CourtListener 10582090•Mobasser v. Moyal CA2/5
Gesamter Gesetzestext
Filed 5/12/25 Mobasser v. Moyal CA2/5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FIVE
HOOSHMAND ELI B333355
MOBASSER,
(Los Angeles County
Plaintiff and Respondent, Super. Ct. No.
21STCP03651)
v.
AMIR HAIM MOYAL, et al.,
Defendants and
Appellants.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Gregory Keosian, Judge. Affirmed.
Bryan Cave Leighton Paisner, Meryl Macklin and Joseph J.
Poppen for Defendants and Appellants.
Law Offices of Homan Mobasser, Homan Mobasser;
Williams Iagman and Jon R. Williams for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
******
The multi-national parties to a business transaction agreed
to arbitrate their dispute before a panel of rabbis. After the panel
awarded one of the parties damages on its claims, the losing
party filed a motion asking the trial court not to “recogniz[e] or
enforc[e]” the arbitration award. The court denied the motion,
finding the movant’s account of the arbitral proceedings to be
“not credible,” and thereafter confirmed the award. Because this
appeal from the confirmation of the award lacks merit, we affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
I. The Business Dispute
Haim Moyal (Moyal) is the director of NKS Laboratories
LTD (NKS). NKS manufactures hair care products, including a
line of products marketed as the “Nanokeritan System.” Both
Moyal and NKS are based in Israel. Hooshmand Mobasser
(Mobasser) is a United States citizen.
In August 2014, Moyal (for NKS) and Mobasser (for a
Nevada corporation called Nanokeritan CA, Inc. (NanoCA))
entered into an Exclusive Distribution Agreement (the
agreement). Under the agreement, NKS authorized NanoCA to
be the exclusive distributor of Nanokeritan System products in
California. The agreement had an initial term of three months,
and would automatically renew for three-month terms.
The parties provide widely varying accounts of what
happened next.
2
According to Moyal, he and Mobasser terminated the
agreement in late 2014 (after Mobasser failed to purchase the
required minimum amount of Nanokeritan System products for
distribution) and orally formed a new joint venture granting
Mobasser the right to market NKS’s products in California for a
10 percent share of any sales profits. In 2020, Mobasser sold
some of the product meant for California sales to a Dubai-based
distributor. Moyal claimed that Mobasser cost him over $15
million, including $6.6 million in lost inventory and $9 million in
lost profits caused by Mobasser’s sale of the product to Dubai.
According to Mobasser, Moyal shipped the product into
California but then leaned on Mobasser to physically move the
product to a different warehouse, where Moyal saddled Mobasser
with having to pay for the warehouse and related upkeep.
Mobasser thereafter learned that the product Moyal sent to
California was unfit for distribution in the United States, and
asked Moyal what to do with the unsellable product; Moyal told
him to do “whatever you want.” When Mobasser subsequently
sold some of it to a Dubai-based distributor, Moyal became
“enraged” and told potential buyers that the product was “stolen”
and “expired,” forcing Mobasser to refund the sale. Mobasser
claimed that warehouse rent and moving expenses, as well as the
cost to ship and re-purchase products to the Middle East, cost
him nearly $400,000.
II. The Arbitration Proceedings
A. The agreement to arbitrate
In February 2021, Moyal and Mobasser agreed to arbitrate
3
their dispute before the Beit Din1 of the Rabbinical Council of
California. Under this arbitration agreement, the Beit Din
“select[s] a panel of three rabbis to serve as arbitrators” and the
parties waive all right to object to who is chosen or their
“qualifications or fitness to serve”; the arbitrators have the sole
“discretion” to “determine the procedures for the submission of
evidence and argument”; and the arbitrators are to base their
decision “on Din Torah, compromise, statutory or common law or
any other authority they see fit.”
