms for the firearm enhancements. The
court imposed and stayed sentences on the remaining counts.
We affirmed the judgment on direct appeal. (People v.
Sanchez (Aug. 5, 2009, B210061) [nonpub. opn.].)
II. Petition for Recall and Resentencing
On October 4, 2023, defendant filed a petition for recall and
resentencing pursuant to section 1170, subdivision (d).2
Defendant alleged that he was 17 years old at the time of the
crime and had been incarcerated for a least 15 years. Relying on
People v. Heard (2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 608 (Heard), defendant
argued that he was entitled to relief because he had been
sentenced to the functional equivalent of life without the
possibility of parole (LWOP) and satisfied the other criteria for
resentencing. The People opposed the petition.
III. Trial Court’s Ruling
On February 8, 2024, the trial court issued an order
denying defendant’s section 1170, subdivision (d) petition. The
court declined to follow Heard, supra, 83 Cal.App.5th 608 and
instead concluded that defendant was ineligible for relief because
he was not serving an LWOP sentence.
2 Defendant previously filed a section 1170, subdivision (d)
petition in July 2023, which the trial court denied. That petition
is not at issue in this appeal.
3
IV. Appeal
This timely appeal ensued.
DISCUSSION
I. Standard of Review
We apply de novo review where, as here, the appeal turns
on questions of law and the application of law to undisputed
facts. (People v. Ashford University, LLC (2024) 100 Cal.App.5th
485, 518.)
II. Relevant Law
Under section 1170, subdivision (d)(1)(A), “[w]hen a
defendant who was under 18 years of age at the time of the
commission of the offense for which the defendant was sentenced
to imprisonment for life without the possibility of parole has been
incarcerated for at least 15 years, the defendant may submit to
the sentencing court a petition for recall and resentencing.”
Among other things, the petition must state that at least one of
four qualifying circumstances is true. (§ 1170, subd. (d)(2).)3 If
the court finds by a preponderance of the evidence that a
qualifying circumstance is true, the court must recall the
sentence and hold a resentencing hearing. (§ 1170, subd. (d)(5).)
3 The qualifying circumstances are: (1) “The defendant was
convicted pursuant to felony murder or aiding and abetting
murder provisions of law”; (2) “[t]he defendant does not have
juvenile felony adjudications for assault or other felony crimes
with a significant potential for personal harm to victims prior to
the offense for which the sentence is being considered for recall”;
(3) “[t]he defendant committed the offense with at least one adult
codefendant”; or (4) “[t]he defendant has performed acts that tend
to indicate rehabilitation or the potential for rehabilitation . . . .”
(§ 1170, subd. (d)(2)(A)-(D).)
4
On its face, section 1170, subdivision (d), limits relief to
juvenile offenders sentenced to LWOP. (People v. Olmos (2025)
109 Cal.App.5th 580, 583; Heard, supra, 83 Cal.App.5th at
pp. 622–626.) However, in Heard, the Court of Appeal held that
denying the opportunity to petition for section 1170,
subdivision (d) relief to juvenile offenders sentenced to the
functional equivalent of LWOP violates the constitutional
guarantee of equal protection. (Heard, supra, at pp. 612, 626–
634; see also People v. Sorto (2024) 104 Cal.App.5th 435, 454
(Sorto) [agreeing “with the Heard court that section 1170[,
subdivision (d),] violates the constitutional guarantee of equal
protection by denying relief to juvenile offenders sentenced to
functionally equivalent LWOP terms”].)
III. Analysis
Defendant was sentenced to a total term of 105 years to life
in prison (60 years plus 45 years to life), which is the functional
equivalent of LWOP. (See People v. Bagsby (2024)
106 Cal.App.5th 1040, 1047, 1051 [107-year-to-life sentence
functional equivalent of LWOP]; Heard, supra, 83 Cal.App.5th at
pp. 612, 629 [same for 103-year-to-life sentence]; see generally
Sorto, supra, 104 Cal.App.5th at p. 443 [“a sentence is the
functional equivalent of LWOP if it includes a ‘term of years with
a parole eligibility date that falls outside the juvenile offender’s
natural life expectancy[]’”].) Based on his right to equal
protection of the laws, defendant is entitled to seek recall and
resentencing relief under section 1170, subdivision (d). (See
Heard, supra, at p. 612; Sorto, supra, at p. 440.) We agree with
the parties that the trial court erred in concluding otherwise.4
4 The trial court did not consider itself bound by Heard,
supra, 83 Cal.App.5th 608 because it concluded that Heard was
5
We therefore reverse the order denying defendant’s
section 1170, subdivision (d) petition. On remand, the court shall
reconsider the merits of defendant’s petition and, in the first
instance, make findings as to whether defendant satisfies any of
the qualifying circumstances set forth in section 1170,
subdivision (d)(2)(A)-(D).5 (See Heard, supra, 83 Cal.App.5th at
p. 634.)
DISPOSITION
The trial court’s February 8, 2024, order denying
defendant’s section 1170, subdivision (d) petition is reversed. On
remand, the court shall reconsider the merits of defendant’s
petition. If the court finds by a preponderance of the evidence
that one or more of the qualifying circumstances set forth in
inconsistent with People v. Franklin (2016) 63 Cal.4th 261
(Franklin). This was incorrect. (See Bagsby, supra,
106 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1056–1059 [Heard and Franklin are
consistent]; Sorto, supra, 104 Cal.App.5th at pp. 447–448 [same].)
5 Defendant contends that the trial court made an implied
finding that, apart from not being sentenced to LWOP, defendant
otherwise met the statutory requirements for resentencing. We
disagree. Having deemed defendant ineligible as a matter of law,
the court did not make any express or implied factual findings
regarding defendant’s entitlement to relief.
6
section 1170, subdivision (d)(2)(A)-(D), is true, the court shall
recall defendant’s sentence and hold a hearing pursuant to
section 1170, subdivision (d)(5).
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS.
_____________________, Acting P. J.
ASHMANN-GERST
We concur:
________________________, J.
CHAVEZ
________________________, J.
RICHARDSON
7
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