In re Ke.B. CA5

CourtListener 10582057Calctapp12.05.2025

Gesamter Gesetzestext

Filed 5/12/25 In re Ke.B. CA5

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

In re Ke.B. et al., Persons Coming Under the
Juvenile Court Law.

KERN COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF F088854
HUMAN SERVICES,
(Super. Ct. Nos. JD141569-01 &
Plaintiff and Respondent, JD141570-01)

v.
OPINION
K.R.,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Kern County. Christie Canales
Norris, Judge.
Neale B. Gold, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Margo A. Raison, County Counsel, and Elizabeth M. Giesick, Deputy County
Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
-ooOoo-
K.R., mother of minor children Ke.B. and Ka.B. appeals from the juvenile court’s
order terminating her parental rights at a Welfare and Institutions Code1 section 366.26
hearing. She contends the court erred by declining to apply two statutory exceptions to
the termination of parental rights: the beneficial parent-child relationship exception
(§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i)) and the sibling relationship exception (§ 366.26,
subd. (c)(1)(B)(v)). She also contends the court erred by finding the Indian Child
Welfare Act of 1978 (25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.; ICWA) did not apply to the proceedings
because the Kern County Department of Human Services (department) failed to make
adequate inquiry into whether the children were potentially Indian children within the
meaning of ICWA.
We conditionally reverse the order terminating parental rights and remand for
compliance with the inquiry provisions of ICWA. In all other respects, we affirm the
order.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In February 2023, mother was involved in a traffic collision and was hospitalized.
The department received a referral alleging general neglect and caretaker
absence/incapacity as to mother’s six minor children, including the two children subject
to this appeal, as it was unknown as to whether mother would recover from her injuries,
and it was assumed the children were in the custody of R.B. (father), who had an active
restraining order protecting the children from him.
The investigating social worker confirmed there was an active criminal protective
order set to expire in 2031 protecting mother and Ke.B. and Ka.B.’s three older siblings
from father. The investigating social worker also learned mother had suffered a traumatic
brain injury (TBI) and a pelvic fracture and had undergone brain surgery. Mother was in

1 All further undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions
Code.

2.
the ICU and improving. The social worker and police contacted father and discovered
the children were in his custody.
A plan was made for the children to be placed in the care of mother’s friend while
father worked to see if the restraining order could be lifted. Upon mother’s release from
the hospital, she stayed with the friend and the children. Mother was having difficulty
getting around and understanding what was going on. Mother’s friend was having
difficulty caring for the children and mother, and mother displayed concerning behaviors
the friend could not control such exhibiting anger and trying to fight everyone in the
home and pulling a knife on the friend. Mother eventually went to live with father, and
the friend expressed she was unable to continue caring for the children.
The children were taken into protective custody on March 15, 2023. On
March 17, 2023, the department filed juvenile dependency petitions on behalf of then
three-year-old Ka.B. and then four-year old Ke.B., and their four older siblings, who are
not subjects of this appeal, alleging they came within the juvenile court’s jurisdiction
under section 300, subdivision (b)(1) because they had suffered or were at risk of
suffering harm by mother’s inability to provide regular care for them due to her traumatic
brain injury.2

2 The specific allegations found true were: “The [children] ha[ve] suffered, or there
is substantial risk that the child[ren] will suffer, serious physical harm or illness by the
inability of … mother … to provide regular care to the child[ren] due to … mother’s
traumatic brain injury. On February 6, 2023, … mother was in a car accident, which
resulted in a traumatic brain injury. [M]other has struggled to provide care for herself or
the child[ren]. Since … mother’s release from the hospital, she has pulled a knife on her
caregiver, and attempted to fight other individuals residing in her caregiver’s home.
[M]other was residing with … father … despite an active restraining order being in place
until May 17, 2031. As a result of [mother’s] injury, [mother] has struggled to care for
herself, [and] this places the children [at] risk.”
The petition also alleged harm due to the parents leaving them with no provision
for support under section 300, subdivision (g), but these allegations were dismissed
without prejudice.

