CourtListener 10586682•People v. Baker CA2/5
Gesamter Gesetzestext
Filed 5/19/25 P. v. Baker CA2/5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on
opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule
8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FIVE
THE PEOPLE, B335581
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No.
v. GA114776)
JAMES ANTHONY BAKER,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Darrell S. Mavis, Judge. Affirmed.
Leonard J. Klaif, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Idan Ivri, Supervising Deputy
Attorney General, and Melanie Dorian, Deputy Attorney General,
for Plaintiff and Respondent.
A jury convicted defendant James Anthony Baker
(defendant) of two counts of making criminal threats and one
count of misdemeanor hit-and-run driving. We are asked to
decide whether there is substantial evidence that the victims of
defendant’s threats experienced the requisite sustained fear and
whether, as defendant claims, the trial court improperly imposed
a high term sentence to punish him for exercising his right to a
jury trial.
I. BACKGROUND
A. The Offense Conduct, as Established by the Evidence
at Trial
Sally S. (Sally) was driving her cousin, James R. (James),
to his home in Burbank on June 11, 2023. Around 1:38 p.m.,
Sally stopped at a red light at the intersection of San Fernando
Boulevard and Grismer Avenue.
As depicted in video from a traffic camera maintained by
Burbank’s Department of Public Works, defendant pulled his car
away from a nearby street curb and struck Sally’s rear bumper.
Sally and defendant both got out of their cars; James initially
remained in Sally’s car but he later exited the car when a
confrontation ensued.
Sally asked defendant for his driver’s license and insurance
information. Defendant replied, “You’re really going to try to get
a few bucks off of me, you hungry ass bitch?” Sally replied, “Are
you serious? You just rear-ended me.” Defendant said he was
serious and called Sally “dumb bitch,” “fat bitch,” and “stupid
bitch.” James then got out of Sally’s car and told defendant to
stop calling Sally names. According to Sally and James,
defendant approached James and “press[ed] up against” him or
2
got “into [his] face.” Sally heard defendant say “he had his gun in
his car” and “would shoot us and drop us both.” James also heard
defendant say he was going to shoot him and Sally.1
At defendant’s later criminal trial, Sally was asked how she
felt “[a]t the moment that . . . defendant threatened to shoot [her]
and [James].” She testified she was “[s]cared” and believed
defendant’s threat. Sally told James to get back into her car, took
a photo of defendant’s license plate, drove away, and continued to
look at defendant’s car to confirm he was not following her. She
did not immediately call for help “[b]ecause [she] was scared in
that moment and just wanted to get to a safer area.” But she did
call 911 when she arrived at James’s home approximately 10
minutes after the collision. A police detective that responded to
the 911 call within an hour of Sally’s confrontation with
defendant observed she was “a little upset” and “[s]eemed very
concerned.”
James was also asked, at defendant’s later criminal trial,
whether he was scared for his or Sally’s safety “[i]n that moment
when [defendant] threatened to shoot you.” James answered,
“Absolutely, yes,” and explained he “didn’t know what
[defendant] had in his car. He kept going back to his car.” (The
video footage of the incident does show defendant walking to the
driver’s door of his vehicle several times during the encounter.)
James also watched defendant’s car as he and Sally were driving
away “[j]ust in case [defendant] was following [them].” The
1
The traffic video indicates approximately two minutes
elapsed between the moment Sally got out of her car and the
moment she and James drove away.
3
responding police detective also observed James “appeared upset”
when she arrived to take a report.
Defendant was arrested a few weeks after the incident.
Detective Kristianna Sanchez of the Burbank Police Department
and a colleague interviewed defendant. At trial, Detective
Sanchez testified to some of defendant’s statements and the jury
viewed video of other portions of the interview. Among other
things, defendant denied threatening to shoot anyone.
B. Verdict and Sentencing
After the presentation of evidence, the trial jury convicted
defendant of two counts of making criminal threats (Pen. Code,2
§ 422)—one count for each of Sally and James—and one count of
misdemeanor hit-and-run driving (Veh. Code, § 20002, subd. (a)).
