CourtListener 10584096•People v. Lopez CA2/2
Gesamter Gesetzestext
Filed 5/14/25 P. v. Lopez CA2/2
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
THE PEOPLE, B336137
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. BA514608)
v.
JEROME JERMAINE LOPEZ,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Gustavo N. Sztraicher, Judge. Affirmed.
Vanessa Place, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Nicholas J. Webster and Amanda V. Lopez,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
__________________________
INTRODUCTION
Defendant and appellant Jerome Jermaine Lopez
sodomized an unhoused disabled woman one early morning as
she sat at a bus stop on a busy intersection. Police officers on
patrol at the intersection witnessed the assault in progress and
arrested Lopez.
A jury convicted Lopez of sodomy and assault with intent to
commit sexual penetration by force. The jury also found true the
aggravating circumstance that the victim was particularly
vulnerable. Premised on this aggravating circumstance, Lopez
was sentenced to the upper term on the sodomy count. Lopez
maintains that the trial court abused its discretion in imposing
the upper term because there was insufficient evidence to support
the finding, made by both the jury and trial court, that the victim
was particularly vulnerable. We find that no abuse of discretion
occurred and affirm.
BACKGROUND
I. Procedural Background
By information, Lopez was charged with two felony counts:
(1) forcible sodomy (Pen. Code,1 § 286, subd. (c)(2)(A)); and
(2) assault with intent to commit rape, sodomy2 and oral
copulation (§ 220, subd. (a)(1)). As to both counts, the information
specially alleged the offenses committed involved great violence
(Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.421(a)(1)),3 and the victim was
1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2 The allegation of assault with intent to commit sodomy in
count 2 was eliminated before the case was submitted to the jury.
3 “Rule” references are to the California Rules of Court.
2
particularly vulnerable (rule 4.421(a)(3)). Lopez pled not guilty
and denied the special allegations.
Lopez was found guilty of both counts. With respect to the
assault with intent to commit a felony, the jury found true that
he intended to commit rape and sexual penetration by force. In a
bifurcated hearing, as to both counts, the jury also found true the
special allegation that the victim was particularly vulnerable
(rule 4.421(a)(3)), but not that the offense involved great violence
(rule 4.421(a)(1)). Lopez was sentenced to an aggregate prison
term of 12 years, calculated as follows: the high term of
eight years as to count 1, plus a consecutive midterm of four
years for count 2. This timely appeal followed.
II. Factual Background
A. The Prosecution’s Evidence
At about 8:00 a.m. on May 7, 2023, Los Angeles Police
Department (LAPD) Officer Kasey Campbell and his partner,
Officer Dominic D’Arcangelo were on patrol. As Officer Campbell
drove, approaching the intersection of 54th and Normandie, he
noticed “frantic motions” at a bus bench across the street. A man
(Lopez) was standing behind a woman (the victim, T.P.) and
making repeated thrusting motions toward her rear. T.P.’s pants
were pulled down, exposing her buttocks and Lopez’s hands were
wrapped around her waist pulling her toward him.
Officer Campbell saw T.P. struggle, repeatedly “throwing
an elbow” back in an effort to try to strike Lopez. T.P., who has
limited mobility, tried to get away, but was only able to move
forward two to six inches. Lopez grabbed her by the waist, pulled
her back toward his pelvis and thrusted repeatedly again in the
area of T.P.’s buttocks. Officer Campbell activated his patrol car
lights and sirens to avoid oncoming traffic and intervene. As he
3
approached, he saw Lopez was still grabbing T.P. with both
hands as she continued to try to escape. When Lopez saw the
police car, he released T.P. and sat on the bus bench. T.P. sat on
the same bench away from Lopez.
Officer Campbell ordered Lopez, who appeared to have his
hands over his crotch to conceal his genitals, to stand up. Lopez
“act[ed] confused,” claimed he had done nothing and made the
officer repeat his command multiple times. When Lopez did stand
up, his erect penis protruded from the top of his pants; he pulled
his waistband up to cover his penis. One still image taken from
the patrol car’s dashcam video showed Lopez standing with his
penis visible. Another image showed T.P.’s exposed buttocks.
