People v. Rodriguez CA5

CourtListener 10583298Calctapp13.05.2025

Gesamter Gesetzestext

Filed 5/12/25 P. v. Rodriguez CA5

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

THE PEOPLE,
F086614
Plaintiff and Respondent,
(Super. Ct. Nos. MCR060295A,
v. MCR063100)

SAMUEL JAMES RALPH RODRIGUEZ,
OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Madera County. Dale J. Blea,
Judge.
Theresa Osterman Stevenson, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Kimberley A. Donohue, Assistant Attorney General, Darren K. Indermill and
Erin Doering, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
-ooOoo-
This appeal involves two cases that were consolidated and tried together, one
based on events that occurred on August 28, 2018, and one based on events that occurred
on January 2, 2022. On May 18, 2023, Rodriguez was convicted of, among other
things: attempting to murder R.C., based on the 2018 events; and assaulting A.C. with a
deadly weapon, based on the 2022 events. On appeal, Rodriguez argues: 1) there is
insufficient evidence to support the specific intent element of his attempted murder
conviction; 2) the trial court abused its discretion and violated Rodriguez’s right to due
process by allowing the 2018 charges and the 2022 charge to be tried together; and 3) the
trial court violated Rodriguez’s right to due process and a fair trial by ordering he be
shackled during the trial. The People disagree. We affirm.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The Madera County District Attorney charged Rodriguez in three separate cases,
Madera Superior Court case Nos. MCR060295A, MCR063100, and MCR073546. On
August 12, 2022, the prosecutor filed a motion to consolidate case Nos. MCR060295A
and MCR073546. Rodriguez opposed the motion. On September 2, 2022, the trial court
granted the motion and ordered that case No. MCR060295A be the leading case.1
On September 19, 2022, the prosecutor filed a consolidated third amended
information in case No. MCR060295A, charging Rodriguez with willful, deliberate, and
premeditated attempted murder (Pen. Code,2 §§ 664, 187, subd. (a); counts 1, 2);
mayhem (§ 203; counts 3, 7); criminal threats (§ 422, subd. (a); count 4); attempted arson
(§ 455; count 5); assault with a deadly weapon (§ 245, subd. (a)(1); counts 6, 9); assault
with caustic chemicals (§ 244; count 8); and misdemeanor possession of tear gas by a
prohibited person (§ 22810, subd. (a); count 10).

1 Case No. MCR063100 was not consolidated with case No. MCR060295A, and
defendant filed a notice of appeal in both cases. However, Rodriguez makes no claims of
error regarding case No. MCR063100. Accordingly, we treat any contentions regarding
case No. MCR063100 as forfeited. (Jones v. Superior Court (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 92,
99 [“Issues do not have a life of their own: if they are not raised or supported by
argument or citation to authority, we consider the issues” forfeited].)
2 All further undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

2.
Prior to a jury being selected, the prosecutor requested that Rodriguez be shackled
during the trial. After holding a hearing, the trial court granted the request.
On May 18, 2023, Rodriguez was found guilty by a jury on counts 1, 4, 6, 7, 9,
and 10. The jury found Rodriguez not guilty on counts 2, 5, and 8. As to count 1, the
jury found not true the allegation that the offense was willful, deliberate, and
premediated. As to count 3, the jury found Rodriguez not guilty of mayhem, but guilty of
the lesser included offense of attempted mayhem.
On May 19, 2023, Rodriguez pled guilty to one count of battery of a custodial
officer (§ 243.1) in case No. MCR063100.
Rodriguez was sentenced on July 10, 2023. The trial court imposed an aggregate
term of 33 years, eight months. On that same day, Rodriguez timely filed a notice of
appeal in Case Nos. MCR060295A and MCR063100.
FACTUAL SUMMARY
The Prosecution’s Case
2018 Incidents Involving R.C. and J.M.
Rodriguez had been A.H.’s boyfriend. While they were dating, he would regularly
stay at her house.
On August 28, 2018, Rodriguez was at A.H.’s house. After she got home from
work, he told her that they needed to leave because he had “a bad feeling there
and … there [were] demons there[.]”
They drove to a nearby store in A.H.’s vehicle. She had a sunshade in the vehicle
that she usually kept on the floorboard of the front passenger seat. She also kept a
pocketknife and pepper spray in the center console.
A.H. went into the store. When she exited the store, Rodriguez and her vehicle
were gone. He came back about 15 minutes later, driving her vehicle.
Eventually, A.H. got into the front passenger seat and yelled at Rodriguez.
Rodriguez drove toward his mother’s house, and she continued yelling at him. He did

3.
not respond, which she thought was strange. He was also driving “very fast,” which
scared her.
Rodriguez turned onto a dirt road. At some point he slowed down enough that
A.H. was able to grab the gear shift and put the vehicle in park. She got out and started
running. Rodriguez continued driving toward his mother’s house.
Eventually, A.H. saw Rodriguez approaching her in her vehicle. Rodriguez
repeatedly apologized and told her to get back in the vehicle, but she did not respond and
kept walking away. She did not see Rodriguez or her vehicle again that day.
That day, R.C. was walking down a road. Rodriguez pulled over and asked him if
he wanted a ride. R.C. had met Rodriguez once before, and he got in the vehicle.
Rodriguez began driving.
Almost immediately after R.C. got in, Rodriguez started acting “crazy.”
Rodriguez repeatedly asked him “random questions,” including what his name was,
where he was from, and how many kids he had. Rodriguez stated that “there was a fight
between good and evil.” Rodriguez would sporadically drive “really fast,” and he “was
not keeping his eyes on the road.” Rodriguez’s voice would change, and it sounded “like
he was going to be violent.”
Eventually, Rodriguez turned on a dirt road that led to his mother’s house. While
driving on the dirt road, Rodriguez “seemed like he was trying to ask” R.C. whether he
was on the side of good or evil. R.C. answered, and in response Rodriguez sprayed him
in the face with bear mace.
R.C.’s eyes were burning, and he was crying uncontrollably. He asked Rodriguez
why Rodriguez sprayed him, but Rodriguez did not respond. Shortly after that,
Rodriguez wrapped a “shiny aluminum-looking windshield visor thing” around him and
he felt a sharp pain in his neck. He realized that Rodriguez was cutting him. Rodriguez
cut both sides of his neck.

