CourtListener 10462676•People v. Santo CA2/5
Gesamter Gesetzestext
Filed 5/2/25 P. v. Santo CA2/5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on
opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule
8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FIVE
THE PEOPLE, B334614
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No.
v. NA114416)
MARK ANTHONY SANTO,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Laura Laesecke, Judge. Affirmed.
Vanessa Place, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Amanda V. Lopez and Nicholas J.
Webster, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
A jury convicted defendant Mark Anthony Santo
(defendant), a former middle school and high school teacher, of
various criminal sex offenses involving two girls under the age of
14 and an 18-year-old woman who was his former middle school
student. The trial court sentenced him to prison for a total term
of 80 years to life. We are asked to consider whether reversal is
required because the trial court should not have admitted
evidence of other uncharged bad acts to prove criminal intent and
absence of mistake.
I. BACKGROUND
For eleven years, from approximately 2002 to 2013,
defendant taught history, psychology, and other subjects at
Lindbergh Middle School. Then, after a year at Poly High School,
defendant transferred to Jordan High School, where he taught for
almost four years (and acted as the school’s athletic director)—
until he was put on administrative leave in February 2018. He
was later criminally charged in an information with two counts of
committing a lewd act on a child under 14 (Pen. Code, § 288,
subd. (a)), two counts of assault to commit specified sex offenses
(Pen. Code, § 220, subd. (a)(1)), sexual penetration by force (Pen.
Code, § 289, subd. (a)(1)(A), and forcible oral copulation (Pen.
Code, § 288a, subd. (c)(2)(A)). Trial on the charges proceeded in
May 2023.
A. Defendant’s Charged Offense Conduct
1. Committing a lewd act on H.C. (count 6)
When H.C. was 13 years old and in eighth grade (2012-
2013), she attended Lindbergh Middle School where defendant
was her history teacher. At the beginning of eighth grade, H.C.
2
was performing poorly at school and suffering verbal and physical
abuse at home from her alcoholic father.
Defendant helped H.C. with her academic performance and
self-esteem, and she confided in him about her home life. She
regarded his classroom as a “safe place” and came to regard
defendant as a “father figure,” with whom she shared things that
she did not share with her parents. Defendant told H.C. she was
like a daughter to him and that she was “beautiful and smart,”
which made her feel “very happy . . . I felt like I was seen for the
first time.” When she hugged defendant, he would sometimes
also give her a kiss on the cheek, face, or neck, which made her
feel “weird.” In addition to face-to-face communication at school,
defendant and H.C. would correspond via text messaging and
through social media.
One day, H.C. came to defendant and told him that her
father hit her the night before while intoxicated. After she
related the incident to defendant, he told her she could rest in a
small room located at the back of his classroom that had a couch.
H.C. accepted the offer and spent the day curled up on the couch.
Throughout the day, defendant would periodically check on
her. On one such occasion, as H.C. was lying facing the couch’s
back pillows, defendant got on the couch next to her, “cuddling”
her from behind and “spooning” her. Defendant rubbed her
shoulders, back, thigh, and hip. While he did so, H.C. could feel
defendant’s erect penis against her “bottom area.” Defendant
stopped touching H.C. when his next class started.1
1
At trial, H.C. testified to a somewhat similar event two
years later when she was a student and defendant was a teacher
at Jordan High School. Despondent over her aunt’s death, H.C.
attempted to commit suicide by swallowing half a bottle of
3
H.C. did not tell her parents or anyone else about how
defendant touched her on the couch at the time it happened. As
H.C. grew older, she grew “uncomfortable” with defendant’s
attempts to hug her and she would avoid them “as much as [she]
could.”
2. Committing a lewd act on M.S. (count 1)
M.S. was never defendant’s student, but she was a friend of
defendant’s daughter and spent a lot of time with defendant’s
family. M.S. also often spent the night at defendant’s home
because his wife worked at the middle school M.S. attended and
could take her to school in the morning. Over time, M.S. came to
regard defendant and his wife as her “second parents.”
