Racicot v. Wiseau Studio CA2/3

CourtListener 10423285Calctapp30.04.2025

Gesamter Gesetzestext

Filed 4/30/25 Racicot v. Wiseau Studio CA2/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

MARTIN RACICOT et al., B334219

Plaintiffs and Respondents, Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. 21STCP03990
v.

WISEAU STUDIO, LLC, et al.,

Defendants and Appellants.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Elaine Lu, Judge. Affirmed.

Tesser | Grossman, Brian M. Grossman and Alec Pierce
Schulman for Defendants and Appellants.

Goode Hemme and Jerry D. Hemme for Plaintiffs
and Respondents.
_________________________
Wiseau Studio, LLC and Tommy Wiseau dba Wiseau-Films
(collectively, appellants) appeal from the trial court’s judgment
of $1,089,010.16 entered in favor of Room Full of Spoons Inc.,
Richard Harper, Fernando Forero McGrath, Martin Racicot dba
Rockhaven Pictures, Parktown Studios Inc., and Richard Stewart
Towns (collectively, respondents). Respondents petitioned the
Los Angeles Superior Court to recognize a Canadian judgment
they had obtained against appellants. The trial court granted
the petition and recognized the judgment under the Uniform
Foreign-Country Money Judgments Recognition Act (UFCA),
adopted by California under Code of Civil Procedure section
1713 et seq. (the Act).1 Defendants contend the court erred in
recognizing the judgment under the Act because (1) the judgment
effectively was a penalty precluding the Act’s application, and
(2) the proceedings in the Canadian court were “incompatible
with due process.” We affirm.
BACKGROUND2
In June 2003, appellants released the feature film
The Room. Although a box office flop,3 the film developed a
cult-like following. The film is screened monthly at “theatres
all over the world.” Wiseau, who wrote, produced, directed,

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Code of Civil
Procedure.
2 We take the underlying facts of the case from the Canadian
court’s written “Reasons for Judgment” and other written rulings
it references.
3 Critics described the film as “ ‘not just bad—it’s
intoxicatingly awful,’ ” the “ ‘Citizen Kane of bad movies,’ ” and
a “ ‘99 minute train wreck.’ ”

2
and starred in The Room, often attends these screenings and
has become “somewhat of a celebrity.”
In 2011, Wiseau’s co-star in The Room and friend, Greg
Sestero, wrote a nonfiction book about the making of The Room
called The Disaster Artist—My Life Inside The Room, The
Greatest Bad Movie Ever Made. A film adaptation of the book
—The Disaster Artist—was released in 2017 to broad critical
acclaim. Wiseau gave interviews, access to the original script
of The Room, and behind the scenes photographs and footage
to the author. He also entered into licensing agreements with
the filmmakers for use of footage from The Room and appeared
in The Disaster Artist.
Also in 2011, Harper and his friends McGrath and Racicot
sponsored a screening of The Room in Ottawa, Canada that
included an appearance by Wiseau for a $1,500 fee. Harper
and his friends “hit it off” with Wiseau. After spending time
with Wiseau in Ottawa and Toronto, “and with Wiseau’s
encouragement,” they decided to make a documentary about
The Room and its fans. A couple of months later, however,
Wiseau no longer wanted to participate in the documentary.
Respondents worked on the documentary, called Room
Full of Spoons, until early 2016. In addition to interviewing
actors and fans, respondents “investigated Wiseau’s background,”
including by interviewing Wiseau’s family in Poland. To finance
the film, respondents invested personal funds and raised money
through Kickstarter, a crowdfunding website.
In March 2014, while making the documentary, Harper
and McGrath attended Sestero’s book signing event at a
bookstore in Toronto. Wiseau was there. All four met later
that evening for dinner. Wiseau asked about the documentary

3
and said “he was not against it and hoped it would succeed.”
However, a year later—in March 2015—Wiseau began to express
disapproval of the documentary. He demanded respondents
stop using footage from The Room in the documentary and
remove all references to him from the Kickstarter campaign.
Harper proposed to Wiseau that they negotiate a license
agreement. In addition to significant payment for each clip
of The Room used in the documentary, Wiseau’s proposed
agreement gave Wiseau final approval of the documentary
and required it to focus on the fans rather than on The Room
or Wiseau. Harper told Wiseau respondents would allow him
to view the film before any public release, but they would not
agree “to give up ‘Final-Cut Privileges’ to him.” In response,
from April 2015 until February 2016, Wiseau attacked the
documentary through a YouTube web-series. Wiseau continued
to demand payment for the use of clips from The Room and—
asserting copyright and trademark infringements—demanded
respondents not use his name and change their promotional
posters.
Respondents completed the documentary in January 2016.
Seven minutes of the 109-minute Room Full of Spoons are clips
from The Room. The documentary tells Harper’s story of his
interest in The Room and in Wiseau, describes how The Room
was made and reactions to it, and addresses questions about
how Wiseau funded The Room and his secretive background,
including where he was born and his age—questions raised in
The Disaster Artist.
On February 23, 2016, respondents gave Wiseau a
“ ‘courtesy copy’ ” of the documentary. Wiseau objected to
references to his original name and birthdate, the time the

4
film devoted to his family in Poland, references to a California
civil action against him for fraud, and reference to claims by
The Room’s script supervisor that he actually directed 90 percent
of the film. He also complained the documentary was “ ‘too
negative’ ” and noted there were more than 65 clips from
The Room and Wiseau-Films original material. Respondents
rejected Wiseau’s objections and took the position the clips
were “ ‘covered under fair use.’ ”
In 2016 and early 2017, Room Full of Spoons was screened
at 10 film festivals in Europe and North America. The screenings
received positive attention. Wiseau emailed exhibitors and
potential exhibitors of the film, alleging copyright infringement
and illegal downloading of The Room, demanding the
documentary not be shown, and his image and references
to The Room not be used in promoting the documentary.
As a result, a planned tour of 25 North American cities, and
screenings scheduled in Australia, Poland, and the United
Kingdom in 2016 and 2017 were canceled.
In 2017, respondents were in discussions with an
independent film distributor in California, Gravitas Ventures,
LLC (Gravitas). Gravitas had offered respondents a draft
distribution agreement for a 15-year term covering the United
States and Canada. Gravitas was excited about the prospect
of releasing the documentary at around the same time as
the release of The Disaster Artist in late 2017.
On June 14, 2017, however, appellants filed a lawsuit
against respondents in Toronto and moved ex parte for
an injunction to prevent the release of Room Full of Spoons.
Respondents were given inadequate notice and could not appear
at the hearing. Justice Diamond of the Canadian court granted

