Montes v. SPS Technologies CA2/7

CourtListener 10585115Calctapp15.05.2025

Gesamter Gesetzestext

Filed 5/15/25 Montes v. SPS Technologies CA2/7
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SEVEN

JAVIER MONTES, B334509

Plaintiff and Appellant, (Los Angeles County Super. Ct.
No. 21STCV47068)
v.

SPS TECHNOLOGIES LLC et al.,

Defendants and Respondents.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Thomas D. Long, Judge. Reversed with
directions.
Law Offices of Allison M. Schulman and Allison M.
Schulman for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Fisher & Phillips, Caroline S. Scala, Regina A. Petty, and
Megan E. Walker for Defendants and Respondents
SPS Technologies LLC and Hector Pelayo.
INTRODUCTION

Javier Montes, a maintenance mechanic at
SPS Technologies LLC dba PB Fasteners (PB Fasteners), went on
medical leave after he was injured at work. When Montes asked
to return to work with physical restrictions 14 months later,
PB Fasteners terminated his employment, stating that Montes’s
physical restrictions prevented him from performing the
maintenance mechanic job and that PB Fasteners did not have
another vacant position Montes could perform.
Montes filed this action against PB Fasteners and one of
Montes’s supervisors, Hector Pelayo, for disability discrimination
and harassment under the Fair Employment and Housing Act
(Gov. Code, § 12900 et seq. (FEHA)) and related causes of action.1
The trial court granted a motion by PB Fasteners and Pelayo for
summary judgment. We reverse.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. Pelayo Harasses Montes After Montes Returns from
Medical Leave
In 1993 Montes began working for PB Fasteners, a
manufacturer of aerospace structural nuts and bolts, or fasteners.
In 2002 he became a maintenance mechanic. Montes repaired
equipment, including grinding machines, hydraulic pumps,
ovens, 100-ton presses, and computerized numerical control
machines. In 2008 Hector Pelayo became Montes’s supervisor.

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Government
Code.

2
In August 2018 Montes had a heart attack, was
hospitalized, and went on medical leave for four months. When
Montes returned to work he requested temporary
accommodations: no bending, going up stairs, or lifting more than
15 pounds. PB Fasteners temporarily assigned Montes to less
physically demanding work in the shipping department, where he
could package bolts while seated.
While Montes worked in the shipping department and
reported to the shipping supervisor, Pelayo (who at the time was
not Montes’s supervisor) told Montes: “Man, you’re old. You’ve
really gone to hell.” Pelayo called Montes an “asshole” and an
“idiot” for requiring accommodations and insinuated Montes was
faking the need for the accommodations. Pelayo also demanded
to see the medication Montes was taking. Pelayo told Montes to
“stop fucking around like a little bitch and go back to work” in the
maintenance department. Pelayo asked another employee to tell
Montes “to stop talking like an idiot and like a little bitch and to
get back to doing normal work,” to “stop messing around like a
dummy,” and that Pelayo “needed [him] working in the ovens.”
When Montes said the human resources department instructed
him to work in the shipping department, Pelayo yelled at Montes
and told him to do what Pelayo said, not what human resources
said.
Montes went to speak with human resources administrator
Sandra Calderon. While they were talking, Pelayo approached
and said, “What the fuck are you doing over here? Why haven’t
you gone where I told you to? You know what, go to hell. I don’t
want you anymore.” Montes asked Calderon: “Do you see how he
treats me in front of you?” Calderon said, “I never knew that he
treated you that way. Why haven’t you come by before?” Montes

3
said, “I never come by, because everyone that does come by gets
fired. And I need this job. That’s why I didn’t want to come to
report this, this man. He always treats [me] like this, like trash,
he humiliates me. How can I do my work with love, since I’m
being mentally and emotionally destroyed?”2
A few weeks later, while Montes was still assigned to the
shipping department, Pelayo began instructing him to do
maintenance work. Pelayo told Montes to clean restrooms while
the janitor was on medical leave. After one week Montes told
Pelayo the janitorial work was hurting him. Pelayo said, “Well,
what the fuck do you want to do? If you don’t want to do
anything, just go home.” Montes said, “I came so that I could do
whatever I’m able to do. Whatever is allowed in the medical
report. I’m reporting to you that I’m getting hurt.” After the
janitor returned from leave, Pelayo told Montes and the janitor to
clean the restrooms and polish the floors with a heavy electric
cleaning machine. Montes said, “I can’t use that heavy
machine. . . . I can’t do pushing or pulling per the medical
recommendations.” Pelayo said, “Well, what the fuck are you
going to do? What the fuck can you do? You tell me what are you
doing here? You tell me.” Montes tried to push the machine, but
he felt he was getting hurt. He told Pelayo, “You’re pushing me
to do things I cannot do.” Pelayo said, “Well, do whatever you
want,” and left. When Montes told Pelayo that he was struggling
physically and that the work was even more physically
challenging than the maintenance mechanic job, Pelayo mocked
Montes and called him “lazy.”

2 Calderon denied Montes complained to her about Pelayo.

4
On another occasion Pelayo made Montes come to Pelayo’s
upstairs office, even though Montes said he could not climb
stairs. Montes had to slowly go up the stairs, backward. When
he got to Pelayo’s office, Montes said, “You know I cannot go up
the stairs. You know what sacrifice it took me to get up here?”
Pelayo said, “Well, damn, if you can’t do anything, then just go
home.” Montes did not complain about Pelayo to human
resources because he “didn’t think that it would get that far” and
because, Montes said, “the people that went to complain, they
would get fired and I was afraid that that would happen to me.”

B. Montes Goes on a Second Medical Leave
In July 2019 an electrician asked Montes to repair a
clutching machine, which Montes said he could not do because it
was too high. The electrician said Montes could use a lift and a
stool, and the electrician’s supervisor asked Montes to “do it as a
favor, just do it slowly, carefully.” Montes agreed. While he was
fixing the machine, Montes injured his foot. He returned to work
for one or two days, but was placed on medical leave starting
July 15, 2019. In July 2019 Montes also saw his doctor for chest
pain, and the doctor ordered a cardiac procedure.
In October 2019 Armand Contreras became human
resources director at PB Fasteners. In the spring of 2020
Contreras discovered Montes and four other employees had been
on medical leave for an extended time. Contreras began to
enforce PB Fasteners’ policy of providing a maximum of 16 weeks
of unpaid leave. On June 15, 2020, after Montes had been on
leave for 11 months, Contreras sent Montes a letter stating: “At
this point, we cannot continue providing approved leave of
absence under our company policy.” Contreras asked Montes to

5
have his doctor report whether Montes would be able to return to
work in July and perform his duties with or without
accommodations, and if not, when the doctor anticipated Montes
would be able to return to work. On June 24, 2020 Montes called
Contreras and said he was not ready to return to work and would
provide the information Contreras requested after a doctor’s
appointment in July. After seeing his doctor Montes gave
PB Fasteners a work status report stating he was off work from
July 1, 2020 to August 16, 2020.
On August 13, 2020 Contreras sent Montes another letter
asking Montes to have his doctor respond to Contreras’s
questions about returning to work. Contreras repeated that
PB Fasteners could not continue to give Montes a leave of
absence and asked Montes to “provide the information requested
so that the Company can decide on next steps.” Montes
submitted a work status report stating he was off work from
August 14, 2020 through September 11, 2020.