4.
R.C. got out of the vehicle and ran. Blood was squirting from the left side of his
neck. He went into the first house he saw, which was Rodriguez’s mother’s house.
Rodriguez came into the house “[f]or a split second,” but then he left.
Eventually, R.C. was taken to a hospital, where he got over 100 stiches in his
neck. A detective with the Madera County Sheriff’s Office was dispatched to the
hospital where he observed that R.C. had two large lacerations on his neck. “[O]ne was
about 15 inches long [and] anywhere from 1 to 2 inches wide.” The other was
approximately eight inches long.
On that same day, J.M. returned home from work a little after 7:00 p.m. and went
inside his residence. A short time later, he saw someone he did not know (later identified
as Rodriguez) approaching his truck. Rodriguez jumped into the back of the truck and
rummaged around.
J.M. asked Rodriguez what he was doing. Rodriguez did not answer. Instead, he
grabbed a gas can from the back of the truck and poured gas on J.M. He pulled out a
lighter and tried to set J.M. on fire, but the lighter would not spark. He then “look[ed] for
another match or something” so he could light J.M. on fire.
After that, Rodriguez went toward a pile of nearby firewood. As Rodriguez
moved toward the pile, J.M. kicked the gas can and the lighter out of Rodriguez’s hands.
J.M. did not know if he also kicked Rodriguez’s hands.
J.M. started to walk back to his residence, but he stopped and looked at Rodriguez.
At about the same time, J.P., who lived in a barn near J.M.’s residence, approached and
stood between J.M. and the back door to J.M.’s residence. J.P. was holding a machete.
J.P. told J.M. that he “ ‘better run,’ ” and Rodriguez repeatedly told J.M. that he was
going to kill him.
At some point, Rodriguez started hitting J.M. and J.M. defended himself.
Rodriguez picked up a wooden bar stool and repeatedly swung it at J.M. Rodriguez hit
J.M.’s face, head, shoulders, and back. J.M. fell after he was hit two or three times.

5.
However, Rodriguez did not stop hitting him until the bar stool broke. While J.M. was
being hit he tried to block the bar stool and grab it, but it broke his thumb.
J.M. tried to run, but he was having trouble standing up. Rodriguez grabbed him,
and he fell. Rodriguez started hitting him again. During this altercation, Rodriguez tried
to poke J.M.’s eyes out and J.M. bit one of Rodriguez’s fingers. At some point,
Rodriguez stopped hitting J.M. while J.P. held a machete to J.M.’s face and started
kicking J.M.’s right leg.
Eventually, J.M. kicked Rodriguez off him and got up. Rodriguez’s phone had
fallen out of his pocket during the altercation, and J.M. had picked it up. Rodriguez
demanded that J.M. give it back, but J.M. threw it instead. Shortly afterward, J.P. told
Rodriguez they needed to leave because the police were coming, and they left the area.
During the incident J.M.’s phone broke, so he was not able to call 911. The
following morning, J.M. drove to his brother’s house, and his brother called law
enforcement.
An officer responding to the call observed the following injuries: “[b]oth of
[J.M.’s] eyes had discoloration and bruising. He had bruising and contusions on the top
and back of his head. He had what appeared to be dry -- a cut and dried blood on the
back of his head. He had a cut on his nose. It was approximately a quarter of an inch in
length. His left eye was bloodshot red.” The officer also observed that J.M. had bruising
on his back, his thumb “was bent and appeared to have been broken,”3 and he had “what
appeared to … be a bite mark on the right side of his chest.” The responding officer also
collected the shirt J.M. was wearing, which smelled like gasoline.

3 A radiologist who reviewed an MRI of J.M.’s right hand later testified that while
J.M. had a bone bruise, swelling, and inflammation around the base of his thumb, there
were no fractures. However, according to one of the emergency room physicians that
treated J.M., his thumb had been dislocated.

6.
Sometime later, Rodriguez and R.C. were in custody at the Madera County
Department of Corrections. They were transported to court in the same van. Rodriguez
apologized to R.C., saying, “Sorry. Got the wrong person.” He also asked R.C. if R.C.
was going to testify against him.
Incident Involving A.C.
On January 2, 2022, Rodriguez was an inmate at Madera County Jail. Rodriguez
was housed in Module E, a maximum-security module where only one inmate is allowed
out of his cell at a time.
At about 1:00 p.m., when Rodriguez was out of his cell, A.C.’s cell door was
opened by mistake. A correctional officer ordered A.C. to close the door, and multiple
correctional officers ordered Rodriguez to go back into his cell. However, neither
obeyed. Instead, Rodriguez “unfolded his shoes,” approached A.C.’s cell, and began
talking to A.C.
Rodriguez then “paced back from the door,” which allowed A.C. to come out of
his cell. Rodriguez also took his glasses off. A.C. came out of his cell and they both got
into a fighting stance. Rodriguez then pulled out “a white sharp object.”
They began fighting. During the fight, Rodriguez repeatedly stabbed A.C. with
the “white sharp object.”
Multiple correctional officers ordered them to return to their cells, but the incident
did not end until after correctional officers deployed pepper spray and a “PepperBall.”4
A.C. had, among other injuries, an open wound on the top of his head and open
wounds on his back. He also had two cuts on his head and one on his left cheek.
Rodriguez had “some markings on his left tricep [sic], inside of his elbow, and his lower
back look[ed] a little red.”

4 According to Correctional Officer Samuel Gill, a “PepperBall” is “like a
paintball gun, but instead of shooting balls filled with paint, it’s … a PAVA powder. It’s
an irritant.” The powder disperses upon impact.

7.
Correctional officers were not sure who initiated the fight, but one heard
Rodriguez say “ ‘We can get this on right now’ ” at around the time he backed away from
A.C.’s door.
A video of the incident, which did not include audio and did not capture the entire
altercation, was played for the jury.
Rodriguez’s Case
Rodriguez called A.C. as a witness. According to A.C., on January 2, 2022, his
cell door opened. Rodriguez approached and told him not to come out of his cell. He
came out anyway because he wanted to attack Rodriguez, and they began fighting. A.C.
tried to hit Rodriguez first, but he could not. Additionally, Rodriguez did not use a
weapon during the altercation and A.C. did not have any puncture wounds on his back.
Rodriguez also testified on his own behalf. As to the incident involving A.C.,
Rodriguez testified that he heard a door open, but he did not know it was a cell door until
A.C. said that his door had opened. Rodriguez approached and told A.C. not to come out
of his cell. However, A.C. came out of his cell and attacked Rodriguez. Rodriguez
defended himself with “a metal plating to an electronic socket.” After A.C. no longer
posed a threat to him, he went back to his cell.
As to the incidents that occurred on August 28, 2018, Rodriguez testified that he
was driving A.H.’s vehicle when he saw a man, later identified as R.C., walking on the
road. He offered to give R.C. a ride, and R.C. accepted. During the drive, Rodriguez
made “small talk” with R.C. He also asked R.C. if R.C. was a good person because he
had to get his ID from his mother’s house, and he did not want to bring a bad person to
his family.
After getting his ID, Rodriguez got back into the vehicle and started driving. As
he was driving, he noticed that his marijuana and THC oil were missing from the console
area. He looked for it, but he could not find it.