T.P. was crying, disoriented and spoke loudly. She thanked
the officers repeatedly. She told them that Lopez was raping her,
had raped her multiple times and had hurt her. Dashcam footage
of the encounter was played for the jury, as was video from the
officers’ body cameras.
At the trial in September 2023, T.P. used a walker. Taking
the stand, she cried, saying she was “a little upset” because the
“whole ordeal [was] just a lot on [her] and [her] family,” and she
was “scared.” T.P. testified she had used a walker for about a
year and could not walk without it. She had not had a walker at
the time of the assault because she had just been released from
the hospital and thought she had been using crutches or a
wheelchair.4
4 Officer D’Arcangelo did not remember T.P. having a walker
with her on the day of the incident. He had since seen her many
times at the same intersection and had recently seen her using a
walker. In his view, T.P. required more assistance to walk at trial
than she had on the date of the incident.
4
T.P. said she had been living on the streets for about
six months at the time she testified and had lived on the streets
in May 2023. She usually stayed by her church at Normandie and
Century where she felt safe but would go to Normandie and 54th
Street to visit friends she had made while on the streets. If it was
too late to take a bus, T.P. slept or stayed on a bench at the
intersection of Normandie and 54th Street and had stayed there
at times in May 2023. T.P. had seen Lopez near that intersection
more than once and knew him by the name “Creep” or “Creepy.”
T.P. testified that on the morning of May 7, 2023, she was
at the bus bench for about 30 minutes before Lopez assaulted her.
She had not been walking around because she could “barely get
around anywhere.” At about 7:45 a.m., Lopez sat next to T.P. on
the bench, began groping her and told her repeatedly to suck his
penis. When she refused, he called her “bitches.” T.P. testified
Lopez was “bothering [her] and pulling out his pee-pee.” His
fingers touched her “backside” (referring to her anus), before also
touching her “pork chop” (vagina). Lopez “finger-bang[ed]” T.P. or
tried to masturbate her with his fingers. She repeatedly told him,
“[D]on’t do that. Don’t bother me. And don’t put your hands on
me.” She said, “Please don’t hurt me.” When Lopez put his fingers
“in [her] backside,” she told him to leave her alone and stop
putting his fingers in her anus. Lopez then pulled out “his thing”
(penis) which he pushed “on her over and over.” T.P. testified
Lopez moved his penis “back and forth” on her “backside,” (her
“a-hole”) and was “trying to put that thing and make it cum like
that.” She felt Lopez’s “penis go inside of [her] butt cheeks.”
Lopez was “cursing and fussing,” and inserted his penis into her
anus a little bit. He told T.P. he would “get away” with what he
was doing and that no one would put him in jail for it. T.P.
5
“squeez[ed]” to “keep [Lopez’s penis] out” and tried to get away.
His penis did not fit in T.P.’s buttocks, so he inserted it into her
vagina.
T.P. testified she had been so afraid and upset she urinated
on herself. She was unable to get away because Lopez was
holding her, and she was “handicapped” and “[could] barely
walk.” When T.P. saw the patrol car, she told Lopez the police
were there to which he responded, “I don’t give a fuck.” Although
there had been heavy traffic at the intersection on the morning of
the incident, “[n]obody cared” and “[n]obody stopped” to help T.P.
until the police officers arrived. Officer D’Arcangelo testified that,
despite heavy traffic at the intersection, no witness stopped to
speak to the police about the attack, nor did anyone speak about
it when he canvased the area and a nearby gas station for
additional evidence.
On cross-examination, when T.P. was asked whether Lopez
had not “enter[ed] [her] pork chop,” she said “[w]ell, he was sure
close to it. He was very close to it actually,” and she had felt the
warmth of his penis. When defense counsel asked again if Lopez’s
penis entered her anus, T.P. said, “It was definitely on it, yes. He
had his penis on my body, yes.” When asked if she had told the
police officers at the time of the incident that Lopez had not
entered her, she responded, “[she knew] that he did do that. And
[she did] not like words to be put in [her] mouth. And [she knew]
what he [did] to [her].”