5
an interim injunction and set a return date for June 23, 2017,
to determine whether the injunction should be extended through
trial. On June 23, at respondents’ request, Justice Akbarali
continued the hearing—and the injunction—to October 10, 2017,
to allow respondents to retain counsel and gather evidence.
In September 2017, while the injunction was in effect,
the film The Disaster Artist—a $10 million Hollywood production
starring James Franco as Wiseau—premiered at the Toronto
International Film Festival. The film is a dramatized version
of the making of The Room.
Due to the injunction and litigation, respondents could not
complete the distribution agreement with Gravitas. Gravitas
would not move forward with the deal until the claim was
resolved. Respondents also could not distribute DVDs or
otherwise release copies of the documentary while the litigation
continued. Some contributors to respondents’ Kickstarter
campaign asked for their money back because they had not
received a copy of the documentary as promised. Respondents
also lost the opportunity to release Room Full of Spoons
around the same time as The Disaster Artist.
Justice Koehnen held the continued hearing on the
injunction on October 10, 2017. Before the hearing, Wiseau
“failed to attend for cross-examination” on the affidavit he
had filed in support of the injunction. Respondents, therefore,
were unable to obtain any financial information from Wiseau
as to his income from The Room and The Disaster Artist.
In detailed “Reasons” released on November 1, 2017, Justice
Koehnen dissolved the injunction, finding appellants failed to
make “ ‘[a] proper disclosure’ ” of the true facts at the earlier

6
ex parte hearing.4 In January 2018, Justice Koehnen awarded
respondents costs “on a substantial indemnity basis in the
amount of $97,034.68, inclusive of disbursements and taxes.”
In so doing, Justice Koehnen stated, “[T]he degree of
nondisclosure and the degree of disparity between the affidavits
[appellants] submitted and the facts as I found them was of such
magnitude and frequency that an award of substantial indemnity
costs is appropriate and necessary to uphold the integrity of the
ex parte process.” Appellants unsuccessfully moved for leave
to appeal. On March 13, 2018, Justice Koehnen was appointed
as the case management judge.
In the meantime, respondents counterclaimed against
appellants alleging they had interfered with the distribution
of the documentary by improperly obtaining the injunction.
In February 2019, respondents indicated they planned to move
to dismiss the action under Ontario’s anti-SLAPP (Strategic
Litigation Against Public Participation) law. Justice Koehnen
suggested the parties instead agree to “a speedy case timetable
that would get the matter to trial quickly.” Respondents agreed
to forgo their motion and, with the parties’ agreement, Justice
Koehnen set a schedule for the completion of discovery and
exchange of affidavit evidence—which would constitute the
parties’ evidence in chief at trial—to allow the trial to be heard
in the fall of 2019.

4 The court also was unpersuaded that appellants “ ‘should
be granted an injunction on the traditional three part test which
requires them to demonstrate a serious issue to be tried, that
they will suffer irreparable harm if an injunction is not granted
and that the balance of convenience favours granting an
injunction.’ ”

7
Appellants changed attorneys several times during 2018
and 2019. There were periods where appellants appeared to be
unrepresented. Justice Koehnen heard three different motions
by three sets of counsel to withdraw from representing appellants
in the Canadian action. In April 2019, Justice Koehnen granted
the motion of appellants’ second set of attorneys to be relieved
as counsel, primarily for nonpayment of fees. Although
appellants had several months’ notice of their second counsel’s
intent to withdraw, they took no steps to appoint new counsel.
Not until Justice Koehnen refused to grant their request “for
lengthy extensions to the case timetable” did appellants retain
new counsel. In May 2019, Justice Koehnen set a new case
timetable with appellants’ third counsel and respondents.
Evidentiary matters were to be completed by the end of
November.
In early June 2019, Justice Koehnen set a trial date for
January 6, 2020. In early fall, appellants’ third counsel advised
the court “they would need to remove themselves from the
record.” Justice Koehnen “urged” Wiseau to retain new counsel
immediately. At an October 4, 2019 case conference, Justice
Koehnen told Wiseau the matter would proceed to trial on
January 6, 2020, despite any change in appellants’ lawyers.
Justice Koehnen also advised Wiseau that his new lawyers likely
would demand “a very large retainer” due to the volume of work
they would face and the history of the action. In mid-October,
appellants retained their fourth counsel. The parties already
had exchanged their evidence as scheduled in the summer
and fall of 2019.
About a month later, in mid-November 2019, appellants’
fourth counsel moved to withdraw. According to Justice

8
Koehnen, appellants’ second, third, and fourth counsel all had
moved to withdraw on the ground appellants refused to provide
a “realistic financial retainer” and “refuse[d] to pay for services”
unless appellants had pre-approved “the specific task” charged.
Justice Koehnen reasoned it was “simply not possible for counsel
to prepare for trial on that basis.” Appellants’ fourth counsel
had asked for a $25,000 retainer, but appellants objected. During
a November 26, 2019 conference call to schedule the motion,
Justice Koehnen advised Wiseau that, in his view, a $25,000
retainer was “very low”—considering the imminent 10-day trial
—for a client outside the jurisdiction with whom counsel had
no prior relationship. Justice Koehnen reiterated to Wiseau
that “under no circumstances” would the January 6, 2020
trial date be postponed.
The court granted counsel’s motion to withdraw on
December 2, 2019 noting that, although relationships between
client and counsel can break down through no fault of either,
here, “the fault clearly lies with the [appellants].” The court
continued, “The defendants are entitled to have the matter
adjudicated. The plaintiffs should not be permitted to delay
adjudication any further.” Justice Koehnen expressly stated
his “concern” that appellants again would use their lack of
counsel as an excuse “to amend the case timetable . . . at the
opening of trial.” He admonished appellants that they would
“have to seek an[d] appoint counsel who are available for a
ten day trial to commence on January 6, 2020.”
At a December 10, 2019 case management conference,
appellants sought to retain their fifth counsel, but respondents

9
objected that the lawyer had an imputed conflict of interest.5
Appellants also asked the court to adjourn the January 6, 2020
trial “to permit them to pursue with the Crown Attorney,
allegations of perjury against [respondents].” Justice Koehnen
denied the motion noting appellants gave no reason for failing
to pursue allegations of perjury in the past or why the civil trial
should not proceed. Wiseau also—for the first time—objected
to the form of trial. The trial had been set to proceed with
“examinations in chief being replaced by affidavits and with
witnesses proceeding immediately to cross-examination.”
Appellants’ former counsel had agreed to the procedure and
timetable. The court overruled Wiseau’s objection.
On December 30, 2019, appellants again moved to
adjourn the trial on the ground they did not have counsel.
On December 31, 2019, appellants’ new counsel Daniel Brinza—
the sixth lawyer to appear for appellants—appeared in a limited
capacity to seek adjournment of the January 6, 2020 trial.
Brinza had told appellants he could not adequately prepare for a
trial beginning in a week, due to the large volume of documents.
In a four-plus page written ruling, Justice Koehnen denied
the adjournment request. As stated in the decision, under
Canadian law, in considering a request for adjournment, the
court “must balance the interests of the plaintiff, the interests
of the defendant and the interests of the administration of justice
in the orderly processing of civil trials on their merits.” Justice
Koehnen expressly stated appellants had “a legitimate interest

5 Appellants’ proposed new lawyer and respondents’
attorneys had worked at the same firm while respondents’
attorneys were representing them in the Canadian matter.