8.
So, he grabbed a box cutter that was in the vehicle, held it to R.C.’s neck, told
R.C. not to move, and tried to “pat [R.C.] down” in order to get the items back.
However, R.C. pulled away and punched him. R.C. then tried to cover him with a
sunshade. He tried to move the sunshade and he grabbed R.C., but R.C. got out of the
vehicle and ran toward Rodriguez’s mother’s house.
Rodriguez did not attack R.C. with bear spray and he did not intend to cut R.C.’s
throat. In fact, he did not notice that R.C. was bleeding until after he followed R.C. into
his mother’s house.
Later, Rodriguez went to the loft where J.P. lived. After a couple hours,
Rodriguez went downstairs and started to get into the back of a truck that was not there
when he arrived. As he was climbing in, he heard someone say, “ ‘What the f**k are you
doing? Who are you?’ ”
Rodriguez looked and saw an individual who was later identified as J.M. He
jumped off the truck, and J.M. approached him in an aggressive manner. They then
began punching each other. Eventually, they both went to the ground, where the fighting
continued. Both tried to get on top of the other, but Rodriguez succeeded.
J.P. approached with a stick and told them to stop. They stopped. As Rodriguez
was getting off J.M., J.M. kicked him and “started coming back after [him].”
J.M. and Rodriguez started fighting again. J.M. bit Rodriguez’s finger. Rodriguez
could not get his finger out of J.M.’s mouth, so he bit J.M. back. At that point J.M. let go
of his finger.
Rodriguez ran to a nearby patio and J.M. followed. Rodriguez picked up a bar
stool and told J.M. to stay away. However, J.M. advanced. He hit J.M. with the bar stool
and then used it to push J.M. over. He told J.M. to stay down, but J.M. tried to get back
up. So, he hit J.M. with the bar stool again. The bar stool broke after the hit, and he
quickly walked away. He did not pour gas on J.M., threaten to kill J.M., or attempt to
gouge J.M.’s eyes out.

9.
DISCUSSION
I. Substantial Evidence Supports the Attempted Murder Conviction
Rodriguez argues there was insufficient evidence to show that he had the specific
intent to kill R.C. The People disagree.
A. Applicable Law and Standard of Review
“ ‘[A]ttempted murder requires the specific intent to kill and the commission of a
direct but ineffectual act toward accomplishing the intended killing.’ ” (People v. Smith
(2005) 37 Cal.4th 733, 739 (Smith).) “[I]t is well settled that intent to kill or express
malice, the mental state required to convict a defendant of attempted murder, may in
many cases be inferred from the defendant’s acts and the circumstances of the crime.”
(Id. at p. 741.) “Whether a defendant possessed the requisite intent to kill is … a question
for the trier of fact.” (People v. Gonzalez (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 1539, 1552
(Gonzalez).)
When evaluating a sufficiency of the evidence claim, “ ‘we review the whole
record in the light most favorable to the judgment to determine whether it discloses
substantial evidence—that is, evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value—
from which a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt.’ ” (People v. Cravens (2012) 53 Cal.4th 500, 507.) “The test for evaluating a
sufficiency of evidence claim is deferential[.]” (People v. Flores (2020) 9 Cal.5th 371,
411 (Flores).) “We must presume in support of the judgment the existence of every fact
that the trier of fact could reasonably deduce from the evidence.” (People v. Medina
(2009) 46 Cal.4th 913, 919.) “We must also ‘accept logical inferences that the jury might
have drawn from the circumstantial evidence.’ ” (Flores, at p. 411.) “The conviction
shall stand ‘unless it appears “that upon no hypothesis whatever is there sufficient
substantial evidence to support [the conviction].” ’ ” (Cravens, at p. 508.)

10.
B. Analysis
Rodriguez’s arguments are not persuasive. They largely rely on viewing the
evidence in the light most favorable to him instead of the light most favorable to the
judgment. For example, Rodriguez argues that the jury could not have found he had the
intent to kill R.C. because “the evidence presented to the jury reflected that Rodriguez
was talking and acting ‘crazy,’ had delusional thinking, and had been smoking marijuana
that morning.”
However, there is no evidence in the record suggesting that smoking marijuana in
the morning prevented Rodriguez from forming an intent to kill later in the day. There is
also no expert testimony suggesting that any mental health issues prevented him from
forming an intent to kill.
Moreover, there is evidence that Rodriguez was not acting “crazy” and did not
have delusional thinking. First, an officer who encountered Rodriguez on the night of the
incident testified that he did not hear or see anything suggesting that Rodriguez was
acting “crazy.” More importantly, Rodriguez’s own testimony supports the jury’s
finding. Rodriguez testified that he normally drives fast and that he was not talking
“crazy” to R.C. Instead, he was making small talk and trying to make sure R.C. was a
good person because he was going to bring R.C. near his family. Additionally, he
testified that he pulled a knife on R.C. because items were missing after he left R.C. alone
in the vehicle, he thought R.C. had stolen from him, and he wanted to get the items back.
Thus, from Rodriguez’s testimony, a jury could reasonably conclude that R.C. was acting
rationally, and not delusional or “crazy,” at the time he slit R.C.’s throat.
As another example, Rodriguez argues that R.C. testified “he had a sunshade over
him such that Rodriguez would not have been able to discern where the cuts were
directed.” However, R.C. testified that the only part of his body that he was sure was
covered by the sunshade was the back area of his neck. From this testimony, the jury
could have reasonably concluded that Rodriguez could still see portions of R.C.’s neck.

11.
Moreover, even if the sunshade did cover R.C.’s entire neck, given that he testified he
was in the passenger seat and it was Rodriguez who placed the sunshade over him, the
jury could have reasonably concluded that Rodriguez still knew the location of R.C.’s
neck.
Thus, even if we believed that the evidence is susceptible to the interpretations
advanced by Rodriguez, his argument still fails. “ ‘Although it is the jury’s duty to acquit
a defendant if it finds the circumstantial evidence susceptible of two reasonable
interpretations, one of which suggests guilt and the other innocence, it is the jury, not the
appellate court that must be convinced of the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt. [Citation.]’ [Citation.] Where the circumstances reasonably justify the trier of
fact’s finding, a reviewing court’s conclusion the circumstances might also reasonably be
reconciled with a contrary finding does not warrant the judgment’s reversal.” (People v.
Zamudio (2008) 43 Cal.4th 327, 357–358; see also People v. Lee (2011) 51 Cal.4th 620,
632 [“ ‘Conflicts and even testimony which is subject to justifiable suspicion do not
justify the reversal of a judgment, for it is the exclusive province of the trial judge or jury
to determine the credibility of a witness and the truth or falsity of the facts upon which a
determination depends. [Citation.] We resolve neither credibility issues nor evidentiary
conflicts; we look for substantial evidence.’ ”]; Flores, supra, 9 Cal.5th 371, 411 [“We
must … ‘accept logical inferences that the jury might have drawn from the circumstantial
evidence’ ”].)
Applying the appropriate standard, substantial evidence supports the jury’s finding
that Rodriguez had the specific intent to kill. R.C. testified that Rodriguez offered him a
ride, and he got in the vehicle. While he was in the vehicle, Rodriguez sprayed him in
the face with bear mace. This caused his eyes to burn and uncontrollable crying. Shortly
afterward, Rodriguez wrapped a sunshade around him and cut his neck.
Additionally, much of R.C.’s testimony is corroborated by other evidence.
Rodriguez admitted that he gave R.C. a ride. Rodriguez’s ex-girlfriend testified that she