C. Montes Asks To Return to Work with Physical
Restrictions, and PB Fasteners Terminates His
Employment
Montes submitted a work status report dated September 1,
2020. The report stated he could return to “modified activity at
work” from September 16, 2020 to October 1, 2020 with the
following restrictions: (1) stand up to 50 percent of shift; (2) walk
up to 50 percent of shift; (3) bend at the waist up to 25 percent of
shift; (4) twist torso/spine up to 25 percent of shift; (5) no
climbing ladders; (6) no using scaffolds or working at heights; and
(7) no lifting, carrying, pushing, or pulling more than 20 pounds.

6
On September 18, 2020 Contreras sent Montes a letter
stating: “It was good to talk with you on 9/14 regarding the work
status report . . . . Based on feedback from management and our
discussion, we are in agreement that you cannot perform [your]
regular duties as a Maintenance Technician based on the allowed
modified activity. My understanding is that your foot injury
prevents you from standing or walking for a prolonged period of
time and there is no plan for surgery or therapy that will improve
this condition.” Contreras listed the restrictions from Montes’s
September 1, 2020 work status report and said, “we do not have
open positions available that would enable us to provide
accommodations at work that would meet your work
restrictions. . . . [¶] Since there is no indication that you will be
able to return to your regular duties in the near future with or
without work accommodations, we cannot continue providing
approved leave of absence as the leave is essentially indefinite
and unreasonable at this point. . . . [¶] Therefore, we have
decided to terminate your employment effective September 18,
2020.”3

3 Montes testified to a different sequence of events.
According to Montes, on September 15, 2020 he called Contreras
and said he was ready to return to work, and Contreras told him
to meet outside the office the next morning. The next day Montes
handed Contreras the September 1, 2020 work status report.
Contreras quickly glanced at it and said he and Pelayo had
decided there was no more work for Montes.

7
D. Montes Files This Action, and the Trial Court Grants
PB Fasteners and Pelayo’s Motion for Summary
Judgment
Montes filed this action against PB Fasteners and Pelayo in
December 2021. In his operative first amended complaint
Montes asserted causes of action against PB Fasteners under
FEHA for discrimination, harassment, retaliation, failure to
provide reasonable accommodation, failure to engage in a good
faith interactive process, and failure to prevent discrimination.
He also asserted causes of action for declaratory relief and
wrongful termination in violation of public policy. Montes
asserted a single cause of action against Pelayo for disability
harassment.
PB Fasteners and Pelayo moved for summary judgment or,
in the alternative, for summary adjudication on each cause of
action and on Montes’s claim for punitive damages. Montes filed
an ex parte application to continue the hearing on the motion on
the grounds that PB Fasteners had not made plant manager
Zach Cheplak available for deposition and that PB Fasteners had
not adequately searched for documents responsive to Montes’s
discovery requests. The trial court denied the ex parte
application.
At the June 1, 2023 hearing on the motion for summary
judgment the trial court continued the hearing for three months
to allow additional discovery. The trial court’s minute order,
however, stated the court was “inclined to grant the motion.” The
trial court concluded PB Fasteners reasonably accommodated
Montes and engaged in the interactive process in good faith. The
court stated PB Fasteners showed that, because of Montes’s
physical restrictions, he could not perform the regular duties of a

8
maintenance mechanic and that there was no open position
where PB Fasteners could accommodate Montes. The court
stated that Montes relied primarily on his declaration to show he
could perform his job and that some portions of the declaration
contradicted his deposition testimony about his work duties.4
The court also stated Montes’s declaration was in English, but
Montes said he was a monolingual Spanish speaker, “another
reason the declaration is not reliable evidence and cannot
contradict the deposition testimony, where a Spanish interpreter
was present.”5
The trial court also stated PB Fasteners met its burden to
show Pelayo’s conduct did not constitute harassment. The court
said Pelayo’s comments did “not specifically refer to his
disability” and were too “occasional and sporadic” to show a
“concerted pattern.” The trial court concluded PB Fasteners did
not discriminate or retaliate against Montes because his inability
to perform the essential functions of his job was a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for terminating his employment. The
trial court also concluded PB Fasteners was entitled to summary
adjudication on Montes’s remaining causes of action for failure to
prevent discrimination and retaliation, wrongful termination in
violation of public policy, and declaratory judgment. Finally, the

4 The trial court also sustained three of PB Fasteners’
objections to Montes’s declaration, rulings Montes does not
challenge. We disregard Montes’s citations in his opening brief to
the excluded evidence.

5 At the continued hearing Montes submitted the declaration
of an interpreter who stated that she interpreted the English
declaration into Spanish and that Montes confirmed he “agreed
with the content at the time that he signed it.”

9
court stated PB Fasteners was not liable for punitive damages
because there was no triable issue regarding oppression, fraud, or
malice and because Contreras and Pelayo were not managing
agents with substantial discretionary authority over corporate
policy decisions.
After Montes took Cheplak’s deposition, the parties
submitted additional briefing. At the continued hearing on
September 21, 2023 the trial court concluded Montes’s
“additional evidence from Cheplak’s deposition does not create a
triable issue of fact.” The court incorporated and adopted its
analysis from the June 1, 2023 order and granted the motion by
PB Fasteners and Pelayo for summary judgment. The court
entered judgment for PB Fasteners and Pelayo, and Montes
timely appealed.