The arbitration agreement authorizes the parties to “take
all steps necessary and appropriate to comply with and effectuate
the arbitration award,” including “obtain[ing] a judgment
confirming the award by filing a petition in a court of competent
jurisdiction in the County of Los Angeles.” However, the
arbitration agreement requires the parties to “accept the
arbitration award of the [Beit] Din as binding, final and
conclusive,” and thus to “waive” (1) “any right to challenge,
appeal or seek to vacate the arbitration award,” and (2) “any
right to appeal any award of the [Beit] Din (including without
limitation all confirmed awards) to another [Beit] Din, or to any
state or federal court.”
In its choice-of-law provision, the arbitration agreement
provides that the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) “and related
federal law shall govern the interpretation, implementation and
enforcement of this Agreement to the fullest extent possible.”
1 The record also refers to this body as the “Beis Din” and
“Beth Din.” In their briefs, the parties settle on the term “Beit
Din.” We will adhere to their convention.
4
B. The conduct of the arbitration
Within days of receiving the parties’ signed agreement to
arbitrate, the Beit Din sent Moyal and Mobasser an email on
February 18, 2021 “confirm[ing]” signature of that agreement,
“plac[ing] th[e] matter on calendar for” a “hearing” on March 17,
2021, and confirming Moyal’s remote appearance (initially
planned to be “by speakerphone” but ultimately conducted by
Zoom “as a courtesy” to Moyal). The email referenced further
“instructions” that would be sent to the parties. Those
instructions came in the form of a letter, which explained that
“[a] single hearing suffices for some cases while multiple hearings
are required for others”; that the plaintiff is the first to “present
his claims” at the hearing through “documents” and “[w]itnesses,”
who are “usually asked to testify later in the proceedings”; that
the respondent will then present “his understanding of the events
and cross claims”; and that “[e]ach side [will be] provided ample
time to state their case and arguments.” Although the record on
appeal only contains the instructional letter sent to Mobasser,
one of the presiding rabbis indicated that “all parties” were
“notified.”
On February 21, 2021, Moyal sent a pre-hearing
“statement” to the panel that “spells out [his] claims.” The record
on appeal does not contain any pre-hearing statement sent by
Mobasser.
On March 17, 2021, the arbitrators held an “[e]videntiary
[h]earing.” The hearing—which took place before Rabbi Sauer,
Rabbi Bess and Rabbi Union—lasted “multiple hours.” At that
hearing, the parties presented exhibits, Mobasser testified (and
was cross-examined by Moyal), and Moyal had the “opportunity
to present . . . evidence.” Moyal later denied that the hearing was
5
an evidentiary hearing at all, while simultaneously admitting
that Mobasser “present[ed] and elaborate[d] [his] arguments and
claims” at that hearing; Moyal also insisted that the hearing
lasted fewer than five minutes.
Within days of the hearing, Moyal complained to the
arbitrators about “having not been physically present.” Rabbi
Union responded that the arbitrators had followed the agreed-
upon procedure of having Moyal appear remotely and that Moyal
could not “now, after the hearing, object and say [he] want[s] it
redone, because [he] now decide[s] it was imbalanced.”
On May 1, 2021, Mobasser sent the arbitrators a post-
hearing brief that articulated his claims for relief under the
theories of (1) breach of contract, (2) unjust enrichment, and (3)
defamation. On May 23, 2021, Moyal sent the arbitrators a post-
hearing brief along with numerous supporting documents, and
stated that he also had “hundreds of additional paperwork.”
On May 26, 2021, Moyal sent a letter to Rabbi Union
implying that Rabbi Union had promised Moyal that he “would
be invited . . . to present and elaborate [his] arguments and
claims in front of” the arbitrators.
In early June 2021, the arbitrators sent Moyal and
Mobasser a letter asking them to file further reply briefs refuting
one another’s positions because their post-hearing briefing
“fail[ed] to respond to points raised by the other party.” Moyal
and Mobasser filed their replies.
C. The arbitration award
On August 3, 2021, the arbitrators issued a written award.