3.
In its detention report, the department reported the family had a history of child
welfare referrals, many of which were deemed unfounded. In 2020, however, a referral
for general neglect was substantiated related to the parents having several recent domestic
violence incidents. The children were placed in protective custody and a dependency
petition was filed. The children were subsequently released to mother on the conditions
that she follow through with obtaining a restraining order against father and complete
services, and the petition was subsequently dismissed. It was further reported that mother
had a minor criminal history, and father had a lengthier criminal history, consisting of a
2010 domestic violence offense and several convictions for violating domestic violence
protective orders, the most recent of which was from January 2023.
The children were ordered detained from the parents on March 23, 2023. On
May 11, 2023, mother was appointed a guardian ad litem (GAL) at her counsel’s request
based on the juvenile court’s finding she did not understand the nature of the proceedings
and was not capable of assisting her attorney in protecting her rights.
Mother waived her rights to a jurisdictional hearing (there were no allegations
pertaining to father), and on June 7, 2023, the juvenile court found the children were
described by section 300, subdivision (b) and appointed doctors to perform psychological
evaluations of mother to determine whether she would benefit from reunification
services. The court continued the matter as to disposition to allow time for the
evaluations to take place.
The parents began participating in voluntary services. Mother underwent her
psychological evaluations. The reports indicated mother had been previously diagnosed
with Bipolar II disorder, Schizophrenia disorder, and panic attacks. One of the doctors
opined she was a good candidate for family reunification services and recommended
specific services. The other clinician diagnosed her with mood disorder secondary to TBI
and mild intellectual disability secondary to TBI and opined she could not independently

4.
care for the children or keep them safe, as the traumatic brain injury she suffered,
“exacerbated her bipolar disorder and schizophrenia,” and compromised her “mood
control” which could be “rapid and violent.” The latter clinician opined mother required
“extensive cognitive retraining intervention, mental health treatment, and medication to
help with mood stabilization” and “[i]t is not possible, in my opinion, for this young lady
to complete a reunification process in the foreseeable future.”
The parents also began attending visitation with the children. Several positive
interactions between mother and the children were documented, however, there were also
several issues with mother getting agitated and becoming verbally aggressive toward visit
supervisors, which sometimes resulted in visits being cancelled. In July 2023, the
visitation center cancelled the referral due to mother’s behavior toward staff members.
The department recommended the parents be provided with family reunification
services.
At the disposition hearing conducted on September 28, 2023, the juvenile court
adjudged the children dependents of the court, ordered them removed from the parents’
physical custody, and ordered the parents to participate in family reunification services.
Mother’s case plan consisted of services recommended by one of the clinicians who
performed her evaluation: mental health counseling, which could include psychiatric
medications if she was unable to manage her symptoms; a parenting technique class; a
child-neglect endangerment class, a parent empowerment program, specifically “Building
on Five Protective Factors”; a coping life skills class; and a counseling group for child
development.
During the first six-month review period, the parents participated in their case plan
components. They had the opportunity to visit the children 24 times and visited nine
times. The parents were observed to interact appropriately with the children and provide
individual attention to each child. On a couple of occasions throughout the review

5.
period, mother was accidentally injured during a visit and asked to suspend visitation to
recover from her injury.
The department recommended services be continued. It reasoned that though the
parents were participating in their case plans, they had missed approximately half their
visits and had not been able to demonstrate they were capable of handling the children for
long periods of time.
At the six-month review hearing conducted on March 28, 2024, the juvenile court
continued reunification services to the parents.
During the six- to 12-month review period, the parents continued to participate in
their case plans. During visitation, mother interacted well with the children but continued
to be verbally aggressive toward visit supervisors, and threatened to physically harm one
of the social workers in front of the children. When mother made the threat of physical
violence, her 17-year-old son had to attempt to calm her down. On another occasion,
mother was recording the visit, and at one point, Ka.B. hit the supervisor. Mother
continued recording and laughed. Father would look to the social worker for guidance
when mother acted aggressively.
The department recommended reunification services be terminated. While the
parents participated in their case plan and completed some components, they were
observed to “have shown no behavioral change.” Mother’s anger and aggressive
behavior had escalated. Father remained in a relationship with mother and had not
provided proof of housing appropriate for himself and the children and had not shown he
was able or willing to protect the children from mother. He had additionally not provided
proof of compliance of the mental health component of his case plan. The parents had
missed half of their scheduled visitation and had not been able to demonstrate they could
handle having the children for long periods of time. It was reported the parents requested