DISCUSSION

A. Applicable Law and Standard of Review
“‘A motion for summary judgment or summary adjudication
is properly granted only when “all the papers submitted show
that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.”’”
(Campbell v. FPI Management, Inc. (2024) 98 Cal.App.5th 1151,
1161; see Civ. Proc. Code, § 437c, subd. (c); Regents of University
of California v. Superior Court (2018) 4 Cal.5th 607, 618.)
“‘When the moving party is a defendant, it must show that the
plaintiff cannot establish at least one element of the cause of
action.’” (Wawrzenski v. United Airlines, Inc. (2024)
106 Cal.App.5th 663, 683; see Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co.
(2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 853.) Once the defendant carries its initial

10
burden, “the burden shifts to the plaintiff to demonstrate, by
reference to specific facts, not just allegations in the pleadings,
there is a triable issue of material fact as to the cause of action.
[Citations.] ‘There is a triable issue of material fact if, and only
if, the evidence would allow a reasonable trier of fact to find the
underlying fact in favor of the party opposing the motion in
accordance with the applicable standard of proof’ at trial.”
(Esplanade Productions, Inc. v. The Walt Disney Co. (2023)
93 Cal.App.5th 793, 805; see Aguilar, at p. 850.)
“‘On appeal from a summary judgment ruling, we review
the record de novo to determine whether triable issues of
material fact exist.’” (Wawrzenski v. United Airlines, Inc., supra,
106 Cal.App.5th at p. 684; see Hampton v. County of San Diego
(2015) 62 Cal.4th 340, 347.) “‘“‘[W]e take the facts from the
record that was before the trial court when it ruled on [the]
motion.’”’” (Wawrzenski, at p. 684; see Hampton, at p. 347.)
“‘“‘We liberally construe the evidence in support of the party
opposing summary judgment and resolve doubts concerning the
evidence in favor of that party.’”’” (Wawrzenski, at p. 684; see
Hampton, at p. 347.) “‘“We need not defer to the trial court and
are not bound by the reasons in its summary judgment ruling; we
review the ruling of the trial court, not its rationale.”’”
(Wawrzenski, at p. 684; see Martin v. Board of Trustees of
California State University (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 149, 161.)

B. The Trial Court Erred in Granting the Motion for
Summary Adjudication on Montes’s Cause of Action
for Disability Discrimination
FEHA “‘prohibits employers from refusing to hire,
discharging, or otherwise discriminating against employees

11
because of their physical disabilities.’” (Atkins v. City of
Los Angeles (2017) 8 Cal.App.5th 696, 714; see § 12940, subd. (a).)
To prevail on a cause of action for disability discrimination under
FEHA, the plaintiff must show he or she “(1) suffered from a
disability, (2) was otherwise qualified to do his or her job, and
(3) was subjected to adverse employment action because of the
disability.” (Nealy v. City of Santa Monica (2015)
234 Cal.App.4th 359, 378; see Zamora v. Security Industry
Specialists, Inc. (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 1, 37-38.)
PB Fasteners argues Montes could not establish the second
element of the cause of action—that he was qualified to do his
job. A plaintiff is qualified to do his or her job if “he or she can
perform the essential functions of the job with or without
reasonable accommodation.” (Green v. State of California (2007)
42 Cal.4th 254, 260; accord, Furtado v. State Personnel Bd. (2013)
212 Cal.App.4th 729, 744; see Nadaf-Rahrov v. Neiman Marcus
Group, Inc. (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 952, 962 (Nadaf-Rahrov)
[“an employee bears the burden of showing . . . he or she could
perform the essential functions of the job with or without
accommodation”].) “‘Essential functions’ means the fundamental
job duties of the employment position the individual with a
disability holds or desires. ‘Essential functions’ does not include
the marginal functions of the position.” (§ 12926, subd. (f); see
Nealy v. City of Santa Monica, supra, 234 Cal.App.4th at p. 373.)
“‘Marginal functions’ of an employment position are those that, if
not performed, would not eliminate the need for the job or that
could be readily performed by another employee or that could be
performed in an alternative way.” (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 2;
§ 11065, subd. (e)(3); see Nealy, at p. 373.)

12
PB Fasteners relied primarily on Contreras’s deposition
testimony Montes could not perform the essential functions of his
job. Contreras testified a maintenance mechanic had to move
around a piece of equipment and walk to and from an equipment
cart; “bend, stoop, and reach into difficult places” while repairing
equipment; and twist his torso or spine. Contreras testified the
job required standing and walking more than 50 percent of the
time, bending more than 25 percent of the time, twisting the
torso or spine more than 25 percent of the time, and
“occasionally” climbing a ladder to work on a machine. In
addition, Cheplak testified a maintenance technician had to lift
between 20 and 35 pounds multiple times every day. With this
evidence, PB Fasteners met its initial burden on summary
judgment to show Montes’s physical restrictions on standing and
walking (no more than 50 percent of the time), bending at the
waist and twisting his torso or spine (no more than 25 percent of
the time), and climbing a ladder and lifting more than 20 pounds
(not at all) prevented him from performing the essential functions
of his job. (See Miller v. Department of Corrections &
Rehabilitation (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 261, 276 [employer met its
initial burden on summary adjudication on a cause of action for
disability discrimination by presenting expert medical testimony
and the plaintiff’s testimony her “permanent restrictions
rendered her incapable of performing the essential duties of a
correctional officer”].)
Montes, however, disputed PB Fasteners’ evidence about
how much standing, walking, bending, and twisting the job
required. In his declaration Montes stated he spent an average of
30 percent of his shift standing, 20 percent walking, 5 percent
bending at the waist, and 5 percent twisting the spine, all within

13
his restrictions. As for the tasks Montes could not do, Montes
said he had to climb a ladder, work at heights, and lift, carry,
push, or pull more than 20 pounds “approximately once per
month.” Montes also stated “the repairs that required climbing
ladders/working at height were basic fixes that several employees
were trained on and able to handle.” This evidence created a
triable issue of material fact regarding whether the tasks Montes
could not perform were essential functions. (See § 12926,
subd. (f)(2)(C) [evidence whether a function is essential includes
the “amount of time spent on the job performing the function”];
cf. § 12926, subd. (f)(1) [a function may be essential because of
the “limited number of employees available” who can perform the
function or because the function is “highly specialized”].)6
Even if climbing a ladder or lifting more than 20 pounds
were an essential function, Montes argues, PB Fasteners could
have reasonably accommodated him by assigning another
employee to perform those tasks. Under FEHA “‘reasonable

6 PB Fasteners dismisses Montes’s declaration as
“self-serving” and “conclusory,” and the trial court agreed with
PB Fasteners some portions of Montes’s declaration
“contradict[ed] his deposition testimony about his work duties.”
PB Fasteners does not, however, point to any specific
contradiction between his deposition testimony and his
declaration regarding Montes’s work duties. In its statement of
undisputed facts, PB Fasteners cited Montes’s testimony about
two incidents: first, that when he returned from his first medical
leave and could not squat, he had to lie on his back and his
stomach to fix a machine; and second, that he injured his foot
when he climbed on a lift to repair a clutching machine. None of
this testimony contradicted Montes’s statements in his
declaration about how frequently he had to bend, climb, or do
other tasks.

