CourtListener 10425745•People v. Hidalgo CA1/2
Gesamter Gesetzestext
Filed 4/30/25 P. v. Hidalgo CA1/2
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
A170371
v.
THOMAS LEE HIDALGO, (Mendocino County
Super. Ct. Nos. 24CR03294,
Defendant and Appellant.
24CR03295)
After the trial court denied defendant Thomas Lee Hidalgo’s motion to
suppress evidence (Pen. Code, § 1538.5),1 Hidalgo pled no contest to
knowingly bringing drug paraphernalia into jail (§ 4573, subd. (a)) and
admitted that the plea constituted a violation of his parole in a separate case.
The trial court sentenced Hidalgo to two years in state prison for bringing
drug paraphernalia into jail and a concurrent 180 days for the parole
violation. On appeal, Hidalgo’s sole argument is that the trial court erred in
denying his motion to suppress because the evidence was obtained from
searches that were the product of an unlawful detention. We conclude the
trial court correctly denied the motion to suppress and therefore affirm the
judgment.
1 Further undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
1
BACKGROUND
The Charges and Parole Revocation Petition
On January 3, 2024, the Mendocino County District Attorney filed a
complaint in case No. 24CR03294 charging Hidalgo with knowingly bringing
drug paraphernalia into jail (§ 4573, subd. (a)) (count 1) and falsely
identifying himself to a peace officer (§ 148.9, subd. (a)) (count 2). The
complaint further alleged as to count 1 that Hidalgo suffered a prior “strike”
felony conviction (arson, § 451, subd. (d)) within the meaning of sections
1170.12 and 667.
On that same day, a petition for revocation of parole was filed in case
No. 24CR03295, alleging Hidalgo violated the conditions of his parole by
committing the offenses charged in the complaint in case No. 24CR03294.
On January 29, following a preliminary hearing, the complaint was
amended to include circumstances in aggravation for sentencing.
The Motion to Suppress Evidence
On March 1, Hidalgo filed a motion to suppress evidence that he
claimed was the fruit of an unlawful detention and subsequent searches.
On March 18, the trial court held a hearing on the motion. The court
heard testimony from August Kinney, a sergeant with the Ukiah Police
Department at the time of his testimony, but a deputy sheriff for Mendocino
County at the time of the underlying incident.2 The trial court also admitted
into evidence a transcript of Deputy Kinney’s bodycam footage of the
incident.3 The evidence disclosed the following:
2 As the parties do, we refer to Kinney as “Deputy Kinney,” his title at
the time of the incident.
3 The bodycam video recording was also admitted into evidence, but it is
not included in the record on appeal.
2
Around 1:00 a.m. on December 31, 2023, Deputy Kinney was patrolling
in Ukiah. Deputy Kinney saw a man, later identified as Hidalgo, with a face
mask on walking along the sidewalk. Deputy Kinney turned his patrol car
around, stopped the car, rolled down his window, “and engaged [Hidalgo] in
casual conversation” from the car. Deputy Kinney asked Hidalgo “what his
name was.” Hidalgo answered, “Jordan Michaelson.” Deputy Kinney ran
that name through his patrol car’s computer, but the name did not return
any matches.
Deputy Kinney had a hunch that Jordan Michaelson was not Hidalgo’s
real name, so Deputy Kinney “parked and exited [his] vehicle to investigate
further.” As he was getting out of the car, he told Hidalgo, “ ‘Hang on for one
sec,’ ” shining his flashlight at Hidalgo. At that point, another deputy pulled
up in another patrol vehicle and stepped out. Deputy Kinney asked Hidalgo
several questions and also asked Hidalgo to take off his face mask. Hidalgo
removed his face mask. Deputy Kinney recalled he had interacted with
Hidalgo from prior law enforcement encounters but did not recall his name at
the moment. Hidalgo was “extremely fidgety and nervous” and sweating, and
he appeared to be under the influence of a controlled substance.
Deputy Kinney asked Hidalgo whether he had any weapons on him,
and Hidalgo said he did not. “ ‘Can I check?,’ ” Deputy Kinney asked, but
Hidalgo said, “ ‘I’d rather not.’ ” Deputy Kinney nonetheless told Hidalgo he
was going to check him for weapons and then pat-searched him, finding
nothing.
Deputy Kinney continued to ask Hidalgo questions, such as whether he
had “anything illegal” on him. Hidalgo said no, before declining another
request from Deputy Kinney to search him, claiming he was not “on
probation or parole.”
