People v. Mancha CA4/1

CourtListener 10587430Calctapp20.05.2025

Gesamter Gesetzestext

Filed 5/20/25 P. v. Mancha CA4/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or
ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THE PEOPLE, D084187

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v. (Super. Ct. No. SCE405573)

KEITH THOMAS MANCHA,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Patricia K. Cookson, Judge. Affirmed.
Patrick Morgan Ford for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Daniel
Rogers and Vincent P. LaPietra, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
A jury found Keith Mancha guilty of one count of oral copulation of an

unconscious person (Pen. Code,1 § 287, subd. (f)) (count 1); one count of
forcible sexual penetration (§ 289, subd. (a)) (count 2); and one count of
forcible rape (§ 261, subd. (a)(2)) (count 3). The trial court sentenced Mancha
to prison for a 10-year term, based on consecutive sentencing for each of the
three counts.
Mancha contends the trial court (1) erred in not instructing on battery
as a lesser included offense for each of the counts, and (2) abused its
discretion in choosing to impose consecutive terms on each of the counts
instead of ordering the terms to run concurrently.
We conclude that Mancha’s arguments lack merit, and we accordingly
affirm the judgment.
I.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Jane Doe drove with her friend to a pool party at Mancha’s house,
where several other people were present. Jane Doe’s friend was well
acquainted with Mancha and others at the party, but Jane Doe was not. The
party attendees, including Jane Doe and Mancha, consumed large amounts of
alcohol. Because Jane Doe’s friend did not want to drive home while
intoxicated, she and Jane Doe decided to spend the night at the house.
Jane Doe testified at trial about what happened next. According to
Jane Doe, when it was time to go to sleep for the night, she was very
intoxicated and followed her friend upstairs to the bedrooms. Jane Doe
ended up on the bed in Mancha’s bedroom. Jane Doe testified that she
quickly went to sleep or passed out while wearing a two-piece bathing suit

1 Unless otherwise indicated, all further statutory references are to the
Penal Code.

2
covered by a long T-shirt. Jane Doe remembered briefly waking up and
seeing Mancha standing inside the bedroom and locking the door. Jane Doe
asked Mancha where her friend was, but Mancha told her “to not worry about
it.” Jane Doe then went back to sleep. When Jane Doe woke up, her bathing
suit bottoms were off and Mancha was orally copulating her.
Jane Doe told Mancha to stop, but he did not. Mancha then pulled
Jane Doe toward him, forced her legs open, and penetrated Jane Doe’s vagina
with his fingers and then with his penis. When Jane Doe continued to resist,
Mancha tried to have Jane Doe orally copulate his penis, but she refused and
tried to shove Mancha away.
The assault ended when Jane Doe stated she had to use the bathroom.
While she was in the bathroom, Jane Doe used her cell phone to send text
messages and call friends, asking for help. Mancha came into the bathroom
while Jane Doe was still inside. He was angry and stated, among other
things, “Why didn’t you let me finish. I already fucked you,” and “I already
got you pregnant.”
Jane Doe eventually was able to locate her belongings and flee from the
house. A friend picked her up, and she filed a report against Mancha at the
police station early that morning. A forensic medical examination was
performed on Jane Doe, which showed a bleeding injury to her cervix but did
not result in any useable DNA evidence.
Mancha was charged with one count of oral copulation of an
unconscious person (§ 287, subd. (f)) (count 1); one count of forcible sexual
penetration (§ 289, subd. (a)) (count 2); and one count of forcible rape (§ 261,
subd. (a)(2)) (count 3). Mancha did not testify at trial, and the jury convicted
him on each count, as charged.

