In re A.R. CA4/3

CourtListener 10584080Calctapp14.05.2025

Gesamter Gesetzestext

Filed 5/14/25 In re A.R. CA4/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

In re A.R., a Person Coming Under
the Juvenile Court Law.

THE PEOPLE,
G063802
Plaintiff and Respondent,
(Super. Ct. No. 23DL1570)
v.
OPINION
A.R.,

Defendant and Appellant.

Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County,
Joe T. Perez, Judge. Affirmed.
Kristen Owen, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Steve
Oetting and Daniel J. Hilton, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
In this appeal, A.R. contends there is insufficient evidence to
support the juvenile court’s finding he constructively possessed an assault
rifle that was found in a car in which he had been riding as a passenger.
Although the issue is a close one, we conclude the court’s finding passes
muster under the deferential standard of review applicable to sufficiency-of-
the-evidence claims. We therefore affirm the judgment.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
I.
THE PROSECUTION’S CASE
On December 18, 2023, at about 10:45 p.m., Fullerton Police
Officer Mathew Levin and his partner Lloyd de Charmoy Bouchet were
dispatched to a residential neighborhood in Fullerton in response to a call
about a suspicious vehicle. Upon arrival, they spotted a white four-door sedan
parked at the curb. There were two juveniles standing by the trunk of the
car, one male and one female. And there were two male juveniles inside the
car, one in the driver’s seat and another—A.R., then age 16—in the right rear
passenger seat.
While Levin contacted the two by the trunk, Bouchet and a
backup officer approached the car from opposite sides. In doing so, they
spotted an AR-15 assault rifle on the floorboard of the front passenger seat.
The rifle was leaning up against the passenger seat, barrel side down, such
that about a foot of the weapon was protruding above the seat cushion.
According to Bouchet, the rifle was within arm’s reach of where A.R. was
sitting in the back of the car.
After removing A.R. and the driver from the car, the officers
seized the rifle and discovered it had a large capacity magazine and a live

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round in the chamber. The gun, however, did not have a serial number and
was never checked for fingerprints. In searching the car, the officers also
noticed several empty liquor bottles strewn throughout the vehicle. All four
minors were arrested and booked for possession of the rifle.
II.
THE DEFENSE CASE
Testifying in his own defense, A.R. said the white sedan belonged
to a friend, who picked him up at around five o’clock on the night in question.
At that time, another friend of A.R. was sitting in the front passenger seat, so
A.R. got in the right rear passenger seat. Their plan was to just drive around,
hang out, and have a good time.
Over the course of the next five and a half hours, A.R. and his
two friends washed the car both inside and out, went to a Walmart store, and
visited a park in Anaheim. They also picked up a female friend, who had a
bottle of liquor they drank and passed around in the car while they were
driving around. After finishing the bottle, they went to the liquor store to get
more alcohol before finally ending up in a residential neighborhood in
Fullerton.
A.R. testified he was drunk by that time, but he sobered up when
the police arrived and seized the rifle from the car. The seizure “shocked”
A.R. because, until then, he had not noticed the weapon. Although he had
been in the car for several hours, A.R. claimed he never saw the rifle or knew
it was in the car because he was always sitting behind the front passenger
seat while they were driving around.
A.R. did admit getting in and out of the vehicle several different
times during that period. He also admitted looking into the front passenger

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area when he first got in the car and while he and his friends were washing it
later on. However, he insisted the rifle was not there during those times, and
he had no idea how it got there.
III.
THE JUVENILE COURT’S RULING
The juvenile court did not find A.R.’s testimony credible. Given
how long A.R. had been in the car that night, the court found it was
unreasonable to believe he would not have realized there was an assault rifle
sitting in plain view in the front seat area. And although there was no
evidence who brought the rifle into the car or when they did so, the court
determined there was sufficient evidence to conclude A.R. constructively
possessed the weapon.
Therefore, the juvenile court sustained all three allegations
against A.R., namely that he: 1) carried a loaded unregistered firearm in a
vehicle [count 1]; 2) possessed a firearm as a minor [count 2]; and 3)
possessed a large capacity magazine [count 3]. (Pen. Code, §§ 25850, subds.
(a), (c)(6), 29610, subd. (a), 32310, subd. (c).) The court then declared A.R. a
ward of the court and committed him to 90 days in a juvenile facility. This
timely appeal followed.
DISCUSSION
A.R.’s appeal is limited to counts 2 and 3. He contends there is
insufficient evidence to support the juvenile court’s ruling he possessed the
rifle (and by extension the large capacity magazine attached to it) that was
found in his friend’s car. We disagree.