6.
to suspend visits for long periods of time when mother was not feeling well, and father
did not attend visits without mother.
At the 12-month review hearing conducted on May 15, 2024, the juvenile court
denied mother’s request for further reunification services and father’s request for return
of the children. In analyzing whether it could continue services beyond 12 months, the
court found the parents had visited consistently and regularly even though they “missed
one or two [visits] here and there.” The court found the parents had not made significant
progress in resolving the problems that led to the children’s removal nor that they had
demonstrated the capacity and ability to complete the objectives of the treatment plan and
to provide for the children’s well-being, given the escalation of mother’s behaviors and
that they were “impacting the children in a negative way and … father doesn’t know how
to redirect her or the situation.” The court noted, “[t]he visits are a brief glimpse that this
Court has on how life would be like if the children were returned, and it’s not positive.”
The court accordingly found there was not a substantial probability the children would be
returned within the statutory time and thus the requirements for setting an 18-month
review hearing were not met. The court additionally found family maintenance for father
was not appropriate. The court set a section 366.26 hearing for Ke.B. and Ka.B.
In its section 366.26 report, the department recommended the juvenile court order
adoption with their care provider (who also had placement of their older brother) as
Ke.B.’s and Ka.B.’s permanent plan and that parental rights be terminated.
It was reported Ka.B. had been in two placements, and had been with his current
care provider since April 2023. Ke.B. had had six placements before being placed with
Ka.B. and their older brother in May 2024. For a short time, Ke.B. was placed with her
older sister, but ended up being in a separate placement for some time due to her sister’s
behavioral issues.

7.
According to the report, mother had visited Ke.B. 66 times and Ka.B. 64 times out
of a possible 123 visits. The report stated, “mother interacted appropriately with the
children by showing appropriate affection, bringing food and snacks, and engaging with
them appropriately. However, on multiple occasions … mother interacted inappropriately
with staff by cursing, threatening, and being aggressive towards them in front of the
children.” It was further stated that two staff members and a security guard were required
for visitation with mother and that visitation frequently ended early due to mother’s
behaviors.
The report indicated it would not be detrimental to terminate parental rights over
Ke.B. and Ka.B. as they knew mother and enjoyed visits but did not show signs of
distress when leaving mother’s care at the end of visits or in their placement when mother
was absent or when visits were cancelled. Mother called the children, but the children
did not ask to call mother or ask for her independently.
The report further indicated sibling visits had been appropriate. It was reported
the children visited for four hours, two by themselves and two with the parents. They did
not like to interact together the entire time and would separate into two groups and do
different activities. The report indicated “it would be beneficial to continue the bond
between the siblings,” but Ke.B. and Ka.B.’s care provider was “undecided” on how
continued contact with the three siblings outside her home would be maintained.
When the social worker spoke to Ke.B. about plans of adoption and legal
guardianship and asked where she would live if she could live anywhere and with anyone
in the world, she responded, “in an ice cream truck, with no one only me.” Ke.B. later
stated she might want to live with her older sister, but no one else. She reported enjoying
living with her care provider because everyone, except Ka.B., was nice to her, and her
care provider did her hair. Ke.B. reported liking visits with her parents and siblings and
liked visiting with her siblings more. Ke.B. was unable to explain or understand what

8.
adoption and legal guardianship was. When asked how she would feel if she could not
visit her family again, she responded, “sad.” Ke.B. then stated she would like to live with
mother. When the social worker asked her if she would be fine living with her care
provider if she could not be returned to mother’s care, she stated “yes” and that she
wanted to keep visiting mother.
When Ka.B. was asked where he would live if he could live anywhere with
anyone, he reported he wanted to live in a Halloween store with only his brothers. He
reported liking living with his care provider and stated he would like to live with mother.
He said his visits were “good.” He appeared to be confused about what adoption and
legal guardianship meant. When asked how he would feel if he could not visit his family
again, he said “I don’t know.” Ka.B. then tried changing the subject and did not want to
return to the topic of adoption and guardianship.
Ke.B. and Ka.B.’s care provider wished to adopt them. She felt as though they
became part of her family quickly and she “love[s] them so much” and saw them all “as
one big happy family.” The care provider’s 14-year-old son reported he thought the
adoption was great, that it felt “normal” to have Ke.B. and Ka.B. in the home and he
“really like[d] them.” It was reported Ke.B. and Ka.B. appeared “happy, comfortable,
and easily comforted” by their care provider and had “formed a parental relationship”
with her.
With regard to ICWA, the department filed a declaration detailing their ICWA
inquiry efforts ahead of each hearing, including contacting various family members and
sending inquiries to multiple tribes. They never uncovered evidence that the children
were Indian children. As relevant to the issues on appeal, the department reported in its
May 2024 declaration that in April 2024, the paternal grandfather reported Native
American ancestry with “Dakota through his father’s side.” To investigate this claim, the
declarant, department paralegal Peggy Byrd, stated she “searched Bureau of Indian