At the time of the incident, T.P. had told the officers both
that Lopez had not inserted his penis into her anus or vagina,
and that she did not know if he had. When Officer D’Arcangelo
asked T.P. whether Lopez fully entered “either one,” T.P. had
said “No,” but then added “[m]inimally.” She testified she had
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been truthful when she spoke to the police officers. T.P. told the
officers Lopez instructed her to go into an alleyway with him. She
said Lopez pulled down her pants, bent her over and held onto
her body.5 He was trying to “do it” “[d]oggie-style to [her] back,”
by which she meant her anus, and said Lopez put “his thing in
[her] ass,” “in the back of [her] bootie,” and inserted it “a little
bit.” Consistent with what she told the police officers at the time
of the assault, T.P. testified Lopez raped her. T.P. also told the
nurse who conducted her examination after the assault that
Lopez tried to insert his fingers in her anus.
Officer D’Arcangelo testified it had been “difficult to
interview” T.P. She appeared to have some “not mental illness,
but a defect.” She was very articulate one moment, and in the
next “sp[oke] like a 10-year-old.” Parts of the interview were
easier to understand than others. During the interview, T.P. used
“slang instead of detail,” but it was clear to Officer D’Arcangelo
that T.P. used the terms “back” to mean her “anus,” and “pork
chop” to refer to her “vagina.”
The day after the assault, LAPD Detective Kristina
Montoya interviewed T.P. at an emergency shelter. Detective
Montoya testified T.P. was “a little in shock. Not sure what was
going on,” was “[v]ery emotional” and did not really understand
who Detective Montoya was or what she asked her. Detective
Montoya testified it was difficult for T.P. to articulate exactly
what had happened. She was “kind of all over the place when [the
5 After viewing video of the incident at trial, T.P. recalled
that Lopez had pulled her pants down while the two were at the
bench, exposing her buttocks and part of her vagina; it
embarrassed her.
7
detective] was asking her questions.” Detective Montoya had
spoken to T.P. a number of times since the assault. There were
times during their conversations when T.P. was “very articulate”
and “very funny,” and others when T.P. seemed to zone out and
did not understand the detective’s directions or what she was
being asked. When Detective Montoya asked T.P. specifically
whether Lopez had been on her lower back or had penetrated her
anus, T.P. ranted about something else.
T.P. told Detective Montoya that Lopez put “his thingy” “in
[her] ass,” and used the words “lower back” and “anus”
interchangeably. At certain points in the interview, T.P. said
there had been no insertion but also said Lopez had inserted his
penis into her anus. T.P. was clear that there had been no
insertion into her vagina. T.P. told Detective Montoya that she
had felt “scared” and “kind of helpless” during the assault. The
detective testified T.P. had not had a walker when she
interviewed her but clearly had difficulty walking. T.P. required
assistance to walk to and from her bed and downstairs. She had
to hold onto something to walk from one point to another.
Following the assault, T.P. was taken to a rape treatment
center for a sexual assault rape treatment test and DNA testing.
Lopez was taken to the same treatment center for DNA testing.
During T.P.’s sexual assault exam, sperm was detected on a
perianal swab, and swabs of her external genitalia and mons
pubis. Male DNA was detected on all swabs taken from T.P. Per
agency protocol, DNA analysis was conducted on a single sample.
The DNA analysis of the perianal swab, which contained the
most sperm, showed a combination of two individuals; both Lopez
8
and T.P. were excluded as contributors.6 All swabs contained
male DNA, but these were not further tested.
During the exam, T.P. said she had injuries on her legs
unrelated to the assault. Her pants were dirty and smelled of
urine, and T.P. was tearful and complained of pain. She told the
nurse examiner Lopez’s hands had been in her genital area, neck
and buttocks during the assault. She stated his penis had been on
her low back and in her anal/genital area. The exam revealed a
fresh laceration on the area around T.P.’s anal opening, and the
cut was consistent with anal penetration. The nurse examiner
testified a laceration in the perianal area was unlikely to occur
absent penetration.
