CourtListener 10404017•People v. Rodriguez CA4/1
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Filed 4/29/25 P. v. Rodriguez CA4/1
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COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THE PEOPLE, D082367
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v. (Super. Ct. No. SCS321162)
JESUS MANUEL RODRIGUEZ,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Timothy R. Walsh, Judge. Affirmed.
Jennifer A. Gambale, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters and Charles C.
Ragland, Assistant Attorneys General, Melissa Mandel and Seth M.
Friedman, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
A jury convicted Jesus Manuel Rodriguez of the first degree murder of
S.D. (Pen. Code,1 § 187, subd. (a)). It found true allegations that Rodriguez
personally and intentionally discharged a firearm causing death (§ 12022.53,
subd. (d)) and that he personally used a firearm during the murder’s
commission (§ 12022.5, subd. (a)). The court sentenced him to 25 years to life
for the murder conviction plus 25 years to life for the personal-discharge
enhancement. It stayed under section 654 the four-year term for the section
12022.5, subdivision (a) personal firearm use enhancement.
Rodriguez contends the court violated his confrontation rights when it
admitted conditional examination testimony of a critical witness to the events
leading up to and during the victim’s shooting, as the prosecution did not
show the witness was unavailable. He further contends the court erred when
it instructed the jury with CALCRIM No. 3475, which unfairly labelled him a
trespasser and negated his claim of self-defense. Rodriguez finally raises
various errors with respect to the court’s imposition of the section 12022.53,
subdivision (d) firearm enhancement. We reject the contentions, and affirm
the judgment.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
People’s Evidence
In January 2022, S.D.2 lived in an apartment’s converted garage in
Imperial Beach. He was in a dating relationship with the defendant’s ex-
wife, N.R., who lived in the same complex. Rodriguez was not happy about
1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2 Both witnesses N.R. and L.M. testified that S.D. has a family member,
S.D.C. with the same name but with an additional surname. Hence, we refer
to the victim as S.D. and his family member as S.D.C.
2
N.R.’s relationship with S.D. After their divorce, he and N.R. continued to be
intimate and saw each other frequently to co-parent their children.
On January 29, 2022, N.R. and Rodriguez went to a bar they
frequented; she was planning to move with S.D. to Arizona but had only told
Rodriguez she was going away for a month or so to focus on herself. They
were having a good time until Rodriguez made physical advances at N.R.,
which she rebuffed, frustrating and upsetting him. Rodriguez, who toward
the end of the night was very intoxicated, began denigrating S.D. N.R. told
him she did not care what he said, prompting Rodriguez to quickly leave the
bar.
At about midnight Rodriguez and N.R. got into Rodriguez’s car, which
he drove extremely fast to N.R.’s apartment complex. Rodriguez drove up to
S.D.’s garage, exited the car and began walking toward the garage, where he
ran into S.D.’s friend, L.M., and pointed a gun at his face Rodriguez then
said he had the “wrong guy,” and ran away. L.M. ran the other way and saw
N.R., who told him to help S.D. because Rodriguez had a gun. L.M. grabbed a
golf club to protect himself then heard shots and ran into S.D., who told L.M.
that Rodriguez had “blanks” in the gun. N.R. saw Rodriguez walk out of
S.D.’s garage and yelled at him to leave. Rodriguez and S.D. proceeded to
have an angry and combative argument. Eventually Rodriguez reentered his
car and drove off after L.M. ran up and hit at the driver’s side window. After
Rodriguez left, S.D. showed L.M. that there were bullet holes in a speaker in
his garage.
Just before 3:00 a.m., Rodriguez drove back to the area of the
apartment complex. He parked and walked down the alley toward S.D.’s
garage. Rodriguez and S.D. then had an exchange in which Rodriguez said,
“Stop or I’m gonna kill you,” and told S.D. to “[p]ut your hands up, homie.”
3
N.R., who had been resting on a bed in the garage, initially stayed behind a
curtain. After she heard a struggle, she opened the curtain to see S.D. face to
face with Rodriguez and pinning him to a vehicle. Rodriguez had a gun in his
right hand and S.D. was holding Rodriguez’s arm up in the air. N.R. saw
that S.D. was trying to stop Rodriguez from using the gun. N.R. went to
them and tried to reach for the gun, but the men told her to leave. She
walked away and sat on the stairs to her apartment holding her ears, then
heard a gunshot and saw Rodriguez run past. N.R. ran to S.D., who was
bleeding, then called 911. Rodriguez fled the scene.