9.
Affairs most up to date BIA Federal Register and ICWA Designated Agents Listing
located here: https://www.bia.gov/bia/ois/dhs/icwa. No tribe by the name of Dakota is
listed.” She further stated she “contacted the BIA social worker, Jesse Abernathy by
email and inquired if Dakota is a tribe or affiliated with a federally recognized tribe” and
attached a copy of the email. No response to that e-mail was presented to the juvenile
court by way of the May 2024 declaration or any subsequent declaration. The court, at
various points throughout the proceedings, found, without prejudice, there was a not a
reason to know the children were Indian children within the meaning of ICWA.
The section 366.26 hearing was conducted on October 14, 2024. Mother lodged
the following objection: “[W]e are objecting to the recommendations and asking that the
Court consider a different permanent plan for these children. It’s very obvious that the
mother loves these children, and that the incident that brought the children into protective
custody is very sad given the condition of the mother, and so I’m submitting it with those
comments.” Father’s counsel also objected generally to adoption. Minor’s counsel
submitted without comment. Counsel for the department noted that no party had asserted
the sibling relationship exception to adoption applied.
In ruling, the juvenile court analyzed the beneficial parent-child relationship
exception: the court found the parents had not regularly and consistently visited the
children; there was not a substantial, positive, emotional attachment between the children
and the parents; and the benefits of adoption outweighed any detriment the children
would suffer from the termination of the relationship. The court also found there was not
a reason to know the children were Indian children. The court selected adoption as the
children’s permanent plan and ordered parental rights terminated.

10.
DISCUSSION
I. Exceptions to Termination of Parental Rights
At a section 366.26 hearing, when the juvenile court finds by clear and convincing
evidence the child is adoptable, it is generally required to terminate parental rights and
order the child be placed for adoption unless a statutory exception applies. (§ 366.26,
subd. (c)(1).) The court may decline to order termination of parental rights when “[t]he
court finds a compelling reason for determining that termination would be detrimental to
the child,” where, as relevant here, “[t]he parents have maintained regular visitation and
contact with the child and the child would benefit from continuing the relationship” (the
beneficial parent-child relationship exception) (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i)) or where
“[t]here would be substantial interference with a child’s sibling relationship” (the sibling
relationship exception) (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(v)). The parent bears the burden of
proving a statutory exception applies by a preponderance of the evidence. (In re Caden
C. (2021) 11 Cal.5th 614, 636 (Caden C.); In re J.S. (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 1071, 1080.)
A court’s factual findings are reviewed for substantial evidence and its ultimate
determination of whether, in weighing competing interests, the facts constitute a
compelling reason for determining termination would be detrimental to the child is
reviewed for abuse of discretion. (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 636, 639‒641; In re
Isaiah S. (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 428, 438.) Under the substantial evidence standard of
review, “a reviewing court should ‘not reweigh the evidence, evaluate the credibility of
witnesses, or resolve evidentiary conflicts.’ [Citation.] The determinations should ‘be
upheld if … supported by substantial evidence, even though substantial evidence to the
contrary also exists and the trial court might have reached a different result had it
believed other evidence.’ ” (Caden C., at p. 640.) “Review for abuse of discretion is
subtly different, focused not primarily on the evidence but the application of a legal
standard. A court abuses its discretion only when ‘ “ ‘the trial court has exceeded the

