CourtListener 10584093•People v. Vasquez CA2/7
Gesamter Gesetzestext
Filed 5/14/25 P. v. Vasquez CA2/7
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION SEVEN
THE PEOPLE, B334609
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. BA494439)
v.
ALBERT CURTIS VASQUEZ,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Richard S. Kemalyan, Judge. Affirmed in
part, dismissed in part.
Steven A. Brody, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Kristen J. Inberg and J. Michael
Lehmann, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
________________________
INTRODUCTION
Albert Curtis Vasquez appeals from his conviction by guilty
plea to possession of a firearm by a felon and his conviction after
a jury trial for second degree murder. He argues the trial court
made improper comments on his decision to testify and on the
trial evidence, violating his rights under the Fifth, Sixth, and
Fourteenth Amendments. He further argues his plea must be
vacated because Penal Code section 29800, the felon in possession
statute, violates the Second Amendment.1 We dismiss Vasquez’s
appeal from his guilty plea because Vasquez did not obtain a
certificate of probable cause under section 1237.5. We otherwise
affirm because the trial court’s comments were not
constitutionally infirm when examined in context.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. Information
In March 2021, Vasquez was living in a Koreatown tent
encampment when he shot and killed Everett Cain, another
resident of the encampment. On August 23, 2022, Vasquez was
charged by information with murder (count 1; § 187, subd. (a)).
The information alleged Vasquez personally used a firearm in the
commission of the murder within the meaning of section 12022.5,
subdivision (a). Vasquez was also charged with possession of a
firearm by a felon (count 2; § 29800, subd. (a)(1)), with the
1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2
allegation that Vasquez had been previously convicted of two
felony burglary charges (§ 459).
B. Jury Trial
The court held a jury trial beginning on June 27, 2023. On
the first day of trial, before jury selection, Vasquez pleaded guilty
to the charge in count 2 of possession of a firearm by a felon.
Vasquez proceeded to trial on count 1.
The trial court advised prospective jurors on Vasquez’s
Fifth Amendment right not to testify at trial. As relevant here,
the court stated:
“[T]he Fifth Amendment right that we all have . . . is
a right under the law that says you cannot be
compelled to testify if you are charged with an offense
or in a trial. . . .
“[A] decision will be made by Mr. Vasquez as to
whether he will testify or not. Nobody can compel
him to do that. What I can tell you about people
testifying or not testifying is that in my judgment
people don’t testify for a lot of different reasons. . . .
“Mr. Vasquez does not have a burden of proof. He
doesn’t have to prove he is innocent. The only
person, as I’ve told you, that has the burden of proof
in this courtroom is [the prosecutor], and he must
prove the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt. So, many times after the People have
presented all their witnesses and all their evidence
3
and the People rest and sit down, the defendant and
his lawyer will look at each other and a decision will
be made based on tactics and strategy that says,
‘[The prosecutor] didn’t prove his case beyond a
reasonable doubt. The jury has to find me not guilty
so I will not testify.’ There are a whole host of
reasons why people do not testify.”
Vasquez did not object to this instruction from the court.
At trial, after the prosecution presented its case, Vasquez
testified in his own defense. On cross-examination, the
prosecutor asked Vasquez, “You destroyed the murder weapon,
didn’t you?” Vasquez’s counsel objected to “characterization of
[the gun] as a murder weapon,” because it “calls for a legal
conclusion.” The court stated, “I’m inclined to overrule the
objection based upon the testimony that’s been given in the trial.
But at the same time, I will simply ask if [the prosecutor] will
restate the question.” The court ruled that the “objection is
sustained,” and the prosecutor rephrased the question without
referring to a “murder weapon.”
C. Conviction and Sentence
The jury convicted Vasquez of second degree murder and
found true the allegation that Vasquez personally used a firearm
in the commission of the offense. The trial court sentenced
Vasquez to a total prison term of 18 years and eight months to
life.
Vasquez timely appealed.