14
accommodation’” means “a modification or adjustment to the
workplace that enables the employee to perform the essential
functions of the job held or desired.” (Nadaf-Rahrov, supra,
166 Cal.App.4th at p. 974; accord, Wentworth v. Regents of
University of California (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 580, 597; Miller
v. Department of Corrections & Rehabilitation, supra,
105 Cal.App.5th at p. 280.) Reasonable accommodations may
include “reallocation or redistribution of non-essential job
functions in a job with multiple responsibilities.” (Cal. Code
Regs., tit. 2, § 11065, subd. (p)(2)(E).) However, “FEHA does not
require employers to eliminate essential functions of a job to
accommodate a disabled employee.” (Atkins v. City of
Los Angeles, supra, 8 Cal.App.5th at p. 719; see Wentworth, at
p. 598 [“‘FEHA does not obligate the employer to accommodate
the employee by excusing him or her from the performance of
essential functions.’”]; Furtado v. State Personnel Bd., supra,
212 Cal.App.4th at p. 753 [waiving an essential function
requirement would mean the plaintiff “would not have to
demonstrate that he is a ‘qualified individual’ within the meaning
of FEHA”].) Nor does FEHA require an accommodation that
would “produce undue hardship” to the employer’s business by
“requiring significant difficulty or expense.” (§§ 12940,
subd. (m)(1); 12926, subd. (u); see Atkins, at p. 733.) “The
reasonableness of an accommodation generally is a question of
fact.” (Nealy v. City of Santa Monica, supra, 234 Cal.App.4th at
p. 374.)
PB Fasteners argues it was not “obligated to create a new
helper position to accommodate” Montes. It is true an “employer
is not required to create a new position . . . to accommodate
disabled employees.” (Zamora v. Security Industry Specialists,

15
Inc., supra, 71 Cal.App.5th at p. 42; see Raine v. City of Burbank
(2006) 135 Cal.App.4th 1215, 1224 [“California law is emphatic
that an employer has no affirmative duty to create a new position
to accommodate a disabled employee”].) However, Montes
submitted evidence that he frequently performed repairs with
another maintenance mechanic and that it would not create
undue hardship if another employee did the climbing and heavy
lifting Montes could not do. In his declaration Montes stated that
“repairs often required more than one person to complete” and
that he “worked with another mechanic on a repair more than
half of [his] time.” Montes also submitted the deposition
testimony of another PB Fasteners maintenance mechanic,
Christian Gallardo, who stated that many tasks required two
people and that he needed another person to assist him
25 percent of the time every day. Contreras testified there were
two maintenance mechanics working at PB Fasteners in
September 2020. This evidence created a triable issue of
material fact regarding whether PB Fasteners could have
reasonably accommodated Montes by assigning a coworker, when
needed, to perform the tasks Montes could not because of his
work restrictions.

C. The Trial Court Erred in Granting the Motion for
Summary Adjudication on Montes’s Causes of Action
for Failure To Provide Reasonable Accommodations
and Failure To Engage in an Interactive Process
Section 12940, subdivision (m)(1), makes it an unlawful
employment practice to “fail to make reasonable accommodation
for the known physical or mental disability” of an employee.
“‘The essential elements of a failure to accommodate claim are:

16
(1) the plaintiff has a disability covered by the FEHA; (2) the
plaintiff is a qualified individual (i.e., he or she can perform the
essential functions of the position); and (3) the employer failed to
reasonably accommodate the plaintiff’s disability.’” (Cuiellette v.
City of Los Angeles (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 757, 766; see Wilson v.
County of Orange (2009) 169 Cal.App.4th 1185, 1192.)
Section 12940, subdivision (n), requires an employer “to
engage in a timely, good faith, interactive process with the
employee . . . to determine effective reasonable accommodations,
if any, in response to a request for reasonable accommodation by
an employee . . . with a known physical or mental disability.”
“‘Under FEHA, an employer must engage in a good faith
interactive process with the disabled employee to explore the
alternatives to accommodate the disability.’” (Nealy v. City of
Santa Monica, supra, 234 Cal.App.4th at p. 379; see Wysinger v.
Automobile Club of Southern California (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th
413, 424.) “FEHA requires an informal process with the
employee to attempt to identify reasonable accommodations, not
necessarily ritualized discussions.” (Nealy, at p. 379; see Wilson
v. County of Orange, supra, 169 Cal.App.4th at p. 1195.) If an
employee requests accommodation, the employer must grant it or
“reject it after due consideration, and initiate discussion
with . . . the employee regarding alternative accommodations.”
(Cal. Code Regs., tit. 2, § 11069, subd. (c)(1).) The employer must
“identify potential accommodations and assess the effectiveness
each would have . . . for the employee to perform the essential
function of the position.” (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 2, § 11069,
subd. (c)(7).) An “employer cannot prevail on summary judgment
on a claim of failure to reasonably accommodate unless it
establishes through undisputed facts that (1) reasonable

17
accommodation was offered and refused; (2) there simply was no
vacant position within the employer’s organization for which the
disabled employee was qualified and which the disabled employee
was capable of performing with or without accommodation; or
(3) the employer did everything in its power to find a reasonable
accommodation, but the informal interactive process broke down
because the employee failed to engage in discussions in good
faith.” (Jensen v. Wells Fargo Bank (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 245,
263; accord, Wentworth v. Regents of University of California,
supra, 105 Cal.App.5th at p. 599.)
PB Fasteners argues that Montes’s physical restrictions
prevented him from performing the maintenance mechanic job
and that the company did not have a vacant position he could
perform.7 As discussed, however, Montes created a triable issue
of material fact regarding whether PB Fasteners could have
reasonably accommodated him in the maintenance mechanic
position by reassigning tasks that required climbing and heavy
lifting to another employee.
PB Fasteners also argues it “did engage in the interactive
process and accommodated Mr. Montes to the extent it could.”
PB Fasteners states that, after Montes’s injury in July 2019,
PB Fasteners granted him a leave of absence, extended that leave
of absence several times, and “reached out multiple times to
identify his anticipated return date and restrictions.” A leave of
absence may be a reasonable accommodation. (Zamora v.
Security Industry Specialists, Inc., supra, 71 Cal.App.5th at

7 Because PB Fasteners had laid off nearly half its workforce
due to the COVID-19 pandemic and had reduced demand from a
major customer, there was no position available in the shipping
department, the only place an employee could work while seated.