During the period when she was spending time with
defendant and his family at their home, M.S. created a Snapchat
account. Although her parents at that time did not allow her to
have such an account, defendant, after learning of it through his
daughter, promised to keep the account secret from M.S.’s
parents if he could monitor it. As time went on, defendant began
to communicate with M.S. via Snapchat; she found some of his
messages unobjectionable, but others, which were sent at night,
were “inappropriate.”
Defendant, who described himself to M.S. as a masseuse,
often gave massages to her and others. On at least one occasion,
he put his fingers inside the waistline of M.S.’s jeans as he
Benadryl. The following day, she told defendant about her
suicide attempt and he told her she could relax and recover in a
recliner chair in his classroom. At some point, H.C. fell asleep
and awoke to find defendant next to her, rubbing her thigh. No
charges were filed regarding this incident.
4
massaged her, which made her feel “uncomfortable.” Because it
happened in the presence of others, however, she did not think it
wrong at the time.
One night in October 2015, when M.S. was 13 years old and
a student in eighth grade, she was sleeping over at defendant’s
home on a school night. At around midnight, M.S. was lying on a
couch in the living room; she was supposed to be asleep, but was
awake and “on her phone.” When she heard footsteps coming
from defendant’s bedroom, M.S. hid her phone and pretended to
be asleep. M.S. was lying on her back and defendant came to the
couch and stroked her outer and inner thigh, her hip, and her
vagina over the shorts she was wearing. Although she kept her
eyes closed the entire time, she knew it was defendant because
“he had a distinct smell and[,] like[,] you could feel who it is, you
know.” She did not move while defendant touched her because
she was “scared” and “so shocked.”
After defendant’s lewd touching, M.S. did not tell her
parents (or others) because she “figured it was a one-time thing
and [she] could pretend that it didn’t happen and [she] wouldn’t
ruin everything.” But M.S. started spending less time with
defendant and his family and began acting out to avoid being
around defendant (e.g., stealing a phone case belonging to
defendant’s daughter and displaying the case in an obvious
manner to defendant’s wife). She remained in contact with
defendant via social media, though.
Over time, the relationship between M.S. and defendant’s
wife became strained because M.S. believed defendant’s wife was
creating fake accounts to follow her (M.S.’s) social media posts
and harassing her. M.S. eventually responded by calling
defendant’s wife and telling her “that her husband was talking to
5
little girls and he was a pedophile . . . .” After that call, M.S.
received a text message from defendant apologizing to her and
her mother for “[his] actions,” admitting he “was losing affection
in [his] home [and] start[ing] to find it online with anyone who
would listen,” and stating M.S. “was always sincere in her
feelings towards me as a father figure and I broke that trust in
her” by “allow[ing] [his] lack of affection at home to manifest
into . . . online flirting that should not have happened.”
M.S. later moved out-of-state, but defendant continued to
communicate with her via Snapchat. Some of defendant’s
messages commenting on photographs of M.S. or discussing ways
for them to meet without his wife knowing were “inappropriate.”
In one such message responding to M.S.’s post of a swimsuit and
asking if she should purchase it, defendant responded by saying,
“Only if I get to see you in it. Hubba hubba.” Feeling “so
awkward,” M.S. replied with only a quick “haha,” to which
defendant responded, “You know I think you’re amazing, right?”
Again, M.S. responded with only a “haha.”
3. Forcible penetration, forcible copulation, and
assault of E.L. (counts 2-5)
E.L. first met defendant when he was her seventh grade
history teacher at Lindbergh Middle School. During her middle
school years, she suffered physical abuse from her adoptive
mother and sexual abuse from her stepfather. E.L. confided in
defendant about her problems at home so much that she came to
regard him as a “parent figure.” In addition, defendant would
take on the role of a “father figure” in regard to her academic
progress by helping her stay on top of her work and advocating
for her with the principal and school counselors.
6
After she graduated eighth grade, E.L. moved away but
stayed in touch with defendant because he reached out to her on
social media. When E.L. returned to the area, she reconnected
with defendant through her attendance at Jordan High School
and through her close friendship with defendant’s daughter, who
was enrolled at the same high school. Because E.L.’s classroom
was across the hall from defendant, she would often talk with
him about her problems at home or school and, for a time, she
continued to regard him as playing a “parent[al] role” in her life.