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DISCUSSION
A. The Trial Court’s Statements Did Not Violate Vasquez’s
Constitutional Rights
Vasquez argues the trial court’s comments on his decision
whether to testify in his own defense and on the evidence of a
“murder weapon” violated his constitutional rights against self-
incrimination, to due process, and to trial by an impartial jury.
1. Governing Law and Standard of Review
The Fifth Amendment to the federal constitution provides a
right against compelled self-incrimination. (See U.S. Const., 5th
Amend.; People v. Tom (2014) 59 Cal.4th 1210, 1222-1223.) In
Griffin v. California (1965) 380 U.S. 609 (Griffin), the United
States Supreme Court held the Fifth Amendment forbids
“comment by the prosecution on the accused’s silence or
instructions by the court that such silence is evidence of guilt.”
(Id. at p. 615; see People v. Thompson (2016) 1 Cal.5th 1043,
1117-1118 (Thompson) [Griffin “prohibit[s] comment on a
defendant’s silence by the trial judge”].)
Judicial comments may also run afoul of the constitution if
they demonstrate bias and deprive a defendant of due process or
a fair trial. (See U.S. Const., 5th & 14th Amends.; People v.
Freeman (2010) 47 Cal.4th 993, 1000 [“[t]he operation of the due
process clause in the realm of judicial impartiality . . . is
primarily to protect the individual’s right to a fair trial”].)
Constitutional due process requires “‘a judge with no actual bias
against the defendant or interest in the outcome of his particular
case.’” (People v. Harris (2005) 37 Cal.4th 310, 346.) As the
reviewing court, “‘[o]ur role . . . is not to determine whether the
trial judge’s conduct left something to be desired, or even whether
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some comments would have been better left unsaid. Rather, we
must determine whether the judge’s behavior was so prejudicial
that it denied [the defendant] a fair, as opposed to a perfect,
trial.’” (People v. Snow (2003) 30 Cal.4th 43, 78; accord, Harris,
at p. 347.) “In deciding whether a trial court has manifested bias
in the presentation of evidence, we have said that such a
violation occurs only where the judge ‘“officiously and
unnecessarily usurp[ed] the duties of the prosecutor . . . and in so
doing create[d] the impression that he [was] allying himself with
the prosecution.”’” (Harris, at p. 347.)
Similarly, commentary on the evidence by a trial judge may
violate the defendant’s right to an impartial jury under the Sixth
Amendment. Indeed, “‘a trial court that chooses to comment to
the jury must be extremely careful to exercise its power “with
wisdom and restraint and with a view to protecting the rights of
the defendant.” [Citations.] The court’s comments must be
scrupulously fair and may not invade the province of the jury as
the exclusive trier of fact.’” (People v. Rodriguez (1986) 42 Cal.3d
730, 772.) Under a Sixth Amendment lens, appellate courts must
“evaluate the propriety of judicial comment on a case-by-case
basis, noting whether the peculiar content and circumstances of
the court’s remarks deprived the accused of his right to trial by
jury.” (Id. at p. 770.)
We review de novo claims of constitutional error on
undisputed facts. (See People v. Frazier (2020) 55 Cal.App.5th
858, 864; accord, In re Taylor (2015) 60 Cal.4th 1019, 1035.) “If
an error violates a defendant’s federal constitutional rights,
reversal is required unless the error was harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt.” (People v. Hernandez (2011) 51 Cal.4th 733,
745, citing Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24; see
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People v. Woodruff (2018) 5 Cal.5th 697, 759 [applying Chapman
standard to due process claim]; Thompson, supra, 1 Cal.5th at
p. 1118 [same, to Griffin error]; People v. Clair (1992) 2 Cal.4th
629, 669, fn. 10 [same, to alleged violation of right to impartial
jury].)
2. The Trial Court Did Not Violate Griffin
Vasquez argues the trial court impermissibly commented
on his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent by stating during
voir dire that after “the People rest . . . , the defendant and his
lawyer will look at each other and a decision will be made based
on tactics and strategy that says, ‘[The prosecutor] didn’t prove
his case beyond a reasonable doubt. The jury has to find me not
guilty so I will not testify.’” Vasquez contends that, because he
did testify, the court’s remark “suggested that [Vasquez] would
only testify if the government had succeeded in proving its case”
and therefore “shifted the burden to [Vasquez] to disprove the
government’s case.”