After noting that Moyal and Mobasser “contradict[ed] one
another’s allegations on the most basic of questions,” the
arbitrators resolved those conflicts in Mobasser’s favor: They
6
awarded Moyal nothing for his claims and awarded Mobasser
$393,099.24 on his claims, consisting of $160,152.58 for breach of
contract (because Moyal did not repurchase from Mobasser the
products unfit for sale in the United States), $222,946.66 for
unjust enrichment (because Moyal saddled Mobasser with the
cost of storing NKS’s products in California for several years),
and $10,000 for Mobasser’s time in managing the inventory; the
panel awarded Mobasser nothing on his defamation claim.
Two days later, Moyal emailed Rabbi Union declaring his
“absolute rejection” of the “unprofessional unfounded
misconducted [a]rbitration.” Moyal accused the arbitrators of
“totally ignor[ing] all proofs, files and documents,” of not
“fulfill[ing] [their] tasks and commitments as declared [i]n [the]
arbitration agreement,” of not independently investigating
Moyal’s own claims for him, and of “absolutely contradicting [the]
essence of Judaism which encourages detailing and
punctiliousness.” Moyal ultimately listed 11 objections to the
award, but did not specifically list any failure by the arbitrators
to hold an evidentiary hearing at all or any failure to conduct a
second evidentiary hearing.
III. The Trial Court Proceedings
In November 2021, Mobasser filed a petition to confirm the
arbitration award.2
In June 2023, Moyal filed a motion “for [an] order refusing
recognition and enforcement of [the] arbitration award.” In
support of his motion, Moyal initially asserted that the March 17,
2021 hearing was merely a “conference call” that lasted
2 Although the trial court initially entered a default
judgment confirming the award, the court subsequently vacated
that judgment.
7
“approximately five minutes” (and thus not an evidentiary
hearing), but subsequently asserted that the arbitrators at the
March 17 hearing had promised him a further, in-person
evidentiary hearing. Mobasser opposed the motion, submitting
declarations from himself and Rabbi Union stating that the
hearing was an evidentiary hearing that lasted “multiple hours.”
In July 2023, the trial court issued an order denying
Moyal’s motion. The court noted how Moyal’s argument had
“shift[ed]” “from an assertion that no hearing was provided[] to
an assertion that, at the March 17[, 2021] hearing, a second
hearing was orally promised but not provided.” The court further
found that Moyal had “received an adequate opportunity to
present [his] evidence and argument, including during an
evidentiary hearing.” The court found Moyal’s “characterization
of the March 17, 2021 hearing” to be “not credible” because it was
“contradicted by [Mobasser], one of the arbitrators, and the
correspondence between the arbitrators and the parties.”
Mobasser thereafter filed a further motion to confirm the
award that incorporated an additional $26,975 in attorney fees
awarded to Mobasser by the arbitrators. The trial court granted
that motion.
IV. This Appeal
Following the entry of judgment for Mobasser, Moyal
timely filed this appeal.
8
DISCUSSION
Moyal’s appeal fails on its merits.3
Moyal effectively makes a two-step argument—namely, (1)
an arbitration award between international parties is invalid
under the New York Convention, June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517,4
if one of those parties is denied the opportunity to present its
case, and (2) Moyal was denied such an opportunity because the
arbitrators never held an evidentiary hearing. The first step of
Moyal’s argument presents a question of law we review de novo.
(Generica Ltd. v. Pharmaceutical Basics (7th Cir. 1997) 125 F.3d
1123, 1129.) The second step presents a question of fact—which
we review deferentially for substantial evidence—as to what
happened in the arbitration proceedings (Ibid.; Jiangsu Beier
Decoration Materials Co. v. Angle World LLC (3d Cir. 2022) 52
F.4th 554, 559), and presents a predominantly legal mixed
question of law—which we review de novo—as to whether what
happened denied Moyal the opportunity to present his case under
the New York Convention (Polimaster Ltd. v. RAE Systems, Inc.