11.
limits of legal discretion by making an arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd
determination.’ ” ’ ” (Id. at p. 641.) We keep in mind that when a court finds the
proponent of a fact has failed to meet their burden, “the question for a reviewing court
becomes whether the evidence compels a finding in favor of the appellant as a matter of
law”; that is, “whether the appellant’s evidence was (1) ‘uncontradicted and
unimpeached’ and (2) ‘of such a character and weight as to leave no room for a judicial
determination that it was insufficient to support a finding.’ ” (In re I.W. (2009)
180 Cal.App.4th 1517, 1528.)
As a threshold matter, respondent argues mother has forfeited her claims by failing
to raise them below. At the section 366.26 hearing, mother made a general objection to
the recommendations and requested a permanent plan other than adoption, noting she
loved the children but did not raise any of the exceptions to termination of parental rights
specifically. The court expressly analyzed the beneficial parent-child relationship
exception on the record, but no mention was made of the sibling relationship exception.
Mother asserts the claims were adequately preserved, but in the alternative, requests we
exercise discretion to review her claims. We will do so. Because the court analyzed the
beneficial parent-child relationship exception, we have no difficulty reviewing those
findings and determinations to determine that they were appropriate. As for the sibling
relationship exception, we have no findings to review, but we can conclude the court was
not compelled by the evidence presented to apply the sibling relationship exception. For
the reasons that follow, we find the court did not err by declining to apply either
exception to the termination of parental rights.
A. Beneficial Parent-Child Relationship Exception
A parent seeking to establish the beneficial parent-child relationship exception
applies has the burden of proving three elements to justify the application of the
exception: (1) “regular visitation and contact with the child, taking into account the

12.
extent of visitation permitted”; (2) “that the child has a substantial, positive, emotional
attachment to the parent—the kind of attachment implying that the child would benefit
from continuing the relationship”; and (3) “that terminating that attachment would be
detrimental to the child even when balanced against the countervailing benefit of a new,
adoptive home.” (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 632‒633, 636‒637.)
In determining the second element—whether the children would benefit from
continuing the relationship because the child has a substantial, emotional, positive
attachment to the parent—the court may consider factors such as “ ‘[t]he age of the child,
the portion of the child’s life spent in the parent’s custody, the “positive” or “negative”
effect of interaction between parent and child, and the child’s particular needs,’ ” as well
as “how children feel about, interact with, look to, or talk about their parents.” (Caden
C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 632.)
In determining the third element, courts look at “whether it would be harmful to
the child to sever the relationship and choose adoption.” (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at
p. 633.) Courts must “determine … how the child would be affected by losing the
parental relationship—in effect, what life would be like for the child in an adoptive home
without the parent in the child’s life…. [¶] … That subtle, case-specific inquiry is what
the statute asks courts to perform: does the benefit of placement in a new, adoptive home
outweigh ‘the harm [the child] would experience from the loss of [a] significant, positive,
emotional relationship with [the parent?]’ ” (Ibid.) Courts may consider whether the
child will experience effects such as “emotional instability and preoccupation leading to
acting out, difficulties in school, insomnia, anxiety, or depression,” as well as how a
“new, stable home may alleviate the emotional instability and preoccupation leading to
such problems, providing a new source of stability that could make the loss of a parent
not, at least on balance, detrimental.” (Ibid.)

13.
Mother first claims that the juvenile court erred by finding that mother did not
consistently or regularly visit the children. She claims the court was bound by the finding
at the 12-month review hearing that visitation was consistent and regular, as it was the
“law of the case.” We need not reach this issue because we conclude the court properly
found the second and third prongs of the exception were not met.
The court’s finding that the children did not have a substantial, positive, emotional
attachment to mother was supported by substantial evidence. While the children stated
they wanted to be with mother, and they had positive interactions with her at visits,
mother displayed troubling behaviors towards others in their presence. The children
consistently observed mother losing her temper and treating others poorly, including
threatening violence. They also observed their older sibling being the one tasked with
calming her down. Mother’s inability to control these behaviors were not only observed
by the children, but occasionally required her visits with the children to be cut short,
depriving the children of limited time with their parents and siblings. Additionally, the
children were relatively young and had spent a significant amount of their lives out of
mother’s custody. The evidence did not compel the court to find the children and mother
had a beneficial relationship within the meaning of the statute. Rather, the court only had
the department’s reports before it, in which the social worker opined permanency was in
the children’s best interest and that termination would not be detrimental.
Even if we were to assume the second prong was met, we cannot say the court
abused its discretion in declining to find the benefits of adoption were outweighed by the
benefit the children would gain from continuing their relationship with mother. No party
offered evidence that the children would be significantly harmed if the parent-child
relationship were to be terminated. The children were doing well and improving in their
placements and did not display any severe distress being out of mother’s care. Ke.B. was
successfully discharged from mental health treatment in May 2024 and Ka.B. participated