3
Deputy Kinney also asked Hidalgo to write his name and date of birth
on an index card. Hidalgo wrote down the name “Jordan Michaelson” and a
date. Deputy Kinney conducted a records check with dispatch with the
information that Hidalgo provided and was advised there were no matches.
About five minutes into the encounter, Deputy Kinney placed Hidalgo
in handcuffs, saying he was not under arrest but that Deputy Kinney was
going to detain him because, “I have to figure out who you are and I’m not
convinced that you are who you say you are because we have no record of that
person.”
A few minutes after placing Hidalgo in handcuffs, Deputy Kinney
began to recognize Hidalgo and asked, “ ‘[A]re you Thomas?,’ ” which is
Hidalgo’s first name. Hidalgo continued to deny his identity. Deputy Kinney
examined some of Hidalgo’s tattoos and looked up a booking photograph of
“Thomas Hidalgo” on his patrol car computer, which verified his belief that
Hidalgo was in fact Thomas Hidalgo. Deputy Kinney also conducted a
records check with dispatch on the name Thomas Hidalgo, who dispatch
confirmed was on parole.
Deputy Kinney searched Hidalgo again. The search revealed a lighter.
Deputy Kinney confirmed with Hidalgo’s parole agent that he was prohibited
from possessing incendiary devices, and the agent issued a parole hold.
Deputy Kinney then placed Hidalgo under arrest for violating his parole and
giving a false name to a peace officer.
After Deputy Kinney took Hidalgo to the jail, a correctional deputy
searched Hidalgo and found contraband in his clothing.
Following Deputy Kinney’s testimony, the prosecutor, citing People v.
Watkins (2009) 170 Cal.App.4th 1403 (Watkins), argued that Hidalgo was
estopped from contesting the validity of the detention and ensuing searches,
4
because he gave Deputy Kinney a false name and thus prevented him from
discovering Hidalgo was on parole with a search condition. Defense counsel
argued that Hidalgo was unlawfully detained when Deputy Kinney got out of
the patrol car and said to Hidalgo, “ ‘Hang on for one sec,’ ” because there was
no reasonable suspicion to detain him. Defense counsel also disputed the
prosecutor’s estoppel argument. The trial court invited the parties to submit
supplemental briefing.
After receiving briefing from the parties, the court heard further
arguments on March 21. Following that argument, the court denied the
motion to suppress. The court found that Hidalgo was detained when Deputy
Kinney got out of his patrol vehicle and said to Hidalgo, “ ‘Hang on for one
sec,’ ” and that the detention was not justified by reasonable suspicion or
probable cause of criminal activity. However, relying on Watkins, the court
determined that because Hidalgo had concealed his identity before he was
detained—thus preventing Kinney from knowing Hidalgo was on parole and
subject to a search condition—Hidalgo was estopped from challenging the
validity of his detention, ensuing searches, and the evidence derived from
them.
The Plea and the Sentence
Also on March 21, pursuant to a negotiated disposition, Hidalgo pled no
contest to knowingly bringing drug paraphernalia into jail as charged in
count 1 in case no. 24CR03294, and admitted that the plea constituted a
violation of parole in case No. 24CR03295. In exchange, the remaining
charge and strike allegation in the complaint were dismissed, and the
indicated sentence was the low term of two years in state prison for count 1
and a concurrent 180 days for the parole violation.
On April 18, the trial court sentenced Hidalgo in accordance with the
5
negotiated disposition.
This timely appeal followed.
DISCUSSION
The Trial Court Did Not Err in Denying the Motion to Suppress
Hidalgo argues the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress
evidence of the lighter and drug paraphernalia because the evidence was
obtained from an unlawful detention and ensuing searches. Hidalgo
contends, and the People do not disagree, that he was detained when Deputy
Kinney stepped out his patrol vehicle and told Hidalgo to “ ‘Hang on one
sec,’ ” and that this detention was unlawful for lack of reasonable suspicion
that criminal activity was afoot. The parties, however, disagree on whether
defendant was estopped from challenging the validity of the detention,
subsequent searches, and the evidence derived from them.