Defendant admitted sustaining a prior Three Strikes law
conviction and two other prior felony convictions; he also
admitted other sentencing enhancement facts. As we later
discuss in more detail, the trial court imposed a total sentence of
seven years and four months in state prison: the high term of
three years on one of the criminal threats convictions, doubled
pursuant to the Three Strikes law; a consecutive term of 16
months for the other criminal threats conviction; and a
concurrent term of six months for the hit-and-run offense.
II. DISCUSSION
Sufficient evidence supports the jury’s finding that both
Sally and James experienced sustained fear within the meaning
2
Undesignated statutory references that follow are to the
Penal Code.
4
of section 422, subdivision (a). There is no abstract number of
minutes or seconds a victim must experience fear; the test is
whether the fear is more than momentary or fleeting. The jury
could appropriately find this standard met on the trial evidence—
most prominently, the evidence that both Sally and James were
concerned defendant might be following them as they left the
scene of the collision.
Defendant’s contention that the trial court imposed a high
term sentence on count one to punish him for exercising his right
to a jury trial is forfeited for lack of an objection below and
defendant does not contend otherwise (he instead asks only that
we overlook the forfeiture). The record, in any event, does not
support defendant’s claim, which rests on a misreading of the
court’s comments during pre-trial plea negotiations and at
sentencing. As we shall discuss, the trial court in pre-trial
proceedings never specified the sentence it would impose if
defendant chose to resolve the case without a trial, and none of
the trial court’s remarks indicate defendant’s demand for a jury
trial influenced its ultimate sentencing decision.
A. Substantial Evidence Supports Defendant’s
Convictions for Making Criminal Threats
“In order to prove a violation of section 422, the prosecution
must establish all of the following: (1) that the defendant
‘willfully threaten[ed] to commit a crime which will result in
death or great bodily injury to another person,’ (2) that the
defendant made the threat ‘with the specific intent that the
statement . . . is to be taken as a threat, even if there is no intent
of actually carrying it out,’ (3) that the threat—which may be
‘made verbally, in writing, or by means of an electronic
5
communication device’—was ‘on its face and under the
circumstances in which it [was] made, . . . so unequivocal,
unconditional, immediate, and specific as to convey to the person
threatened, a gravity of purpose and an immediate prospect of
execution of the threat,’ (4) that the threat actually caused the
person threatened ‘to be in sustained fear for his or her own
safety or for his or her immediate family’s safety,’ and (5) that the
threatened person’s fear was ‘reasonabl[e]’ under the
circumstances. [Citation.]” (People v. Toledo (2001) 26 Cal.4th
221, 227-28; accord People v. Turner (2020) 10 Cal.5th 786, 826.)
Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence regarding
the fourth element: whether Sally and James experienced
sustained fear for their safety.3
Section 422 does not define “sustained fear,” but,
“[d]efining the word ‘sustained’ by its opposites,” courts have held
“that it means a period of time that extends beyond what is
momentary, fleeting, or transitory.” (People v. Allen (1995) 33
Cal.App.4th 1149, 1156; see also People v. Brugman (2021) 62
Cal.App.5th 608, 634; People v. Roles (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 935,
942.) While precedent has observed, as a general matter, that 15
minutes is “more than sufficient” to satisfy the sustained fear
requirement (see, e.g., Allen, supra, 33 Cal.App.4th at 1156;
Brugman, supra, 62 Cal.App.5th at 634), there is no abstract
3
In his opening brief, defendant argued there is no evidence
that James experienced any fear—sustained or otherwise. This
argument is contradicted by James’s testimony, and defendant
concedes the point in his reply brief.
We discuss Sally and James’s fear for their own safety—as
opposed to the safety of one another—because cousins are not
“immediately family” for purposes of section 422, subdivision (b).