12.
kept a pocketknife and pepper spray in the center console of her vehicle, which was the
vehicle Rodriguez was driving when he gave R.C. a ride. The vehicle was recovered, and
an officer testified there was “a large amount of dried blood on the vehicle.” Blood taken
from various spots was tested by a senior criminalist, and he determined it “was the same
as the reference profile of [R.C.]” A can of pepper spray was also recovered from the
vehicle. Finally, an officer testified that he saw R.C. in the hospital on the day of the
incident, and R.C. had two large lacerations on his neck.
The evidence that Rodriguez pepper sprayed R.C. and then cut his neck in two
places is, by itself, substantial evidence that supports the jury’s intent to kill finding. In
People v. Williams (2018) 23 Cal.App.5th 396, the court held that, “[a]lthough not a
compelled inference, [a] jury could rationally find that two stabs to the neck is a method
of killing that ‘was so particular and exacting that the defendant must have intentionally
killed according to a “preconceived design” ’ to kill.” (Id., at p. 412;5 see also Gonzalez,
supra, 126 Cal.App.4th at p. 1552 [the “appellant’s intent [to kill] was established by the
evidence of his unprovoked attack that rendered the unarmed victim prone and
defenseless as appellant repeatedly stabbed him with a shank he had hidden in his
boxers”]; People v. Avila (2009) 46 Cal.4th 680, 701–702 [evidence of the defendant’s
repeated attempts to stab the victim, who was unarmed and trapped, and the defendant’s
successful stabs to the victim’s arm and leg, “alone [was] substantial evidence of [the]
defendant’s intent to kill”].) Accordingly, “the totality of the circumstances, including

5 Rodriguez argues Williams is not on point because additional evidence was
presented in that case. However, the fact that other evidence also supported the verdict
does not change the court’s holding that a jury can infer intent to kill from multiple stab
wounds to the neck. Moreover, there is other evidence in the present case as well,
including motive (the theft of Rodriguez’s marijuana). We note that, like Williams, we
do not hold that the jury was compelled to find an intent to kill, only that substantial
evidence supports such a finding.

13.
the manner of the attack and the number and location of the penetrating knife wounds,
[is] sufficient to support a finding of intent to kill.” (Gonzalez, at p. 1552.)
Additionally, while “motive itself is not an element of [attempted murder],”
“evidence of motive is often probative of intent to kill.” (Smith, supra, 37 Cal.4th at
pp. 740–741.) And here, there is evidence of a motive. Rodriguez himself testified that
he believed that R.C. had taken his marijuana and THC oil, and in response, he pulled out
a box cutter. This motive is also at least somewhat supported by R.C.’s testimony that
Rodriguez later told him, “Sorry. Got the wrong person.”
Accordingly, Rodriguez’s claim that substantial evidence does not support the
jury’s intent to kill finding fails.
II. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion or Violate Rodriguez’s Due
Process Rights by Allowing the 2018 Charges and the 2022 Charge to be Tried
Together
Rodriguez argues that the trial court erred by granting the prosecutor’s motion to
consolidate the 2018 charges with the 2022 charge. He further argues that even if it was
not an error to consolidate the charges, due to the risk of prejudice in trying these charges
together, they should have been severed. The People disagree.
A. Applicable Law
“Section 954 allows for the joint trial of ‘two or more different offenses connected
together in their commission ... or two or more different offenses of the same class of
crimes or offenses.’ ” (People v. Hin (2025) 17 Cal.5th 401, 438 (Hin).) “[O]ffenses are
‘of the same class’ if they possess common characteristics or attributes.” (People v.
Moore (1986) 185 Cal.App.3d 1005, 1012.)
“Where joinder is proper under section 954, ‘[t]he burden is on the party seeking
severance to clearly establish that there is a substantial danger of prejudice requiring that
the charges be separately tried.’ [Citation.] In determining whether a court abused its
discretion in declining to sever properly joined charges, we first ‘consider the cross-

14.
admissibility of the evidence in hypothetical separate trials.’ [Citation.] If the evidence
is cross-admissible, then this ‘is normally sufficient to dispel any suggestion of prejudice
and to justify a trial court's refusal to sever properly joined charges.’ ” (Hin, supra,
17 Cal.5th at pp. 438–439.)
“If we determine that evidence underlying properly joined charges would not be
cross-admissible, we proceed to consider ‘whether the benefits of joinder were
sufficiently substantial to outweigh the possible “spill-over” effect of the “other-crimes”
evidence on the jury in its consideration of the evidence of defendant’s guilt of each set
of offenses.’ [Citations.] In making that assessment, we consider three additional
factors, any of which—combined with our earlier determination of absence of cross-
admissibility—might establish an abuse of the trial court’s discretion: (1) whether some
of the charges are particularly likely to inflame the jury against the defendant;
(2) whether a weak case has been joined with a strong case or another weak case so that
the totality of the evidence may alter the outcome as to some or all of the charges; or
(3) whether one of the charges (but not another) is a capital offense, or the joinder of the
charges converts the matter into a capital case. [Citations.] We then balance the
potential for prejudice to the defendant from a joint trial against the countervailing
benefits to the state.” (People v. Soper (2009) 45 Cal.4th 759, 775, fn. omitted (Soper).)
“ ‘Even if a defendant fails to demonstrate the trial court’s joinder ruling was an
abuse of discretion when it was made, reversal may nonetheless be required if the
defendant can demonstrate that “the joint trial resulted in such gross unfairness as to
amount to a due process violation.” ’ ” (Hin, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 439.) The defendant
bears the “high burden” of making this showing. (Soper, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 783.)
B. Standard of Review
Whether a trial court properly joined charges under section 954 is a question of
law subject to independent review. (People v. Alvarez (1996) 14 Cal.4th 155, 188.)

15.
“A defendant, to establish error in a trial court’s ruling declining to sever properly
joined charges, must make a ‘ “clear showing of prejudice to establish that the trial court
abused its discretion ....” ’ [Citation.] A trial court’s denial of a motion to sever properly
joined charged offenses amounts to a prejudicial abuse of discretion only if that ruling
‘ “ ‘ “ ‘falls outside the bounds of reason.’ ” ’ ” ’ ” (Soper, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 774.)
“In determining whether a trial court abused its discretion under section 954 in declining
to sever properly joined charges, ‘we consider the record before the trial court when it
made its ruling.’ ” (Ibid.)
C. Additional Background
On August 12, 2022, the prosecutor filed a motion to consolidate case
Nos. MCR060295A and MCR073546 pursuant to section 954. Case No. MCR060295A
involved the incidents that occurred on August 28, 2018. Case No. MCR073546
involved the incident that occurred on January 2, 2022. The prosecutor argued that the
cases were connected in their commission and shared a common element. Rodriguez was
charged with assault with a deadly weapon in both cases, Rodriguez attacked an unarmed
victim in both cases, Rodriguez used a weapon to attack R.C., J.M., and A.C., and none
of the victims provoked Rodriguez or attacked him first. The prosecutor further argued
that the cases should be consolidated in the interest of judicial economy.
On August 31, 2022, Rodriguez filed an opposition to the prosecutor’s motion,
arguing that there was no nexus between the assaults that allegedly occurred on
August 28, 2018, and the “jail fight” that allegedly occurred on January 2, 2022.
Additionally, “[t]he alleged jail assault in [case No. MCR073546] is not the same offense
or the same class of offense as the attempted murder, mayhem, criminal threat, and
burning charges alleged in [case No. MCR060295A].”
On September 2, 2022, the trial court held a hearing on the motion. At the
hearing, Rodriguez also argued that consolidating the cases would be unduly prejudicial.
After hearing arguments from the parties, the court found that the offenses in both cases

