People v. Lopez CA4/1

CourtListener 10423290Calctapp30.04.2025

Gesamter Gesetzestext

Filed 4/30/25 P. v. Lopez CA4/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or
ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THE PEOPLE, D083906

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v. (Super. Ct. No. SCN420969)

MANUEL ANTONIO LOPEZ,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Bradley A. Weinreb, Judge. Affirmed.
Charles Thomas Anderson, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General,
Christopher P. Beesley and Warren J. Williams, Deputy Attorneys General,
for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Manuel Antonio Lopez appeals from a judgment imposing an aggregate
sentence of 22 years in prison based on the upper rather than the middle or
low term. Resolving this matter by memorandum opinion (see generally
People v. Garcia (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 847), we affirm.
I.
In 2023, Lopez pled guilty to attempted murder (Pen. Code, §§ 664,
187(a); count 1) and admitted (1) he personally discharged a firearm
(§ 12022.5(a)), (2) he personally inflicted great bodily injury (§ 12022.7(a)),
and (3) he committed the offense for the benefit of a criminal street gang
(§ 186.22(b)(1)). Lopez further admitted his prior convictions were numerous
and of increasing seriousness.
Prior to sentencing, psychologist Morgan Shaw submitted an
evaluation to the court stating Lopez “met the criteria for a diagnosis of
Posttraumatic Stress Disorder.” (Italics and bolding omitted.) Lopez also
filed a motion to strike and a statement in mitigation for the purposes of
sentencing. One of the described “circumstances in mitigation” was: “The
commission of the current offense is connected to the defendant’s prior
victimization or childhood trauma . . . . In a recent evaluation, Mr. Lopez met
the criteria for a diagnosis of Posttraumatic Stress Disorder . . . . In addition,
he was found to have PTSD based on his childhood years.” (Bolding omitted.)
As such, Lopez’s defense counsel argued it had “demonstrated sufficient
factors in mitigation to justify imposing the lower range.”
In 2024, the court sentenced Lopez to a total prison term of 22 years,
using the upper term. At the sentencing hearing, the court found and
weighed aggravating factors under rule 4.421 of the California Rules of
Court, such as Lopez’s gang-related conduct, prior criminal history, and
general tendency toward violence with weapons. As to rule 4.421(a)(1) and
(b)(1) through (5), the court concluded, “Those factors are all apparent in this
particular case.”

2
The court noted, “While there may be some mitigant that I have before
me in terms of PTSD,” “I don’t find that to necessarily be so mitigating on
your behalf.” “So I look at all of those factors that I’ve discussed on the record
and it is clear that this is not a case in which a low term should be selected.”
The court additionally stated, “But I’m looking at the rules of court,
aggravating factors and mitigating factors that I have to apply and these
aggravating factors clearly outweigh the mitigating factors, which is why the
court is selecting the upper nine-year term.”
II.
Lopez contends the trial court abused its discretion by failing to apply
section 1170(b)(6)’s mandatory low-term presumption because the record
shows his childhood trauma and PTSD contributed to his offense. He argues
remand is required because the record does not clearly indicate he would
have received the upper-term sentence had the trial court been aware of the
section 1170(b)(6) presumption. Alternatively, Lopez contends defense
counsel’s failure to expressly argue the applicability of section 1170(b)(6)
rises to the level of ineffective assistance of counsel.
In 2022, several amendments to section 1170 went into effect.
(Stats. 2021, ch. 695, § 5.3.) “Based on those amendments, a trial court may
impose no greater than a middle-term sentence unless it relies on
aggravating factors that (with the exception of prior convictions in a certified
record) have been found true beyond a reasonable doubt or stipulated to by
the defendant.” (People v. Caparrotta (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 874, 904.)
Amended section 1170(b)(6) further provides a sentencing court shall impose
the low term if psychological, physical, or childhood trauma was a
contributing factor in the commission of the offense, unless the court
concludes the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating

3
circumstances and imposing the low term “would be contrary to the interests
of justice.”
“[I]n light of the presumption on a silent record that the trial court is
aware of the applicable law, including statutory discretion at sentencing, we
cannot presume error where the record does not establish on its face that the
trial court misunderstood the scope of that discretion.” (People v. Gutierrez
(2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 515, 527.) “After a sufficient factual basis to support
the circumstances in aggravation or mitigation is found, the court enjoys
broad discretion in its sentencing determination.” (People v. Hilburn (2023)
93 Cal.App.5th 189, 205.) We review a trial court’s sentencing determination
for abuse of discretion. (People v. Moseley (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 870, 874.)
Here, absent evidence to the contrary, we presume the trial court knew
of and applied section 1170(b)(6)’s low-term presumption. When the court
sentenced Lopez, amended section 1170(b)(6) had been in effect for more than
two years. The court referenced and considered Lopez’s PTSD diagnosis as a
mitigating factor. It concluded, however, the aggravating factors clearly
outweighed the mitigating ones. Just because the trial court failed to cite
section 1170(b)(6) does not prove it failed to apply it. (Caparrotta,
103 Cal.App.5th at p. 905 [“[A]lthough the trial court did not specifically
mention [section 1170(b)(6)], it is presumed to have known of the
provision.”].) And no authority requires the court to state expressly on the
record that imposition of the low term “‘would be contrary to the interests of
justice’” in order to fulfill its obligations under section 1170(b)(6). (Id. at
p. 906, fn. 14.)
Lopez analogizes to People v. Panozo (2021) 59 Cal.App.5th 825 and
People v. Fredrickson (2023) 90 Cal.App.5th 984 to argue the record here does
not affirmatively show the trial court understood and applied

4
section 1170(b)(6), thus requiring us to conclude the trial court erred. But we
are not persuaded.
The statutes at issue in Panozo were sections 1170.9 and 1170.91.
(Panozo, 59 Cal.App.5th at p. 828.) Unlike section 1170(b)(6), these statutes
expressly require the court to, “prior to sentencing, make a determination as
to whether the defendant . . . may be suffering from” PTSD and, if so,
consider that fact in favor of granting probation and as a mitigating factor in
sentencing. (Pen. Code, §§ 1170.9(a) & (b), 1170.91(a).) At the sentencing
hearing, the court failed to make the required PTSD determination or include
the defendant’s PTSD as one of the mitigating factors it expressly referenced
on the record. (Panozo, at pp. 837-839.) The court of appeal concluded from
these facts that the record was ambiguous, rather than silent, as to the
court’s understanding of its obligations under sections 1170.9 and 1170.91
such that a remand for resentencing was appropriate. (Id. at pp. 837, 840-
841.)
Here, unlike in Panozo, the record is silent as opposed to ambiguous as
to the sentencing court’s apprehension of its sentencing obligations. Unlike
in Panozo, the court here found Lopez’s PTSD diagnosis to function as “some
mitigant.” We therefore presume the court knew of and applied
section 1170(b)(6)’s low-term presumption. Panozo is therefore inapt.
Fredrickson at least concerns section 1170(b)(6), but it is
distinguishable because the issue was whether the defendant had made a
sufficient initial showing that her youth contributed to the commission of the
offense to trigger the low-term presumption. (Fredrickson, 90 Cal.App.5th at
pp. 991-992.) We agree with Lopez that such an initial showing was made
here; accordingly, the relevant issue is whether the record affirmatively
demonstrates the court appropriately considered the relevant factor in

5
exercising its sentencing discretion. The record shows the court weighed the
mitigating and aggravating circumstances, including Lopez’s PTSD. The
court noted Lopez “was diagnosed with PTSD from early childhood trauma”
and has “had to deal with being a product of his environment living in a
gang-in[f]ested neighborhood.” Because the matter here does not concern the
threshold inquiry into what adequately evidences a contributing factor in the
commission of an offense for section 1170(b)(6) purposes, Fredrickson does
not assist Lopez.
The court’s express consideration of Lopez taking responsibility does
not disprove it considered his PTSD during sentencing. The court stated,
“the only factor that kind of sways me one way is the fact [Lopez] took
responsibility after the preliminary hearing in this case.” That statement
does not prove the court failed to consider Lopez’s PTSD; it merely proves
Lopez’s PTSD did not sway it as his taking responsibility did. The trial court
previously concluded PTSD was “some mitigant.” It therefore weighed it as
such. But it ultimately concluded “this is not a case in which a low term
should be selected.” Whether it was a persuasive mitigating factor and the
weight to give it were for the sentencing court to determine.
In sum, we conclude on this record that the court was aware of and
exercised its sentencing duty under section 1170(b)(6). Its references to
PTSD and weighing the mitigating and aggravating circumstances are
sufficient to affirmatively show its compliance with the statute. Given our
disposition of this matter, we need not address the parties’ remaining
arguments.

6
III.
We affirm.

CASTILLO, J.

WE CONCUR:

O’ROURKE, Acting P. J.

DO, J.

7

Setzen Sie Ihre Recherche in ChatGPT oder Claude fort

Verbinden Sie Omnilex, um den Rechtskorpus über Ihren KI-Assistenten zu durchsuchen.