S.D. died from a gunshot wound to his chest. He had two other gunshot
wounds through his right upper arm and the palm of his right hand.
Security Video Evidence and 911 Call
Detectives obtained security camera video from surrounding homes,
which was played for the jury. One video showed Rodriguez and N.R. arrive
at S.D.’s garage at about 12:34 a.m., and Rodriguez leave the vehicle with
something in his right hand. The video recorded sounds of the argument
between Rodriguez and S.D. and one gunshot; it then captured Rodriguez
returning to his car and moving it forward while L.M. approached and hit the
car.
Another camera recorded events at approximately 2:56 a.m. near the
alley toward S.D.’s residence. That video showed Rodriguez walking toward
the apartment complex driveway and garage area, then about three minutes
later running away after the shooting in the alley. Another video captured
N.R. and Rodriguez moving back and forth around S.D.’s garage before and
after the gunshots, and N.R. running back to S.D. while Rodriguez left the
scene. A transcript from the security video showed that Rodriguez told N.R.
to get in his car, while she told him, “No, . . . stop!” After she screamed,
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Rodriguez said, “Shit” and again told N.R. to get in his car. N.R. called out to
S.D. and ran to him, telling him to “please don’t die!”
The People also played N.R.’s call to 911 after the shooting.
Defense Evidence
Rodriguez testified he acted in self-defense. He explained that he had
seen N.R. with black eyes, lacerated lips and bruises all over her, and offered
to help her. That night, N.R. had said things that indicated to him she did
not want to see S.D. anymore, so at the end of the night Rodriguez told her he
was going to talk to S.D. and tell him to leave N.R alone. When he reached
the apartment complex, he grabbed his gun, which had a clip with blank
rounds, so S.D. would know he “wasn’t playing around.” Rodriguez walked
into the garage and told S.D. to leave N.R. alone, that she was done using
methamphetamine.3 The first time he shot his gun was because S.D. had
removed his hands from his pockets and “came at [him]” and Rodriguez knew
S.D. had guns. Rodriguez did not intend to shoot S.D. Rodriguez told S.D. he
would be back.
When Rodriguez returned later that morning, he loaded his gun with
real bullets to protect himself because he knew S.D. was a gang member who
carried a gun. Rodriguez intended to fight S.D., not shoot or kill him.
According to Rodriguez, the gun ended up firing during a physical fight with
S.D., when S.D. had grabbed the gun, and while Rodriguez was pulling it out
of S.D.’s hand. The gun went off again after Rodriguez fell when his arm hit
the ground. He fired the gun two more times when he saw S.D. come at him
again, and Rodriguez assumed he was trying to grab the gun again. After
Rodriguez learned S.D. had died, he fled to Mexico but turned himself in a
3 N.R. testified at her conditional examination that at the time of his
death, S.D. was her methamphetamine supplier.
5
few months later because he knew he had no intention of shooting or killing
S.D. that night.
DISCUSSION
I. Admission of N.R’s Conditional Examination
A. Background
Before trial, the court granted the People’s request that N.R undergo a
videotaped conditional examination after she was hospitalized for a drug
overdose.4 The examination took place in January 2023, with defense
counsel conducting a full cross-examination. Trial was set for April 25, 2023.
During preliminary discussions on April 25, 2023, the prosecutor
advised the court that they had been in contact with N.R. the previous
Friday, but she did not appear in the courtroom when ordered, so the People
had a bench warrant for her appearance. The prosecutor told the court they
would be attempting to locate her but if she was unavailable they might ask
to admit her conditional testimony. Rodriguez’s counsel acknowledged that
the People had ordered N.R. to appear, and that he had also subpoenaed her
to come to court that day.
Two days later, during jury selection, the People moved to admit N.R.’s
conditional examination. The prosecutor reported that they still had not had
contact with her and expected she would not appear for trial. The People’s
motion indicated that N.R. had acknowledged receiving a trial subpoena on
March 24, 2023. Thereafter, a district attorney investigator made several
unsuccessful attempts to contact her, but eventually spoke with N.R. on April
20, 2023, when he confirmed she would be present on her court date. N.R.
did not appear for a scheduled trial preparation meeting the next day, and
4 N.R. testified at her conditional examination that she had overdosed on
Fentanyl “about 20” times and still sometimes used methamphetamine.