10
in having access to counsel and in being represented by counsel
at trial”; the refusal to grant an adjournment could jeopardize
that right; and whether it was appropriate to jeopardize that
right depended “on the circumstances of the individual case.”
The Justice concluded that in this case, however, “any limitation
on the plaintiffs’ access to counsel is a limitation of their own
making about which they have been warned on numerous
occasions in the past.”
The decision set forth the history of the setting of the
expedited schedule and the repeated withdrawals of appellants’
counsel from the case due to appellants’ refusal to pay a
reasonable retainer and to allow counsel to work on “any single
task” without advance approval. Justice Koehnen explained
he had told Wiseau “no lawyer would represent him on the trial
unless he provided the lawyer with a retainer that covered the
cost to prepare for and attend a 10-day trial, plus a generous
contingency in the event their time estimates were incorrect.”
He also repeatedly had warned Wiseau the trial would proceed
on January 6 and would not be adjourned. Justice Koehnen
concluded appellants’ request to continue the trial did “not fall
into the category of unforeseen events”: appellants had known
since early June 2019 that the trial would begin on January 6,
2020, and had “treated their own lawyers in a commercially
unreasonable manner and forced them to remove themselves
from the record.”
The court continued, “If the court permits [appellants] to
act irresponsibly with respect to numerous sets of lawyers and
then allows [appellants] to delay the trial because of their own
lack of responsibility, it would be doing a grave injustice to the
[respondents].” The court noted respondents had agreed to forgo

11
filing their anti-SLAPP motion—as “a concession” to appellants—
based on the agreed-upon expedited trial schedule. They also
had arranged to have a large number of witnesses—many from
out of town—attend the trial in Toronto during the weeks of
January 6 and 13, 2020. The court reasoned that, to adjourn
a 10-day trial that had been set since June 2019 would amount
“to a waste of 10 days of judicial time that could have been
available for other litigants, but no longer is. [¶] While the
[appellants] have a right to counsel, that right should not be used
to deny other litigants waiting for court dates access to justice.
[¶] To use Mr. Wiseau’s language[,] it would be a ‘major
disservice to justice’ to allow him to delay access to justice to
[respondents] and others in the litigation system simply because
he refuses to deal with lawyers on ordinary commercial terms.”
On January 3, 2020, Justice Koehnen heard appellants’
January 1, 2020 motion—brought by Brinza—to discontinue
their claim. The court again balanced the prejudice appellants
would suffer if not permitted to discontinue against the prejudice
to respondents if leave to discontinue were granted. Brinza
suggested the main action be discontinued, but respondents
could continue with their counterclaim. Justice Koehnen noted
a discontinuance of the main case would not lift the restraints
imposed against respondents. Rather, appellants “simply
propos[ed] to bring a new action in another jurisdiction for the
same relief.” Discontinuing appellants’ action would deprive
respondents—who already had waited two years—of an
adjudication of the issues and “would force them to wait another
undetermined period of time until [appellants’] new action is
resolved.” The court found the prejudice to respondents

12
“far outweigh[ed]” the prejudice to appellants and dismissed
the motion for leave to discontinue the case.
On January 6, 2020, the trial proceeded over eight days
before Justice Schabas. On April 23, 2020, Justice Schabas
entered a money judgment in favor of respondents. The court
issued a detailed and lengthy “Reasons for Judgment”—akin
to a statement of decision—including background information,
a summary of the evidence presented, legal analysis of
appellants’ causes of action and respondents’ counterclaim,
findings of fact, and conclusions of law. Appellants
unsuccessfully sought reconsideration of the judgment and
then unsuccessfully appealed the decision to the Court of Appeal
for Ontario and to the Supreme Court of Canada.
The Canadian judgment totaled $1,089,010.16 in United
States currency plus interest. Of that amount, $550,000 was for
compensatory damages; and $481,521.80 was for costs, including
$406,456.85 in attorney fees—$278,567.54 of which was
“assessed on a ‘substantial’ indemnity basis,” and $81,128.79
of which “was assessed on a ‘partial’ indemnity basis.” The court
also awarded respondents $200,000 in Canadian currency in
punitive damages. The judgment became final on April 14, 2022,
after the Supreme Court of Canada dismissed appellants’
application for leave to appeal from the judgment of the
Court of Appeal for Ontario.
On December 6, 2021, respondents commenced this action
in the Los Angeles Superior Court by filing a petition to enforce
the Canadian judgment under the Act. The parties stipulated to
try the case through written briefing with no in-person testimony
and based on a stipulated record from the Canadian court’s
record. The parties deemed their trial briefs as opening

13
statements and filed closing arguments. Appellants asserted
several defenses to the enforcement of the Canadian judgment.
On August 1, 2023, the trial court took the matter under
submission. The court issued its final statement of decision on
October 19, 2023.6 The court rejected appellants’ defenses, found
the Act applied, and granted respondents’ petition to recognize
the Canadian judgment. On November 6, 2023, the trial court
entered judgment for respondents in the amount of $1,089,010.16
in United States currency plus prejudgment and postjudgment
interest and costs.
DISCUSSION
Appellants’ appeal is limited to the trial court’s rejection
of two of their defenses to the enforcement of the Canadian
judgment: that the judgment was a fine or penalty, and that
the proceedings were not compatible with due process.
1. Applicable law and standards of review
Under the Act, California courts must recognize foreign-
country judgments for the recovery of a sum of money that are
“final, conclusive, and enforceable.” (§§ 1715, subd. (a), 1716,
subd. (a).) As relevant here, the Act does not apply to a foreign-
country money judgment “to the extent that the judgment is . . .
[¶] . . . [a] fine or other penalty.” (§ 1715, subd. (b)(2).) The party
seeking to enforce a foreign judgment has the burden to show
the judgment “is entitled to recognition” under the Act. (§ 1715,
subd. (c).) Once that burden is met, the party resisting
recognition of the judgment “has the burden of establishing

6 The court issued its proposed statement of decision on
October 2, 2023. Appellants filed objections and respondents
replied.

14
that a ground for nonrecognition stated in [section 1716,]
subdivision (b), (c), or (d) exists.” (§ 1716, subd. (e).)
An express ground for nonrecognition is where “[t]he
specific proceeding in the foreign court leading to the judgment
was not compatible with the requirements of due process of law.”
(§ 1716, subd. (c)(1)(G).) “[T]he focus of the inquiry ‘is not
whether the procedure in the rendering country is similar to U.S.
procedure, but rather on the basic fairness of the foreign-country
procedure.’ ” (Cal. Law Revision Com. com. (2017 Amend.),
West’s Ann. Code Civ. Proc. (2018 ed.) foll. § 1716.) A court
may nonetheless recognize the judgment “if the party seeking
recognition of the judgment demonstrates good reason to
recognize the judgment that outweighs the ground for
nonrecognition.” (§ 1716, subd. (c)(2).) Accordingly,
subparagraph (c)(1)(G) is a “discretionary ground[ ] for
denying recognition.” (Cal. Law Revision Com. com., supra,
Background from the 2005 Uniform Act ¶¶ 3–4, 12.)
We review the question of whether the Canadian judgment
is a “fine or penalty” under the Act—a question of law—de novo.
(See, e.g., Hyundai Securities Co., Ltd. v. Lee (2013) 215
Cal.App.4th 682, 688 (Hyundai Securities I) [“Questions of law
regarding the application and requirements of the Act are
reviewed de novo.”].) As the incompatibility of the foreign
proceedings with the requirements of due process is a
discretionary ground for nonrecognition, respondents assert
the standard of review is for abuse of discretion. The authority
respondents cite concerned a different ground for nonrecognition,
however—where the judgment is repugnant to the public policy
of the state or the United States. (Citing Hyundai Securities
Co., Ltd. v. Lee (2015) 232 Cal.App.4th 1379, 1386 (Hyundai