We do not reach the merits of defendant’s constitutional claim, since we
resolve the appeal on the issue of a estoppel. (See People v. Pearson (2008)
165 Cal.App.4th 740, 744–745 (Pearson) [holding it was unnecessary to reach
the merits of defendant’s constitutional and statutory jeopardy claims,
concluding he was estopped from asserting on appeal such errors that were
induced by his own conduct].) Where, as here, the relevant facts are
undisputed, whether defendant was estopped from raising his Fourth
Amendment challenges presents a pure question of law subject to de novo
review. (See People v. Ashford University, LLC (2024) 100 Cal.App.5th 485,
518 [“Questions of law and the application of law to undisputed facts are
subject to de novo review.”]; cf. People v. Balint (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 200,
205 [appellate court independently determines the legality of a challenged
search or seizure where the facts are undisputed].) And we conclude that the
trial court correctly found Hidalgo was estopped from challenging the validity
of the detention, searches, and evidence obtained from the searches. On this
6
basis, the trial court properly denied the motion to suppress.
Applicable Law
The Fourth Amendment protects the “right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures.” (U.S. Const., 4th Amend.) “ ‘A warrantless search is presumed to
be unreasonable, and the prosecution bears the burden of demonstrating a
legal justification for the search [or seizure].’ ” (People v. Suff (2014) 58
Cal.4th 1013, 1053.) “If the prosecution cannot meet this burden, the
exclusionary rule normally requires the suppression of any evidence obtained
from the search or seizure.” (People v. Mathews (2018) 21 Cal.App.5th 130,
137 (Mathews), citing Wong Sun v. United States (1963) 371 U.S. 471, 487–
488.)
“ ‘[O]ne of the specifically established exceptions to the requirements of
both a warrant and probable cause is a search [or seizure] conducted
pursuant to consent.’ ” (People v. Woods (1999) 21 Cal.4th 668, 674.)
Parolees who accept conditions of probation “may validly consent in advance
to warrantless searches [or seizures] in exchange for the opportunity to avoid
or obtain release from custody.” (People v. Session (2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 723,
731.) “Every inmate eligible for release on parole is subject, by statute, ‘to
search or seizure . . . at any time.’ ” (Ibid., citing § 3067, subd. (b)(3).) “The
California Supreme Court has repeatedly said such searches are lawful.
(People v. Woods, [(1999)] supra, 21 Cal.4th [668] at p. 675.) There are only
two requirements: the parolee’s status must be known to the officer,[4] and
4 “Because a search condition is statutorily mandated for all parolees
[citations], the officer need only know that the individual is on parole.”
(People v. Douglas (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 855, 862.) In other words, “ ‘ “[A]n
officer’s knowledge of parole status [is] equivalent to knowledge of a parole
search condition.” ’ ” (Ibid.) By contrast, “[a] search condition is not
7
the search may not be ‘arbitrary, capricious, or harassing.’ [(People v.]
Schmitz [(2012)] 55 Cal.4th [909,] 916.)” (People v. Session, supra, 93
Cal.App.5th at p. 731.)
In Watkins, the decision that the trial court here relied on to deny the
motion to suppress, a police officer stopped the defendant’s vehicle, and the
defendant stated that he was on probation but falsely identified himself as
his brother. (Watkins, supra, 170 Cal.App.4th at p. 1406.) A record check of
the brother’s name did not reveal that the brother was subject to a search
condition, but the officer nonetheless conducted a search and found
contraband. (Ibid.) After his arrest, the defendant gave his true name, and a
record check revealed that he “was on searchable probation.” (Ibid.) The
Court of Appeal held that even though the officer was not aware of the search
condition when he performed the search, the defendant was estopped from
challenging the legality of the search as a probation search because he had
concealed that he was subject to the condition by lying about his identity.
(Id. at p. 1409.)
Watkins explained that “[t]he equitable principle ‘No one can take
advantage of his own wrong’ (Civ. Code § 3517) applies in criminal law.”
(Watkins, supra, 170 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1408–1409, citing People v.
Concepcion (2008) 45 Cal.4th 77, 81–82 [a defendant who absconds from
custody during trial is estopped to argue that the court violated his
constitutional right to be present at trial by proceeding in his absence] and
Pearson, supra, 165 Cal.App.4th at p. 742, 744–747 [a criminal defendant
mandated by statute for every probationer, and probation search clauses are
not worded uniformly.” (Id. at p. 863, italics added.) “Thus, in the case of
probation searches, the officer must have some knowledge not just of the fact
someone is on probation, but of the existence of a search clause broad enough
to justify the search at issue.” (Ibid.)
8
who obtains a benefit in a judicial proceeding by intentionally concealing key
information about his case is estopped to argue, when that information comes
to light, that the court cannot use it against him].) Applying that principle to
the facts before it, Watkins concluded, “Defendant concealed his identity from
[the police officer], a misdemeanor offense (§ 148.9, subd. (a)); by doing so, he
also concealed his probation search condition. Then he claimed that this ploy
entitled him to suppress evidence obtained from what would otherwise
plainly have been a lawful probation search.” (Watkins, at p. 1409.)
