In re M.H. CA2/1

CourtListener 10407782Calctapp29.04.2025

Gesamter Gesetzestext

Filed 4/29/25 In re M.H. CA2/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

In re M.H. et al., B338230 consolidated with
B340581
Persons Coming Under the
Juvenile Court Law. (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. 24CCJP00700)

LOS ANGELES COUNTY
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN
AND FAMILY SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

A.W.,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEALS from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County, Natalie Nardecchia, Judge. Affirmed.
James W. Tritt, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy,
Assistant County Counsel, and Sarah Vesecky, Senior Deputy
County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
_____________________

We decide this matter by memorandum disposition. (Cal.
Stds. Jud. Admin., § 8.1.) We recite only those facts necessary to
explain our disposition.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A.W. (Mother) and B.H. (Father) have three children: M.H.
(born 2010), V.H. (born 2015), and L.H. (born 2020). The children
were the subject of numerous child welfare referrals between
August 2016 and July 2023 in Los Angeles, Orange, and
Riverside counties.
In April 2023, the Orange County superior court issued a
family law order for the parents to share joint legal and physical
custody of the children; the specified custodial timeshare was 50-
50. Later statements from Mother, Father, and the children
indicated the parties did not strictly adhere to that order; M.H.
lived primarily with Father and the two younger children lived
with Mother but spent custodial time with Father approximately
one day a week.
On February 23, 2024, the Los Angeles County Department
of Children and Family Services (DCFS) received a referral
concerning Mother. On February 29, 2024, DCFS obtained a
removal order and detained all three children. On March 4,
2024, DCFS filed a petition pursuant to Welfare and Institutions

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Code1 section 300. The petition was later amended by
interlineation to allege Mother’s history of emotional problems
(for which she was previously hospitalized) rendered her unable
to provide regular care for the children, that Mother created a
detrimental and endangering situation by leaving V.H. alone on a
balcony outside her home, that Mother inappropriately physically
disciplined V.H. on two occasions causing V.H. unreasonable pain
and suffering, and that Mother’s actions towards V.H. posed
substantial risk of harm to the other two children. In the
amended petition, Father was nonoffending, and he is not a party
to this appeal.
At a hearing on March 18, 2024, the juvenile court detained
all three children from Mother, released them to Father, and
ordered monitored visitation for Mother. On May 7, 2024,
Mother pleaded no contest to the petition as amended by
interlineation and the court sustained the amended petition.
The juvenile court conducted a disposition hearing on
May 15, 2024. Mother did not appear, but her counsel was
present. Minors’ counsel requested the court close the case with
an exit order awarding the parents joint legal custody, Father
sole physical custody, and Mother monitored visits. Minors’
counsel further requested the court refer the parents to
mediation to resolve details concerning the visitation schedule
and proposed monitors. Counsel for Father and DCFS joined in
this request.
Mother’s counsel asked the court to maintain dependency
jurisdiction. If the court was not inclined to maintain

1 Unspecified statutory references are to the Welfare and
Institutions Code.

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jurisdiction, Mother’s counsel asked the court to order the
parents to mediation for the same reasons expressed by minors’
counsel. As a final alternative, in the event the court did
terminate jurisdiction and did not order mediation, Mother’s
counsel requested the court “use its powers under . . . section 352
for a short continuance so that [DCFS] could provide a report”
regarding monitoring alternatives “or do both mediation and
request [such a] follow-up report.”
The court found dependency jurisdiction no longer
warranted and terminated it. The court stayed that order
pending (1) the receipt of a custody order granting joint legal
custody and sole physical custody to Father, and (2) the parents’
attendance at mediation to work out the details of Mother’s
visitation.
The parties attended a mediation on July 9, 2024, and
reached an agreement. On July 15, 2024, the juvenile court
issued exit orders as to all three children awarding joint legal
custody (including mediated provisions about both parties’
exercise of that legal custody), sole physical custody to Father,
and monitored visits to Mother (including mediated provisions
about the sharing of holidays, communication between the
parents, monitors, and other topics); it also terminated
jurisdiction over the children.
DISCUSSION
Mother claims the juvenile court committed two errors.
She first asserts the court abused its discretion by terminating
dependency jurisdiction instead of continuing the case pursuant
to section 352. She also claims the juvenile court erred by failing
to adhere to section 361.2 when terminating jurisdiction.