E.L.’s view of defendant changed, however, after an
incident in his classroom one day. Defendant told her that he
had been a masseuse and began to massage her shoulders. He
then had E.L. lie on the floor, and as he gave her a back massage,
he repeatedly tried to pull her jeans down but she would not let
him. Because she found the experience “weird,” she got up, left
the classroom, and promptly told her sister and mother about
what happened.
E.L. withdrew further from defendant because of social
media messages he sent her. For example, in December 2017,
defendant sent a photo of himself standing behind a counter and
apparently nude with the caption: “Jacuzzi time. Wish you could
join me.” At around the same time, defendant sent her another
photo of himself captioned: “You would be a wonderful gift to
have under my tree.” Later that month, defendant left a voice-
mail message on E.L.’s phone asking her to “verify” for his wife,
who was also on the call, that he had never done anything
“inappropriate” with her.
In February 2018, when she was 18 years old, E.L. and
defendant’s daughter attended a concert together. Following the
concert, E.L. and her own infant daughter spent the night at
7
defendant’s home. The next afternoon, E.L. and defendant
watched a movie in the home’s living room while defendant’s
daughter and the baby were napping. As they watched the
movie, defendant invited E.L. to join him in having an alcoholic
beverage; she declined.
After the movie ended, defendant invited E.L. to view a
room where she and her daughter could stay if problems at E.L.’s
home continued. As they went through a short hallway
connected to a restroom, defendant pulled E.L. close and tried to
kiss her. As he did so, he also put his hand down the front of her
pants and touched her vaginal area. Feeling both “scared” and
“disgusted,” E.L. “froze.” Defendant grabbed E.L. by the
shoulders, sat her down on the toilet, and tried repeatedly to
force his penis into her mouth. After he ejaculated onto her t-
shirt, defendant told her “that’s what he had been waiting for.”
E.L. left the restroom in tears, called one of her friends and
her then-boyfriend, and placed the shirt she was wearing in a
bag.2 During the next school week, she reported the incident to a
school counselor and a police officer.
B. The Uncharged Sexual Misconduct Evidence
Admitted at Trial
Before defendant’s trial, the prosecution moved to admit
evidence of other uncharged acts by defendant—specifically,
inappropriate social media communications with students and
improper touching of two other underage girls. The prosecution
argued the evidence was admissible under Evidence Code section
2
Later forensic testing of the shirt revealed the presence of
defendant’s DNA.
8
1101 to show defendant’s intent and absence of mistake. In
addition, the prosecution contended evidence of defendant’s
inappropriate touching of the two girls, M.U. and L.B., was
admissible under Evidence Code section 1108 because
defendant’s touching of M.U. constituted a lewd and lascivious
act on a minor (Pen. Code, § 288, subd. (c)(1)) or an act annoying
or molesting a child under the age of 18 (Pen. Code, § 647.6) and
his touching of L.B. constituted sexual battery (Pen. Code,
§ 243.4, subd. (e)(1)) or an act annoying or molesting a child
under the age of 18 (Pen. Code., § 647.6). The defense opposed
the motion on hearsay and lack of foundation grounds, and on the
ground that admission of the evidence would be unduly
prejudicial and a waste of the jury’s time.
The trial court granted the prosecution’s motion. The court
found the uncharged other acts evidence the prosecution sought
to introduce was (1) relevant to proving defendant’s intent and
the absence of mistake in connection with the charged offenses
and (2) not unduly prejudicial and not likely to confuse the issues
or mislead the jury. In accordance with the trial court’s ruling,
the prosecution introduced other acts evidence at trial.
1. Testimony concerning defendant’s social media
communications with underage students
During the 2012-2013 academic year (defendant’s last at
Lindbergh Middle School), Natalie Ramirez (Ramirez) worked as
a counseling clerk at the school and followed other school
employees and teachers on social media, including defendant. At
the time, the school district had a policy that limited online
communications between teachers and students to academic
subjects only.
9
In early 2013, Ramirez received notifications that
defendant “liked” two sexually suggestive photos posted on
Instagram by female students at Lindbergh Middle School: one
showed a girl lying on a bed in a tank top shirt and the other
showed the same girl walking with another girl with their hands
on each other’s buttocks. After viewing the photographs,
Ramirez found defendant’s reaction to them “concerning.”