15
Securities II).) Nevertheless, we agree that, because a court may
recognize a foreign judgment on a proper showing by the party
seeking to enforce it—even where the proceedings were not
compatible with the requirements of due process—its decision
to do so is reviewed for abuse of discretion.
“ ‘ “An abuse of discretion occurs if, in light of the applicable
law and considering all of the relevant circumstances, the
court’s decision exceeds the bounds of reason and results in a
miscarriage of justice.” ’ ” (Espejo v. The Copley Press, Inc. (2017)
13 Cal.App.5th 329, 378.) Accordingly, whether the court applied
the correct legal standard in exercising its discretion is a question
of law subject to de novo review. (E.g., Esparza v. Safeway, Inc.
(2019) 36 Cal.App.5th 42, 59; see also Camacho v. Superior Court
(2023) 15 Cal.5th 354, 383 [under abuse of discretion standard
findings of fact are reviewed for substantial evidence and
conclusions of law de novo].) We will reverse the trial court’s
application of the law to the facts, however, “ ‘only if arbitrary
and capricious.’ ” (Camacho, at p. 383.)
2. The portion of the judgment respondents ask
the court to recognize is not a penalty
The Act does not apply to a foreign-country money
judgment “to the extent that the judgment is . . . [a] fine or other
penalty.” (§ 1715, subd. (b)(2).) Generally, the test for whether
a judgment is a fine or penalty under the Act “is determined
by whether its purpose is remedial in nature, with its benefits
accruing to private individuals, or it is penal in nature, punishing
an offense against public justice.” (Hyundai Securities II, supra,
232 Cal.App.4th at p. 1388; see id. at pp. 1383, 1387 [foreign
judgment for indemnification of criminal fine paid by the plaintiff
was not a penalty or fine because it was meant to compensate the

16
plaintiff for damages it incurred in having had to pay that fine];
see also Java Oil Ltd. v. Sullivan (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 1178,
1188 (Java Oil) [“ ‘A penal judgment . . . is a judgment in favor of
a foreign state or one of its subdivisions, and primarily punitive
rather than compensatory in character.’ ”].)
Although “ ‘[s]ome states consider judgments penal for
purpose of nonrecognition if multiple, punitive, or exemplary
damages are awarded, even when no governmental agency is
a party . . .[,] [i]n the United States, such judgments are not
considered penal for this purpose.’ ” (Java Oil, supra, 168
Cal.App.4th at pp. 1188–1189 [holding foreign-country judgment
ordering appellant to pay attorney fees was not a penalty because
it did not punish appellant for an offense against the public but
ordered him to compensate respondents for fees they incurred
in defending the lawsuit].) Thus, in determining whether
a judgment is a fine or penalty, courts consider such factors
as “whether the judgment is for punishment rather than
compensation; the judgment is payable to the state as opposed to
a private party; the judgment arose from the penal laws of the
country rather than a civil action; the damages were designed
to make the defendant an example or punish the defendant;
and a mandatory fine, sanction or multiplier was imposed on
the defendant.” (Hyundai Securities II, supra, 232 Cal.App.4th
at p. 1389 [describing the factors suggested by the court in
Java Oil, at pp. 1186–1189].)
a. The $550,000 compensatory damages award
compensated respondents for their lost revenue
Respondents met their burden to demonstrate the
Canadian judgment was not a penalty or fine under the Act.
The $550,000 compensatory damages awarded to Room Full

17
of Spoons, Inc.7 was a damages award between private, civil
litigants to compensate Room Full of Spoons, Inc. for the revenue
it lost as a result of its “inability to exploit Room Full of Spoons”
due to the injunction that the Canadian court found Wiseau
wrongfully had obtained.
Respondents’ expert witness Doug Bania opined on the
revenue respondents lost due to their inability to release their
documentary around the release of The Disaster Artist. As part
of his analysis, Bania considered three comparable situations
where documentaries had been made about feature films. Bania
opined that, “[d]ue to the success of The Disaster Artist,”8 if
respondents had been able to release Room Full of Spoons in
2017 before The Disaster Artist’s release, Room Full of Spoons,
Inc. conservatively would have earned $660,000 [in United States
currency] from its production of the documentary. Bania noted
The Room “benefitted considerably from the release of The
Disaster Artist, especially following its release in December
2017.” Room Full of Spoons did not receive any online “ ‘buzz,’ ”
explained by the fact the injunction had forced respondents
“to take down their social media promoting” the documentary.
Bania also testified on cross-examination about “the ‘cloud

7 The Canadian court concluded the damages should be
awarded to respondents’ corporate entity because it owns the
documentary.
8 James Franco won a Golden Globe award for best actor
in a musical or comedy for his work in The Disaster Artist, and
the film was nominated for an Academy Award for Best Adapted
Screenplay. It “garnered box office revenue of approximately
$30 [million].”

18
on title’ from this action and confirmed that this would explain
why the documentary has still not been released.”
In determining the amount of compensatory damages
to award, the Canadian trial court considered several factors,
including the timing of the injunction, the potential distribution
deal with Gravitas, and the future earning potential of the
documentary. The court found “compelling” and “accepted”
Bania’s “uncontradicted” evidence and conclusion that Room
Full of Spoons Inc. would have earned $660,000 in United States
currency had the documentary been released in 2017. The court
considered that, although the injunction was lifted in November
2017, and The Disaster Artist was released commercially in
December 2017, “[t]he injunction, which launched this lawsuit,
had the effect of blocking the release of the documentary in 2017.
Although lifted in November, [respondents] could not complete
the distribution deal while the lawsuit was outstanding and,
in any event, it would have been impossible to finalize, market
and distribute Room Full of Spoons widely within just a few
weeks in late 2017, which is when the ‘buzz’ for The Disaster
Artist peaked.” The court noted, however, that interest in
The Room continued and there would “be a market for Room
Full of Spoons when it is finally released.” For that reason,
the court was “willing to assume that, absent ‘buzz’ from
The Disaster Artist, Room Full of Spoons [would] likely earn
something similar to” a documentary “at the low end of Bania’s
comparables, or about US$110,000.” The court thus reduced
the compensatory damages award by that amount to $550,000.
Nevertheless, appellants argue the $550,000 compensatory
damages award “was an over-inflated and cleverly disguised
penalty.” They argue the $550,000 compensatory damages award

19
was penal in nature because it “went beyond what was necessary
to compensate [r]espondents.” (Citing Miller v. Municipal Court
of Los Angeles (1943) 22 Cal.2d 818, 837 for the proposition that
“a ‘penalty’ includes any law compelling a defendant to pay
a plaintiff other than what is necessary to compensate him for
a legal damage done him by the former.”)9 Appellants seem
to argue respondents were not damaged by the injunction,
but by appellants’ filing of the lawsuit itself. They note the
Canadian court and respondents “repeatedly stated” the lawsuit,
not the injunction, prevented the release of Room of Spoons.
Appellants also assert the Canadian court awarded respondents
$97,034.68 “as a penalty against [a]ppellants” after dissolving
the injunction.10 Appellants also surmise the Canadian court
awarded respondents “an additional $1.2+ million under the
pretext that the injunction was wrongful and prevented (the
already released film) from being released at a ‘commercially
critical time.’ ” Appellants’ contentions are without merit.
In respondents’ words, the injunction was “devastating.”
After considering the evidence, the Canadian trial court
apparently agreed. The court specifically found it was the
injunction that prevented respondents from capitalizing on

9 The court in Miller reviewed statutes requiring payment of
treble damages, double damages, and minimum fines and found
they were penal for purposes of enforcement of foreign state
judgments. (Miller v. Municipal Court of Los Angeles, supra,
22 Cal.2d at p. 837.)
10 The $97,034.68 award was not included in the judgment.
It related to respondents’ attorney fees and costs—reduced from
their requested $106,413.68—incurred in opposing the injunction
motion.