3
Mancha retained new counsel and filed a motion for a new trial based
on the contention that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance.
Among other things, Mancha contended that trial counsel’s performance was
deficient because he failed to request that the jury be instructed on the lesser
included offenses of “ ‘Assault With Intent to Commit Rape’ or ‘Attempted

Rape.’ ” The trial court denied the motion.2
Mancha was sentenced to prison for a 10-year term, which was
composed of a middle term six-year sentence on count 1, plus two consecutive

two-year terms on counts 2 and 3.3
II.
DISCUSSION
A. The Doctrine of Invited Error Bars Mancha’s Argument That the Trial
Court Erred by Failing to Instruct With a Lesser Included Offense
We first evaluate Mancha’s contention that the trial court committed
reversible error by failing to instruct on battery as a lesser included offense
on each of the counts.
“A trial court has a sua sponte duty to ‘instruct on a lesser offense
necessarily included in the charged offense if there is substantial evidence
the defendant is guilty only of the lesser.’ ” (People v. Shockley (2013)
58 Cal.4th 400, 403–404.) “ ‘On the other hand, the court is not obliged to

2 On appeal, Mancha does not contend that reversal is warranted on the
ground that his trial attorney provided ineffective assistance.
3 On counts 2 and 3, the trial court sentenced Mancha pursuant to
section 1170.1, subdivision (a) by imposing one-third of the middle term
sentence for each count. Although it could have done so, the trial court did
not sentence on those counts under section 667.6, subdivisions (c), which
states that “a full, separate, and consecutive term may be imposed for each
violation of” certain forcible sex crimes “if the crimes involve the same victim
on the same occasion.” (§ 667.6, subd. (c)).

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instruct on theories that have no such evidentiary support.’ ” (People v.
Smith (2013) 57 Cal.4th 232, 240.) “To ascertain whether one crime is
necessarily included in another, courts may look either to the accusatory
pleading or the statutory elements of the crimes. When, as here, the
accusatory pleading incorporates the statutory definition of the charged
offense without referring to the particular facts, a reviewing court must rely
on the statutory elements to determine if there is a lesser included offense.”
(People v. Robinson (2016) 63 Cal.4th 200, 207 (Robinson).) “ ‘The elements
test is satisfied if the statutory elements of the greater offense include all of
the statutory elements of the lesser offense, such that all legal elements of
the lesser offense are also elements of the greater. [Citation.] In other
words, “ ‘[i]f a crime cannot be committed without also necessarily
committing a lesser offense, the latter is a lesser included offense within the
former.’ ” ’ ” (Id. at p. 207.) “On appeal, we independently review whether a
trial court erroneously failed to instruct on a lesser included offense.” (People
v. Trujeque (2015) 61 Cal.4th 227, 271.)
Mancha contends that the trial court should have instructed on battery
as a lesser included offense on each of the counts. However, at trial, defense
counsel specifically stated that he did not want the trial court to instruct on
any lesser included offenses, and Mancha expressly stated he agreed with
that approach. Specifically, while discussing jury instructions, the trial court
stated, “The biggest issue right now is there are lesser-included offenses. . . .
[Defense counsel], have you decided what you want to do on the lesser-
included offenses?” Defense counsel replied, “Yes, your Honor. We do not
want any [lesser included offenses].” The trial court asked, “Is that for
tactical reasons?” Defense counsel answered, “After conferring with my
client, yes, your Honor.” The trial court then directly asked Mancha whether

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he agreed. Referring to instructions on lesser included offenses, the trial
court explained, “And I just want to be clear that you do have the right to
have them. I’m not going to read the jury instructions on the lesser-included
offenses unless it’s at either side’s request.” Mancha stated that he was in
agreement with defense counsel.
“A trial court has an independent obligation to instruct the jury on all
lesser included offenses the evidence warrants, even against the defense’s
wishes.” (People v. Hardy (2018) 5 Cal.5th 56, 98 (Hardy).) However, “ ‘[a]
defendant may not invoke a trial court’s failure to instruct on a lesser
included offense as a basis on which to reverse a conviction when, for tactical
reasons, the defendant persuades a trial court not to instruct on a lesser
included offense supported by the evidence. [Citations.] In that situation,
the doctrine of invited error bars the defendant from challenging on appeal

the trial court’s failure to give the instruction.’ ” (Id. at p. 99.)4 There is no
requirement that defense counsel identify the specific tactical reasons. (Ibid.)