14.
in screening, the results of which indicated he was not in need of a referral to mental
health services. While the children did express desires to be with mother, they also
seemed content with continuing to live in their placement, which indicated they were not
experiencing great harm out of mother’s care.
For the foregoing reasons, we find no error in the court’s decision not to apply the
beneficial parent-child relationship exception.
B. Sibling Relationship Exception
In analyzing whether the sibling relationship exception applies, the court must
“tak[e] into consideration the nature and extent of the relationship, including, but not
limited to, whether the child was raised with a sibling in the same home, whether the
child shared significant common experiences or has existing close and strong bonds with
a sibling, and whether ongoing contact is in the child’s best interest, including the child’s
long-term emotional interest, as compared to the benefit of legal permanence through
adoption.” (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(v).)
The “purpose of [the sibling relationship] exception is to preserve long-standing
sibling relationships that serve as ‘anchors for dependent children whose lives are in
turmoil.’ ” (In re Isaiah S., supra, 5 Cal.App.5th at p. 437.) The “ ‘strong language’ ”
used by the Legislature to describe the sibling relationship exception creates a “ ‘heavy
burden for the party opposing adoption.’ ” (In re Celine R. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 45, 61.)
The bill’s author wrote that use of the sibling relationship exception “ ‘will likely be
rare,’ ” which has been interpreted to mean that “the child’s relationship with his or her
siblings would rarely be sufficiently strong to outweigh the benefits of adoption.” (In re
L.Y.L. (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 942, 950.)
Here, as no party argued the sibling relationship exception to termination of
parental rights, or offered evidence in support thereof, the court was left with only the
department’s reports on the issue, wherein the social worker noted it would be beneficial

15.
to continue the children’s relationship with their three siblings out of the home “[a]fter
the adoption” but made no assertions that the relationship between siblings constituted a
reason for determining termination of parental rights would be detrimental to them. The
evidence showed the children lived with their older siblings for the first few years of their
lives but were removed from mother’s custody relatively young and had spent a
substantial portion of their short lives out of custody in various placements, sometimes
with siblings and sometimes without. Their visits went well, and we recognize that the
children love their siblings, but the record simply does not show the children would have
suffered detriment that outweighed the benefits of the permanency and stability of
adoption. The department had difficulty keeping the siblings together and were unable to
find a placement for all six siblings. As for Ke.B. especially, she had experienced many
placements throughout the proceedings and had to live in a separate placement for some
time but was now experiencing stability and the opportunity for permanence for the first
time in a placement with two of her siblings.
Mother briefly states that there “appeared to be confusion” as to whether the
siblings, or Ke.B. and Ka.B., needed to file section 388 petitions to assert the sibling
relationship exception and this constituted a mistake of law and therefore error. To
support this claim, she cites county counsel’s statement at the section 366.26 hearing that
“there has not been any 388s or anything to file to assert the sibling exception to
adoption.” This does not establish that any legal error occurred. We read county
counsel’s statement as simply pointing out that no party was asserting the exception
applied. There is no evidence that any of the children, all of whom were represented by
counsel, sought to raise the sibling relationship exception on behalf of Ke.B. and Ka.B.
and that they were somehow prevented from doing so. Most significantly, Ke.B. and
Ka.B.’s counsel, who was given an opportunity to argue at the section 366.26 hearing,
merely submitted without any comment.