20
the “ ‘buzz’ ” of The Disaster Artist—that despite the lifting
of the injunction before that film debuted, “it would have been
impossible to finalize, market and distribute” the documentary
within just a few weeks in late 2017. The injunction had
prevented respondents from marketing Room Full of Spoons
or referring to Wiseau or The Room—the subjects of the
documentary—and had required them to remove pre-injunction,
historical posts, as well. Moreover, the trial court reduced
respondents’ estimated damages, recognizing Room Full of
Spoons still could be released and earn revenue. Accordingly,
we conclude the Canadian court did not award the $550,000
to make an example of—or to punish—appellants, but to
compensate respondents for damages caused by the
wrongful injunction.
Appellants contend the Canadian court ignored their
evidence that respondents had no contract with Gravitas and
Gravitas had no plans to release the documentary theatrically,
as well as evidence that the documentary “required additional
editing and would have had challenges obtaining insurance.”
They thus argue the court “sided with [r]espondents and
punished [a]ppellants for enforcing their rights through the
Courts.” Appellants’ argument relates to their disagreement
with the Canadian court’s assessment of the evidence, findings,
and analysis of respondents’ damages. It has no bearing on
whether the compensatory award constitutes a penalty under
the Act. Even if the Canadian court got it wrong, the judgment
is final. Appellants had their chance to appeal and they lost.
Appellants’ argument that the Canadian court awarded
respondents $1.2 million (in compensatory damages and costs
and fees) “under the pretext that the injunction was wrongful”

21
and prevented the documentary “from being released at a
‘commercially critical time,’ ” is purely speculative. (Italics
added.) As none of the factors leads us to conclude the
$550,000 compensatory damages award was a penalty or fine,
we reject appellants’ contention that the Act does not apply.
b. Respondents did not cause the injunction to be
extended
Appellants also argue the compensatory damages award
was inflated because it included the four-and-a-half-month period
between the original return date for the hearing on appellants’
motion for an interlocutory injunction in June 2017, and the
continued October 2017 date that respondents had requested.
Appellants argue the four-and-a-half-month period never should
have been included in Bania’s calculation of damages because
respondents asked for the injunction hearing to be continued
thus extending the injunction.
On June 14, 2017, appellants brought an ex parte
motion for an interim and interlocutory injunction preventing
respondents from releasing, distributing, or promoting their
documentary. Because the court granted the motion ex parte,
the court “adjourned” the motion for a 30-minute hearing on
June 23, 2017, for the court to determine “whether to further
extend the terms of the injunction order, and if so for how long
and upon what, if any, additional terms.” Accordingly, as
respondents argue, the interim injunction would not simply
have expired on June 23, 2017.
Respondents appeared at the June 23, 2017 hearing and
asked the court to adjourn the motion to give them time to retain
counsel and present evidence in opposition to the continuation
of the injunction. We can infer respondents would have been

22
unable to defeat the extension of the injunction on June 23.
Thus, if respondents had not asked for the adjournment, the
injunction would have remained in effect until trial—another
two and half years. Accordingly, respondents’ request to continue
the hearing did not extend the time the injunction was in place
but enabled respondents to obtain its dissolution much earlier.
Moreover, the court selected October 10, 2017, for the new
hearing because it was “the first available date.”
c. The award of punitive damages does not render
the rest of the judgment a penalty
The Canadian court also awarded respondents $200,000
in Canadian currency in punitive damages. Respondents agree
the punitive damages award was a penalty that should not be
recognized under the Act. They did not include the $200,000 in
Canadian currency in their petition/complaint for recognition of
the Canadian judgment, however. Without citation to authority,
appellants nevertheless argue “[r]espondent[s’] exclusion of
the punitive damages component of the judgment demonstrates
the entire judgment can’t be recognized because the basis of
the compensatory damages award was penal in nature.”
Section 1715, subdivision (b)(2) expressly states that
the Act “does not apply to a foreign-country judgment . . .
to the extent that the judgment is . . . [a] fine or other penalty.”
(Italics added.) As respondents argue, the plain meaning of
the qualifying language—“to the extent that”—demonstrates
it is only the portion of a judgment that is a fine or penalty that
cannot be recognized, not that the entirety of a money judgment
should not be recognized if any part of it is a fine or penalty. (See
Coalition of Concerned Communities, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles
(2004) 34 Cal.4th 733, 737 [if the plain language of a statute

23
is clear “courts must generally follow its plain meaning unless
a literal interpretation would result in absurd consequences
the Legislature did not intend”].)
d. The $278,567.54 in costs awarded on a substantial
indemnity basis was not a penalty under the Act
Finally, appellants argue the $278,567.54 in costs awarded
on a substantial indemnity basis “were penal in character” based
on the Canadian court’s statements in its “Reasons for Costs.”
According to the Canadian authorities appellants gave the trial
court, a Canadian court may determine in its discretion to whom
and what costs shall be paid. (Skourtis v. The City of Toronto
et al. (June 22, 2021 CV-18-590158) 2021 ONSC 4492 (CanLII).)
“The overriding principles in determining costs are fairness and
reasonableness.” (Ibid.) “The court should only depart from the
general rule that costs on a partial indemnity scale should follow
the event for very good reasons such as misconduct of the party,
miscarriage in procedure or oppressive or vexatious conduct.”
(Ibid.; Covenoho v. HomeLife/Response Realty Inc., et al. (Jan. 1,
2023, DC 008/22) 2023 ONSC 168 (CanLII) [“substantial
indemnity costs should not be awarded except in rare and
exceptional circumstances”].)
In the Canadian trial court’s June 24, 2020 Reasons
for Costs, the court explained, “In deciding costs, my role is to
consider whether, aside from the injunction motion, the conduct
of the case by Mr. Wiseau and his counsel was so egregious
and reprehensible that it merits an elevated award of costs.”
The court found Wiseau’s conduct, accusations against the court,
and “isolated allegation of perjury” alone did not support
awarding substantial indemnity costs. The court noted, however,
that respondents had served offers to settle the main action