6
amount of time below which experienced fear only qualifies as
momentary, fleeting, or transitory. (See, e.g., People v. Fierro
(2010) 180 Cal.App.4th 1342, 1349 [“When one believes he is
about to die, a minute is longer than ‘momentary, fleeting, or
transitory’”]; People v. Culbert (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 184, 190-
191; see also Allen, supra, at 1156, fn. 6.)
This case is similar in material respects to Fierro, supra,
180 Cal.App.4th 1342, where the Court of Appeal affirmed a
criminal threats conviction. (Id. at 1347-1349.) The threat there,
like here, “stem[med] from what should have been a non-event
between two motorists,” and the defendant in Fierro aggressively
asked the victims whether they wanted to “fuck with [him]” and
raised his shirt to display what the victims believed was a gun
“tucked into a waistband.” (Id. at 1344-1346.) The defendant
also said he ought to kill the victims “right now” and ordered
them to “get the fuck out of here.” (Id. at 1346.) The victims
drove away and one called 911 “[w]ithin about 15 minutes—once
he was on the freeway and ‘out of harm’s way’ . . . and told the
operator that he was ‘scared shitless.’” (Ibid.)
The Fierro court reasoned there was substantial evidence of
sustained fear because “[t]he fear lasted not only through the
minute or so that [the defendant] stood there exposing his
weapon, but for up to fifteen minutes after [the father] drove
away.” (Fierro, supra, 180 Cal.App.4th at 1348.) But the Fierro
court further observed that even excluding the time when the
victims were on the freeway, “the minute during which [one of
the victims] heard the threat and saw [the defendant’s] weapon
qualifie[d] as ‘sustained’ under the statute. . . . [Citation.]” (Id. at
1348-1349.)
7
In this case, defendant made an unequivocal threat to shoot
Sally and James accompanied by actions consistent with
retrieving a gun from his car. Like Fierro, Sally and James did
not immediately call 911 because they were concerned with
escaping a dangerous situation, but they watched defendant as
they left because they feared he might follow them. Like the
victims in Fierro, Sally called 911 once she and James were out of
harm’s way—which supports an inference that they were in fear
for the duration of their flight from the scene.4
Defendant, however, makes much of the fact that the
prosecution’s questions to the victims at trial about their fear
were framed only in terms of their feelings in the “moment” that
defendant threatened to shoot them. Even accepting defendant’s
parsing of those questions, that was not the only evidence the
jury had before it to consider. In addition to the victims’
admission of experiencing fear at the time of the death threats,
they jury could also rely, as we have, on the victims’
preoccupation with watching defendant when driving away
minutes later, their decision to follow through and call the police
several minutes after that (when they felt they were no longer in
immediate danger), and the police detective’s observation of their
still “upset” demeanor when subsequently arriving to take a
crime report.5
4
Defendant’s suggestion that Sally “calmly drove away” has
no basis in the record. Sally testified she did not immediately
call for help “[b]ecause [she] was scared in that moment and just
wanted to get to a safer area.”
5
Defendant also argues Sally paused to photograph
defendant’s license plate before leaving the scene and directed
8
B. The Trial Court Did Not Punish Defendant for
Exercising His Constitutional Right to a Jury Trial
1. Additional background
a. Pre-trial plea negotiations
Before the case reached the judicial officer who presided at
defendant’s trial and sentencing, the prosecution offered
defendant a plea deal wherein he would plead guilty to one count
of making a criminal threat and the prosecution would
recommend a sentence of 32 months in state prison and dismiss
another separate case in which defendant was accused of making
criminal threats. Defendant rejected this offer.
Immediately before trial commenced, the trial court asked
defendant (who was representing himself) whether he would
accept the prosecution’s earlier offer. The prosecution indicated
this offer was no longer on the table, but the trial court indicated
it would “try to talk to [the prosecution] about trying to keep the
offer open” if defendant was interested.
