People v. Medrano CA2/4

CourtListener 10586727Calctapp19.05.2025

Gesamter Gesetzestext

Filed 5/19/25 P. v. Medrano CA2/4
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on
opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(a). This
opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115(a).

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FOUR

THE PEOPLE, B335521

Plaintiff and Respondent, Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. BA420259
v.

JASON JEREMIAH
MEDRANO,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Alison S. Matsumoto, Judge. Affirmed and
remanded with directions.
Jonathan E. Demson, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Idan Ivri and Melanie Dorian,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
INTRODUCTION1

The trial court denied Defendant-Appellant Jason
Jeremiah Medrano’s petition for resentencing under Penal Code
section 1172.6.2 The court concluded that Medrano’s record of
conviction demonstrated as a matter of law that he was convicted
of manslaughter as the actual killer, making him prima facie
ineligible for relief under section 1172.6, subdivision (c), obviating
the need for an evidentiary hearing under subdivision (d). On
appeal, Medrano’s sole contention is that the trial court could not,
as a matter of law, rely upon the transcript of a preliminary
hearing in making that prima facie determination.
Our Supreme Court’s recent decision in People v. Patton
(2025) 17 Cal.5th 549 (Patton) resolved this issue. Patton holds
that a trial court may properly rely on uncontroverted evidence in
a preliminary hearing transcript to refute conclusory allegations
in determining whether a petitioner has stated a prima facie
entitlement to relief under section 1172.6. (Patton, supra, at p.
564.) Following Patton, we reject Medrano’s claim of error.
However, also following Patton, we remand the matter to the trial
court to allow Medrano to file an amended petition if he wishes to
do so. (Id. at pp. 569-570.)

1 We resolve this case by memorandum opinion. (Cal. Stds.
Jud. Admin., § 8.1.)
2 All undesignated statutory references are to the Penal
Code.

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BACKGROUND3
In 2015, after being charged with murder, Medrano
pleaded no contest to voluntary manslaughter. (§ 192, subd. (a).)
Medrano also admitted that he personally used a firearm in the
commission of the offense (§ 12022.5, subd. (a)), and he
committed the crime for the benefit of a criminal street gang
(§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)(C)).4 The trial court ultimately sentenced
Medrano to 23 years in state prison.
In 2018, the Legislature, through Senate Bill No. 1437
(2017-2018 Reg. Sess.) (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015), amended section
188 to eliminate the natural and probable consequences doctrine
as it applies to murder and to require, with certain exceptions
under the felony-murder rule, that a defendant act with malice to
be convicted of murder. (§ 188, subd. (a)(3).)
In 2021, through Senate Bill No. 775 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.)
(Stats. 2021, ch. 551), the Legislature clarified that the
amendments made by Senate Bill No. 1437 were also intended to
apply to voluntary manslaughter. (People v. Hin (2025) 17
Cal.5th 401, 441.) Senate Bill No. 775 also amended former
section 1170.95 to permit persons convicted by plea agreement of
voluntary manslaughter under the natural and probable
consequences doctrine to file a petition with the sentencing court
to vacate the conviction and be resentenced. (§ 1172.6, subd. (a).)

3 The parties are familiar with the facts and procedural
history of the case. We do not restate those details. We simply
provide context for our disposition. (People v. Garcia (2002) 97
Cal.App.4th 847, 851.)
4 Medrano was also charged with other offenses and
allegations, which were dismissed in exchange for his plea.

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Under section 1172.6, a defendant convicted by plea of
voluntary manslaughter under the natural and probable
consequences doctrine must attest to the following: “(1) A
complaint, information, or indictment was filed against the
petitioner that allowed the prosecution to proceed under . . . the
natural and probable consequences doctrine or other theory
under which malice is imputed to a person based solely on that
person’s participation in a crime . . . . [¶] (2) The petitioner was
convicted of . . . manslaughter following . . . a plea offer in lieu of
a trial at which the petitioner could have been convicted of
murder or attempted murder. [¶] (3) The petitioner could not
presently be convicted of murder or attempted murder [under
current law].” (§ 1172.6, subd. (a)(1)-(3).)
After a facially sufficient petition is filed, the trial court
determines whether the petitioner is prima facie eligible for
relief. (People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 957.) We review de
novo a trial court’s determination of whether a petitioner has
made a prima facie showing. (People v. Harden (2022) 81
Cal.App.5th 45, 52.)

DISCUSSION

Medrano’s only argument on appeal is that the trial court
engaged in impermissible fact-finding as a matter of law at the
prima facie stage by relying on a preliminary hearing transcript
to deny his section 1172.6 petition. At the time Medrano
submitted his briefing, this issue was the subject of a split of
opinion among the Courts of Appeal. However, after briefing
concluded, our Supreme Court resolved the issue and foreclosed
Medrano’s contention.
In Patton, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 569, our Supreme Court
held that a trial court may “reference the record of conviction

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[which includes the preliminary hearing transcript] to ‘“‘refut[e]’”’
[citation] conclusory allegations in furtherance of its statutorily
required screening function at that juncture of a section 1172.6
proceeding” without engaging in impermissible fact-finding, and
may conclude, based upon its review, that the petitioner has
failed to make a prima facie showing of eligibility.
Patton compels affirmance. Under Patton, the preliminary
hearing transcript at issue here formed part of the record of
conviction. (Patton, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 568.) Confronted
with that record of conviction, Medrano failed to make a prima
facie showing. As in Patton, he “offered only conclusory
allegations of entitlement to resentencing relief under section
1172.6 in response to a record of conviction” that in no way
suggested Medrano was convicted under a now-invalid homicide
theory. (Patton, supra, at p. 569.) Accordingly, the trial court did
not err when it found Medrano ineligible for relief.
However, in Patton, the petitioner asked for leave at oral
argument to be able to plead additional facts on remand in
support of the petition. (Patton, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 569.)
“[O]ut of an abundance of caution” our Supreme Court ordered a
remand to the superior court with directions for the superior
court to consider an amended petition if the petitioner asked for
leave to file one. (Id. at pp. 569-570.)
Here, after briefing was complete in this case, Medrano
filed a new authority letter citing Patton. (Cal. Rules of Court,
rule 8.254.) We deem that citation to the disposition in Patton as
a request to remand for the opportunity to plead additional facts.
Accordingly, consistent with Patton, and in an abundance of
caution, we remand the matter to the trial court with directions
for that court to consider an amended petition should Medrano,

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within 30 days of that remand, seek to file one. We express no
opinion on the viability of any additional facts Medrano might
allege in his amended petition. We otherwise affirm the trial
court’s order.

DISPOSITION

We remand the matter to the trial court with directions to
consider an amended petition should Medrano seek to file one
within 30 days of the issuance of the remittitur. We otherwise
affirm the trial court’s order denying Medrano’s petition for
resentencing pursuant to section 1172.6.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

DAUM, J.*
We concur:

ZUKIN, Acting P.J.

COLLINS, J.

* Judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court assigned by the
Chief Justice pursuant to article IV, section 6 of the California
Constitution.

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