24
and the counterclaim a month before trial began, and they
had obtained both a monetary judgment on the counterclaim
and a costs award on the main action that were higher than the
settlement offers. Under the Canadian Rules of Civil Procedure,
the court has discretion to award substantial indemnity costs
from the date of an offer to settle a counterclaim or the main
action. (R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194, r. 49.10, 49.13, 49.14).) Rule 57
of the Canadian Rules discusses various factors “the court may
consider, in addition to the result in the proceeding and any
offer to settle” in exercising its discretion to award costs. (Id.,
r. 57.01(1).)
Justice Schabas explained that he had noted many factors
“favour[ed], but on their own did not persuade” him, “that costs
on an elevated basis should be awarded.” The court found the
offers to settle “tip[ped] the balance, however, in favour of
elevated costs at least from the date that those offers were made.”
Justice Schabas reasoned respondents “achieved far better
results than were contained in their settlement offers, and in my
view, [respondents] should be awarded substantial indemnity
costs from December 3, 2019 forward.” Of the $629,313.57
respondents sought in their Bill of Costs, the court awarded
“the costs under the headings ‘Pre-Trial Hearing After Rule 49
Offer,’ ‘Trial Preparation (2019/2020),’ ‘Trial’ and ‘Costs
Submissions’ on a substantial indemnity basis,” totaling
$278,567.54.
Contrary to appellants’ representations, the Canadian
court thus did not award substantial indemnity costs to punish
or make an example of appellants. The court specifically found
Wiseau’s conduct did not justify imposition of elevated costs.
Rather, the court awarded substantial indemnity costs in its

25
discretion under Rules of Civil Procedure, rule 49 based on
respondents’ achievement of “far better results” than what were
contained in their rejected settlement offers.
We conclude the Canadian court’s discretionary award
of substantial indemnity costs was not a fine or penalty under
the Act. True, as appellants assert, the Canadian court explained
that “ ‘costs serve a purpose beyond indemnification’ including
encouraging settlement, deterring frivolous actions and
preventing abuse of the court’s process.” That litigants may
have to reimburse their opponents’ costs—including attorney fees
—if they lose does not render the award of costs a penalty or fine
under the Act. The Canadian court did not award the costs
under a penal statute designed to punish a public offense.
Nor were the costs paid to the court or state. The award of
substantial indemnity costs, in short, “ ‘afford[ed] a private
remedy to a person injured by [a] wrongful act.’ ” (Java Oil,
supra, 168 Cal.App.4th at p. 1187.)
Java Oil is on point. There, the court found an award
of attorney fees in a malicious prosecution lawsuit was not
a penalty under the Act. (Java Oil, supra, 168 Cal.App.4th at
pp. 1188–1189.) Although the defendant “view[ed] the attorney
fee award as a penalty for groundless litigation, it was not
a penalty within the meaning of the [Act].” (Id. at p. 1189.)
The judgment arose from a civil action, not from an enforcement
of the foreign country’s penal laws; the defendant was not
being punished for a public offense but ordered to compensate
the plaintiff for having to defend the frivolous action; and the
court imposed “[n]o mandatory fine, sanction, or multiplier.”
(Id. at pp. 1188–1189.)

26
Similarly, here, the Canadian court’s substantial
indemnity cost award compensated respondents for their
costs and attorney fees at trial.11 Even if effectively punishing
appellants, the purpose of the award was reparation to
respondents, not punishment of appellants “for an offense
against the public.” (Java Oil, supra, 168 Cal.App.4th at p. 1188;
see also Erbe Elektromedizin GMBH v. Canady (W.D.Pa. 2008)
545 F.Supp.2d 491, 496–497, cited by Java Oil [attorney fees
awarded to prevailing party after party incurred costs defending
civil patent suit were meant to compensate party, not punish
losing party for a penal offense and therefore qualified as
enforceable foreign judgment]; Loucks v. Standard Oil Co.
of New York (N.Y.Ct.App. 1918) 120 N.E. 198, 198–199, cited
by Java Oil [award of damages to estate in wrongful death case
under statute allowing minimum recovery not penal under
the Act where offender was punished as “reparation to those
aggrieved by his offense”].) Nor did the Canadian court impose
a multiplier or other mandatory fine or penalty in awarding
the costs. Rather, the court in its discretion imposed substantial

11 Respondents’ attorneys apparently took the case pro bono.
The Canadian court rejected appellants’ argument that “a large
costs award would amount to a windfall for the lawyers akin to
a contingency fee.” The court explained Canadian law permitted
awards of costs to pro bono counsel and self-represented litigants
and law firms. Such awards ensured both pro bono and non-
pro bono parties understood they were not free to abuse the
system without fear of having to pay costs; and promoted access
to justice by enabling and encouraging lawyers to volunteer
to work pro bono on deserving cases. (Citing 1465778 Ontario
Inc. et al. v. 1122077 Ontario Ltd. et al. (2006), 2006 CanLII
35819 (ON CA), 82 O.R. (3d) 757, at paras. 30, 35.)

27
indemnity costs—as permitted under Canadian rules—to
compensate respondents for their costs of trial given the trial
could have been avoided had appellants settled the case.
3. The court did not err in finding the denial of the
continuance was not inconsistent with due process
Appellants contend the Canadian judgment also should not
be recognized because the proceedings resulting in the judgment
were incompatible with due process. (§ 1716, subd. (c)(1)(G).)
The due process exception under subdivision (c)(1)(G) is “reserved
for challenges as to the ‘integrity or fundamental fairness with
regard to the particular proceeding leading to the foreign-country
judgment.’ ” (AO Alfa-Bank v. Yakovlev (2018) 21 Cal.App.5th
189, 215.) “ ‘[F]oreign courts are not required to adopt “every
jot and tittle of American due process,” ’ ” however. (Ibid.) Thus,
the court’s “task is to decide whether the foreign procedures
are ‘ “fundamentally fair” ’ and do not offend ‘ “basic fairness.” ’ ”
(Id. at p. 216 [“the question is whether the foreign proceeding
conformed to . . . the ‘international concept of due process’ ”].)
Appellants contend the Canadian court proceedings were
fundamentally unfair because the court effectively denied them
their right to counsel when it would not continue the trial date
after allowing appellants’ attorneys to withdraw. Appellants
note, “[a] civil litigant has a constitutional right to be represented
by counsel at trial.” (Oliveros v. County of Los Angeles (2004)
120 Cal.App.4th 1389, 1398 (Oliveros).) More accurately, “a party
has the right to appear through counsel if a lawyer has been
retained,” but there “ ‘is no due process right to counsel in
civil cases.’ ” (In re Marriage of Tara & Robert D. (2024) 99
Cal.App.5th 871, 887 (Tara), quoting Walker v. State Bar (1989)
49 Cal.3d 1107, 1116.) Here, appellants in fact were represented

28
by counsel at the trial leading to the Canadian judgment.
Appellants argue, however, they were “effectively pro se” due to
their newly retained counsel Daniel Brinza having had only
one week to prepare for trial.
“A motion for continuance is addressed to the sound
discretion of the trial court. [Citation.] However, ‘ “[t]he trial
judge must exercise his discretion with due regard to all interests
involved, and the refusal of a continuance which has the practical
effect of denying the applicant a fair hearing is reversible
error.” ’ ” (Oliveros, supra, 120 Cal.App.4th at p. 1395.) We
conclude the Canadian court’s refusal to continue the trial did
not render the proceedings fundamentally unfair to appellants.
In the trial court, appellants argued the Canadian
court abused its discretion in denying their request to adjourn
(continue) the January 6, 2020 trial date, relying on Oliveros
and Vann v. Shilleh (1975) 54 Cal.App.3d 192 (Vann). On appeal,
appellants also rely on Tara, supra, decided during the pendency
of this appeal. The trial court found Oliveros and Vann
distinguishable. We agree and also find Tara distinguishable.
In Oliveros, the defendant county’s outside trial counsel
learned of an unexpected, last-minute scheduling conflict with
a trial in an earlier-filed action and asked the trial court to
continue the trial against the county. (Oliveros, supra, 120
Cal.App.4th at pp. 1392–1394.) The court—believing defense
counsel had taken on too many cases and should get another
lawyer in his firm to handle the case—would not continue the
trial to begin after the earlier-filed case concluded. The court
began the trial without the presence of the county or its counsel
and directed a verdict in plaintiffs’ favor for more than $12.5
million. (Id. at pp. 1393–1394.) The appellate court concluded