The following day, Ramirez spoke with defendant and told
him that if she was the female student’s parents she would feel
“very uncomfortable” that a teacher “liked” such photos.
Although defendant told Ramirez he agreed with her, she
thought his body language indicated he was upset with her (and
defendant never spoke to Ramirez again thereafter). Ramirez
reported the matter to the school’s principal Dr. Constance
Magee (Magee).
Magee told defendant she found his “likes” of the two
photographs “inappropriate” and advised that such conduct could
subject him to “allegations.” He responded in an angry and
defensive manner and called her a “prude.”
2. Defendant’s inappropriate touching of M.U.
M.U. graduated from Jordan High School in 2020.
Although defendant was never one of her teachers, she often
visited his classroom during lunch or on breaks. When she would
leave his classroom, defendant would hug her.
Defendant’s hugs made her feel “uncomfortable” because on
two separate occasions three weeks apart, defendant’s hands
brushed her buttocks when he hugged her. Following the second
incident, which occurred in 2018 and which she regarded as
nonaccidental, she reported what happened to another teacher.
10
3. Defendant’s inappropriate touching of L.B.
L.B. graduated from Jordan High School in 2018. While a
student at the school, she was a member of the cheer and dance
teams. During her sophomore year, defendant, who claimed to
have experience in cheer, attended practices of the cheer team.
On one occasion, defendant improperly lifted L.B.; instead
of supporting her by placing the palm of his hand on her
buttocks, he positioned his hand so that his thumb was on her
vagina, which made her feel “embarrassed and . . . a little gross.”
L.B. reported the matter to her cheer coach and later made an
official report to the school that defendant had touched her
inappropriately.
C. The Defense Case at Trial, Argument by Counsel, and
Conviction and Sentencing
At trial, defendant testified in his own defense. He denied
any inappropriate contact or communication with H.C. or M.S.
Defendant testified he did not recall flirting with any student
before he flirted with E.L. And as to E.L., he maintained his
sexual contact with her was consensual and the result of a
change in their relationship after she turned 18 years old.
Defendant also denied touching L.B. inappropriately or
performing any stunts with cheerleaders. Defendant claimed he,
like many teachers and school administrators, would hug, shake
hands, or pat students on the back as a way to greet them (and
he was unaware of school policy forbidding such physical contact
with students). Defendant was not asked any specific questions
concerning his interaction with M.U.
11
Other witnesses also testified during the defense case. One
of defendant’s former colleagues from Lindbergh Middle School,
whose classroom was connected to defendant’s by a short
connecting passage with a small couch, testified he never saw
defendant lying with a student on the couch or behave in an
inappropriate manner with a student. L.B.’s cheer coach from
Jordan High School testified L.B. never advised her that
defendant touched her inappropriately while practicing a stunt.
A defense forensic serologist testified that samples from the t-
shirt E.L. was wearing during the alleged sexual assault
contained both male and female DNA and opined that was
because the female spit ejaculate on the shirt rather than the
ejaculate contacting the shirt directly. Defendant’s daughter told
the jury that on the day her father allegedly sexually assaulted
E.L., E.L. never came to her crying or saying that something was
wrong.
During closing argument, the prosecution argued the jurors
could use M.U. and L.B.’s testimony, if believed, “for the charged
offenses. . . . [Y]ou can use [their testimony] to say ‘Hey, this guy,
the defendant, he has the disposition to commit sex offenses.’”
The prosecutor also argued L.B. and E.L. “don’t know each other
at all. [L.B. and M.S.] don’t know each other at all. [M.S. and
M.U.] don’t know each other at all. [Yet, a]ll of these kids have
very similar stories. [¶] He touched [L.B.] on her vagina. He
touched [M.S.] on her vagina. He touched [M.U.] over her hip
and her butt and her thighs. Similar places he touched [H.C.].”