16.
For the foregoing reasons, we find no error in the court not applying the sibling
relationship exception.
II. ICWA
Under California’s statutory scheme to comply with ICWA, the court and county
child welfare department “have an affirmative and continuing duty to inquire whether a
child,” who is the subject of a juvenile dependency petition, “is or may be an Indian
child.”3 (§ 224.2, subd. (a); see In re Isaiah W. (2016) 1 Cal.5th 1, 9; Cal. Rules of Court,
rule 5.481(a).)
When the court or social worker has “reason to believe”4 (but not sufficient
evidence to determine there is “reason to know”5) that an Indian child is involved in a

3 An “Indian child” is defined in ICWA as an unmarried individual under 18 years
of age who is either (1) a member of a federally recognized Indian tribe, or (2) is eligible
for membership in a federally recognized tribe and is the biological child of a member of
a federally recognized tribe. (25 U.S.C. § 1903(4) & (8); see § 224.1, subd. (a) [adopting
federal definitions].)
4 “There is reason to believe a child involved in a proceeding is an Indian child
whenever the court, social worker, or probation officer has information suggesting that
either the parent of the child or the child is a member or citizen, or may be eligible for
membership or citizenship, in an Indian tribe. Information suggesting membership or
eligibility for membership includes, but is not limited to, information that indicates, but
does not establish, the existence of one or more of the grounds for reason to know
enumerated” in section 224.2, subdivision (d)(1)–(6). (§ 224.2, subd. (e)(1).)
5 These enumerated grounds for “reason to know” are: “(1) A person having an
interest in the child, including the child, an officer of the court, a tribe, an Indian
organization, a public or private agency, or a member of the child’s extended family
informs the court that the child is an Indian child[;] [¶] (2) The residence or domicile of
the child, the child’s parents, or Indian custodian is on a reservation or in an Alaska
Native village[;] [¶] (3) Any participant in the proceeding, officer of the court, Indian
tribe, Indian organization, or agency informs the court that it has discovered information
indicating that the child is an Indian child[;] [¶] (4) The child who is the subject of the
proceeding gives the court reason to know that the child is an Indian child[;] [¶] (5) The
court is informed that the child is or has been a ward of a tribal court[;] [¶] [and/or]
(6) The court is informed that either parent or the child possess an identification card

17.
proceeding, “further inquiry regarding the possible Indian status of the child” is required.
(§ 224.2, subd. (e).) Section 224.2, subdivision (e)(2) enumerates three duties of further
inquiry: (1) interviewing the parents, Indian custodian, and extended family members to
gather biographical information regarding the child; (2) contacting the Bureau of Indian
Affairs (BIA) and the State Department of Social Services for assistance in identifying
tribes with whom the child may be affiliated; and (3) contacting tribes, or any other
person who may reasonably be expected to have information regarding the child’s
membership or eligibility for membership in a tribe. (§ 224.2, subd. (e)(2)(A)–(C).)6
Before finding ICWA inapplicable, the juvenile court must make a finding that the
department conducted “proper and adequate further inquiry” and exercised “due
diligence” in doing so, and that “there is no reason to know whether the child is an Indian
child.” (§ 224.2, subd. (i)(2).)
We review the juvenile court’s finding that there is no reason to know whether a
child is an Indian child for substantial evidence, and the court’s finding that the
department has conducted a proper and adequate inquiry and due diligence for abuse of
discretion. (In re K.H. (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 566, 600–601.)
Mother contends the juvenile court erred by finding the department had fulfilled
its duty of further inquiry because it did not appropriately follow up with the paternal
grandfather’s claim of “Dakota” ancestry, which would have revealed “Dakota” is

indicating membership or citizenship in an Indian tribe.” (§ 224.2, subd. (d); see
25 C.F.R. § 23.107(c) (2025).)
6 “Contact with a tribe” for the purpose of the department’s duty of further inquiry
“shall, at a minimum, include telephone, facsimile, or electronic mail contact to each
tribe’s designated agent for receipt of notices under [ICWA]” and “include sharing
information identified by the tribe as necessary for the tribe to make a membership or
citizenship eligibility determination, as well as information on the current status of the
child and the case.” (§ 224.2, subd. (e)(2)(C).)

18.
affiliated with several federally recognized Sioux tribes, and thus it failed to obtain this
information and contact the relevant tribes. We agree.
Mother points out the website paralegal Byrd cited in her declaration—
www.bia.gov/bia/ois/dhs/icwa—contains a link entitled, “I Can’t Find a Tribe in my
Search.” Clicking this link reveals a page with the following steps:

“1. Review the BIA’s most recent list of federally recognized Indian tribes
and look for the Tribe. The BIA’s list can be found here: [link to the BIA
Federal Register].