Vasquez did not object to the court’s statement at trial, and
he has forfeited the issue for appeal. (See People v. Lewis (2001)
25 Cal.4th 610, 670 [Griffin claim forfeited where “defense
counsel neither objected to the prosecutor’s remarks on this or
any other basis, nor requested an admonition from the trial court
to cure any perceived harm”]; accord, People v. Turner (2004)
34 Cal.4th 406, 420; People v. Miller (1990) 50 Cal.3d 954, 1000
(Miller).)
But even if we consider the argument on the merits,
Vasquez does not demonstrate error. In Griffin, supra, 380 U.S.
609, the defendant did not testify at trial and the trial court
instructed the jury it could consider the defendant’s “failure” to
7
explain “facts within his knowledge” because “he d[id] not
testify.” (Id. at pp. 609-610.) Griffin held it was error to
“solemnize[ ] the silence of the accused into evidence against
him.” (Id. at p. 614.) Here, however, Vasquez did testify at trial.
Vasquez does not cite any authority finding Griffin error when
the defendant actually testified at trial. (See Miller, supra,
50 Cal.3d at p. 1000 [“the comments were not misconduct; they
did not ‘draw attention to the defendant’s right not to testify’
since he did testify’”; concluding no Griffin error from
prosecutor’s comments].)
Further, the challenged statement occurred during voir
dire and was part of the trial court’s explanation of the Fifth
Amendment privilege to potential jurors. The court, perhaps
inartfully, explained that what it described was one example
from “a whole host of reasons why people do not testify.” In
People v. Carter (2005) 36 Cal.4th 1114, defense counsel argued
in closing that the jury could not hold the defendant’s silence
against him because “‘[t]here are many reasons that a defendant
may or might not testify in a case,’” including that “‘[s]ome people
tell the truth in this kind of setting, some people lie poorly.’” (Id.
at p. 1191.) This comment “manifestly did not constitute the type
of comments that Griffin declared invalid,” because “[v]iewing
defense counsel’s remarks in their proper context, it is clear that
counsel was not suggesting that the jury draw any sort of adverse
inference from defendant’s silence. . . . [C]ounsel merely sought
to explain to the jury that there are ‘many reasons’ why a
defendant may not testify, including the ‘hypothetical[]’
possibility that ‘[s]ome people tell the truth . . . some people lie
poorly.’” (Id. at p. 1192.)
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Viewed in context, the trial court’s comment in this case did
not violate Griffin. Here, the trial court provided several reasons
why a defendant might not testify, including “nervous[ness]” or
fear “[he] will not be believed,” and it went on to explain that it
was speaking “theoretically” about a defendant’s decision
whether to testify. And it confirmed with the potential jurors
that “even though Mr. Vasquez does not testify in this case, even
though you might want to hear from Mr. Vasquez, can you still
decide the case fairly and impartially?” Although Vasquez argues
the trial court’s comment “shift[ed] the burden of proof,” the court
repeatedly advised the jury that Vasquez did not have to prove
his innocence. When explaining at voir dire the defendant’s
decision to testify, the court emphasized that “Vasquez does not
have a burden of proof. He doesn’t have to prove he is innocent.”
The court stated at the beginning of trial and when charging the
jury that, “A defendant in a criminal case is presumed to be
innocent. This presumption requires that the People prove the
defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.”
3. The Trial Court’s Commentary on the Evidence Did
Not Violate Vasquez’s Fifth and Sixth Amendment
Rights
Vasquez further argues the court violated his Fifth and
Sixth Amendment rights when it stated, “I’m inclined to overrule
the objection [to the prosecutor’s use of the phrase “murder
weapon”] based upon the testimony that’s been given in the trial.”