The prosecutor further argued Ramirez and Magee’s testimony
revealed why defendant left Lindbergh Middle School at the end
of the 2013 academic year: “It’s no coincidence that he left. He
let his mask fall with Dr. Magee that day. The red flag had gone
12
up, and he knew that she would never look at him with the same
trust again. That there was always going to be that suspicion
and he had to get out of there; so[,]he did.”
After a brief period of deliberation (which the trial court
would later describe as “basically a heartbeat”), the jury found
defendant guilty on all counts. In addition, the jury found true
multiple victim allegations under the so-called One Strike law
(Pen. Code, § 667.61, subds (b), (j)(2), &(e)).
The trial court sentenced defendant to a total of 80 years to
life in prison as follows: 25 years to life on count 1, 15 years to life
on count 2, 15 years to life on count 3, and 25 years to life on
count 6, the terms to be served consecutively. Finding that
counts 4 and 5 were to be considered only if the jury found
defendant not guilty on counts 2 and 3, the court dismissed those
counts and vacated the convictions.
II. DISCUSSION
Defendant challenges the admissibility of the other acts
evidence, i.e., the testimony from L.B. (cheer practice vagina
touching), M.U. (buttocks touching when hugging), and Ramirez
and Magee (sexual social media interaction with minors). We
hold there was no abuse of discretion in admitting the evidence
under Evidence Code section 1101, subdivision (b),3 which
permits introduction of other acts evidence to prove intent and
absence of mistake or accident.4 (See generally People v.
3
Undesignated statutory references that follow are to the
Evidence Code.
4
Because the challenge is to admissibility and we hold there
was no abuse of discretion in admitting the evidence under
section 1101, subdivision (b), we have no need to discuss the
13
Daveggio and Michaud, 4 Cal.5th 790, 824 [“A trial court’s
rulings admitting evidence under . . . sections 1101 and 1108 are
reviewed for abuse of discretion”].) The other acts evidence
admitted was sufficiently similar to the charged crimes to
support an inference that defendant had the same intent and to
conclude his conduct was not attributable to some mistake. The
probative value of the other acts evidence was also not
outweighed by a danger of undue prejudice—the other acts were
not more inflammatory than the charged crimes and were not
remote in time—and admission of the evidence did not confuse
the issues or consume an undue amount of time.
Section 1101, subdivision (a) makes other uncharged acts
“inadmissible when offered to prove [a defendant’s] conduct on a
specified occasion” except as specified in subdivision (b) of the
statute. That provision allows a court to admit other acts “when
relevant to prove some fact (such as motive, opportunity, intent,
preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake or
accident . . .) other than [the defendant’s] disposition to commit
such an act.” (§ 1101, subd. (b).)
When determining whether other acts evidence is
admissible for reasons specified in subdivision (b), “the degree of
similarity . . . is often a key factor” (People v. Jackson (2016) 1
Cal.5th 269, 300), and “‘[t]he least degree of similarity (between
admissibility of the evidence under section 1108, a statute that
broadly permits evidence of a defendant’s commission of another
sexual offense in a trial in which the defendant is accused of a sex
offense—so long as admitting evidence of the other sex offense
evidence does not run afoul of section 352. (See generally People
v. Falsetta (1999) 21 Cal.4th 903; People v. Britt (2002) 104
Cal.App.4th 500, 505.)
14
the uncharged act and the charged offense) is required’” to prove
intent and the absence of mistake (Daveggio and Michaud, supra,
4 Cal.5th at 827). To be relevant, there need only be “‘sufficient
evidence for the jury to find defendant committed both sets of
acts, and sufficient similarities to demonstrate that in each
instance the perpetrator acted with the same intent or motive.’
[Citation.]” (Ibid.; see also People v. Whisenhunt (2008) 44
Cal.4th 174, 204; People v. Ewoldt (1994) 7 Cal.4th 380, 402
[“‘[T]he recurrence of a similar result . . . tends (increasingly with
each instance) to negative accident or inadvertence or self-
defense or good faith or other innocent mental state, and tends to
establish (provisionally, at least, though not certainly) the
presence of the normal, i.e., criminal, intent accompanying such
an act . . .’”].) When relevant, the other acts evidence may be
admitted if “‘“[t]he probative value of the uncharged offense
[is] . . . substantial and [is] not . . . largely outweighed by the
probability that its admission would create a serious danger of
undue prejudice, of confusing the issues, or of misleading the
jury.”’” (People v. Thomas (2011) 52 Cal.4th 336, 354.)