Addressing defendant, the trial court remarked, “So what I
think you should understand, in evaluating it, is that you could
be sentenced up to eight years and four months. [¶] And in
James to get in the car, which defendant believes are indications
of rational behavior consistent with a quick recovery from initial
fear. The jury did not have to understand these actions in that
matter, however. Many crime victims thankfully have enough of
their wits about them to document or recall the facts of a crime
despite experiencing fear at the time. Moreover, the jury could
also weigh the acts defendant highlights against the other
evidence of sustained fear that we have catalogued, and we do
not reweigh that evidence under the applicable standard of
review. (People v. Williams (2015) 61 Cal.4th 1244, 1281.)
9
addition, you could be sentenced to seven years and four months
on your other case. [¶] They’re willing to dismiss that other case.
[¶] So you’re—I just want to make sure, before I try to talk to
them about trying to keep the offer open—because they just said
they’re done, and they’re ready to go to trial, there’s no point in
me trying to talk to them about keeping the offer open, if you’re
not even interested in it, because might as well just be the trial.
[¶] But what I’m trying to—I don’t know anything about your
case. [¶] All I know is that you’re facing a lot of time . . . .”
Defendant interjected, “I better win then,” and the trial court
continued, “Yeah. [¶] Because otherwise—and the reason I have
this conversation before trial is because I’ve done over 100 jury
trials. [¶] I’ve seen the defendants with regret, who have been—
who have turned down an offer made by the government—and
wished they hadn’t. [¶] So I just want to make sure you fully are
aware of everything you’re facing so that you can’t, later on, say
‘Oh, I didn’t know. I didn’t know that I could be going to state
prison for over 15 years.’”
Defendant then told the court why he believed 32 months
was excessive, and the prosecution explained its position,
including by citing defendant’s criminal history. When defendant
attempted to minimize his criminal history, the trial court
pointed out that he had served “seven years in state prison” and
emphasized “it’s very hard for a court to go below, when
someone’s been to state prison . . . [¶] . . . [¶] and they’ve done
that much time already, and there’s other cases like this, it’s
hard . . . .” When defendant reiterated that “[32] months is just
too high,” the trial court replied, “Okay. [¶] I just want to make
sure you understand ahead of time, because defendants who—I
just don’t want you to be shocked if you get convicted and you end
10
up getting the maximum sentence. [¶] Because you[‘ve] been to
state prison before, you’ve done seven years before—it’s very easy
for a court to impose more.” Defendant emphasized, “I just better
win then, I guess, so I don’t face eight years.”
After more discussion of the merits of the case, the trial
court additionally remarked, “I’m just trying to, before the jury
comes in, try to—you say you’re a business man. [¶] Mitigate
your exposure. [¶] Control your risk. [¶] . . . [¶] Your risk is
very high; okay? [¶] And it’s not just because of this case; it’s
because of your history.” Defendant replied that he was “aware
that the court can make me an offer too,” and suggested a 16-
month sentence in exchange for resolving the case. The trial
court replied that for it to “make that offer or whatever offer, I
would want to hear what the victims had to say and find out a lot
more information, and all sorts of things. [¶] So in other words,
what you could do, if you want to do that, is you could plead open.
[¶] And then, what I would do is I would hear a sentencing. [¶]
That’s an alternative as well. [¶] And then what I would do is I
would hear what they wanted for sentencing, and I would hear
what you want for sentencing, and then I would make a decision.”
The trial court emphasized it would not “matter whether
[defendant] ple[ ]d to one charge here or three charges here”
because of his “long criminal history.” The trial court then
suggested “another alternative,” that defendant waive his right to
a jury trial and do “a court trial for a lid, meaning that the most
that the court would impose” would be the prosecution’s offer of
six years in state prison. Defendant, however, rejected these
proposals.
11
b. Sentencing hearing
After trial, defendant was represented by counsel at
sentencing. The prosecution did not file a sentencing
memorandum in advance of the hearing, explaining that defense
counsel indicated she planned to request a continuance to
prepare a mitigation packet. The trial court responded, “I have
got to tell you I am a little surprised that the People didn’t file a
sentencing memorandum. This is set for sentencing today.