“[D]efendant committed a wrong and then tried to profit from it. . . . [W]e
conclude that this misconduct results in an estoppel.” (Ibid.)
In Mathews, Division One of this court, following Watkins, held that
“when a probationer gives a false name to a police officer, and a record check
of that name fails to reveal that the probationer is in fact subject to a search
condition, the probationer is estopped from challenging the legality of an
ensuing search or seizure that would have been authorized had the officer
been aware of the condition.” (Mathews, supra, 21 Cal.App.5th at p. 133.)
Mathews explained “that estoppel is triggered when an officer receives the
results from a record check based on a false name” (id. at p. 140, italics
omitted)—i.e., when “the officer would have known about the search
condition but for [the defendant’s] dishonesty.” (Id. at pp. 140–141, fn.
omitted.) Accordingly, Mathews held that the defendant was estopped from
challenging the seizure of his cell phone and the evidence derived from it
where the seizure occurred after police ran a check on a false name given by
the defendant. (Ibid.)
9
Analysis
We agree with the trial court that under Watkins and Mathews,
Hidalgo was estopped from challenging the validity of the detention,
subsequent searches, and evidence derived from them.
Hidalgo gave a false name to Deputy Kinney during their initial,
consensual encounter. Deputy Kinney then ran a record check on that false
name and the results of that record check yielded no matches. When Deputy
Kinney received the results from a record check based on the false name,
“estoppel was triggered.” (Mathews, supra, 21 Cal.App.5th at p. 140.) But for
Hidalgo’s lie, Deputy Kinney would have discovered the fact that Hidalgo was
on parole and therefore subject to a search condition. In taking the position
that his detention shortly after he gave a false name was unlawful, and that
the evidence seized from searches following that detention therefore should
be suppressed, Hidalgo “tried to profit” from his wrongdoing. (Watkins,
supra, 170 Cal.App.4th at p. 1409.) In other words, Hidalgo “claimed that
this ploy entitled him to suppress evidence obtained from what would
otherwise plainly have been a lawful [parole] search.” (Ibid.) Thus, under
Watkins and Mathews, Hidalgo’s misconduct estopped him from challenging
the validity of the detention, searches, and evidence derived from them. On
this basis, the trial court properly denied the motion to suppress.
Hidalgo’s counterarguments are unpersuasive.
Hidalgo attempts to distinguish this case from Watkins and Mathews.
He asserts that in Watkins, police searched the defendant during an
otherwise lawful traffic stop and lawfully detained him for the traffic
violation (see Watkins, supra, 170 Cal.App.4th at p. 1410), under which
circumstances the defendant “was then required by section 148.9 to give a
true name to the officer.” (See § 148.9, subd. (a) [makes it a misdemeanor for
10
any person who falsely represents or identifies himself or herself as another
or fictitious person to any peace officer upon “lawful detention or arrest”].)
Hidalgo then asserts that here, unlike in Watkins, at the time he gave a false
name to Deputy Kinney, Hidalgo was not yet detained and their encounter
was consensual, and therefore Hidalgo “had no duty to give the deputy his
correct name and failing to do so was not a crime.” And he goes on to claim
that he “committed no wrongdoing, and thus cannot be estopped from making
the claim that the detention and search that followed violated the Fourth
Amendment.” In a similar vein, Hidalgo argues Mathews is distinguishable,
asserting that whereas the defendant there gave a false name during a lawful
detention, here, Hidalgo “was walking down the street,” “had committed no
crime,” and “was not lawfully detained.”
In essence, Hidalgo argues that “wrongdoing” under the estoppel
doctrine is limited to criminal acts, and that Watkins and Mathews purported
to limit the wrongdoing to a violation of section 148.9. We disagree. Neither
Watkins nor Mathews limited the estoppel doctrine to criminal acts. To the
contrary, Watkins apparently endorsed a broad view of “wrongdoing.”
Watkins noted that “the Civil Code maxim” in section 3517—“No one can take
advantage of his wrong”—states the principle underlying estoppel “as broadly
as possible.” (Watkins, supra, 170 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1408, 1410.) Watkins,
citing Pearson, supra, 165 Cal.App.4th at page 742, stated that “by leading
off with the Civil Code maxim, . . . Pearson supports the . . . conclusion [that]
the estoppel doctrine in the criminal context should apply to any and all
wrong from which a defendant seeks to profit.” (Watkins, at p. 1410.) And,
as in Pearson, Watkins also relies on the Civil Code maxim. (Watkins, at pp.