29
the trial court abused its discretion because it failed to “carefully
balance all of the competing interests at stake” before denying
the continuance. (Id. at p. 1399.) The court noted that,
“ ‘ “[w]hile it is true that a trial judge must have control of
the courtroom and its calendar and must have discretion to
deny a request for a continuance when there is no good cause
for granting one, it is equally true that, absent [a lack of diligence
or other abusive] circumstances which are not present in this
case, a request for a continuance supported by a showing of
good cause usually ought to be granted.” ’ ” (Id. at p. 1396.)
Similarly, in Vann—based on the trial court’s “policy of
no continuance[s]”—the court denied a defendant’s motion to
continue a trial after his attorney unexpectedly withdrew one
court day before trial. (Vann, supra, 54 Cal.App.3d at pp. 195–
196.) The bench trial proceeded with that defendant acting as
his own attorney. (Id. at p. 196.) The Court of Appeal concluded
the trial court failed to exercise its discretion by denying the
continuance solely based on its policy against continuances.
(Id. at pp. 198–199.)
The court noted, however, that “[i]t cannot be held that
litigants in all cases may demand a continuance by engaging
counsel just prior to a trial date, where there is no showing of any
necessity for any change of counsel, but a necessary substitution
of counsel just prior to trial may justify the granting of a
continuance, in some cases.” (Vann, supra, 54 Cal.App.3d
at p. 196, italics added.) The court concluded the attorney’s
withdrawal on the eve of trial—because the defendant rejected
a settlement—was unethical, and it was the trial court’s duty
to see that the attorney’s former client “was protected, so far
as possible, from the consequences of [the attorney’s] improper

30
abandonment of his client.” (Id. at p. 197.) The court noted
that, when an attorney withdraws on the eve of trial, “the party
ordinarily does not have sufficient time to procure counsel, and
unless the party actually had sufficient advance warning that
his attorney intended to withdraw, the circumstances justified
granting a continuance.” (Ibid., italics added.)
In Tara, a week before trial, appellant’s counsel moved
to be relieved due to a breakdown in the attorney-client
relationship. (Tara, supra, 99 Cal.App.5th at p. 875.)
After a hearing, the court permitted the attorney to withdraw
but would not continue the trial—except for a one-day
postponement—noting it had “ ‘made . . . clear again and again
that this trial was not going to be continued.’ ” (Id. at p. 876.)
Although appellant “told the court he did not want to proceed
without counsel and did not think he could successfully try the
case on his own,” the court declined to continue the trial further.
(Id. at pp. 876–877.)
The appellate court found the trial court abused its
discretion, but the court’s error did not affect the outcome of
the proceedings. (Tara, supra, 99 Cal.App.5th at pp. 883, 889.)
The court explained that, in exercising its discretion, the trial
court “could not merely rely on its prior statements, but was
instead required to revisit the reasons [for] those statements
to determine whether they still applied in light of the changed
circumstance”—the withdrawal of counsel on the eve of trial. (Id.
at pp. 881–882.) The court noted the trial court’s decision there,
unlike in Vann, was not based on a blanket policy against
continuances in all cases, but “it was based on a blanket policy
of denying any continuance of the trial in this case, despite a
significant change of circumstance.” (Id. at p. 882.) Accordingly,

31
as in Vann, the trial court had failed “to consider whether new
facts and a developing situation” required reevaluation of its
earlier decisions and a rebalancing of the competing interests.
(Ibid.) The court expressly did not hold, however, “that the trial
court was obligated to grant a continuance, or that a continuance
of some particular length was required.” (Ibid.) The problem
there was the trial court “failed to conduct the necessary inquiry.”
(Ibid.)
Appellants argue the Canadian court, like the courts
in Oliveros and Vann “hid behind the façade it needed to keep
to its schedule no matter what without due regard to the extreme
prejudice placed upon Appellants . . . [and] failed in its duty to
protect Appellants from the consequences of Appellants’ prior
counsel’s improper abandonment.” Appellants also contend the
Canadian court, as the court did in Tara, applied a blanket policy
of no continuances in this case and thus did not properly exercise
its discretion in deciding whether to grant a continuance. The
record does not support appellants’ contentions.
First, the withdrawal of appellants’ counsel is different
from the situations in Oliveros, Vann, and Tara. There is no
evidence appellants’ attorneys acted unethically in withdrawing
from representing them, as in Vann, or the need for a
continuance lay at the attorneys’ feet, as in Oliveros. Moreover,
in all three cases, the attorney moved to withdraw, or learned
of the need for a continuance, only a week or days before the
trial was to begin. Here, appellants’ fourth counsel stated they
intended to withdraw from the case a month and a half before
the trial date. Appellants were not blindsided by their attorneys’
withdrawal. (Cf. Vann, supra, 54 Cal.App.3d at p. 197 [absent

32
sufficient warning of attorney’s withdrawal, eve-of-trial
withdrawal justifies granting a continuance].)
Indeed, the reason for counsel’s withdrawal—and the
withdrawal of appellants’ second and third sets of attorneys—
primarily was due to Wiseau’s refusal to pay a reasonable
retainer. Appellants’ fourth counsel had requested a $25,000
retainer that appellants had deemed unreasonable. Yet, after
appellants’ third attorneys withdrew—before appellants had
retained their fourth counsel—Justice Koehnen had told Wiseau
that his new attorneys likely would want “a very large retainer
given the volume of work . . . and the history of this action.”
Wiseau nevertheless refused to pay the $25,000 retainer,
which Justice Koehnen had said was more than reasonable.
As he noted in his ruling granting counsel’s motion to withdraw,
Justice Koehnen would have expected counsel to have demanded
at least a $75,000 retainer under the circumstances.
Second, contrary to appellants’ contention, the record
demonstrates the Canadian court did not deny appellants
a continuance merely to maintain its schedule or due to a
pre-judged, blanket policy of no continuances for the case,
as in Tara and Vann. Indeed, although appellants’ second
counsel—who withdrew for nonpayment of fees—had agreed
to an expedited schedule with an anticipated trial date in early
fall 2019, Justice Koehnen revised that timetable to accommodate
appellants after they had delayed in retaining new counsel,
ultimately setting the trial for January 6, 2020. Appellants’
third counsel agreed the revised schedule was reasonable
and did not object.
True, after setting the trial for January 6, 2020, Justice
Koehnen repeatedly warned Wiseau the trial would not be