(9th Cir. 2010) 623 F.3d 832, 836 (Polimaster); China National
3 We reject Mobasser’s request to dismiss this appeal under
the arbitration agreement’s provision barring the parties from
appealing an award, because, as Mobasser conceded during oral
argument, that provision includes an impermissible waiver of all
judicial review of the arbitration award and Mobasser is not
asking us to sever that impermissible waiver from the more
limited but permissible waiver of any appeal from a judicially
confirmed award.
4 The formal name for what is commonly referred to as the
New York Convention is the Convention on the Recognition and
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards.
9
Metals Products Import/Export Co. v. Apex Digital, Inc. (9th Cir.
2004) 379 F.3d 796, 799).
The first step of Moyal’s argument correctly states the law.
The New York Convention is an international treaty that applies,
as pertinent here, to commercial arbitrations involving a United
States citizen and the citizen of a foreign country. (Beijing
Shougang Mining Inv. Co. v. Mongolia (2d Cir. 2021) 11 F.4th
144, 159; Asignacion v. Rickmers Genoa Schiffahrtsgesellschaft
mbH & Cie KG (5th Cir. 2015) 783 F.3d 1010, 1015; Minister of
Defense of Islamic Republic of Iran v. Gould, Inc. (9th Cir. 1989)
887 F.2d 1357, 1362.) Under the Convention, arbitration awards
are generally enforceable unless “one of the grounds for refusal . .
. of recognition or enforcement of the award specified in the . . .
Convention” applies. (9 U.S.C. § 207.) As relevant here, the
Convention provides that “recognition and enforcement of [an]
award may be refused” if (1) “[t]he party against whom the award
is invoked” was “unable to present his case” (21 U.S.T. 2517, at
Art. V, § 1(b)), or (2) “the arbitral procedure was not in
accordance with the agreement of the parties” (id., § 1(d)). In
assessing whether a party was unable to present its case, courts
look to “‘the forum state’s standards of due process’” (Iran
Aircraft Industries v. Avco Corp. (2d Cir. 1992) 980 F.2d 141, 145-
146), and due process under federal law encompasses “an
adequate opportunity to present . . . evidence and arguments”
(Hoteles Condado Beach, La Concha & Convention Center v.
Union de Tronquistas Local 901 (1st Cir. 1985) 763 F.2d 34, 39;
Tempo Shain Corp. v. Bertek, Inc. (2d Cir. 1997) 120 F.3d 16, 20).
Applying these standards, courts have declined to enforce
arbitration awards under the Convention when the arbitrators
misled a party by indicating proof need not be by invoices but
10
then found a failure of proof based on the failure to provide
invoices (Iran Aircraft, at p. 146) or by promising a hearing but
not providing one (International Union, UMW v. Marrowbone
Dev. Co. (4th Cir. 2000) 232 F.3d 383, 390; Murphy Oil USA, Inc.
v. USW AFL-CIO Local 8363 (E.D.La. March 4, 2009) 2009 U.S.
Dist. Lexis 19098, at *8-*9).
The second step of Moyal’s argument, however, is
unsupported by the record. That is because the trial court found
that Moyal did receive an evidentiary hearing on March 17, 2021
and that the arbitrators did not promise a further evidentiary
hearing. The trial court’s findings are supported by substantial
evidence: Both Rabbi Union and Mobasser declared that the
March 17, 2021 hearing was an evidentiary hearing, and the pre-
hearing letter corroborated their declarations by indicating that
the Biet Din typically holds a “single hearing” where “documents”
and “[w]itnesses” are presented. Although Moyal offered a
contrary declaration, the trial court found this declaration not to
be credible and, when reviewing the trial court’s findings, we may
not gainsay the court’s credibility finding or reweigh the
evidence. (Reynaud v. Technicolor Creative Services USA, Inc.
(2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 1007, 1015.) Moyal’s near-
contemporaneous failure to raise the absence of a hearing as one
of his 11 objections in his post-award letter undercuts Moyal’s
own declaration. Applying these findings, Moyal was accorded
due process and provided precisely what the arbitration
agreement promised—an evidentiary hearing.