18
p. 41.) However, the duty to discuss potential accommodations
“is a continuing duty and the fact that the employer took some
steps to identify a reasonable accommodation does not absolve
the employer of liability for failure to engage in the interactive
process if it is responsible for a later breakdown in the process.”
(Ibid.; see Nadaf-Rahrov, supra, 166 Cal.App.4th at p. 985.)
After Montes submitted a report from his doctor stating he could
return to work with restrictions on September 16, 2020,
PB Fasteners communicated with Montes only once before
terminating his employment—when Contreras and Montes spoke
on September 14, 2020. According to Contreras, they discussed
“whether [Montes] was ever gonna be able to come back to
work, . . . and he admitted and agreed . . . that he didn’t feel that
he was gonna be able to return to work.” Montes confirmed he
spoke with Contreras, but disputed Contreras’s assertion Montes
agreed he could not return to work. Montes testified Contreras
told him “he was from HR and they wanted to see me to reach an
agreement. But I didn’t pay attention to that conversation,
because I asked myself, ‘what agreement?’” PB Fasteners
presented no evidence that, between the time Montes was cleared
to return to work and the time PB Fasteners terminated his
employment, PB Fasteners had any discussions with Montes
about how his physical restrictions affected his ability to do his
job or what accommodations would allow Montes to return to
work. (See Cal. Code Regs., tit. 2, § 11069, subd. (c)(1) [if the
employer rejects the employee’s requested accommodation, the
employer must discuss alternative accommodations with the
employee].)
Nadaf-Rahrov, supra, 166 Cal.App.4th 952 is instructive.
In that case the plaintiff developed pain in multiple joints,

19
leaving her unable to perform her job as a clothes fitter in a
department store. (Id. at pp. 957-958.) The plaintiff took a
medical leave, which was extended several times. (Id. at p. 958.)
After the plaintiff had been on leave for seven months, her doctor
told her employer “she may be able to return to work [seven
weeks later] but not in her previous position.” (Id. at p. 959.)
Two weeks later the employer terminated the plaintiff’s
employment. (Ibid.) The court in Nadaf-Rahrov reversed the
trial court’s order granting the employer’s motion for summary
judgment. (Id. at p. 957.) The court held that, though in the first
few months of the employee’s leave the employer “engaged in a
good faith interactive process to identify a reasonable
accommodation” (id. at p. 985), a “jury could find that . . . it was
unreasonable for [the employer] to determine unilaterally that
[the employee] could not perform any available vacant position
and would not be able to do so in the foreseeable future” and that
the employer “needed to engage in further discussion with [the
employee] before concluding that no reasonable accommodation
was possible.” (Id. at p. 989.) Same here: A jury could find that
PB Fasteners could have reasonably accommodated Montes and
that PB Fasteners did not fully engage in the interactive process
to determine whether there were reasonable accommodations for
Montes. The trial court erred in granting the motion for
summary adjudication on Montes’s causes of action under
section 12940, subdivisions (m) and (n).8

8 In Nadaf-Rahrov, supra, 166 Cal.App.4th 952 the plaintiff
conceded she could not perform the essential functions of her
regular job, but argued that her employer should have reassigned
her to another job (id. at p. 968) and that “an employer’s duty to

20
D. The Trial Court Erred in Granting the Motion for
Summary Adjudication on Montes’s Cause of Action
for Harassment
“It is an unlawful employment practice for an employer to
‘harass’ an employee based on membership in a protected class”
(Bailey v. San Francisco Dist. Attorney’s Office (2024) 16 Cal.5th
611, 626), including “because of . . . physical disability” (§ 12940,
subd. (j)(1)). “Harassment includes ‘[v]erbal harassment’ such as
‘epithets, derogatory comments or slurs on a basis enumerated in
[FEHA].’” (Bailey, at p. 627; see Cal. Code Regs., tit. 2, § 11019,
subd. (b)(2)(A).) Harassment “consists of conduct outside the
scope of necessary job performance, conduct presumably engaged
in for personal gratification, because of meanness or bigotry, or
for other personal motives.” (Reno v. Baird (1998) 18 Cal.4th
640, 645-646; accord, Lopez v. Routt (2017) 17 Cal.App.5th 1006,
1017.) “Hostile work environment harassment is a type of
harassment that ‘“‘has the purpose or effect of either interfering
with the work performance of an employee, or creating an
intimidating workplace.’”’” (Wawrzenski v. United Airlines, Inc.,
supra, 106 Cal.App.5th at p. 692.) “‘FEHA makes the employer
strictly liable for harassment by a supervisor.’” (Wawrzenski, at

accommodate a disabled employee by reassigning him or her to a
vacant position is not per se limited to vacant positions in the
same workplace where the employee originally worked” (id. at
p. 970). Because we conclude Montes created a triable issue of
material fact regarding whether he could perform the
maintenance mechanic job in his usual work location, we do not
reach his argument PB Fasteners should have considered
whether it could accommodate him by reassigning him to a
position in one of its other facilities.

21
p. 694; see Doe v. Department of Corrections & Rehabilitation
(2019) 43 Cal.App.5th 721, 737.)
To prevail on a cause of action for hostile work environment
under FEHA, an employee must show he or she was “subjected to
‘offensive comments or other abusive conduct’ that is (1) based on
a ‘protected characteristic’ (here, a claimed disability) and
(2) ‘sufficiently severe or pervasive as to alter the conditions of
[his] employment.’” (Doe v. Department of Corrections
& Rehabilitation, supra, 43 Cal.App.5th at p. 736; see Bailey v.
San Francisco Dist. Attorney’s Office, supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 627.)
“Whether a work environment is reasonably perceived as hostile
or abusive . . . “‘. . . must be evaluated in light of the totality of
the circumstances,’” including “‘“the frequency of the
discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically
threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and
whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee’s work
performance.”’” (Bailey, at p. 628; see Miller v. Department of
Corrections (2005) 36 Cal.4th 446, 462; Doe, at p. 736.) “A single
incident of harassing conduct is sufficient to create a triable issue
regarding the existence of a hostile work environment if the
harassing conduct has unreasonably interfered with the
plaintiff’s work performance or created an intimidating, hostile,
or offensive working environment.” (§ 12923, subd. (b); see
Wawrzenski v. United Airlines, Inc., supra, 106 Cal.App.5th at
p. 693.)
“The objective severity of harassment should be judged
from the perspective of a reasonable person in the plaintiff’s
position.” (Bailey v. San Francisco Dist. Attorney’s Office, supra,
16 Cal.5th at p. 629; see Miller v. Department of Corrections,
supra, 36 Cal.4th at p. 462; Cornell v. Berkeley Tennis Club