Regardless of what the defense was going to do, I would expect
the People to file a sentencing memorandum. That’s what the
court would have expected a representative from the People of
the State of California to have done.”
The prosecution apologized and recommended a sentence of
“six years which was extended to [defendant] right before trial.
He’s facing a maximum of seven years and ten months; three
years times two for the first count and one-third of the mid term
of 24 months, which is . . . eight months times two, for the second
count, and the misdemeanor six months for the third count . . . .”
Defense counsel requested “the mid term.” In defendant’s
allocution, he acknowledged that, during trial, “I pretty much
admitted that me and the guy almost got in a fight. I admitted
that I would kick his ass. Not saying that that was okay.
Obviously I will be appealing this case so I am limited in what I
can say, but I do want you to know that I accept accountability
for my role in this incident, and I wish none of it happened.”
The trial court stated, “Well, look, I obviously have
reviewed the probation officer’s report. That recommendation is
high term.” The trial court asked the prosecution why it chose
not to present any victim impact statements, and the prosecution
represented Sally and James were satisfied with the
12
recommended sentence of six years.6 The prosecution mentioned
the trial court had previously advised defendant “of not only his
maximum exposure here, given his criminal history not only in
California, in other states, but also because of the—also the
maximum exposure he was facing in his pending Burbank
case . . . for, also, the criminal threats.” The trial court agreed
and explained, “[f]rankly, that’s why I am surprised the People
are recommending a mid term sentence now after trial because
that was what the court had indicated, is that the court would be
sentencing to the high term, and the counts would be consecutive.
I mean, I am surprised the People’s recommendation is what the
People’s recommendation is. That’s why I wanted to make sure
that the People had—because there’s—you don’t want to have
any victim impact presented.”
When the prosecution reiterated the victims felt a six-year
sentence was fair, the trial court said, “Again, all I am trying to
do is make sure the People have an opportunity. If the victims
would like to speak to the court to address the court regarding
sentencing, that they have that opportunity, as the law requires,
and that’s what I am trying to find out from the People right
now.” The prosecution said Sally and James did not want to miss
work.
Proceeding to imposition of sentence, the trial court stated
it had read the probation officer’s report, which “recommend[ed]
6
The probation officer’s report did not include statements
from the victims. The report explained the probation officer was
not provided with a D.A. packet. The probation officer attempted
to contact the detective by phone to obtain the victims’ phone
numbers. The phone call was unsuccessful. A victim notification
letter was sent by mail.
13
the high term.” The trial court also “looked at [defendant’s]
extensive criminal history and . . . noted that he’s been to state
prison, you know, most recently for seven years as a sentence.”
The court then imposed the aggregate sentence of seven years
and four months in state prison, including the high term on count
one. The court explained it was “selecting the high term based on
all of the aggravating circumstances; there being no mitigating
circumstances including[ ] no expression of remorse.” In his
statement to the court, defendant was “clearly not acknowledging
that he made the threat. The court [was] absolutely convinced
that he did it based on the evidence that the court heard, and [the
court was] actually sad to have to . . . sentence [defendant] to the
maximum” in light of defendant’s intelligence and skill in
representing himself.
2. Relevant legal principles
The right to a jury trial in a criminal prosecution is a
fundamental right under both the state and federal
Constitutions. (People v. Collins (2001) 26 Cal.4th 297, 305.) “It
is well settled that to punish a person for exercising a
constitutional right is ‘a due process violation of the most basic
sort[ ]’ [citation],” and a court “‘may not treat a defendant more
leniently because he foregoes his right to trial or more harshly
because he exercises that right.’ [Citation.]” (In re Lewallen
(1979) 23 Cal.3d 274, 278-279; accord Collins, supra, at 307 [“The
impropriety of a trial court’s explicit promise of more lenient
treatment in sentencing if the defendant waives trial by jury is
comparable to the impropriety of harsher treatment imposed
because of the defendant’s having invoked his or her right to trial
by jury”]; People v. Clancey (2013) 56 Cal.4th 562, 575.)