Moyal responds that the trial court’s factual findings,
including its adverse credibility finding, are unsupported by
substantial evidence because four “undisputed facts” in the
record refute those findings.
11
First, Moyal argues that it is “temporally impossible” that
the March 17, 2021 hearing was an evidentiary hearing because
it is “undisputed” that Mobasser first articulated that he was
seeking relief for breach of contract, unjust enrichment, and
defamation in his May 2021 post-hearing filing.5 Nothing else in
the record, Moyal continues, shows that Mobasser articulated
these claims prior to or at the hearing (and thus failed to give
Moyal advance notice of those claims). This argument ignores
that, in reviewing findings for substantial evidence, we are to
give the prevailing party “the benefit of all reasonable inferences”
(Scott v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co. (1995) 11 Cal.4th 454, 465);
here, we may reasonably infer from Rabbi Union’s and
Mobasser’s declarations—as well as from Moyal’s own admission
in his May 26, 2021 email that Mobasser “present[ed] and
elaborate[d] [his] arguments and claims” at the March 17
hearing—that Mobasser presented evidence at that hearing in
support of the claims he articulated in his post-hearing filing.
Moyal effectively urges us to discard the trial court’s findings
based on a gap in the record (that is, the absence of Mobasser’s
pre-hearing filing and a transcript of the March 17 evidentiary
hearing), a gap that Moyal—as the party bearing the burden of
showing invalidity of an award under the Convention
(Polimaster, supra, 623 F.3d at p. 836) and the party bearing the
burden of showing error on appeal (Vaughn v. Jonas (1948) 31
5 At oral argument, Moyal repeatedly referred to this as
Mobasser’s “cross-complaint,” but the document is labeled a
“Brief of Arbitration Issues.”
12
Cal.2d 586, 601)—had the duty to fill with evidence contradicting
the court’s findings.6
Second, Moyal argues that his May 26, 2021 email implying
that Rabbi Union had promised a second hearing was also
“undisputed” because Rabbi Union at no point thereafter
explicitly said he did not promise a second hearing. Again, this
argument ignores the standard of review. Rabbi Union declared
that the March 17, 2021 hearing was an evidentiary hearing, and
the pre-hearing letter indicated that typically there is only one
hearing; we can reasonably infer from these facts that there was
no promise of a further hearing. What is more, the May 26
email—coming as it did after Moyal’s earlier post-hearing
complaint about the arbitration procedure—was, as the trial
court found, an attempt to insert untrue facts into the arbitral
record that Moyal could use in subsequent challenges to the
order.
Third, Moyal argues that it is “undisputed” that only
Mobasser received the pre-hearing letter because the only copy of
the letter in the record was addressed to Mobasser. Yet again,
this argument ignores the standard of review. Rabbi Union
declared that “all parties” were “notified” of the evidentiary
hearing. This fills in the purported “gap” in the record that
Moyal would like us to otherwise construe in his favor.
Fourth, Moyal argues that none of the correspondence uses
the phrase “evidentiary hearing,” such that it remains
6 For the first time in his reply brief, Moyal argues that due
process was violated because Mobasser articulated his claims for
the first time in his post-hearing filing. Moyal waived this
argument by not raising it in his opening brief. (E.g., Old East
Davis Neighborhood Assn. v. City of Davis (2021) 73 Cal.App.5th
895, 915.)
13
“undisputed” that there was no evidentiary hearing. This, too,
ignores the standard of review because it wholly ignores the
sufficient evidence—including the pre-hearing letter—detailed
above that documents and witnesses would be, and were,
presented at the March 17 hearing.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Mobasser is entitled to his costs
on appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS.
______________________, P.J.
HOFFSTADT
We concur:
_________________________, J.
BAKER
_________________________, J.
WILLIAMS
Judge of the Santa Clara County Superior Court, assigned by
the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the
California Constitution.
14
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