33
postponed if appellants changed counsel. But we reasonably
can infer those warnings were the direct result of appellants
having created the issues leading to their need for new counsel,
not an indication that Justice Koehnen never would entertain
continuing the trial date if the circumstances warranted it.
Justice Koehnen noted appellants had “used their lack of
counsel as an excuse in the past to amend the case timetable.”
Reasonably, he had “a significant concern” appellants would
“try to do so again.” Moreover, as the trial court noted, Justice
Koehnen specifically acknowledged that “relationships between
client and counsel can breakdown through no fault of either,”
sometimes requiring the court to make an accommodation.
Justice Koehnen found, however, that “[i]n this situation . . .
the fault clearly lies with [appellants],” and would not permit
appellants to delay any further respondents’ right to have
the matter adjudicated.
Critically, when appellants asked for a continuance the
week before the trial date—because their new (and sixth) counsel
could not adequately prepare for a trial beginning on January 6—
Justice Koehnen engaged in the inquiry lacking in Tara and
balanced the competing interests in accordance with Canadian
law. Justice Koehnen’s four-plus-page written ruling makes
clear the court considered the current circumstances and found
they did not warrant delaying the trial. The court expressly
acknowledged appellants had “a legitimate interest” in having
counsel represent them at trial. The court explained “a refusal
to adjourn should never be entirely absolute because there will
always be the possibility of totally unforeseen circumstances.”
After considering the history of the case—and appellants’ refusal
to pay counsel “anything approaching a reasonable retainer for

34
trial” or to allow counsel to work on tasks unless preapproved—
the court found appellants’ request did not “fall into the category
of unforeseen circumstances.”
Rather, the Canadian court found appellants had created
“any limitation” on their access to counsel. The court explained,
“[Appellants] have known since June
2019 that the trial would begin on January 6,
2020. They have treated their own lawyers in a
commercially unreasonable manner and forced
them to remove themselves from the record.
[¶] . . . [T]hey have had ample time and
opportunity to avail themselves of the right
to counsel. They have failed to act responsibly
in doing so. They should not be able to visit the
consequences of their failure to act responsibly
on the [respondents] or other participants
in the justice system. [¶] . . . [¶] [I]t would be
a ‘major disservice to justice’ to allow [Wiseau]
to delay access to justice to [respondents] and
others in the litigation system simply because
he refuses to deal with lawyers on ordinary
commercial terms.”
Given this, we cannot conclude the Canadian court—or
the trial court in assessing the Canadian court proceedings—
acted arbitrarily or failed properly to exercise its discretion
in denying appellants’ request to continue the trial. The case
management judge—who had been involved in the matter
since dissolving the interim injunction in October 2017—found
appellants had not been diligent in moving the matter forward
and their sudden need for new counsel was a situation they easily

35
could have avoided. (See Oliveros, supra, 120 Cal.App.4th at
p. 1398 [implying court had discretion to deny a continuance
where lack of diligence or other abusive circumstances exists].)
The court reasonably balanced appellants’ need to retain new
counsel the week before trial—and the circumstances leading to
their counsel’s withdrawal—against the prejudice to respondents,
who had agreed not to bring their anti-SLAPP motion if the
case could be tried quickly. (See Tara, supra, 99 Cal.App.5th at
p. 882 [trial court not obligated to grant continuance based on
withdrawal of attorney before trial but must rebalance competing
interests based on new facts before denying continuance].)
As we have concluded the Canadian court properly acted
within its discretion in denying appellants’ request to postpone
the trial, the trial court did not err in finding the Canadian
proceedings were not inconsistent with the principles of
due process. As the trial court so aptly explained, “The mere
fact that another court might have exercised its discretion
differently and granted [appellants’] request for a continuance
is not a denial of American due process—let alone the denial
of the international concept of due process for purposes of
refusing to recognize an otherwise valid foreign judgment.”
Appellants nevertheless contend the “forced litigation”
resulted in “a stream of prejudicial actions” that would not
have occurred had their counsel had adequate time to prepare.
Appellants articulate two ways in which they were prejudiced.
They first contend that, had they “been properly represented,”
they could have excluded from the case “highly prejudicial”
documents asserting a claim of fraud against Wiseau that
a California superior court had sealed. Respondents’ counsel
cross-examined Wiseau about and referred to the sealed

36
documents during the trial. But Wiseau and his trial attorney
did act to exclude the documents—they objected and moved
to expunge all references to the California action on the ground
the record had been sealed. In a supporting affidavit, Wiseau
averred he had known respondents had access to the California
court record since February 2016 when he saw the documentary,
however. He affirmed he had told Harper about the court order
sealing the record and that “any publication of it would be a
‘contempt of court.’ ” Wiseau’s affidavit attached a copy of
the California court order providing that the “ ‘entire record
in this matter be sealed.’ ”
The Canadian trial court dismissed the motion, reasoning
there was no evidence respondents “had improperly obtained or
reproduced the court documents, or copies of them,” which could
“be obtained from many sources.” The court also reasoned that,
despite knowing for years that the documents had been used
in the documentary, Wiseau had taken “no steps to enjoin the
release of the film on that basis or any other steps to enforce
any sealing order.” Nor had he taken any earlier steps to object
to their use in the lawsuit. On cross-examination, Harper
also denied knowing the California case was sealed. In short,
appellants have not shown a reasonable probability that the
Canadian trial court would have excluded the documents had
the trial been continued. Nor have appellants demonstrated
how the sealed documents prejudicially affected the outcome—
the Canadian trial court concluded the documents “were of little,
if any, relevance or value.” (See Tara, supra, 99 Cal.App.5th at
pp. 883–884, citing Cal. Const., art. VI, § 13 [usually no reversal
“where the challenged error did not affect the outcome of the
proceedings and thus did not prejudice the appellant”]; see also,

37
e.g., People v. Samayoa (1997) 15 Cal.4th 795, 840 [“In the
absence of a showing of an abuse of discretion and prejudice
to the defendant, a denial of his or her motion for a continuance
does not require reversal . . . .”].)
Second, appellants contend that, had their trial lawyer had
more time to prepare, it was “more than likely that [a]ppellants
would have been able to rebut the highly inflated compensatory
damages award proffered by [r]espondents’ expert.” Appellants
seem to contend that, had the Canadian court continued the trial,
their lawyer would have been able to convince the court that
Bania’s damages calculation was inflated because it included
the four-month period between the original June 23, 2017 return
hearing on appellants’ ex parte request for an injunction and the
continued October 10, 2017 hearing date. Again, we find no error
in the Canadian court’s inclusion of that time period in assessing
compensatory damages. Moreover, as the parties already had
exchanged their direct evidence in the summer and fall of 2019
—leaving only cross-examination for trial—the basis for
Bania’s damages calculation hardly was a surprise. Indeed,
Bania appears to have provided his 30-page expert affidavit
(plus exhibits) setting forth the bases for his opinion around
October 23, 2019—before appellants’ fourth counsel withdrew.
Accordingly, even if the Canadian court had abused its
discretion in denying the continuance, any error was harmless.12
(People v. Samayoa, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 840; Tara, supra,
99 Cal.App.5th at pp. 883–884.)

12 Nor, for the same reasons, did the inclusion of the above
evidence render the Canadian trial fundamentally unfair, to the
extent appellants separately contend the trial was unfair
regardless of the court’s denial of the continuance.

38
DISPOSITION
We affirm the judgment and award costs on appeal to
respondents.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

EGERTON, Acting P. J.

We concur:

ADAMS, J.

HANASONO, J.*

* Judge of the Los Angeles County Superior Court, assigned
by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the
California Constitution.

39

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