22
(2017) 18 Cal.App.5th 908, 940.) “Harassment cases are rarely
appropriate for disposition on summary judgment,” and “hostile
working environment cases involve issues ‘not determinable on
paper.’” (§ 12923, subds. (b) & (e); see Nazir v. United Airlines,
Inc. (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 243, 286 [“many employment cases
present issues of intent, and motive, and hostile working
environment, issues not determinable on paper”].)
Montes submitted evidence that, after he returned from his
first medical leave in December 2018 and was assigned to less
physically demanding work in the shipping department, Pelayo
repeatedly made negative comments about Montes’s physical
condition, referred to Montes using derogatory terms, and
insulted him for not returning to the maintenance department.
For example, as stated Pelayo told Montes he was “old” and had
“gone to hell,” told him to “stop fucking around like a little bitch
and go back to work,” and said Montes should “get back to doing
normal work.” When Montes complained to Pelayo the tasks he
had assigned Montes violated his physical restrictions, Pelayo
said “what the fuck are you going to do?” and “what are you doing
here?” and called Montes “lazy.” Montes also testified Pelayo
made him go upstairs to Pelayo’s office, even though Montes told
Pelayo he could not climb stairs. Taken together and viewed in
the light most favorable to, and drawing all inferences in favor of,
Montes (Weiss v. People ex rel. Department of Transportation
(2020) 9 Cal.5th 840, 864), this evidence could allow a reasonable
jury to conclude PB Fasteners created an environment that was
intolerable to Montes and to a reasonable person with a
disability. (See Cornell v. Berkeley Tennis Club, supra,
18 Cal.App.5th at p. 941 [trial court erred in granting a motion
for summary adjudication on a harassment cause of action where

23
the supervisor of an obese employee ordered clothing that was
much too small for her, reported her for resisting the uniform
policy, and made “comments communicating an offensive weight-
based message”].)
PB Fasteners argues that Pelayo’s comments were
“personnel actions,” such as “directions” and “performance
feedback,” and that the comments were not “about a particular
disability” or “tied to disability.” Perhaps, in another context,
some of Pelayo’s comments could be viewed as performance
feedback; for example, where a supervisor says to an employee
who was taking an unreasonably long coffee break, “Stop being
lazy; I need you there already.” But when Pelayo said the same
words to Montes, who was temporarily assigned to the shipping
department to accommodate his physical restrictions, Montes
could reasonably interpret Pelayo’s statements as disparaging
Montes’s disability, his physical restrictions, and his
accommodations. (See Cornell v. Berkeley Tennis Club, supra,
18 Cal.App.5th at p. 941 [manager’s “comments ‘must be viewed
in context with [the employer’s] other [allegedly] harassing
conduct’”]; see also Miller v. Department of Corrections, supra,
36 Cal.4th at p. 462 [“Common sense, and an appropriate
sensibility to social context, will enable courts and juries to
distinguish between simple teasing or roughhousing . . . and
conduct which a reasonable person in the plaintiff’s position
would find severely hostile or abusive.”].) Moreover, Pelayo’s
comments to Montes could not have been personnel actions
necessary to Pelayo’s job as Montes’s supervisor because they
occurred, according to Montes, when Montes was temporarily
assigned to the shipping department and Pelayo was not
supervising him. (See Reno v. Baird, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 645

24
[“‘harassment consists of a type of conduct not necessary for
performance of a supervisory job’”]; cf. Doe v. Department of
Corrections & Rehabilitation, supra, 43 Cal.App.5th at p. 737
[supervisor’s actions in assigning work and enforcing workplace
rules were not harassment because each action “involved a
personnel decision by [the supervisor] within the scope of his
duties as [the plaintiff’s] supervisor”].)
PB Fasteners also argues Pelayo’s comments were not
sufficiently severe or pervasive to constitute harassment. “Before
2019 the ‘severe or pervasive’ requirement ‘was quite a high bar
for plaintiffs to clear, even in the context of a motion for summary
judgment.’” (Wawrzenski v. United Airlines, Inc., supra,
106 Cal.App.5th at p. 693; see Beltran v. Hard Rock Hotel
Licensing, Inc. (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 865, 878.) “Effective
January 1, 2019, however, the Legislature added section 12923,
which ‘clarified existing law’ to provide ‘that “[a] single incident
of harassing conduct is sufficient to create a triable issue
regarding the existence of a hostile work environment if the
harassing conduct has unreasonably interfered with the
plaintiff’s work performance or created an intimidating, hostile,
or offensive work environment.”’” (Wawrzenski, at p. 693; see
§ 12923, subd. (b); Beltran, at p. 878.) “Section 12923 also
‘clarified that a hostile work environment exists “when the
harassing conduct sufficiently offends, humiliates, distresses, or
intrudes upon its victim, so as to disrupt the victim’s emotional
tranquility in the workplace, affect the victim’s ability to perform
the job as usual, or otherwise interfere with and undermine the
victim’s personal sense of well-being.’” (Wawrzenski, at p. 693;
see § 12923, subd. (a); Beltran, at p. 878.)

25
Montes’s evidence met this low bar, at least on summary
judgment. He testified he told Calderon that Pelayo treated him
“like trash” and humiliated him and that Montes was “being
mentally and emotionally destroyed.” Although PB Fasteners
argues a “handful of statements made over the course of five
years do not constitute a severe or pervasive harassment,”
Montes (to the extent he needed to under section 12923)
presented evidence of more than a handful of statements, all but
one of which occurred within the seven-month period from
December 2018 to July 2019 when Montes was temporarily
assigned to the shipping department. In his declaration Montes
stated Pelayo made derogatory comments two to three times a
day between December 2018 and July 2019. Although
PB Fasteners contends Montes may not rely on his declaration to
the extent it contradicts his deposition testimony, Montes
testified in his deposition to eight incidents between
December 2018 and July 2019 and, when counsel for
PB Fasteners asked Montes whether Pelayo made any other
offensive comments, Montes said “I know there are, but I don’t
recall right now.” A reasonable jury could find this evidence
constituted severe or pervasive harassment. (See Caldera v.
Department of Corrections & Rehabilitation (2018)
25 Cal.App.5th 31, 39 [“Incidents of harassing conduct over a
short period of time may constitute severe or pervasive
harassment.”]; Fuentes v. AutoZone, Inc. (2011) 200 Cal.App.4th
1221, 1234 [harassment over a three-week period “was both
pervasive and severe”].)