Vasquez contends this statement “served as confirmation for the
jury that . . . the State had established every element of the
crime.” He argues the statement exhibited bias toward the
prosecution, violating his rights to due process and a fair trial,
9
and it improperly influenced the jury’s factfinding in violation of
his right to an impartial jury. Although Vasquez objected to the
prosecutor’s question, Vasquez did not object to the trial court’s
statement or request a curative instruction, and this argument is
also forfeited. (See People v. Cash (2002) 28 Cal.4th 703, 730
[“[t]o preserve the issue for review, a defendant must make a
timely objection” to challenged judicial comment].)
But even considering the argument on the merits, the
court’s statement did not exhibit judicial bias toward the
prosecution or violate his right to an impartial jury. Under
Article VI, section 10 of the California Constitution, “The court
may make any comment on the evidence and the testimony and
credibility of any witness as in its opinion is necessary for the
proper determination of the cause.” Further, in People v.
Monterroso (2004) 34 Cal.4th 743 (Monterroso), the prosecutor
argued that the murder was racially motivated, the defendant
“objected that there was no evidence this was a racist killing,”
and the trial court overruled the objection as a “‘fair comment on
the evidence.’” (Id. at p. 783.) The California Supreme Court
held the trial court’s statement did not violate state or federal
due process, the right to a fair trial, or the right to an impartial
jury because it was not “misconduct for the court to state briefly
the basis for overruling the objection. The court’s observation
that the inference was permissible was hardly equivalent to an
instruction that it was obligatory.” (Ibid.; see id. at p. 780
[applying “the state and federal Constitutions”].)
This rule applies to the court’s commentary in ruling on
Vasquez’s evidentiary objection. The court briefly stated the
basis for its “inclin[ation] to overrule [Vasquez’s] objection,”
“based upon the testimony that’s been given in the trial,” but
10
then it sustained the objection and directed the prosecutor to
rephrase. As in Monterroso, the observation was not an
obligatory instruction to the jury regarding the state of the
evidence and whether there was sufficient evidence of murder.
Additionally, the comment was fleeting. Under these
circumstances, the court’s comment did not demonstrate judicial
bias or infringe on the jury’s factfinding. (See People v. Pearson
(2013) 56 Cal.4th 393, 444 [trial judge did not “unfairly bolster[]
the prosecutor’s argument” where evidentiary ruling implied the
defendant’s conduct “could be considered evidence of
[premeditation]” but did not “improperly tell the jury that
evidence of the threats constituted sufficient proof”]; accord,
People v. Seumanu (2015) 61 Cal.4th 1293, 1320-1321 (Seumanu)
[no due process violation where court’s comment about witness
during evidentiary ruling was “single, fleeting, and ambiguous”
and did not exhibit judicial bias]; cf. People v. Sturm (2006)
37 Cal.4th 1218, 1230-1233 [trial judge erred and “bolstered the
prosecutor’s argument . . . in telling the jury that premeditation
was a ‘gimme’ and that the issue of premeditation was ‘all over
and done with’”].)
Further, the jury was instructed at the beginning of trial
and before deliberations to disregard “anything [the court] said or
did during the trial as an indication of what [the court] think[s]
about the evidence, the witnesses, or what your verdict should be.
It is not my role to tell you what your verdict should be. You are
the sole judges of the evidence and believability of witnesses. It
is up to you and you alone to decide the issues in this case.” We
assume the jury followed these instructions. (See People v.
Chhoun (2021) 11 Cal.5th 1, 30; see also People v. Linwood (2003)
105 Cal.App.4th 59, 74 [no prejudice from comment on evidence
11
where “the jury was instructed . . . that the court had not
intended by anything it had said or done to suggest what the jury
should find as the facts and that the court’s comments were not
binding”]; accord, Seumanu, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 1321 [same,
where court’s comment was “solitary and fleeting”]; People v.
Brown (2003) 31 Cal.4th 518, 539-540.)