16.
had “[c]ommon characteristics.” They “share that same instrumentality – a stabbing
weapon – they share that same method of execution, and they – both incidents involve
violent attacks on victims, and, in both incidents, the … victims were unarmed.” The
court also found that, as to cross-admissibility, “an argument … can be made that they’re
admissible under [Evidence Code section 1101[, subdivision ](b) to establish intent, plan,
knowledge, or absence of a mistake or accident.” Accordingly, the court granted the
prosecutor’s motion.
D. Analysis
Rodriguez first argues that it was error to join the charges stemming from the 2018
with the charge stemming from the 2022 case pursuant to section 954.
This argument fails. At the preliminary hearing regarding the 2018 charges,
evidence was introduced that, without warning or reason, Rodriguez sprayed R.C. with
mace. After that, Rodriguez tried to wrap a sunshade around him and then cut his neck.
R.C. had cuts to both sides of his neck. Photographs of his injuries were introduced into
evidence.
Evidence was also introduced that, on the same day, J.M. had recently come home
from work when he saw Rodriguez in the back of his truck. Rodriguez was pouring
gasoline on the truck, and he asked Rodriguez what he was doing. Then, without
provocation, Rodriguez poured gasoline on him and tried to light him on fire with a
cigarette lighter. However, the lighter did not work. Rodriguez then headed toward a
pile of firewood, and J.M. kicked the gasoline can out of Rodriguez’s hand. At some
point he also took the lighter from Rodriguez. They then “had some words” and started
fighting. Eventually, J.M. tried to get away. However, J.P. prevented him from doing so.
Rodriguez then repeatedly stated he was going to kill J.M. and hit him several times with
a bar stool. He fell, and Rodriguez again hit him repeatedly with the bar stool. Overall,
Rodriguez hit his head, face, both arms, both shoulders, and back. Rodriguez only

17.
stopped hitting him when the bar stool broke into pieces. Photographs of J.M.’s injuries
were introduced into evidence.
At the preliminary hearing regarding the 2022 charge, evidence was introduced
that Rodriguez ignored multiple orders from correctional officers to return to his cell after
a different cell door was opened. Instead, he told the occupant of that cell, A.C., “ ‘we
can get this on right now.’ ” Eventually, A.C. came out of his cell and they both took a
“bladed fighting stance.” A.C. approached Rodriguez. However, before they began fist
fighting, Rodriguez pulled out a weapon that looked like a plastic spoon that had been
sharpened, and he attacked A.C. He repeatedly stabbed A.C. with the object. After the
altercation, A.C. was bleeding from his head. He also had scrapes or puncture wounds on
the left side of his ribcage and back.
Thus, evidence was introduced that Rodriguez initiated all three incidents, and that
in all three incidents he used a weapon on an unarmed individual. Therefore, all three
incidents had common characteristics. Moreover, both the 2018 case and the 2022 case
had the identical charge of assault with a deadly weapon. Accordingly, the trial court
properly joined the charges for trial. (People v. Anderson (2018) 5 Cal.5th 372, 388
[“The law prefers trying charged offenses together because doing so ordinarily promotes
efficiency.”].)
Second, Rodriguez argues that, even if the 2018 charges were appropriately joined
with the 2022 charge, the risk of prejudice was so great that the trial court should have
severed the charges. According to Rodriguez, “there was limited, if any, cross-
admissibility between the two cases.” Rodriguez further argues that there was a risk that
the video of the 2022 incident “would affect the jurors’ view, whether consciously or
subconsciously, of Rodriguez as a violent person[.]” According to Rodriguez, this,
combined with the weak evidence regarding what occurred during the 2018 incidents,
prejudiced him.

18.
These arguments fail. As to cross-admissibility of the evidence in hypothetical
separate trials, the trial court found that “an argument … can be made that [the evidence
is] admissible under [Evidence Code section 1101[, subdivision ](b) to establish intent,
plan, knowledge, or absence of a mistake or accident.” This holding was not an abuse of
discretion, especially as to intent.
“[T]here exists a continuum concerning the degree of similarity required for cross-
admissibility, depending upon the purpose for which introduction of the evidence is
sought: ‘The least degree of similarity ... is required in order to prove intent .... In order
to be admissible [for that purpose], the uncharged misconduct must be sufficiently similar
to support the inference that the defendant “ ‘probably harbor[ed] the same intent in each
instance.’ ” ’ ” (Soper, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 776.) Here, as discussed above, the
charges included similar conduct, including that Rodriguez initiated all three incidents,
and that in all three incidents he used a weapon on an unarmed individual. Thus, the trial
court’s ruling did not fall outside the bounds of reason.6
Moreover, even if no evidence was cross-admissible, Rodriguez’s argument still
fails. In arguing prejudice, Rodriguez relies largely on what occurred during the trial.
This is inappropriate. As discussed above, “[i]n determining whether a trial court abused
its discretion under section 954 in declining to sever properly joined charges, ‘we
consider the record before the trial court when it made its ruling.’ ” (Soper, supra,
45 Cal.4th at p. 774.) As it is Rodriguez’s burden to make a clear showing of prejudice,
and as he failed to discuss the evidence before the trial court when it made its ruling, this
alone is fatal to his claim.
However, despite this failure, we have reviewed the preliminary hearing
transcripts related to the 2018 charges and the 2022 charge, and we do not see a

6 We note that at least some of Rodriguez’s arguments to the contrary rely on
evidence that was only introduced after the trial court made its ruling, in contravention of
the applicable legal standard.