26
E. The Trial Court Erred in Granting the Motion for
Summary Adjudication on Montes’s Cause of Action
for Retaliation
“To establish a prima facie case of retaliation under FEHA,
an employee must show that (1) she engaged in a ‘protected
activity,’ (2) the employer subjected her to an adverse
employment action, and (3) a causal link existed between the
protected activity and the employer’s action.” (Bailey v.
San Francisco Dist. Attorney’s Office, supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 636;
see Yanowitz v. L’Oreal USA, Inc. (2005) 36 Cal.4th 1028, 1042.)
“Once an employee establishes a prima facie case, the employer is
required to offer a legitimate, nonretaliatory reason for the
adverse employment action. [Citation.] If the employer produces
a legitimate reason for the adverse employment action, the
presumption of retaliation ‘“‘drops out of the picture,’”’ and the
burden shifts back to the employee to prove intentional
retaliation.” (Yanowitz, at p. 1042.)
Montes submitted evidence PB Fasteners terminated his
employment shortly after he asked to return to work with
accommodations. Requesting accommodation for a disability is a
protected activity under FEHA. (Miller v. Department of
Corrections & Rehabilitation, supra, 105 Cal.App.5th at p. 285;
Nadaf-Rahrov, supra, 166 Cal.App.4th at p. 990.) “A causal link
may be established with evidence demonstrating that the
employer was aware of the protected activity and the adverse
action followed within a relatively short time.” (California Fair
Employment & Housing Com. v. Gemini Aluminum Corp. (2004)
122 Cal.App.4th 1004, 1018; see Nadaf-Rahrov, at p. 990.) This
evidence established a prima facie case of retaliation.

27
PB Fasteners, however, provided a legitimate
non-retaliatory reason for terminating Montes’s employment:
Montes’s restrictions prevented him from performing his job as a
maintenance mechanic, and PB Fasteners had no vacant position
for which Montes was qualified. That was sufficient to overcome
the presumption of retaliation. (See Nadaf-Rahrov, supra,
166 Cal.App.4th at p. 990 [“the fact that [the employer’s]
rationale might not have absolved [the employer] of liability
under [the employee’s] disability-related claims does not
demonstrate that [the employer’s] true motive was retaliation”].)
But Montes met his burden on summary judgment to show
PB Fasteners’ stated reason for terminating his employment was
pretextual. As discussed, Montes presented evidence that Pelayo
exhibited bias against him because of his disability and that
PB Fasteners’ decisionmakers relied on Pelayo’s input in deciding
Montes could not perform his job as a maintenance mechanic.
Cheplak testified that he deferred to Pelayo in deciding whether
Montes could return to the maintenance mechanic position; that
Pelayo said Montes could not perform the physical demands of
the job; and that, solely based on his conversation with Pelayo,
Cheplak recommended to Contreras and Scott Cooper,
PB Fasteners’ general manager, that the company not allow
Montes to return to his previous job. And when Cooper suggested
Montes could do purchasing work in the maintenance
department, Cheplak told Cooper that Pelayo said Montes was
not proficient at computers. Cheplak recommended to Cooper
that PB Fasteners terminate Montes’s employment, and Cooper
agreed.

28
Under “the so-called ‘“cat’s paw”’ doctrine,[9] a plaintiff
‘need not demonstrate that every individual who participated in
the [challenged employment action] shared discriminatory
animus in order to defeat a summary judgment
motion. . . . [S]howing that a significant participant in an
employment decision exhibited discriminatory animus is enough
to raise an inference that the employment decision itself was
discriminatory, even absent evidence that others in the process
harbored such animus.’” (Lin v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals
(2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 712, 722-723; see DeJung v. Superior
Court (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 533, 551 [same]; Reeves v. Safeway
Stores, Inc. (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 95, 116 [an employer is
responsible “where discriminatory or retaliatory actions by
supervisory personnel bring about adverse employment actions
through the instrumentality or conduit of other corporate actors
who may be entirely innocent of discriminatory or retaliatory
animus”].) Because Cheplak relied significantly, indeed
exclusively, on Pelayo’s assessment of Montes’s abilities, and
Cooper in turn adopted Cheplak’s recommendation to fire
Montes, Montes created a triable issue of material fact regarding
retaliatory intent.

9 The “cat’s paw” doctrine derives from a fable where a
monkey induces a cat to extract roasting chestnuts from a fire.
(Reeves v. Safeway Stores, Inc. (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 95, 114,
fn. 14.) Under the doctrine, “[i]mputation of retaliatory animus
will be justified by any set of facts that would permit a jury to
find that an intermediary, for whatever reasons, simply carried
out the will of the actuator, rather than breaking the chain of
causation by taking a truly independent action.” (Ibid.)

29
F. The Trial Court Erred in Granting the Motion for
Summary Adjudication on Montes’s Cause of Action
for Failure To Prevent Discrimination and
Harassment
Section 12940, subdivision (k), requires an employer “to
take all reasonable steps necessary to prevent discrimination and
harassment from occurring.” PB Fasteners argues Montes’s
cause of action for failure to prevent discrimination and
harassment “automatically fails as a matter of law when the
underlying discrimination and retaliation claims also fail.”
However, as discussed, there were triable issues of material fact
regarding whether PB Fasteners discriminated and retaliated
against Montes and whether Pelayo harassed him. Therefore, a
jury could reasonably find PB Fasteners did not take all
reasonable steps necessary to prevent discrimination and
harassment. (See Caldera v. Department of Corrections
& Rehabilitation, supra, 25 Cal.App.5th at p. 44 [“the jury could
have reasonably determined that regardless of whatever steps
the [employer] had taken to prevent harassment, those steps
were not effective; thus, the jury could reasonably find that the
[employer] had failed ‘to take all reasonable steps’ to prevent the
harassment”]; California Fair Employment & Housing Com. v.
Gemini Aluminum Corp., supra, 122 Cal.App.4th at p. 1024 [an
“employer’s claim that its procedures are effective in addressing
discrimination is negated by proof of retaliation”].)

30
G. The Trial Court Erred in Granting the Motion for
Summary Adjudication on Montes’s Cause of Action
for Wrongful Termination in Violation of Public
Policy
An “‘employer’s discharge of an employee in violation of a
fundamental public policy embodied in a constitutional or
statutory provision gives rise to a tort action.’” (Prue v. Brady
Co./San Diego, Inc. (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 1367, 1377.)
“FEHA’s provisions may provide the policy basis for a claim for
wrongful termination in violation of public policy.” (Zamora v.
Security Industry Specialists, Inc., supra, 71 Cal.App.5th at
p. 31.)
Montes bases his cause of action for wrongful termination
on his allegations PB Fasteners terminated his employment in
violation of FEHA’s prohibitions against discrimination and
retaliation. As discussed, there were triable issues of material
fact regarding whether PB Fasteners violated FEHA by
terminating Montes’s employment. That same evidence created a
triable issue of fact regarding whether PB Fasteners wrongfully
terminated Montes’s employment in violation of public policy.
(See Zamora v. Security Industry Specialists, Inc., supra,
71 Cal.App.5th at p. 62 [cause of action for wrongful termination
in violation of public policy “rises and falls” with FEHA causes of
action]; Soria v. Univision Radio Los Angeles, Inc. (2016)
5 Cal.App.5th 570, 604 [because employee created triable issues
of material fact on her cause of action for discrimination under
FEHA, the trial court erred in granting a motion for summary
adjudication on a wrongful termination cause of action based on
the same facts].)