1408–1409.)
Moreover, the application of estoppel in Watkins and Mathews did not
11
hinge on whether the defendants’ “wrongdoing” in providing a false name
itself constituted a crime. Indeed, Mathews did not even mention section
148.9. Rather, as the People note, Mathews made clear that the wrongdoing
was the defendant’s lie about his name: “[W]hen a probationer gives a false
name to a police officer, and a record check of that name fails to reveal that
the probationer is in fact subject to a search condition, the probationer is
estopped from challenging the legality of an ensuing search or seizure that
would have been authorized had the officer been aware of the condition.”
(Mathews, supra, 21 Cal.App.5th at p. 133, italics added.) Thus, Hidalgo’s
attempts to distinguish Watkins and Mathews on the ground that his
wrongdoing did not constitute a crime is unavailing.
Hidalgo next argues that his case is more akin to Myers v. Superior
Court (2004) 124 Cal.App.4th 1247 (Myers). In Myers, a police officer stopped
the defendant and asked him whether he was on parole or probation. (Myers,
at p. 1251.) Although the defendant was on informal probation, he falsely
told the officer “ ‘that he had [been] discharged [from] parole . . . and was not
on probation.’ ” (Ibid.) The officer did no record check and instead simply
searched the defendant “without a warrant, probable cause, reasonable
suspicion, or knowledge [the defendant] was on probation and subject to a
search condition” and discovered contraband. (Id. at pp. 1251, 1256.) The
Court of Appeal held that the evidence should have been excluded because
not applying the exclusionary rule under the circumstances “would reward
police misconduct, not deter it.” (Id. at p. 1256.) The court also rejected the
argument that the defendant’s lie was significant, observing that the
defendant’s “response should have prompted [the officer] to conduct a record
check where he would have discovered [the defendant] was on probation and
subject to a search condition.” (Ibid.)
12
Like Hidalgo here, the defendants in Watkins and Mathews relied on
Myers to avoid estoppel. (Watkins, supra, 170 Cal.App.4th at p. 1410;
Mathews, supra, 21 Cal.App.5th at p. 139.) And, as in Watkins and Mathews,
we find such reliance misplaced. (Ibid.) Mathews explained: “As Watkins
itself observed in distinguishing Myers, although Myers concluded that the
evidence should have been suppressed despite the defendant’s
misrepresentation about his parole status, the conclusion was reached
because it was the officer’s failure to perform a record check, not the
misrepresentation, that prevented the officer from learning about the search
condition. [Citation.] In contrast, in Watkins the officer performed a record
check, but the ‘defendant’s lie about his identity ensured that the . . . check
would not disclose his probation search condition in time.’ [Citation.] Thus,
nothing in Myers undermines Watkins’s holding that a defendant can be
estopped from challenging evidence obtained after a record check fails to
reveal a search condition when the check was based on false information
provided by the defendant.” (Mathews, at p. 139.) Here, unlike in Myers, but
similar to Watkins and Mathews, Deputy Kinney did conduct a record check
based on the false name provided by Hidalgo during the consensual
encounter. If, instead, Hidalgo had provided his true name, Deputy Kinney’s
record check would have revealed Hidalgo’s parole status and search
condition. Thus, Myers does not assist Hidalgo.5
5 Besides disputing the estoppel finding, Hidalgo argues that the motion
to suppress should have been granted on a separate ground: “that law
enforcement later found out that [defendant] was on parole does not
attenuate the taint of [his] unlawful detention and the discovery of the
challenged evidence.” (Capitalization and boldface omitted.) This challenge
is based on the “attenuation doctrine,” which “holds that, notwithstanding
the exclusionary rule, ‘[e]vidence is admissible when the connection between
unconstitutional police conduct and the evidence is remote or has been
13
In sum, the trial court properly denied Hidalgo’s motion to suppress.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
interrupted by some intervening circumstance, so that ‘the interest protected
by the constitutional guarantee that has been violated would not be served by
suppression of the evidence obtained.’ ” (People v. McWilliams (2023) 14
Cal.5th 429, 437–438.) But as the People note, they “did not rely on the
doctrine of attenuation in the superior court, and the superior court did not
deny the motion to suppress based on a finding of attenuation . . . . Thus,
there is no reason for this court to consider the attenuation doctrine in this
case.” We agree with the People. Accordingly, we do not address this
argument.
14
RICHMAN, ACTING P. J.
We concur.
MILLER, J.
DESAUTELS, J.
(A170371N)
15
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