We are unpersuaded by defendant’s argument that the
other acts evidence admitted at his trial was too dissimilar from
the charged offenses to be probative. All of the conduct (charged
and uncharged) involved females who were decades younger than
defendant. In addition, defendant was in a position of authority
over each victim: he was the current or former teacher, or trusted
father figure, for all of them before the abuse. Further, the
uncharged conduct involving L.B. and M.U. involved defendant’s
contact with intimate areas of their bodies, just like all the
charged offenses. Under the circumstances, the trial court
reasonably determined admission of the other acts evidence had a
15
tendency in reason to prove—certainly with respect to the
charged offenses involving H.C. and M.S. (People v. Martinez
(1995) 11 Cal.4th 434, 452 [proof of intent to arouse the sexual
desires of the perpetrator or the child required]), but also with
respect to the offenses involving E.L.—that defendant had a
prurient interest in young women that often left him unable to
confine his behavior to appropriate standards and limits. The
other acts also had a tendency in reason to disprove any defense
contention that defendant’s conduct could be explained away as
being mistakenly interpreted or consensual on the victims’ part.
(Ewoldt, supra, 7 Cal.4th at 402 [“‘[T]he recurrence of a similar
result . . . tends (increasingly with each instance) to negative
accident or inadvertence or self-defense or good faith or other
innocent mental state . . .’”]; see also Whisenhunt, supra, 44
Cal.4th at 204 [introducing evidence of absence of accident is not
limited to instances when a defendant admits committing an act
but denies the necessary intent for the charged crime because “a
defendant’s plea of not guilty puts in issue all the elements of the
charged offense”].)
The trial court also reasonably determined that admitting
the other acts evidence was consistent with section 352, which
provides for exclusion of relevant evidence “if its probative value
is substantially outweighed by the probability that its admission
will (a) necessitate undue consumption of time or (b) create
substantial danger of undue prejudice, of confusing the issues, or
of misleading the jury.” When undertaking a section 352
analysis, courts frequently consider “‘“(1) the inflammatory
nature of the uncharged conduct; (2) the possibility of confusion
of issues; (3) remoteness in time of the uncharged offenses; and
(4) the amount of time involved in introducing and refuting the
16
evidence of uncharged offenses.”’ [Citation.]” (People v. Thomas
(2021) 63 Cal.App.5th 612, 630.)
In comparison with the charged offenses, the uncharged
other acts evidence was no more inflammatory than the charged
offenses—and markedly less so with respect to the charged
offenses involving E.L. Indeed, even considered in isolation and
not in relative terms to the charged offenses, the other acts
evidence (social media “likes,” brushing buttocks over clothes,
and vaginal touching during a cheerleading hold) was not “so
inflammatory as to divert the jury’s attention or invite an
irrational response.” (People v. Bivert (2011) 52 Cal.4th 96, 118.)
The other acts were also not remote in time from the charged
conduct: M.U. and L.B. reported defendant’s misconduct in 2018;
defendant committed his offenses against H.C., M.S. and E.L.,
respectively, in 2012-2013, 2015, and 2018; and the Instagram
posts by defendant occurred in 2013. The trial court also
reasonably determined there was no likely prospect of juror
confusion or undue consumption of time: just two additional
subjects of inappropriate touching who testified to a total of three
incidents, and social media testimony that was easily
comprehensible and not extended.5
5
Insofar as defendant contends there was a risk of undue
prejudice because defendant suffered no criminal punishment in
connection with the acts described by L.B. and M.U. (because the
jury would be tempted to convict on the charged offenses to
punish defendant for the uncharged conduct), we see no such
risk. The evidence of the charged and uncharged conduct was
comparably strong and, as we have said, the charged offenses
involved more reprehensible conduct. Indeed, for these reasons,
17
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
BAKER, Acting P. J.
We concur:
MOOR, J.
KIM (D.), J.
we believe the uncharged other acts evidence was unlikely to
have significantly contributed to the verdicts obtained.
18
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