19.
substantial danger of prejudice created by trying the cases together. All three incidents
involved similar behavior, including Rodriguez using a weapon on an unarmed victim,
resulting in injuries. The fact that there was a video of the 2022 incident was not
particularly likely to inflame the jury against Rodriguez and have a “spill-over effect” to
the 2018 charges. This is especially true given the similarity between the incidents and
that pictures of the injuries related to the 2018 incidents were also introduced, which,
according to the evidence, included a throat slit in multiple places, a bite mark, bruising
under the eyes, a broken nose, and a thumb that was out of its socket. (See, e.g., Soper,
supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 759 [“The homicides at issue … are similar in nature and equally
egregious—hence neither, when compared to the other, was likely to unduly inflame a
jury against [the] defendant.”].)
As to the strength of the cases, both the 2018 case and the 2022 case were strong.
As to the 2022 case, at the preliminary hearing, the prosecutor introduced both testimony
and a video showing that Rodriguez attacked A.C. with a white object.
As to the 2018 case, both victims testified that they were attacked, and
photographs of the injuries they each received from the alleged attacks were introduced
into evidence. Additionally, both victims identified Rodriguez as their attacker. As to
the incident involving R.C., the prosecutor also introduced evidence that the vehicle
matching the description given by R.C. was found. There was blood on and in the
passenger side of that vehicle. There was also a bloody sunshade that had cuts to it in the
vehicle, as well as a canister of pepper spray and Rodriguez’s ID card.
Thus, both cases were strong, and any minor differences between the cases does
not change this result. (See Soper, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 781 [“between any two
charges, it always is possible to point to individual aspects of one case and argue that one
is stronger than the other. A mere imbalance in the evidence, however, will not indicate a
risk of prejudicial ‘spillover effect,’ militating against the benefits of joinder and
warranting severance of properly joined charges”].)

20.
In addition to the fact that both cases were strong and none of the charges were
likely to inflame the jury,7 “a single trial of properly joined charges promotes important
systemic economies. Whenever properly joined charges are severed, the burden on the
public court system of processing the charges is substantially increased.” (Soper, supra,
45 Cal.4th at p. 782.) Accordingly, even if no evidence was cross-admissible, it was not
an abuse of discretion for the trial court to conclude that the any potential prejudice to
Rodriguez was outweighed by the benefits to the state.
In arguing to the contrary, Rodriguez relies on People v. Earle (2009)
172 Cal.App.4th 372. In Earle, the defendant was charged in one case with indecent
exposure, and in another case, sexual assault. (Id. at p. 378.) The trial court consolidated
the cases for trial and denied the defendant’s motion to sever. (Ibid.) In analyzing the
evidence, the appellate court found that proof of the indecent exposure charge was strong,
proof of the sexual assault case “was considerably weaker,” and the “charges arose from
entirely distinct and dissimilar incidents. (Ibid.)” The appellate court also found that, “in
the context of the assault case here the exposure charge may well have had the potential
to inflame the jury against the defendant in an unusual and peculiar manner …. As a
repellent sexual aberration—what is still widely known as a ‘perversion’—the indecent
exposure would naturally incline the jury to view defendant as a kind of freak, a pariah, a
‘pervert.’ This would at a minimum reduce the jurors’ natural compunction about
convicting him of the more serious offense on questionable evidence, as well as impair[]
their ability to view evidence of that offense objectively.” (Id. at p. 401.)
However, Earle is readily distinguishable. First, none of the charges in this case
involved a “repellent sexual aberration” or any similar behavior. Moreover, as discussed
above, all three incidents in this case contain substantial similarities, the video evidence

7 Neither case involved a capital offense, so that consideration is not relevant here.

21.
was not particularly likely to inflame the jury, and the evidence supporting all three
incidents was strong.
Finally, Rodriguez argues that even if the trial court’s decision to try the cases
together was not an abuse of discretion at the time it was made, “Rodriguez’s judgment
must be reversed since the joinder actually resulted in gross unfairness, amounting to a
denial of due process.”
However, Rodriguez fails to meet his high burden of showing gross unfairness that
deprived him of due process. As discussed above, video of the 2022 incident was not
particularly likely to inflame the jury against Rodriguez. Additionally, Rodriguez does
not identify anything that occurred at trial that might change the analysis, nor do we see
anything. For example, Rodriguez does not argue, nor do we see in the record, that the
prosecutor urged the jury to convict Rodriguez of any of the 2018 charges based on the
video. (See People v. Grant (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 579, 583, 586–587, 589–591
[finding a due process violation where a trial court properly denied a motion to sever a
burglary charge from a possession of stolen property charge, in part because the evidence
was not cross admissible but the prosecutor “urged the jury to draw the impermissible
inference that defendant committed the burglary … based on the evidence that he
knowingly possessed stolen computer equipment[.]”].)8
Moreover, while Rodriguez is correct that there were inconsistencies in the
testimony of R.C. and J.M., the strength of the 2018 case only increased with the
evidence presented at trial. The prosecutor once again produced the accounts of the
victims, photographs of their injuries, and evidence that Rodriguez’s ID card was found

8 Rodriguez testified at the trial, and on appeal, Rodriguez relies on that testimony.
However, Rodriguez does not cite to any authority, nor are we aware of any, suggesting
that a defendant’s testimony regarding accident or self-defense turns an otherwise strong
case into a weak one such that an otherwise proper joinder becomes a due process
violation.

22.
in the vehicle that was covered in blood. However, the prosecutor also produced
additional evidence supporting Rodriguez’s guilt. As to the incident involving R.C.,
Rodriguez’s girlfriend at the time testified that, on the day in question, Rodriguez was
driving her vehicle. Her vehicle was eventually recovered, blood taken from the vehicle
was tested, and a senior criminalist testified that the DNA profile “was the same as the
reference profile of [R.C.]” Moreover, a latent print analyst testified that two fingerprints
taken from the vehicle matched Rodriguez’s fingerprints.
As to the incident involving J.M., the jury was also shown pieces of a broken bar
stool, which were recovered near J.M.’s residence. The same senior criminalist tested
two pieces of the bar stool. Both pieces tested positive for blood, and “[t]he results from
the two apparent blood stains … were the same DNA profile, and that was the same as
the reference profile of [J.M.].” The senior criminalist also performed an analysis on
DNA from the bar stool pieces that was not blood, and neither J.M. nor Rodriguez could
be eliminated as contributors to the mixture of DNA. Finally, the criminalist performed
an analysis on a swab of blood taken from Rodriguez’s hand on the day of the incident,
and there were two major DNA contributors, Rodriguez and J.M.
In addition to being strong, the evidence related to each incident was both simple
and distinct. And, “[a]ppellate courts have found ‘ “no prejudicial effect from joinder
when the evidence of each crime is simple and distinct, even though such evidence might
not have been admissible in separate trials.” ’ ” (Soper, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 784.)
Therefore, based on the foregoing, Rodriguez’s argument that the trial court
abused its discretion and violated Rodriguez’s right to due process by allowing the 2018
charges and the 2022 charge to be tried together fails.

23.
III. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion or Violate Rodriguez’s Right to
Due Process by Ordering He be Shackled During Trial
Rodriguez argues that the trial court violated his right to due process and a fair
trial by ordering that his non-writing hand be shackled during the trial. The People
disagree.
A. Applicable Law
“A trial court has broad power to maintain courtroom security and orderly
proceedings.” (People v. Hayes (1999) 21 Cal.4th 1211, 1269.) “However, the court’s
discretion to impose physical restraints is constrained by constitutional principles. Under
California law, ‘a defendant cannot be subjected to physical restraints of any kind in the
courtroom while in the jury's presence, unless there is a showing of a manifest need for
such restraints.’ [Citation.] Similarly, the federal ‘Constitution forbids the use of visible
shackles ... unless that use is “justified by an essential state interest”—such as the interest
in courtroom security—specific to the defendant on trial.’ ” (People v. Lomax (2010)
49 Cal.4th 530, 558–559 (Lomax).)
“ ‘In deciding whether restraints are justified, the trial court may “take into
account the factors that courts have traditionally relied on in gauging potential security
problems and the risk of escape at trial.” [Citation.] These factors include evidence
establishing that a defendant poses a safety risk, a flight risk, or is likely to disrupt the
proceedings or otherwise engage in nonconforming behavior.’ [Citation.] Although the
court need not hold a formal hearing before imposing restraints, ‘the record must show
the court based its determination on facts, not rumor and innuendo.’ [Citation.] The
imposition of physical restraints without evidence of violence, a threat of violence, or
other nonconforming conduct is an abuse of discretion.” (Lomax, supra, 49 Cal.4th at
p. 559.)