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A. The Juvenile Court Did Not Err in Denying a
Continuance Pursuant to Section 352
“Continuances are expressly discouraged” in dependency
proceedings “so that the child is not kept ‘in limbo’ any longer
than necessary.” (In re Emily L. (1989) 212 Cal.App.3d 734, 743.)
As relevant here, section 352 provides that a juvenile court may
continue a hearing at a parent’s request only if such a
continuance is not contrary to the interest of the minor, and “only
upon a showing of good cause and only for that period of time
shown to be necessary.” (§ 352, subd. (a)(1)-(2).) Additionally,
written notice along with supporting documentation must be filed
and served on all parties at least two court days before the
hearing sought to be continued unless the court finds good cause
for hearing an oral motion. (Id., subd. (a)(3); Cal. Rules of Court,
rule 5.550(a)(4).)
Putting aside the requested continuance’s potential
untimeliness as it was not made two days in advance and no good
cause was articulated for it being raised at the hearing itself, the
fundamental problem with Mother’s claim is that she cannot
assert error when she got what she asked for. Mother’s counsel
requested a continuance pursuant to section 352 only if the court
was “not inclined to order mediation.”2 The court did order

2 In her reply brief, Mother attempts to reframe her
continuance request by arguing her section 352 request related
more generally to “keep[ing] the case open.” That is not accurate.
Mother’s request at the disposition hearing for the court to
maintain jurisdiction did not involve a continuance. She argued
the court should find then and there that dependency jurisdiction
should continue, not that the court should defer that decision to a
later, continued hearing.

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mediation—the parties attended it, reached an agreement, and
had their agreed-upon provisions included in the exit order.
Mother cannot claim the court abused its discretion when it
ordered the very thing she asked for in lieu of a continuance. (In
re Jamie R. (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 766, 772 [when a juvenile
court follows the suggestion of parent’s counsel, the parent is
estopped from claiming that the court erred in following that
request].)
B. The Juvenile Court Properly Terminated
Jurisdiction
Mother argues the juvenile court erred by following only
section 364 when terminating jurisdiction instead of also
conducting an analysis pursuant to section 361.2. DCFS
contends that Mother forfeited this objection because she did not
claim before the juvenile court that section 361.2 governed and
thus deprived the court of the opportunity to address that claim
in the first instance. We need not address whether forfeiture
occurred, because the court did not err regardless.
Section 364 requires the juvenile court to determine
whether continued supervision is necessary, and to “terminate its
jurisdiction unless the social worker or his or her department
establishes by a preponderance of evidence that the conditions
still exist which would justify initial assumption of jurisdiction
under [s]ection 300, or that those conditions are likely to exist if
supervision is withdrawn.” (§ 364, subd. (c).) The court complied
with this statutory language by finding on the record “that [the]
conditions which would justify the initial assumption of
jurisdiction under . . . section 300 no longer exist and are not
likely to exist if supervision is withdrawn. The court does find
that continued supervision of the children is no longer necessary,

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and the court is terminating jurisdiction.” The record contains
substantial evidence supporting these findings, and Mother does
not claim otherwise.
Section 361.2 requires additional findings where the
juvenile court is considering placement of a minor with a parent
“who desires to assume custody” and “with whom the child was
not residing at the time that the events or conditions arose that
brought the child within the provisions of [s]ection 300.” (§ 361.2,
subd. (a).) It further provides a menu of options if the court does
so place the child. (Id., subds. (b) & (c).)
Section 361.2 did not apply to Father as he was a custodial
parent. Father was not a parent seeking “to assume custody” as
that term is used in section 361.2—he already had it.
“ ‘ “[C]ustody” ’ as used in section 361.2 refers to the parent’s
‘right to make decisions pertaining to the child’ and to have ‘legal
possession of the child’ ” (In re Noe F. (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 358,
368), which Father had by virtue of an April 2023 family court
order issued before the dependency proceedings began. Further,
substantial evidence demonstrates the children spent meaningful
custodial time with Father at the time of the events giving rise to
dependency jurisdiction, such that they resided with him as that
term is used in section 361.2. Additionally, the children were in
Father’s exclusive custody during the pendency of the
dependency proceedings. Section 361.2 therefore did not apply to
the court’s decision to terminate jurisdiction.

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DISPOSITION
The juvenile court’s orders are affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

WEINGART, J.

We concur:

ROTHSCHILD, P. J.

BENDIX, J.

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