31
H. The Trial Court Erred in Granting Pelayo’s Motion
for Summary Adjudication on Montes’s Claim for
Punitive Damages, but Did Not Err in Granting
PB Fasteners’ Motion

1. Whether Montes Is Entitled to Punitive
Damages Against Pelayo Is a Factual Issue
A plaintiff may recover punitive damages for violations of
FEHA “where it is proven by clear and convincing evidence that
the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice.”
(Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (a); see Commodore Home Systems, Inc.
v. Superior Court (1982) 32 Cal.3d 211, 215 [punitive damages
are recoverable for FEHA violations]; Myers v. Trendwest Resorts,
Inc. (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 1403, 1435 [same].) “‘Malice’ means
conduct which is intended by the defendant to cause injury to the
plaintiff or despicable conduct which is carried on by the
defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or
safety of others.” (Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (c)(1).) “‘Oppression’
means despicable conduct that subjects a person to cruel and
unjust hardship in conscious disregard of that person's rights.”
(Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (c)(2).) As discussed, Montes presented
evidence Pelayo ridiculed him for needing accommodations and,
despite Montes’s physical restrictions, required Montes to climb
stairs and perform strenuous janitorial work. A reasonable jury
could find this evidence demonstrated oppression or malice.

32
2. Montes Did Not Submit Evidence a Managing
Agent of PB Fasteners Ratified Pelayo’s
Misconduct
Under Civil Code section 3294, subdivision (b), a court can
award punitive damages against a corporation based on the acts
of an employee if an “officer, director, or managing agent of the
corporation” had “advance knowledge of the unfitness of the
employee and employed him or her with a conscious disregard of
the rights or safety of others or authorized or ratified the
wrongful conduct” of the employee. “For purposes of determining
an employer’s liability for punitive damages, ratification
generally occurs where, under the particular circumstances, the
employer demonstrates an intent to adopt or approve oppressive,
fraudulent, or malicious behavior by an employee in the
performance of his job duties.” (College Hospital Inc. v. Superior
Court (1994) 8 Cal.4th 704, 726; see Cruz v. HomeBase (2000)
83 Cal.App.4th 160, 168 [“‘ratification’ is the ‘[c]onfirmation and
acceptance of a previous act’”].)
Montes concedes Pelayo was not an officer, director, or
managing agent of PB Fasteners, but he argues that Cooper (the
general manager), Cheplak, and Contreras were managing
agents and that they ratified Pelayo’s conduct.10 Montes cites
evidence that PB Fasteners continued to employ Pelayo in
March 2023, that Cooper did not investigate Montes’s allegations
or ask Pelayo whether they were true, and that PB Fasteners did
not send Pelayo to receive training to prevent him from harassing

10 Montes does not argue that PB Fasteners had advance
knowledge of Pelayo’s unfitness or that it authorized Pelayo’s
wrongful conduct.

33
others. Montes, however, did not present any evidence Cooper or
any PB Fasteners managing agent knew, while Montes worked at
PB Fasteners, about the harassment. (See Cruz v. HomeBase,
supra, 83 Cal.App.4th at p. 168 [a “corporation cannot confirm
and accept that which it does not actually know about”]; cf. Pulte
Home Corp. v. American Safety Indemnity Co. (2017)
14 Cal.App.5th 1086, 1126 [insurance company ratified an
attorney’s conduct where the “pattern of not accepting additional
insured tenders [had] gone on for years and clearly was known to
the officers and managing agents of” the insurance company];
Hart v. National Mortgage & Land Co. (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d
1420, 1433 [employer could be liable to an employee for punitive
damages where the employee reported harassment to his
superior several times, but “nothing was done to punish” the
harasser].)11
To the extent Montes argues PB Fasteners ratified Pelayo’s
conduct after Montes filed this action, Montes did not create a
triable issue of material fact regarding how PB Fasteners
responded to Montes’s allegations. Montes cites Cooper’s
deposition testimony that Cooper did not ask Pelayo about the
allegations in the lawsuit and did not know whether anyone else
had done so, but Cooper also testified that, “in this type of case,
human resources and legal will do whatever investigation . . . is
needed.” Montes’s evidence would not allow a reasonable jury to
conclude no one at PB Fasteners investigated Montes’s
allegations or questioned Pelayo about them. Nor does Montes

11 Montes does not argue his testimony that he complained
about Pelayo to Calderon (the former human resources
administrator) created a triable issue of material fact regarding
whether PB Fasteners knew about Pelayo’s misconduct.

34
cite authority for the proposition an employer’s failure, after an
employee files an action for harassment, to terminate the alleged
harasser’s employment or send the harasser to training is
sufficient to create a triable issue of material fact regarding
whether the employer ratified the harassment.
Montes also asserts PB Fasteners “has hidden documents
and changed its story regarding why Montes was terminated,
showing malice, oppression, and fraud.” Montes, however, does
not cite any evidence to support those assertions. The cases
Montes cites involve employers who gave pretextual reasons for
adverse employment actions. (See Colucci v. T-Mobile USA, Inc.
(2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 442, 454, 455 [substantial evidence
supported the jury’s finding a supervisor “acted with malice or
oppression” by terminating an employee who complained of
discrimination and “concoct[ing] a reason for termination”];
Cloud v. Casey (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 895, 912 [evidence an
employer denied the plaintiff a promotion based on her gender
and gave a pretextual reason for its decision supported “the jury’s
determination that the conduct was willful and in conscious
disregard of” the plaintiff’s rights].) Those cases do not apply
here, where PB Fasteners admits it fired Montes because of his
disability, but argues he could not perform his job.12

12 Because Montes submitted evidence creating triable issues
of material fact regarding whether PB Fasteners violated FEHA,
the trial court also erred in granting summary adjudication on
Montes’s cause of action for declaratory relief.

35
DISPOSITION

The judgment is reversed. The trial court is directed to
vacate its order granting the motion by PB Fasteners and Pelayo
for summary judgment. The trial court is directed to enter a new
order (1) denying PB Fasteners’ motion for summary adjudication
on Montes’s causes of action for discrimination, failure to provide
reasonable accommodations, failure to engage in an interactive
process, harassment, retaliation, failure to prevent
discrimination and harassment, wrongful termination in
violation of public policy, and declaratory relief; (2) denying
Pelayo’s motion for summary adjudication on Montes’s cause of
action for harassment; (3) denying Pelayo’s motion for summary
adjudication on Montes’s claim for punitive damages; (4) granting
PB Fasteners’ motion for summary adjudication on Montes’s
claim for punitive damages; and (5) denying the motion for
summary judgment. Montes is to recover his costs on appeal.

SEGAL, J.

We concur:

MARTINEZ, P. J.

STONE, J.

36

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