14
These principles, however, do not limit the trial court’s
discretion to impose a sentence in excess “of any negotiated pleas
or sentences offered the defendant by the prosecution. The
imposition of sentence within the legislatively prescribed limits is
exclusively a judicial function. [Citation.]” (Lewallen, supra, 23
Cal.3d at 281.) “[U]nder appropriate circumstances a defendant
may receive a more severe sentence following trial than he would
have received had he pleaded guilty; the trial itself may reveal
more adverse information about him than was previously
known.” (Ibid.) Accordingly, reviewing courts do not presume a
retaliatory purpose from the mere fact that a defendant received
a harsher sentence after trial than they would have received had
they waived the right to a jury trial and entered a guilty plea.
(People v. Szeto (1981) 29 Cal.3d 20, 35.) The defendant has the
burden to show the trial court imposed a harsher sentence as a
punishment for their decision to go to trial. (Ibid.; accord, People
v. Angus (1980) 114 Cal.App.3d 973, 989-990 [“There must be
some showing, properly before the appellate court, that the
higher sentence was imposed as punishment for exercise of the
right” to a probation revocation hearing].)
3. Analysis
At sentencing, defendant did not object or argue the court’s
sentence was imposed in retaliation for exercising his
constitutional right to a trial. That means the point is forfeited.
(See, e.g., People v. Williams (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 649, 654-656
[a defendant who fails to object to another form of retaliatory
sentencing—the trial court’s imposition of a harsher sentence
following a successful appeal—forfeits the issue].) Even putting
aside the forfeiture, though, the claim is still unavailing.
15
The trial court’s remarks during pre-trial plea discussions
and at sentencing must be evaluated in their full context. During
the pre-trial discussion, the trial court was gauging defendant’s
interest in an offer the prosecution had withdrawn. The trial
court specifically declined defendant’s suggestion that it offer an
indicated sentence, emphasizing it “would want to hear what the
victims had to say and find out a lot more information” first. The
trial court also did not suggest its feeling that it would be “very
easy” to impose a high sentence in defendant’s case would not
apply if he were to waive his right to a jury trial and plead open.
More generally, the trial court said nothing to suggest
defendant’s decision to exercise his right to a jury trial would
factor into its sentencing decision. This record therefore does not
support defendant’s argument that this case is analogous to
Collins, in which the trial court told the defendant he would be
“getting some benefit” by waiving his right to a jury. (Collins,
supra, 26 Cal.4th at 302.)
At sentencing, the trial court referred to its earlier
remarks—retrospectively overstating the certainty that a high
term sentence would be imposed—to emphasize its surprise at
the prosecution’s recommended sentence. The trial court did so
in response to statements by the prosecution suggesting it had
misconstrued the trial court’s concern regarding the lack of
victim impact statements. Rather than thinking the
prosecution’s recommendation was too high in the absence of
victim impact statements—as the prosecution apparently took
the court to be saying—the court was instead expressing surprise
the prosecution was undercutting the probation officer’s
recommendation, particularly in light of the court’s pre-trial
comments suggesting defendant’s criminal history would make it
16
easy to impose a high sentence. Unlike the trial court in
Lewallen, the trial court was not expressing the view that a
sentence following a guilty verdict should exceed a pre-trial offer.7
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
BAKER, Acting P. J.
We concur:
MOOR, J.
KIM (D.), J.
7
Defendant’s analogy to In re Edy D. (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th
1199 is also inapt. In that case, the juvenile court stated that a
more favorable disposition was not available to the minor because
he inconvenienced witnesses by making them come to court. (Id.
at 1201-1202.) Again, there is no indication in this case that
defendant’s decision to exercise his right to a jury trial factored
into the trial court’s sentencing decision.
17
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