B. Vasquez Did Not Preserve His Claim That Section 29800
Violates the Second Amendment
For the first time on appeal, Vasquez argues his conviction
for possession of a firearm by a felon violates his Second
Amendment rights under United States v. Rahimi (2024)
602 U.S. 680 (Rahimi). Vasquez’s challenge to his section 29800
conviction is barred because he did not obtain a certificate of
appealability. “[I]f the judgment resulted from a guilty or no
contest plea, Penal Code section 1237.5, subdivisions (a) and (b),
provide that no appeal may be taken unless ‘[t]he defendant has
filed with the trial court a written statement, executed under
oath or penalty of perjury showing reasonable constitutional,
jurisdictional, or other grounds going to the legality of the
proceedings,’ and the court ‘has executed and filed a certificate of
probable cause for such appeal with the clerk of the court.’”
(People v. Stamps (2020) 9 Cal.5th 685, 694, fn. omitted
(Stamps).) Section 1237.5 contains two exceptions: if the
defendant appeals “‘postplea matters not challenging his plea’s
validity,’” or “‘matters involving a search or seizure whose
lawfulness was contested pursuant to section 1538.5.’” (Stamps,
at p. 694.)
Vasquez concedes he did not request or obtain a certificate
of probable cause, but he argues that any “effort to do so would
12
have been pointless” because the decision in Rahimi post-dated
his guilty plea, constituting “a significant change in the law of the
Second Amendment.” A certificate of probable cause is not
required when a defendant “seek[s] retroactive application of a
subsequently enacted ameliorative provision,” because this
amounts to a claim of “postplea error.” (Stamps, supra, 9 Cal.5th
at p. 696 [allowing appellate claim under newly enacted Senate
Bill No. 1393 to proceed without certificate].)
According to Vasquez, Rahimi overruled California case
law upholding section 29800 under New York State Rifle & Pistol
Association, Inc. v. Bruen (2022) 597 U.S. 1 (Bruen), because
Rahimi clarified that a person cannot “be disarmed simply
because he is not ‘responsible.’”2 But Rahimi did not create any
ameliorative change in the law affecting felon-in-possession
convictions. Instead, it applied the Second Amendment test
previously articulated in Bruen, supra, 597 U.S. 1, and in District
of Columbia v. Heller (2008) 554 U.S. 570, both of which were
decided before Vasquez pleaded guilty to being a felon in
possession of a firearm in June 2023. (See Rahimi, supra,
602 U.S. at p. 692 [applying Bruen test]; Bruen, at p. 26 [“The
test that we set forth in Heller and apply today requires courts to
assess whether modern firearms regulations are consistent with
the Second Amendment’s text and historical understanding.”].)
In any event, Rahimi reiterated “that many [firearm]
2 Even after Rahimi, “California Courts of Appeal have
consistently upheld section 29800 against constitutional
challenge.” (People v. Bey (2025) 108 Cal.App.5th 144, 161;
accord, People v. Gomez (2025) 110 Cal.App.5th 419, 437-439;
People v. Richardson (2025) 108 Cal.App.5th 1203, 1211-1213;
People v. Anderson (2024) 104 Cal.App.5th 577, 599-600.)
13
prohibitions, like those on the possession of firearms by ‘felons
and the mentally ill’ are ‘presumptively lawful.’” (Rahimi, at
p. 699, quoting Heller, at p. 626.)
We conclude Vasquez effectively “challenge[s] his plea as
defective when made,” and he should have raised it in an
application for a certificate of probable cause. (Stamps, supra,
9 Cal.5th at p. 696.) Vasquez did not obtain a certificate of
probable cause, and we must therefore dismiss this portion of his
appeal. (See People v. Puente (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1143, 1149
[“In the absence of full compliance and a certificate of probable
cause, the reviewing court may not reach the merits of any issue
challenging the validity of the plea, but must order dismissal of
the appeal.”]; accord, People v. Mendez (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1084,
1099 [section 1237.5 is “applied in a strict manner” and reviewing
court “must decline to address certificate issues”].)
DISPOSITION
Vasquez’s appeal challenging his conviction under
section 29800, subdivision (a)(1), is dismissed. The judgment is
otherwise affirmed.
MARTINEZ, P. J.
We concur:
SEGAL, J. PULOS, J. *
* Judge of the San Diego County Superior Court, assigned by
the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the
California Constitution.
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