4 Relying mainly on People v. Barton (1995) 12 Cal.4th 186, 194–195,
Mancha contends that he should prevail on appeal based on the principle
that “[t]he obligation to instruct on lesser included offenses exists even when
as a matter of trial tactics a defendant not only fails to request the
instruction but expressly objects to it being given.” (Id. at p. 195.) Mancha
correctly identifies that controlling legal principle. However, Mancha
overlooks the doctrine of invited error, which Barton explains is applicable
“when, for tactical reasons, the defendant persuades a trial court not to
instruct on a lesser included offense supported by the evidence.” (Id. at
p. 198.) “In that situation, the doctrine of invited error bars the defendant
from challenging on appeal the trial court’s failure to give the instruction.”
(Ibid.) “The doctrine of invited error does not . . . vindicate the decision of a
trial court to grant a defendant’s request not to give an instruction that is
otherwise proper: the error is still error.” (Ibid.) However, “when the trial
court accedes to the defendant’s wishes, the defendant may not argue on
appeal that in doing so the court committed prejudicial error, thus requiring

6
Here, defense counsel clearly stated that (1) he did not want the trial
court to instruct on any lesser included offenses, and (2) he had a tactical
reason for that decision. Accordingly, the doctrine of invited error applies,
which “is designed to prevent an accused from gaining a reversal on appeal
because of an error made by the trial court at his behest.” (People v. Coffman
and Marlow (2004) 34 Cal.4th 1, 49.) Because Mancha invited the error that
he claims the trial court committed when it failed to instruct on battery as a
lesser included offense, “he cannot complain on appeal of the court’s failure to
give the instruction.” (People v. Horning (2004) 34 Cal.4th 871, 906.) We
accordingly reject Mancha’s argument that reversal is warranted due to the
trial court’s failure to instruct the jury on battery as a lesser included offense

for each of the counts.5
B. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Imposing Consecutive
Term Sentences
Mancha next contends that the trial court abused its discretion by
deciding to impose consecutive term sentences, rather than concurrent term
sentences, on each of the three counts. “It is well established that a trial
court has discretion to determine whether several sentences are to run
concurrently or consecutively. [Citations.] In the absence of a clear showing
of abuse, the trial court’s discretion in this respect is not to be disturbed on
appeal.” (People v. Bradford (1976) 17 Cal.3d 8, 20.)

a reversal of the conviction.” (Ibid.) Our Supreme Court continues to follow
the invited error doctrine as set forth in Barton. (Hardy, supra, 5 Cal.5th at
p. 98; People v. Bell (2019) 7 Cal.5th 70, 109.)
5 Because we find that the doctrine of invited error applies, we need not,
and do not, consider whether there is evidentiary support for instructing on
battery as a lesser included offense for any of the counts.

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During sentencing, in explaining why it had chosen to impose
consecutive term sentences, the trial court referred to and adopted the
ground set forth in the probation officer’s report. Specifically, the trial court
stated that the probation officer had concluded consecutive term sentences
could be justified because “Count 1 and 2 and 3, involved separate acts of
sexual violence toward the victim . . . . I agree that the Court has the
discretion to impose consecutive sentencing, and I intend to.” The trial court
noted that the probation officer’s report had cited rule 4.425(a)(2) of the
California Rules of Court, which states that consecutive term sentences may
be imposed when “[t]he crimes involved separate acts of violence or threats of

violence.” (Cal. Rules of Court,6 rule 4.425(a)(2).)
Under section 669, subdivision (a), a trial court may impose either a
consecutive term sentence or a concurrent term sentence. “In exercising its
discretion whether to impose concurrent or consecutive terms, a trial court
should consider the factors set forth in California Rules of Court, rule 4.425.”
(People v. Rodriguez (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 1257, 1262.) As relevant here,
rule 4.425 states that, in deciding between consecutive and concurrent terms,
the trial court may consider “[f]acts relating to the crimes, including whether
or not: [¶] (1) The crimes and their objectives were predominantly
independent of each other; [¶] (2) The crimes involved separate acts of
violence or threats of violence; or [¶] (3) The crimes were committed at
different times or separate places, rather than being committed so closely in
time and place as to indicate a single period of aberrant behavior.” (Rule
4.425(a)(2).) As we have explained, the trial court expressly cited and applied