24.
B. Standard of Review
“ ‘[W]e will not overturn a trial court’s decision to restrain a defendant absent “a
showing of a manifest abuse of discretion.” ’ [Citation.] To establish an abuse of
discretion, defendants must demonstrate that the trial court’s decision was so erroneous
that it ‘falls outside the bounds of reason.’ [Citations.] A merely debatable ruling cannot
be deemed an abuse of discretion. [Citations.] An abuse of discretion will be
‘established by “a showing the trial court exercised its discretion in an arbitrary,
capricious, or patently absurd manner that resulted in a manifest miscarriage of
justice[.]” ’ ” (People v. Bryant, Smith & Wheeler (2014) 60 Cal.4th 335, 390.)
C. Additional Background
Prior to a jury being selected, the prosecutor requested that Rodriguez be shackled
during the trial. On February 9 and February 14, 2023, the trial court held an evidentiary
hearing on the request.
i. The Prosecutor’s Evidence
Jason Quick, who was employed by the Madera County Sheriff’s Office as the Jail
Division Watch Three Sergeant, testified that Rodriguez had been incarcerated at the
Madera County Jail several times, the most recent of which began in 2018. Throughout
his time at the jail, Rodriguez was consistently violent and consistently noncompliant and
violent with officers. When Rodriguez “[got] told, ‘no,’ or [did not] get what he
want[ed], there tend[ed] to be an incident or an altercation that quickly follow[ed]
afterwards.” Rodriguez had held pass doors9 hostage, lashed out at deputies, and lashed
out at other inmates. He also threatened jail staff.
According to Quick, at the time of the hearing Rodriguez was housed at the jail’s
highest security level “[d]ue to his history of violence and noncompliance with jail staff.”

9 According to Quick, a pass door is a small rectangular opening in the cell door
that allows food to be based through. Additionally, when there is an incident, an inmate
can put his hands through the door so an officer can handcuff him.

25.
In this housing, inmates are allowed out of their cells and in “the day room” 75 minutes
per day. They are not allowed to be around other inmates, and whenever they are
transported outside of their cell or module, they “are fully belly chained, [have] two pairs
of handcuffs and leg bands on,” and two officers are present.
Quick also testified regarding several instances when Rodriguez was
noncompliant. On August 14, 2022, an officer informed Quick that he thought Rodriguez
was smoking marijuana in his cell. Rodriguez was told to “cuff up,” meaning to put his
hands through the pass door so he could be handcuffed. While Rodriguez was not
aggressive, he refused to comply. He also covered the pass door with his shirt and with
his blanket to prevent pepper spray from entering his cell. Officers continued to tell
Rodriguez to “cuff up,” and he continued to refuse. At some point during the incident,
Rodriguez told Quick to open the door so he and Quick could “handle this one on one.”
Quick perceived this as a threat. After a deputy deployed a round from the PepperBall
launcher into Rodriguez’s cell (which was caught by the blanket), Rodriguez submitted to
handcuffs. After being placed in handcuffs, Rodriguez stated that he was “going to get”
“whoever was roughing [him] up.” Quick also perceived this as a threat.
Quick also testified that, on another occasion, Rodriguez held his pass door
hostage by placing his arms through the door and refusing to move them. This was a
safety concern because, if a pass door is unsecured, an inmate inside the cell could
manipulate the locking mechanisms on the door, grab nearby inmates, or grab nearby
officers.
On another occasion, two doors in Rodriguez’s housing module were opened.
Defendant got into a fight with another inmate, during which Rodriguez stabbed him.10

10 On cross-examination, Quick testified that a “porter” is an inmate worker that is
allowed additional time outside of his cell. Quick also testified that porters clean the day
room and the showers, violent inmates are not chosen as porters, and at the time of the
hearing, Rodriguez was a porter.

26.
Daryll Swengel was employed by the Madera County Sheriff’s Office as a peace
officer. At the time, he was the Sergeant of the Courts. It was his job to supervise all
security at the courthouse. As part of this job, he communicated with the jail daily
regarding inmates that were going to be brought to court.
Swengel was familiar with Rodriguez. Swengel personally observed Rodriguez
“curse under his breath” or be defiant when a bailiff gave him an order he did not like.
Additionally, on prior occasions when Rodriguez had been transported to court, jail staff
notified Swengel that there had been “instances of violence at the jailhouse where
corrections officers [had] been attacked …, defiance by [Rodriguez] and those sorts of
things.” Given this, it was Swengel’s job to get “at least one or more extra deputies in the
courtroom to assist in case there [were] any further issues.” Moreover, jail staff put
Rodriguez in “black box” handcuffs, which kept his “hands in a closer tighter position to
restrict [his] movement even more than a normal inmate would be.”
Jesus Martinez, who was employed by the Madera County Sheriff’s Office in the
Jail Division, testified that he had contact with Rodriguez while Rodriguez was
incarcerated in the jail. Rodriguez would talk back or get loud, but Martinez “never
really had to get physical with him.”
Martinez also testified that, on January 9, 2020, Rodriguez got upset because a
commissary worker started passing out commissary items at the housing module on the
opposite side of Rodriguez’s housing module, and he had to wait. Rodriguez expressed
his distaste to the commissary worker and the correctional officer escorting her. The
officer explained why they started at the opposite side, then asked Rodriguez if he was
going to purchase anything. Rodriguez responded that he was talking to the commissary
worker. The officer took this as a refusal to purchase items. He went to secure
Rodriguez’s pass door, but Rodriguez placed his hand through it. Rodriguez repeatedly