B. Defense Evidence
Lopez did not present any witnesses.
C. Closing Argument
In closing argument at the first phase of trial, the
prosecutor told the jurors that “throughout [T.P.’s] testimony
[they] all should have understood that there is some kind of
limitation.” The prosecution also acknowledged the case might
not have been prosecuted had police officers not witnessed the
assault in progress, given that the only evidence came from the
victim, an unhoused woman. “[T]hat’s the harsh reality of the
world that we live in, where we sometimes don’t believe people off
the streets, where people don’t stop to help people that are being
assaulted and violated in broad daylight at a public bus stop.”
During closing argument in the second phase of trial as to
the special allegations of aggravating circumstances, the
prosecution argued that T.P. was particularly vulnerable based
6 The prosecution argued this was consistent with her
testimony that he did not ejaculate.
9
on her unique characteristics. She had physical limitations and
difficulty walking which contributed to her vulnerability and had
tried to help herself but was unable to do so. The unusual
circumstances of the crime also contributed to T.P.’s vulnerability
as it was committed at 8:00 a.m. at a busy intersection. Under
those very public conditions, T.P. could not have anticipated that
someone would approach her, demand that she perform a sexual
act, and violently grab her.
In its closing argument, the defense countered that T.P.
was not particularly vulnerable, as she had not been “surprised
out of her sleep,” “isolated” or “grabbed from a public place say
into an alley.” In addition, defense counsel noted T.P. was neither
elderly nor a child. Moreover, whatever medical conditions she
had were unlikely to have been known by Lopez as he approached
her sitting on a bench. Defense counsel observed a surprise
attack was not tantamount to an attack on a particularly
vulnerable victim, as “no one ever expects any sort of offense like
this to happen.”
As to the rule 4.421(a)(3) allegation, the court instructed
the jury: “Particularly vulnerable includes being defenseless,
unguarded, unprotected, or otherwise susceptible to [Lopez’s]
criminal act to a special or unusual degree. [¶] In determining
whether [T.P.] was particularly vulnerable, you should consider
all the circumstances surrounding the commission of the crime,
including the characteristics . . . of [T.P.] and the manner and
setting in which the crime was committed.” The jury was further
instructed that to find T.P. was particularly vulnerable within
the meaning of the special allegation, it must unanimously find
Lopez’s “conduct was distinctly worse than an ordinary
commission of the underlying offense.” However, jurors need not
10
agree on which facts showed that T.P. was particularly
vulnerable. The jury found true the special allegation that T.P.
was particularly vulnerable as to both counts.
At sentencing, the court found the “facts [in this case] are
terrible,” and the prosecution had proven beyond a reasonable
doubt Lopez “sodomized the victim in public, on a park bench,
against her will.” The court stated it had “observed [T.P.] testify,”
and noted she was transient, “appeared disabled” and “appeared
particularly vulnerable.” The sodomy had been committed by
force and T.P. appeared “somewhat disabled.” The court stated
there was “no question in [its] mind that the high term on [the
sodomy count was] appropriate” given its conclusion and the
jury’s finding that T.P. “was particularly vulnerable.”
DISCUSSION
I. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in
Imposing the Upper Term Sentence on the Ground
T.P. Was a Particularly Vulnerable Victim
Lopez contends the trial court abused its discretion in
imposing the upper term as to the sodomy conviction because
there was insufficient evidence to support the factual conclusion
T.P. was a particularly vulnerable victim, within the meaning of
rule 4.421(a)(3).
Lopez argues the court erred in imposing the upper term
because, notwithstanding its reference to the fact T.P. appeared
to have a physical disability, there was no evidence of the extent
to which that disability was obvious at the time of the assault.