6
the investigator called her last location and was told she had left. On April
24, 2023, the investigator looked for N.R. at a transient encampment and
when she did not appear at trial he made several phone calls to her that went
to voicemail. The People obtained the bench warrant. The investigator
searched other transient camps, parks, motels and other areas N.R. was
known to frequent, her mother’s home and the point of entry border crossing.
He confirmed N.R. was not currently in custody. The prosecutor advised the
court that as of that morning, two investigators were out looking for N.R.
The court asked the prosecution to provide an updated report, noting
there were three and a half days before it had to make its finding of N.R.’s
unavailability. The prosecutor pointed out that N.R. had visited Rodriguez,
expressed reservations about testifying, and afterwards stopped responding
to their calls. He offered that she was likely actively avoiding the subpoena.
The court indicated its tentative view was to find unavailability and admit
the video, as long as it found the People had continued its efforts during the
coming days to use its law enforcement resources to locate her.
At the next hearing on May 1, 2023, the prosecutor advised the court
that the investigator had notified all law enforcement agencies and resources
available to locate individuals, and there were no new updates. As of that
morning, the investigator had not received any notification from those law
enforcement contacts. He also tried calling N.R.’s phone number and
received an automated message, and spoke to N.R.’s mother, who had also
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tried calling N.R. several times without luck. N.R.’s mother last had contact
with N.R. briefly after she missed her pretrial preparation meeting.5
Indicating it had read and considered the investigator’s report, the
court granted the People’s request to present N.R.’s conditional examination.
In doing so, it stated: “My initial reaction to [the prosecutor’s update of
efforts to locate N.R.] was why weren’t the investigators out in town driving
around looking for her? But the reality is, okay. It’s a big town. It’s a big
city. And unless there’s some reason to go to a specific location beyond what
they’ve already gone to, I’ve been given no indication that she hangs out at a
specific spot. It’s clear to me that she’s avoiding this. She’s not available.
She doesn’t want to be here. And as such, I’m making a finding of her
unavailability pursuant to Evidence Code section 240[, subdivision] (a)(5).”
The court found “even beyond the dates listed [in the investigator’s report,
the People] exercised due diligence to find this person. She’s not available.
Under [Penal Code section] 1345 prior sworn testimony that was noticed
5 This court granted Rodriguez’s requests to augment the record with
N.R.’s conditional hearing transcript as well as a sealed May 1, 2023 in
camera hearing transcript. We granted his request that the latter transcript
be provided to his counsel only. Rodriguez has asked that we unseal the
portion of the May 1, 2023 transcript in which the court held a brief in
camera discussion with counsel and make it part of the appellate record. He
argues the court ordered sealing without a “specific reason.” He states “the
hearing was likely held in camera to allow defense counsel not to divulge trial
strategy” and asserts that since the trial is over “that reason for sealing no
longer applies.” Rodriguez further states that “leaving the items sealed
without justification” would lead to undue time and expense, as it would
require the parties to file both redacted and sealed versions of their briefs.
None of the briefs filed in this appeal have redactions, and Rodriguez’s
assertion concerning his counsel’s trial strategy appears to be speculation.
Since his appellate counsel had access to the sealed portion of the transcript,
we are not persuaded that unsealing is warranted.
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testimony—and . . . it was prepared specifically as a conditional exam in the
event this happened. It will be allowed.”
The day after the court’s ruling, the People filed a supplemental paper
attaching an investigation report listing 26 locations where N.R. had been
contacted or located by family members in the past that the investigator had
searched on April 28, 29, and 30, 2023. The court reaffirmed its ruling that
the People had exercised due diligence in locating her. It then allowed the
People to play the conditional examination video for the jury.
The People rested their case five days later on May 8, 2023. The next
day, N.R. appeared in the courtroom. The court had her placed in a nearby
courtroom and advised the parties it would continue the trial. Defense
counsel moved for a mistrial, which the court denied, finding no wrongful
conduct or prejudice. Defense counsel proceeded with Rodriguez’s testimony.