27.
refused to remove his arm from the pass door. Martinez talked to Rodriguez and
eventually got him to remove his arm from the door.
Alicia Valadez previously worked at the Madera County Jail as a correctional
officer. Valadez testified that, on September 30, 2018, she heard an officer call for
assistance over the radio, and she responded. When she arrived, approximately four
officers were near Rodriguez’s cell. Rodriguez was ordered to turn around so he could be
placed in handcuffs, but he did not comply. He was angry and yelling. After Rodriguez
repeatedly refused to comply, a correctional officer was directed to get the “PepperBall,”
which is a device that consists of bullets filled with PepperBall powder. Initially the
officer was directed to “place” PepperBalls into the cell through the pass door. However,
Rodriguez covered the pass door with clothes. The officer was then directed to throw
PepperBalls under the cell door. This eventually worked, and Rodriguez was placed in
restraints.
Valadez also testified that she looked up incident reports involving Rodriguez on
the jail management system, and there were approximately 118 reports (this included
incidents where Rodriguez was involved, even if he may have been the victim). There
were incidents involving Rodriguez fighting other inmates, Rodriguez fighting an officer,
weapons, and noncompliance.
Valadez also testified that, based on her interactions with Rodriguez, small things
would trigger angry outbursts. And once he became upset, he would raise his voice and
verbally abuse officers.
John Grayson was employed by the Madera County Sheriff’s Office as a deputy
sheriff. Grayson testified that, in June 2012, he received a call that several vehicles had
been vandalized and items had been taken. Witnesses described a man who was “acting
weird and frightening the hikers.” One witness provided Grayson with the man’s
location. Grayson drove to that location and saw Rodriguez. Grayson got out of his
vehicle and tried to talk to him. In response, Rodriguez went back to his vehicle and put

28.
his hand on the floorboard while Grayson was ordering him to stop. Grayson thought
Rodriguez was reaching for a weapon, so he pointed his firearm at Rodriguez and told
him to show his hands. Rodriguez complied, but he screamed and cursed at Grayson.
Grayson then ordered Rodriguez to drop to his knees, but Rodriguez advanced
toward Grayson and continued cursing and screaming. Rodriguez “made a weird roar”
and reached toward Grayson’s firearm. Grayson took a step forward and threatened to
kill Rodriguez. In response, Rodriguez ran back to his vehicle. Grayson told him to stop
and to get out of the vehicle, but Rodriguez did not comply. Grayson then pepper
sprayed Rodriguez, but he was still able to drive away.
Grayson followed Rodriguez in his patrol vehicle. Eventually Rodriguez began to
stop, jumped out of his vehicle, and ran into a forest. Rodriguez was located four or five
hours later.
In addition to witness testimony, the prosecutor submitted several of the incident
reports into evidence. The prosecutor also requested that the trial court take judicial
notice of the preliminary hearing transcripts in case Nos. MCR060295A and
MCR063100, and the trial court reviewed these transcripts. In case No. MCR063100, the
court had found sufficient cause to believe Rodriguez battered two custodial officers in
2019. In case No. MCR060295A (originally case No. MCR073546), a different trial
court had found sufficient cause to believe that Rodriguez assaulted another inmate with
a deadly weapon in 2022.
ii. Rodriguez’s Evidence
Logan Majeski was employed by the Madera County Sheriff’s Office as a deputy
sheriff. Majeski testified that in late 2022 he was assigned to the maximum security unit
at the Madera County Jail. At some point, he inadvertently opened A.C.’s cell door from
the control room. Rodriguez was in the day room at the time. However, he did not attack
A.C. Instead, he went back to his cell and closed the door.

29.
iii. Trial Court’s Ruling
After receiving evidence and hearing argument from the parties, the trial court
ruled as follows:

“During his incarceration, Mr. Rodriguez has been involved in two
violent attacks – including assaults on two correctional officers and the
stabbing of another inmate. The stabbing occurred with the use of a jail-
made weapon. Mr. Rodriguez has failed to comply with – consistently
failed to comply with the rules of the jail – including having contraband in
the form of marijuana on at least two incidents.

“On numerous occasions, Mr. Rodriguez has threatened to harm
correctional officers and challenged them to fights. His disruptions and
refusal to obey the rules of the jail required the correctional officers on
several occasions to deploy [pepper] spray and PepperBalls to obtain his
compliance.

“It appears to the Court that others in Mr. Rodriguez’s presence are
at risk when Mr. Rodriguez is not shackled. This is apparent by his [2022]
attacks on the other – on another inmate while housed in maximum security
at the jail. There’s no less restrictive means of protecting the safety of
those in the courtroom than to shackle Mr. Rodriguez. The attacks on
correctional officers, attacks on fellow inmates, threats made to correctional
officers, the manufacture of a jail-made weapon, noncomplying conduct at
the jail – including possessing contraband in the form of marijuana –
indicate that Mr. Rodriguez is just not going to follow the rules.

“And when things don’t cut his direction, he becomes upset to the
point where he becomes, at a minimum, verbally abusive and on occasion
has become physically abusive; and I think it indicates a compelling
manifest need to require that Mr. Rodriguez be shackled during the trial.”
After determining that Rodriguez should be shackled, the trial court turned to “the
form that the shackles are going to take.” Rodriguez argued that only his feet should be
shackled.

30.
Ultimately, the trial court ordered that “soft shackles”11 be used on Rodriguez’s
feet and his non-writing hand.
D. Analysis
As summarized above, evidence (not just rumor or innuendo) was presented that
Rodriguez posed a safety risk at the proceedings and that he was likely to disrupt them if
he was not shackled.12
As to whether Rodriguez posed a safety risk, there was evidence that in 2019,
while Rodriguez was in jail, he battered two correctional officers. There was also
evidence that, in 2022, he attacked another inmate with a weapon. Finally, there was
evidence that on August 14, 2022, he threatened to harm a correctional officer.
As to his disruptiveness, evidence was presented of multiple occasions where
Rodriguez would become disruptive, including by preventing officers from closing his
pass door, usually when things were not going his way. On some of these occasions,
including one that occurred on August 14, 2022, Rodriguez would not comply with
orders from correctional officers until after force, in the form of a PepperBall launcher,
was used.
Given this evidence, the trial court could have reasonably ordered that both
Rodriguez’s hands and feet be shackled, to prevent a violent incident and to prevent
disruptive conduct. However, instead the court ordered that soft shackles be used, and

11 Swengel testified that soft shackles “are velcro straps. They’re able to lock, and
they will be soundless and not visible and can be underneath the clothes.”
12 To the extent Rodriguez asserts that prior violent or disruptive conduct must
have occurred in the courtroom, or that there must be direct evidence of Rodriguez’s
intent to be violent or disruptive in the courtroom, Rodriguez is incorrect. (See, e.g.,
People v. Lewis & Oliver (2006) 39 Cal.4th 970, 1031 [the required showing of manifest
need “is satisfied by evidence that the defendant has threatened jail deputies, possessed
weapons in custody, threatened or assaulted other inmates, and/or engaged in violent
outbursts in court”].)

31.
that his writing hand remain free. Accordingly, the trial court’s order did not fall outside
the bounds of reason.13
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.

FAIN, J.*

WE CONCUR:

HILL, P. J.

PEÑA, J.

13 Rodriguez is correct that some evidence presented suggested that he would not
be violent or disruptive, including that he was a porter and that in late August of 2022 he
had another chance to attack A.C. but did not do so. However, even if, in light of this
evidence, the trial court’s ruling was “debatable,” that is insufficient for us to find an
abuse of discretion. (People v. Bryant, Smith & Wheeler, supra, 60 Cal.4th at p. 390.)
* Judge of the Fresno Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to
article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.

32.

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