People v. Lopez CA4/1

CourtListener 10585020Calctapp15.05.2025

Gesamter Gesetzestext

Filed 5/15/25 P. v. Lopez CA4/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THE PEOPLE, D084077

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v. (Super. Ct. No. SCE417025)

JOHN DAVID LOPEZ,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Frank L. Birchak, Judge. Affirmed.
Marta I. Stanton, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
No appearance by Plaintiff and Respondent.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
John David Lopez appeals from a judgment of conviction and sentence
following a guilty plea to voluntary manslaughter. His appellate counsel filed
a brief pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende) and Anders
v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 738 (Anders). We notified Lopez of his right to
file a supplemental brief, and he has not done so. Based on our independent
review of the record, we find no reasonably arguable appellate issues and
affirm the judgment.
I.
Background
In an amended information, Lopez was charged with murder (Pen.
Code, § 187, subd. (a) (all further references are to the Penal Code)) with
firearm enhancements pursuant to section 12022.53, subdivision (d), and
section 12022.5, subdivision (a). It was further alleged he had two serious
felony priors and two strike priors based on felony assault convictions from
1985 and 2016. Three aggravating circumstances were also alleged in
support of an upper term sentence.
On March 11, 2024, Lopez pled guilty to the lesser included offense of
voluntary manslaughter (§ 192, subd. (a)) and admitted the section 12022.5,
subdivision (a), firearm enhancement and one strike prior. With the

assistance of counsel, Lopez completed and signed a Boykin/Tahl1 waiver
form, initialing each line acknowledging the constitutional rights he waived
and the consequences of his plea. Relevant here, he initialed the
acknowledgements: (1) “I have not been induced to enter this plea by any
promise or representation of any kind, except” the stipulated agreement he
would be sentenced to “26 years to run concurrent with [case No.]
SCD296684.” (2) He was subject to the maximum exposure of 32 years state
prison and his conviction will be a strike resulting in substantially increased
penalties. (3) His attorney explained to him other possible consequences,
including reduced conduct/work credits as follows, “b. Violent Felony (No
credit or max. 15%)” and “c. Prior Strike(s) (No credit to max. 20%).” He

1 Boykin v. Alabama (1969) 395 U.S. 238 and In re Tahl (1969) 1 Cal.3d
122 (Boykin/Tahl).
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agreed to the following factual basis: “I unlawfully killed David Martinez. I
intentionally discharged a firearm. I have suffered a previous strike offense.
I have previously been to prison.”
Lopez’s attorney signed the waiver form, attesting she personally read
and explained the entire contents of the plea form and any attached
addendum to him; discussed all charges, possible defenses, and consequences
with him; and concurred in his plea and waiver of constitutional rights.

The trial judge reviewed the plea form with Lopez,2 confirming he read
the form, had enough time to speak with his attorney, understood all of the
contents of the form, and initialed and signed the form because he understood
it and “everything in [it] was true.” Lopez confirmed he understood he would
be sentenced to 26 years on the voluntary manslaughter conviction and the
section 12022.5, subdivision (a), enhancement, concurrent with the two-year
sentence he would receive in case no. SCD296684. The court asked him, “Did
anybody promise you anything else in order to get you to plead guilty?” He
responded, “No.” It asked him, “Do you believe you understand all of the
consequences of your plea of guilty including any potential immigration
consequences.” He responded, “I believe I do.” Lopez then pled guilty as
indicated. The court found Lopez’s plea was knowingly, voluntarily, and
intelligently entered and there was a factual basis for the plea.
At the sentencing hearing on April 9, Lopez moved to withdraw his
guilty plea. His appointed counsel informed the court that after conducting
research, “the law did not appear to support [his request] based on the

2 The court also reviewed the plea form in Case No. SCD296684 at the
same time.

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reason” he provided her. She requested the court conduct a Marsden3
hearing to allow Lopez to explain “what was going on in his mind when he
agreed to accept the deal, so the court can take that into consideration, and
see whether or not they feel there is any appropriate remedy to be had.”
After confirming counsel’s representation with Lopez, the court closed the
courtroom except for defense counsel and court staff to conduct a Marsden
hearing.
Relevant here, on April 8, the day before his sentencing hearing, Lopez
filed a handwritten letter to the court asserting he accepted the negotiated
plea bargain believing that “15 years were going to come off [his] sentence”
and he was “only going to have to do 66 [percent] on 11 [years], not 85
[percent] on 26 [years],” due to a “new law” that became effective in 2023 in
which “double-ups and enhancements are automatically coming off of every
ones [sic] sentence.” He acknowledged his lawyer “told [him] the truth,” that
he would “have to do 85 [percent] on [his] plea bargain,” but asserted:
“[W]hen my lawyer told me how much time I was really going to do I told her
I could not accept a deal like that.” He maintained, however, he was “lied to,
and miss informed [sic] about the [new] law” and that he now understands,
from talking to family members of “people who are up state” that “violent
offenders double up’s and enhancements do not come off.” He asserted he
could no longer “consent to the plea bargain.”
In the Marsden hearing, Lopez told the court his appointed counsel “did
a great job,” is “a good lawyer,” “one of the best ones that [he has] ever had in
[his] life,” and he has “no conflict of issue with her.” He provided the
following basis to withdraw his plea: “I was under the impression that there
was a new law in effect. Everybody is talking about it. They are coming

3 People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118.
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down from up state talking about the double up and things taken off of
everybody’s cases now. When they offered me the deal, 26 without life, the 11
doubled up to 22 with the four year gun enhancement, I thought it doesn’t
sound so bad. [¶] I talked to her about it. She told me that is not the case.
This is not the case.” He confirmed in response to the court’s direct question
that his attorney did inform him he would not be getting any reduction on the
stipulated 26-year sentence. But he “did not believe her.” Lopez then added
he “got high that day” and “was under the influence,” contrary to his plea
form acknowledging, “I am sober and my judgment is not impaired. I have
not consumed any drug, alcohol or narcotic within the past 24 hours.”
Lopez’s attorney confirmed she repeatedly advised him that “he would
do 85 percent.” The trial judge found Lopez was provided with effective
representation, there was no legal basis for Lopez to withdraw his plea, and
denied the Marsden motion. Proceeding to sentencing, the court imposed the
upper term of 11 years on the voluntary manslaughter, doubled for the strike
prior to 22 years, and 4 years on the section 12022.5, subdivision (a), firearm
enhancement, for a total of 26 years. The sentence was run concurrent with
the sentence imposed in case SCD296684.
Lopez timely filed a notice of appeal and obtained a certificate of
probable cause.
II.
Discussion
Lopez’s appellate counsel has filed a brief pursuant to Wende, supra,
25 Cal.3d 436 and Anders, supra, 386 U.S. 738, setting forth a statement of
the case and statement of facts, urging no grounds for reversal of the
judgment, and asking this court to independently review the record for error.
Counsel identifies the following issue to assist the court in its review: “Was
appellant properly advised of his Boykin/Tahl constitutional rights prior to
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the acceptance of the guilty plea?” After reviewing the entire record as
required by Wende and Anders, we conclude he was properly advised of his
Boykin/Tahl constitutional rights before his guilty plea and, further, we have
not discovered any arguable issues for reversal or modification on appeal.
Competent counsel has represented Lopez on this appeal.
III.
Disposition
The judgment is affirmed.

DO, J.

WE CONCUR:

IRION, Acting P. J.

BUCHANAN, J.

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