CourtListener 10552444•People v. Estrada CA4/3
Gesamter Gesetzestext
Filed 5/6/25 P. v. Estrada CA4/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, G063496
v. (Super. Ct. No. 18NF2612)
WESLEY GERARDO ESTRADA, OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.
Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County,
Robert A. Knox, Judge. Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
Jeffrey S. Kross, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Eric A.
Swenson and Monique Myers, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
Wesley Gerardo Estrada challenges his sentence for multiple sex
offenses against children. He contends the trial court wrongly imposed a
consecutive sentence on count 8 because nothing showed it was committed on
a separate occasion from another offense. We conclude the court permissibly
found that count 8 occurred on a separate occasion, rendering a consecutive
sentence mandatory.
Although Estrada attacks only the sentence on count 8, we
address an error identified by the Attorney General regarding count 7. We
agree with the Attorney General that the trial court improperly imposed a
one-strike sentence on count 7 despite finding that it occurred during the
same incident as another count that already received a one-strike sentence.
Thus, we reverse the sentence on count 7 and remand for resentencing.
FACTS
The Orange County District Attorney’s Office charged Estrada
with numerous sex offenses against children. Three charges pertained to
victim M.E.: aggravated sexual assault of a child by rape (Pen. Code, § 269,
subd. (a)(1);1 count 6) and two counts of forcible lewd act on a child (§ 288,
subd. (b)(1); counts 7 & 8). The information did not allege specific dates for
these three counts.
At trial, M.E. testified that in 2001, when she was 11 years old,
M.E. and her father moved into a house with Estrada and others. One night,
after having gone to sleep in her bedroom, she awoke to find herself lying on
the garage floor, with Estrada on top of her. Estrada proceeded to rape her,
while also putting his fingers in her vagina and fondling her breasts.
1 All statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2
Following the garage incident, Estrada continued to assault M.E.
repeatedly over the next couple of months. M.E. would wake up at night in
her bed to Estrada touching her vagina and breasts. In several of these
incidents, Estrada raped M.E. On one occasion, M.E. went to sleep in her
bedroom and awoke in an adjacent bedroom, where Estrada then raped her.
During closing arguments, the prosecutor highlighted the garage
incident and the rape in the adjacent bedroom. He argued: “[I]f you believe
both of them happened beyond a reasonable doubt, [Estrada]’s guilty [of
counts 6 through 8]. If you all believe one of them, . . . then he’s guilty. You
just all have to agree on one or both.” The prosecutor recounted that during
the garage incident, Estrada touched M.E.’s breasts and placed his fingers in
her vagina. He asserted this constituted the offense of forcible lewd act on a
child for purposes of counts 7 and 8, “one for her breasts, and one for her
vagina.”
After deliberations, the jury found Estrada guilty as charged. The
verdicts did not indicate which incident supported which count.
The trial court sentenced Estrada to a total prison term of 90
years to life, plus nine years. This included a one-strike sentence of 15 years
to life on count 6 under section 667.61, subdivision (b), and a similar
consecutive term on count 8, which the court concluded was “independent of
the other crimes.” The court imposed a similar concurrent term on count 7,
concluding it was committed “during the same incident as Counts 6 and 8.”
DISCUSSION
Estrada claims the trial court erred by imposing a consecutive
sentence on count 8 because he committed that offense on the same occasion
as the offense in count 6, during the garage incident. We disagree and
conclude that the court’s findings required a consecutive sentence on count 8.
3
Section 667.61, subdivision (i), mandates consecutive sentences
for qualifying offenses—including rape and forcible lewd act on a child—
committed against the same victim on separate occasions.2
The trial court found that count 8 was “independent of the other
crimes,” meaning it was not committed on the same occasion as count 6.3 The
court had the authority to make this finding on its own, without a jury.
(People v. Catarino (2023) 14 Cal.5th 748, 750, 753–754.) And the evidence
supported it: M.E. testified that Estrada raped and molested her multiple
times—both in her bedroom and in another bedroom—separate from the
garage incident. This evidence permitted a finding that counts 6 and 8
pertained to separate incidents.
The record does not support Estrada’s claim that a consecutive
sentence was improper because the prosecutor’s closing argument established
that counts 6, 7, and 8 all pertained to the garage incident. Although the
prosecutor argued the garage incident alone could satisfy all three counts, he
also identified the rape in the adjacent bedroom as an alternative basis for
conviction on all three counts. So the prosecutor’s arguments supported—
rather than contradicted—the court’s finding that count 8 could have
occurred on a separate occasion.
2 At the time of Estrada’s crimes, former section 667.6,
subdivision (d), contained a similar mandate.
3 As noted, the trial court also said count 7 was committed
“during the same incident as Counts 6 and 8.” But based on the court’s
sentencing decisions—imposing consecutive sentences on counts 6 and 8 but
a concurrent sentence on count 7—we interpret the court as finding that
count 7 occurred during the same incident as either count 6 or count 8, not
both.
4
Nor does it support Estrada’s claim that count 8 (lewd act) could
not have pertained to a separate incident from count 6 (rape). First, the rape
in the adjacent bedroom inherently involved a lewd act. (See People v. Lopez
(2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 1220, 1232 [“‘any touching of an underage child is
“lewd or lascivious” within the meaning of section 288 where it is committed
for the purpose of sexual arousal’”].) Second, M.E. testified to multiple
molestation incidents, some including rape and others not. Either type of
incident could support count 8. The prosecutor’s focus on rape incidents did
not constrain the jury or the trial court from considering other molestation
incidents to which M.E. testified. (People v. Perez (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1117, 1126
[prosecutor’s argument is not evidence; jury may consider other theories].)
Because the court permissibly found that Estrada committed count 8 on a
separate occasion, it properly imposed a consecutive sentence on it. (§ 667.61,
subd. (i).)
On the other hand, the Attorney General concedes the trial court
erred by imposing a one-strike sentence on count 7, given its finding that it
did not relate to a separate incident. We accept the concession.
At the time of Estrada’s offenses, former section 667.61,
subdivision (g), provided that a one-strike sentence under that section “shall
be imposed on the defendant once for any offense or offenses committed
against a single victim during a single occasion.”4 As noted, the trial court
found that count 7 occurred “during the same incident” as count 6 or 8. Thus,
once the court imposed one-strike sentences on counts 6 and 8, it was
4 The Legislature removed former subdivision (g) from section
667.61 in 2006. (Stats. 2006, ch. 337, § 33.) Because Estrada’s offenses
occurred before this amendment, the former version applies to Estrada under
ex post facto principles. (People v. McVickers (1992) 4 Cal.4th 81, 84.)
5
precluded from imposing another one-strike sentence on count 7. Accordingly,
Estrada must be resentenced on that count.
DISPOSITION
The sentence on count 7 is reversed and the matter is remanded
for resentencing. In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed. Following
resentencing, the trial court shall forward certified copies of an amended
abstract of judgment to the California Department of Corrections and
Rehabilitation.
SCOTT, J.
WE CONCUR:
SANCHEZ, ACTING P. J.
DELANEY, J.
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