T.P. testified that she used a wheelchair or crutches that
morning, but neither officer saw a wheelchair or other assistive
device. In addition, because T.P. sat on the bus bench for about
30 minutes before she was accosted, Lopez would not have been
11
aware of her mobility issues. He also maintains the fact the
officers saw T.P. struggle with and “throw an elbow” at him is
evidence she was not particularly vulnerable, but rather “able
and willing to fight back.” Lopez also contends there is no
evidence he knew T.P. was an unhoused person, a fact noted by
the court, or even if he had it would bear on the degree of her
vulnerability. Finally, Lopez contends the trial court’s reliance on
its own observations and witness testimony that T.P. was
particularly vulnerable due to her precarious mental state and
inability to respond consistently or cohesively to questions, also
was not a fact obvious to him at the time of the assault.
A. Controlling Law and the Standard of Review
Effective January 2022, section 1170, subdivision (b) was
amended making the middle term (here six years) the
presumptive sentence. (People v. Lopez (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th
459, 464 (Lopez), disapproved on another ground by People v.
Lynch (2024) 16 Cal.5th 730, 769.) For crimes to which a
sentencing triad applies, “a trial court is free to base an upper
term sentence upon any aggravating circumstance that (1) the
court deems significant and (2) is reasonably related to the
decision being made.” (People v. Moberly (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th
1191, 1196; accord People v. Sandoval (2007) 41 Cal.4th 825, 848
(Sandoval), superseded by statute as stated in Lynch, at p. 757.)
A single appropriate factor is a sufficient basis to support an
aggravated term. (People v. Castellano (1983) 140 Cal.App.3d
608, 615; see also § 1170, subd. (b)(1)-(2); Lopez, at p. 464.)
If a sufficient basis is established to support a conclusion of
at least one aggravating factor, the trial court enjoys broad
discretion in its sentencing determination. (People v. Catalan
(2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 173, 179.) In such cases, an appellate
12
court will set aside the sentencing decision only if it is “arbitrary,
capricious, or so outside the bounds of reason as to render its
ruling an abuse of discretion.” (People v. Thomas (2023)
14 Cal.5th 327, 400; Sandoval, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 847.) The
party challenging a sentencing decision bears the burden to
establish that the trial court clearly abused its discretion.
“ ‘ “A merely debatable ruling cannot be deemed an abuse of
discretion.” ’ ” (People v. Johnson (2022) 12 Cal.5th 544, 605;
People v. Jennings (2010) 50 Cal.4th 616, 639 [where
circumstances justify findings made by the trier of fact, reversal
of the judgment is not warranted simply because the
circumstances might also reasonably be reconciled with a
contrary finding].)
For purposes of rule 4.421(a)(3), “particularly” has been
interpreted to mean “ ‘ “in a special or unusual degree, to an
extent greater than in other cases” ’ ” and “[v]ulnerability” means
“ ‘ “defenseless, unguarded, unprotected, accessible, assailable,
one who is susceptible to the defendant’s criminal act.” ’ ” (People
v. DeHoyos (2013) 57 Cal.4th 79, 154 (DeHoyos).)
B. Analysis
We conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
imposing the upper term sentence on the sodomy count, premised
on its finding that T.P. was “particularly vulnerable.”
(Rule 4.421(a)(3).) Contrary to Lopez’s assertion, being
“particularly vulnerable” is not limited to victims who are hidden
from view, young or who have a preexisting subordinate
relationship to the perpetrator. “ ‘ “[P]articular vulnerability” is
determined in light of the “total milieu in which the commission
of the crime occurred. . . .” ’ ” (People v. Weaver (2007)
149 Cal.App.4th 1301, 1321 (Weaver), disapproved on another
13
ground by People v. Cook (2015) 60 Cal.4th 922, 939.) A victim
who is isolated and separated from others who could help is
particularly vulnerable. (People v. Ramos (1980) 106 Cal.App.3d
591, 607 (Ramos) [victim alone in single room trailer was
particularly vulnerable due to isolation and not being “subject to
help from individuals who were passing by”], disapproved on
another ground in People v. Scott (1994) 9 Cal.4th 331, 353,
fn. 16, 356.)
In terms of the “ ‘ “total milieu” ’ ” of the crime, here the
assault occurred just before 8:00 a.m. at a busy intersection in
full view of the public—indeed, in full view of the police officers
who interceded. T.P. testified “a lot” of people were “coming up
and down the street” as Lopez groped her, yet “Nobody cared.