6 All further references to rules are to the California Rules of Court.

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subdivision (a)(2) of rule 4.425, agreeing with the probation officer that each
count “involved separate acts of sexual violence toward the victim.”
Mancha first contends that the trial court abused its discretion because
it “failed to note the acts were committed almost simultaneously, and
involved a single intent to gain sexual gratification as described in rule
4.425(a)(1) and (3).” Although the trial court relied upon subdivision (a)(2) of
rule 4.425, which focuses only on whether the crimes constituted separate
acts of violence, Mancha argues that we should interpret subdivision (a)(2)’s
reference to the defendant’s “separate acts of violence” (rule 4.425(a)(2)), by
also considering subdivision (a)(1), which focuses on the defendant’s objective
in committing the offenses, and subdivision (a)(3), which focuses on the time
and place of the offenses. Mancha argues, “Read together, the two provisions
would have supported concurrent rather than consecutive sentences.”
We are not persuaded. The three subdivisions of rule 4.425(a)
represent three distinct factors: whether the defendant had the same
objective in committing the offenses (rule 4.425(a)(1)); whether the defendant
committed separate acts of violence (id., subd. (a)(2)); and whether the
offenses were spatially and temporally distinct (id., subd. (a)(3)). Under the
plain language of rule 4.425, any of the three distinct factors are sufficient to
support a consecutive term sentence. Therefore, the trial court was well
within its discretion to rely solely on the fact that Mancha committed three
separate acts of violence against Jane Doe.
Mancha next argues that in evaluating whether the trial court abused
its discretion in concluding that consecutive sentencing was warranted
pursuant to rule 4.425(a)(2), we should look to case law arising under section
667.6 subdivision (d). That provision states that “[a] full, separate, and
consecutive term shall be imposed for each violation of” certain aggravated

9
sex crimes “if the crimes involve separate victims or involve the same victim

on separate occasions.” (§ 667.6, subd. (d).)7 Although Mancha was not
sentenced under that provision, he argues that we should rely on case law
interpreting the meaning of “separate occasions” in section 667.6 subdivision
(d) to decide whether his offenses “involved separate acts of violence or
threats of violence” as stated in rule 4.425(a)(2). Mancha’s contention lacks
merit. The relevant term in rule 4.425(a)(2) is “separate acts,” not “separate
occasions” as in section 667.6 subdivision (d). Mancha does not explain why
the two different terms would have any bearing on each other, and we
perceive no reason to conclude that they do.
The remainder of Mancha’s challenge to the trial court’s imposition of
consecutive sentences is premised on a misunderstanding of the basis for the
trial court’s decision. Mancha contends that the trial court decided to impose
consecutive sentences based, in part, on what he characterizes as a finding
that “the victim was ‘particularly vulnerable,’ given her unconscious state,
that [Mancha] showed no remorse, and that he failed to use a condom.” He
argues that these factors “were either inapplicable or lacked evidentiary
support.” Mancha’s argument fails because the trial court did not discuss
those factors when explaining why it was imposing consecutive sentences.
Instead the trial court identified those factors when discussing whether it
would impose a lower, middle or upper term sentence. After discussing the
factors described by Mancha, along with others, the trial court decided to
impose a middle term sentence. Mancha does not challenge that decision.

7 Specifically, Mancha cites People v. Solis (2012) 206 Cal.App.4th 1210
and People v. Pena (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1294. Those cases explain that the
term “separate occasions” in section 667.6 subdivision (d) focuses on whether
the defendant had a reasonable opportunity to reflect between sex acts.
(Solis, at p. 1220; Pena, at p. 1314.)

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In sum, we find no merit to Mancha’s contention that the trial court
abused its discretion by imposing consecutive sentences on each of the counts.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.

IRION, J.

WE CONCUR:

McCONNELL, P. J.

CASTILLO, J.

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