CourtListener 10462682•People v. Carlin CA3
Gesamter Gesetzestext
Filed 5/2/25 P. v. Carlin CA3
Opinion following transfer from Supreme Court
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
(Butte)
----
THE PEOPLE, C094284
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. No. 20CF03174)
v.
OPINION ON TRANSFER
PAUL DAVID CARLIN,
Defendant and Appellant.
Defendant Paul David Carlin pled no contest to first degree burglary and the trial
court sentenced him to the upper term. On appeal, Carlin argued Senate Bill No. 567
(2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill 567) (Stats. 2021, ch. 731) applied retroactively to
his case, and because the trial court imposed the upper term on his lone offense, our court
should modify his sentence to impose the middle term. The People did not address
whether our court could modify Carlin’s sentence but conceded Senate Bill 567 applied
to Carlin and that remand was appropriate. We rejected the People’s concession and
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concluded the trial court’s error was harmless under People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d
818.
Carlin sought review in the California Supreme Court, which ordered this court to
vacate the previous opinion and reconsider the matter in light of People v. Lynch (2024)
16 Cal.5th 730 (Lynch) and Erlinger v. United States (2024) 602 U.S. 821 (Erlinger). By
separate order, we vacated our decision. Having done so, we now conclude that remand
for a resentencing hearing is required.
BACKGROUND
As the facts of Carlin’s conviction do not bear on our decision, they are not
recounted here in any detail. Suffice it to say, in 2020, Carlin entered the victim’s garage
and stole fishing reels from within it. Carlin pled no contest to first degree burglary (Pen.
Code, § 495)1 in exchange for the dismissal of an additional case.
Carlin’s probation report recounted a lengthy criminal history dating back to 1988,
which included multiple convictions for theft, forgery, fraud, and drug-related offenses.
Carlin committed several of his four felonies and 11 prior misdemeanors while in
custody, or while on parole, probation, or supervision.
In imposing a sentence, the trial court considered the probation report. As
circumstances in aggravation, the court found Carlin had four prior felony convictions
and 11 prior misdemeanors, Carlin’s prior performance under supervision had been
unsatisfactory, and Carlin had served a prior prison term. The trial court found no
circumstances in mitigation. Carlin represented himself at sentencing and did not object
to the trial court’s identification of aggravating circumstances. The trial court imposed
the six-year upper term.
After transfer from our Supreme Court, the parties filed supplemental briefing.
1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
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DISCUSSION
In their supplemental briefing, the parties agree that the trial court committed
prejudicial error because during sentencing Carlin did not stipulate to aggravating facts,
the jury did not find the requisite aggravating facts true beyond a reasonable doubt, and
the court did not rely on a certified record of conviction in exercising its sentencing
discretion. We agree.
Section 1170, subdivision (b)(1) through (3), as amended by Senate Bill 567,
provides the court may impose the upper term “only when there are circumstances in
aggravation of the crime that justify the imposition of a term of imprisonment exceeding
the middle term.” (§ 1170, subd. (b)(2).) As amended, section 1170, subdivision (b)
“alter[ed] the trial court's sentencing discretion” and “creat[ed] a presumption against the
upper term, which may be overcome only if the required facts are properly proven and
the [trial] court concludes the term is justified.” (Lynch, supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 773.)
Unless a defendant stipulates to the facts, or waives his or her jury trial right, “that
[aggravating] factfinding role now resides solely with the jury.” (Id. at p. 760.) The trial
court may also consider the defendant’s prior convictions in determining sentencing
based on a certified record of conviction. (§ 1170, subd. (b)(3).)
In Lynch, our Supreme Court held that under section 1170, subdivision (b), “a
Sixth Amendment violation occurs when the trial court relies on unproven aggravating
facts to impose an upper term sentence, even if some other aggravating facts relied on
have been properly established.” (Lynch, supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 768.) Our Supreme
Court held in Lynch that such a violation “is prejudicial unless an appellate court can
conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that a jury would have found true all of the
aggravating facts relied upon by the trial court to justify an upper term sentence, or that
those facts were otherwise proved true in compliance with the current statutory
requirements.” (Ibid.) Accordingly, a defendant is entitled to reversal and remand unless
“we can conclude that the omission of a jury trial was harmless beyond a reasonable
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doubt as to every aggravating fact the trial court used to justify an upper term sentence.”
(Id. at p. 775.)
In addition, when the trial court imposed a sentence before the statute’s 2022
amendment, as it did here, the appropriate remedy “ ‘is to remand for resentencing unless
the record “clearly indicate[s]” that the trial court would have reached the same
conclusion “even if it had been aware that it had such discretion.” ’ ” (Lynch, supra,
16 Cal.5th at p. 771.) This requirement “must be satisfied in addition to a finding of
harmlessness regarding any omitted factual finding” because “neither a Chapman nor a
Watson review ‘can adequately indicate that resentencing is unnecessary upon retroactive
application of amended section 1170[, subdivision ](b).’ ” (Id. at p. 772.)
Moreover, while this appeal was pending, the United States Supreme Court
decided Erlinger, supra, 602 U.S. 821. There, the court rejected the argument that the
prior conviction exception to the Sixth Amendment “permits a judge to find perhaps any
fact related to a defendant's past offenses, including whether he committed them on
different occasions” within the meaning of the Armed Career Criminal Act of 1984
(18 U.S.C. § 924(e)). (Erlinger, at p. 837.) Instead, “a judge may ‘do no more,
consistent with the Sixth Amendment, than determine what crime, with what elements,
the defendant was convicted of.’ ” (Id. at p. 838.)
The trial court imposed a sentence exceeding the middle term based on its review
of the probation report. It justified an upper term sentence by relying on Carlin’s four
prior felony convictions and 11 prior misdemeanors, Carlin’s prior unsatisfactory
performance under supervision, and that Carlin had served a prior prison term. However,
Carlin did not stipulate to these factors nor did a jury find these factors true beyond a
reasonable doubt. The trial court considered Carlin’s prior convictions, but it improperly
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relied on the probation report and not a certified record of conviction as required by
section 1170, subdivision (b)(3). (§ 969b [defining record of conviction].)
At sentencing, the trial court was not aware of the full scope of its discretion or the
guidance in Lynch or Erlinger. The record does not clearly indicate the trial court would
have reached the same conclusion because the required proof of Carlin’s prior
convictions, a certified record of conviction, is not in the record. (Lynch, supra,
16 Cal.5th at p. 771.) Accordingly, the trial court’s reliance on aggravating
circumstances to impose an upper term sentence is not harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt and remand is necessary. (Id. at p. 768.)
DISPOSITION
The judgment is reversed. The matter is remanded for further litigation of the
aggravating circumstances and for the trial court to exercise its discretion under the
current section 1170, subdivision (b) in a full resentencing.
/s/
EARL, P. J.
We concur:
/s/
MAURO, J.
/s/
KRAUSE, J.
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