Nobody stopped.” The fact no one was willing to assist T.P., a
transient, disabled and not entirely lucid individual, rendered her
isolated just as effectively as if she had been alone in a nearby
alley.
The court’s finding T.P. was particularly vulnerable was
reasonable and within its discretion. The crime involved a
completely unexpected, violent physical assault at a busy location
in broad daylight. T.P., who had just been released from the
hospital, was sitting on a bus bench because she could “barely get
around.” Lopez approached her, demanded she perform oral sex
on him and, when she refused, pulled down her pants and
brutally assaulted her. Lopez was much stronger than T.P., who
tried uselessly to fight him off by throwing back her elbows and
futilely tried to escape by taking the few tentative steps her
physical incapacity permitted before he wrenched her back and
continued an assault so rough it caused a tear in the area around
her anus. T.P. was so afraid she urinated on herself.
14
In addition to her physical disability, the court and
witnesses observed that T.P. appeared to suffer some cognitive
impairment. According to Officer D’Arcangelo, T.P. was “difficult
to interview,” vacillating between being articulate, then suddenly
“speaking like a 10-year-old.” Similarly, Detective Montoya
testified that, when she interviewed the victim the day after the
assault, T.P. again vacillated between being “very articulate”
then seeming to “zone out,” and unable to understand the
detective’s questions or directions. Based on this evidence and its
own observations, the trial court found that T.P., a forcibly
sodomized transient, “appeared disabled,” and “particularly
vulnerable,” and concluded there was “no question in [its] mind
that [the] high term on [the sodomy] count [was] appropriate.”
Lopez, in turn, presented no evidence that would mitigate
the court’s conclusion. Instead, he tries to minimize the
conclusion T.P. was particularly vulnerable by pointing to the
fact the assault took place in broad daylight at a busy
intersection. This evidence does not advance his case. Sadly, the
facts showed no one travelling in the area cared enough to stop to
help a disabled transient. As T.P. said, “Nobody cared. Nobody
stopped.” Indeed, Lopez clearly attempted to capitalize on this
harsh reality when he told T.P. he would “get away” with the
assault, he did not “give a fuck” police officers had arrived in the
middle of his attack, and he would not be prosecuted for his
crimes. Lopez also asserts there is no evidence he knew about
T.P.’s physical or mental limitations. He is mistaken. T.P. had
been living on the streets for about a month before the assault
and was regularly in the area where the crime occurred. She had
seen Lopez more than once in that area and knew him by his
nickname. Thus, it may reasonably be inferred that Lopez
15
similarly had some familiarity with T.P., and would have been
aware that she was unhoused, disabled and vulnerable. Indeed,
even if he had not known this information beforehand, at the
time of the assault, Lopez clearly took full advantage of the fact
that T.P.’s vulnerability and physical limitations prevented her
from escaping or defending herself against his attack. (See
DeHoyos, supra, 57 Cal.4th at p. 154 [vulnerability means
“defenseless, unguarded, unprotected, accessible, assailable”];
People v. Smith (1979) 94 Cal.App.3d 433, 436 [in football jargon,
an attack on a particularly vulnerable victim is “a cheap shot”].)
Viewing the record in the light most favorable to the
judgment and considering the evidence in “ ‘ “the total milieu in
which the commission of the crime occurred” ’ ” (Weaver, supra,
149 Cal.App.4th at p. 1321), and according due deference to the
trier of fact, we have no difficulty concluding that substantial
evidence supports the jury’s true finding as to the aggravating
circumstances and the trial court’s corresponding decision to
impose the upper term based on its conclusion that T.P. was a
particularly vulnerable victim. (See, e.g., Ramos, supra,
106 Cal.App.3d p. 608 [trial court’s finding of vulnerability was
“wholly proper” where victim was alone at home, surprised by the
sudden assault, and where the “likelihood of gaining help from
other individuals or fleeing from the scene was greatly
diminished”].)
16
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
RICHARDSON, J.
WE CONCUR:
ASHMANN-GERST, Acting P. J.
CHAVEZ, J.
17
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