“2. To ensure a thorough search, please consider the names of any tribal
ancestral groups (see below for examples) and check the spelling of the
Tribe’s name, which may be different than its pronunciation. Search in
Affiliated Tribes.

“3. If you need further assistance, please contact the appropriate BIA
Regional Social Worker or Central Office at [list of contacts].

“4. If the Tribe’s name does not appear on the BIA’s list, then the Tribe is
not a federally recognized Indian tribe and ICWA does not apply.” (I Can’t
Find a Tribe in my Search <https://www.bia.gov/bia/ois/dhs/icwa/tribe-
search> as of May 12, 2025, italics added.)
Further down that same page, under the heading “Sioux (Sue or Soo) Tribe Breakdown”
the text explains that some Sioux tribes call themselves “Dakota” and when someone
reports Dakota ancestry, “This could mean they are affiliated with or have membership or
citizenship with one or more of the following Federally Recognized Tribes.” Under the
“Dakota” heading, the page lists eight tribes. The page further advises, “If one Tribe
cannot be identified, then all Tribes in the group should be sent an ICWA Notice.” (Ibid.)
Pursuant to this information on the BIA website, the department should have
conducted additional further inquiry into the paternal grandfather’s claim of “Dakota”
ancestry by contacting relevant Sioux tribes.

19.
Respondent contends we must affirm the juvenile court’s findings because this
information was not before the juvenile court. To support their position, they cite a quote
from In re D.S. (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 1041, 1053 that the department is not required “to
‘cast about’ for information or pursue unproductive investigative leads.”
While we recognize the information stating that “Dakota” is affiliated with several
Sioux tribes was not before the juvenile court, the existence of this information, which
was readily available with one additional click on the BIA website accessed by Paralegal
Byrd, shows that the claim of Dakota ancestry was certainly not an “unproductive
investigative lead.” The department reported that to investigate the claim, in May 2024,
paralegal Byrd (1) checked the BIA website to determine if “Dakota” was on the register
of federally recognized tribes and (2) contacted the BIA to determine whether Dakota
was affiliated with a federally recognized tribe. This information supports the claim that
“Dakota” ancestry required additional investigation, but the investigation was never
resolved. No response was either received or documented prior to the section 366.26
hearing in October 2024. While the court did not have definitive information that Dakota
was affiliated with federally recognized tribes, it was aware the investigation of a claim
of Dakota ancestry was pending, with no follow up over the course of five months.
Again, we recognize respondent’s concerns about evidence outside the record
being used to reverse an order on appeal, but in this particular case, the website was
accessed and cited by the department in their search and merely buttresses mother’s claim
that the investigation into the claim of Dakota ancestry was insufficient. As such, we
conclude the court’s finding the department conducted an adequate inquiry was an abuse
of discretion, and conditional reversal of the order terminating parental rights and remand
for compliance with the statutory inquiry requirements is required. (In re Dezi C. (2024)
16 Cal.5th 1112, 1151.)

20.
We do want to note the department was very thorough and diligent in contacting
family members and gathering pertinent information, and for the most part followed up
appropriately on family members’ claims of ancestry. Under the circumstances of this
case, however, we must remand for the department to complete their duty of further
inquiry as to the paternal grandfather’s claim of Dakota ancestry.
DISPOSITION
The order terminating parental rights is conditionally reversed. The matter is
remanded to the juvenile court for compliance with the inquiry and notice requirements
of sections 224.2 and 224.3 and the documentation provisions of California Rules of
Court, rule 5.481(a)(5). If the juvenile court thereafter finds a proper and adequate
further inquiry and due diligence has been conducted and concludes ICWA does not
apply (§ 224.2, subd. (i)(2)), then the court shall reinstate the order terminating parental
rights. If the juvenile court concludes ICWA applies, then it shall proceed in conformity
with ICWA and California implementing provisions. (See 25 U.S.C., § 1912, subd. (a);
§§ 224.2, subd. (i)(1), 224.3, 224.4.)

DE SANTOS, J.
WE CONCUR:

LEVY, Acting P. J.

MEEHAN, J.

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