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I.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The standard of review for assessing the sufficiency of the
evidence to support a criminal conviction is “highly deferential.” (People v.
Lochtefeld (2000) 77 Cal.App.4th 533, 538.) Our task is to review the record
in the light most favorable to the judgment to determine whether it discloses
substantial evidence of the defendant’s guilt. (People v. Alexander (2010) 49
Cal.4th 846, 917.) Although the evidence must be reasonable, credible, and of
solid value, we do not reweigh the evidence or reevaluate the credibility of the
witnesses who testified at trial; rather, “‘[w]e presume in support of the
judgment the existence of every fact the trier could reasonably deduce from
the evidence. [Citation.] [¶] . . . “[I]f the circumstances reasonably justify the
[trier of fact’s] findings, the judgment may not be reversed simply because the
circumstances might also reasonably be reconciled with a contrary finding.”’”
(Ibid.) “The conviction shall stand ‘unless it appears “that upon no hypothesis
whatever is there sufficient substantial evidence to support [it].”’” (People v.
Cravens (2012) 53 Cal.4th 500, 508.)
The same standard of review applies in cases involving juvenile
defendants. (In re V.V. (2011) 51 Cal.4th 1020, 1026.) Whether an appeal
involves the review of a criminal conviction or a juvenile court finding, the
defendant “bears an enormous burden” in challenging the sufficiency of the
evidence to support the trier of fact’s decision. (People v. Sanchez (2003) 113
Cal.App.4th 325, 330.)
II.
LAW ON POSSESSION
A defendant’s possession of a firearm may be actual, such as
when the weapon is found on the defendant’s person, or it may be
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constructive. (In re Charles G. (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 945, 951.) Constructive
possession is established when the firearm is under the defendant’s
“dominion and control, either directly or through others.” (People v. Peña
(1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 1078, 1083–1084.) Therefore, the defendant can be
convicted of a possession-related offense even if his right to exercise dominion
and control over the contraband was shared with others. (People v. Rushing
(1989) 209 Cal.App.3d 618, 622.)
As A.R. correctly notes, constructive possession cannot be
inferred solely from the defendant’s proximity to or opportunity to access a
firearm, or from his knowledge of a firearm’s presence in his vicinity. (In re
I.A. (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 767, 779.) These factors, however, logically bear on
the issue of possession, and when they are present in a particular case, only
slight additional evidence is needed to support a finding of constructive
possession. (People v. Rushing, supra, 209 Cal.App.3d at p. 622; People v.
Zyduck (1969) 270 Cal.App.2d 334, 336; People v. Nieto (1966) 247 Cal.App.2d
364, 368.)
III.
ANALYSIS
In this case, Officer Bouchet testified that when he spotted the
rifle in the front passenger compartment of the car, it was within arm’s reach
of A.R. In fact, the gun’s handle was protruding above the passenger seat
cushion, making the weapon readily accessible to A.R., which is a factor
supporting the juvenile court’s finding he constructively possessed the rifle.
(Compare People v. Sifuentes (2011) 195 Cal.App.4th 1410, 1417–1418
[reversing gun possession conviction where the subject firearm was under a

6
mattress in a motel room that defendant shared with three others and was
not readily available for offensive or defensive purposes].)
A.R. not only had easy access to the rifle, the juvenile court found
he falsely denied knowing about the weapon. This finding, which we may not
second-guess (People v. Brown (2014) 59 Cal.4th 86, 106), is significant in two
respects. First, from a factual perspective, it means we must presume A.R.
knew there was a rifle located just feet from where he was sitting in his
friend’s car. Coupled with A.R.’s proximity and access to the rifle, this factual
circumstance bolsters the juvenile court’s finding on the possession issue.
(People v. Miranda (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 398, 410–411.)
Secondly, A.R.’s prevarication reflects a broader consciousness of
guilt that undermines his assertion of innocence. (People v. Beyah (2009) 170
Cal.App.4th 1241, 1249; People v. White (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 758, 772.)
Indeed, when, as here, a defendant makes a false statement regarding the
circumstances attendant to a charged offense, it may properly be inferred
that he was trying to avoid responsibility for his guilty behavior. (People v.
Showers (1968) 68 Cal.2d 639, 643; People v. Jones (2018) 26 Cal.App.5th
420, 441.)
A.R. would have us believe his case is like People v. Stanford
(1959) 176 Cal.App.2d 388, in which the court ruled there was insufficient
evidence to support the defendant’s conviction for possession of narcotics. But
in that case, the defendant was merely present in an area where the narcotics
were found. There was nothing to suggest he had actual dominion and control
over the drugs, which is why the court rejected the state’s theory of
constructive possession. (Id. at pp. 391–392.)

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Here, in contrast, A.R. was not merely present in the area where
the rifle was discovered. Rather, he was sitting within easy reach of the rifle,
and he knew the weapon was located right there in the car with him.
Furthermore, A.R. had been riding around in the car for several hours,
drinking and hanging out with his friends. He even helped clean the car
during the course of their extended outing. This indicates he had shared
dominion and control with his fellow passengers over the interior of the
vehicle, including the area in the front passenger seat where the rifle was
found. There is no evidence of any limits being placed on his ability to access
and/or control any of the items located in that area.
Adding A.R.’s false testimony into the equation, we are convinced
the factual circumstances, although not overwhelming, constitute substantial
evidence to support the juvenile court’s finding he constructively possessed
the rifle and its large capacity magazine. We therefore have no occasion to
disturb the juvenile court’s finding to that effect.

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DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.

GOODING, J.

WE CONCUR:

MOTOIKE, ACTING P. J.

SCOTT, J.

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