Following a break, the court revisited the issue of N.R.’s appearance and how
to proceed on her arrest warrant. Defense counsel advised the court, “I’m not
going to call her. She’s testified.” After recounting the circumstances of
N.R.’s subpoena and her failure to appear, the court remanded N.R. into
custody, and the matter proceeded with defense counsel resting his case
without calling her as a witness.
B. Legal Principles
We recently summarized the relevant legal principles in People v. Ayala
(2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 62, explaining that a defendant has a constitutional
right to confront prosecution witnesses, but that right is not absolute. (Id. at
p. 68.) “ ‘An exception exists when a witness is unavailable and, at a previous
court proceeding against the same defendant, has given testimony that was
subject to cross-examination.’ ” (Ibid.) This exception permits the court to
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admit the prior sworn testimony of the unavailable witness at trial without
violating the defendant’s confrontation right. (Ibid.)
“A witness is unavailable when the witness is absent from the hearing
and the proponent of the witness’s testimony has exercised reasonable
diligence but has been unable to procure the witness’s attendance by the
court’s process.” (People v. Ayala, supra, 101 Cal.App.5th at p. 69.) The
prosecution must demonstrate that “ ‘the witness is unavailable and,
additionally, that it made a “good-faith effort” [citation] or, equivalently,
exercised reasonable or due diligence to obtain the witness’s presence at
trial.’ [Citation.] While due diligence lacks a precise definition, . . . it
‘ “ ‘connotes persevering application, untiring efforts in good earnest, [and]
efforts of a substantial character.’ ” ’ ” (People v. Wilson (2021) 11 Cal.5th
259, 291; see also People v. Cogswell (2010) 48 Cal.4th 467, 477.)
As the proponent of the evidence, it is the People’s burden to show a
witness is unavailable (People v. Wilson, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 291; People v.
Smith (2003) 30 Cal.4th 581, 609) and “that it made a ‘good-faith effort’ . . .
or, equivalently, exercised reasonable or due diligence to obtain the witness’s
presence at trial.” (People v. Sánchez (2016) 63 Cal.4th 411, 440.) To
determine whether the prosecutor has shown reasonable diligence we look to
factors “includ[ing] the timeliness of the search, the importance of the
witness’s testimony, and whether leads to the witness’s possible location were
reasonably explored. [Citation.] The timely commencement of the search
and the energy with which it was pursued are sequential aspects of the
prosecution’s obligation to demonstrate diligence. But whether these efforts
were reasonable depends in part on the importance of the witness’s
testimony. If a witness is critical, the search must be started sooner and
pursued with more energy than if the witness is less significant. And while
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we defer to the trial court’s determination ‘ “of the historical facts of what the
prosecution did to locate an absent witness” ’ [citation], we independently
review the prosecution’s claim of good faith and reasonable diligence.”
(People v. Ayala, supra, 101 Cal.App.5th at p. 69; see also People v. Wilson,
supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 293; Sánchez, at p. 442; People v. Cromer (2001) 24
Cal.4th 889, 893, 901.)
Applying these standards, we determined in People v. Ayala that the
prosecution did not exercise reasonable diligence when searching for a
witness who heard the screams of the victim dying, saw the defendants carry
the victim’s body out of a recreational vehicle, and helped clean up blood and
other debris after the killing. (People v. Ayala, supra, 101 Cal.App.5th at p.
66.) The witness identified for investigators the perpetrators involved in the
murder and participated in a walk-through of the crime scene. (Id. at p. 70.)
That witness appeared and testified at a preliminary hearing in late 2017,
but the district attorney’s office lost contact with her sometime before the
COVID-19 pandemic. (Ibid.) After several continuances, trial was set for
April 2020, but nothing in the record showed the prosecution did anything to
locate the witness before the trial date, even though the prosecution “was also
aware that the matter would eventually be rescheduled for trial, and that
[the witness] was missing.” (Ibid.) Even after “numerous additional
continuances” to July 2021, “it was not until July 6, seven days [before the
parties declared they were ready for trial], that [the district attorney
investigator] first created a subpoena for [the witness] and the search for the
missing witness began.” (Ibid.) The investigator was able to “quickly” learn
where the witness’s child lived and visited the location, learning the witness
had been there earlier. (Ibid.) “Critically, had the prosecution attempted to
locate [the witness] a few weeks or even days earlier it would have discovered
11
where her child lived, that [the witness] visited her child every month or two,
and likely could have contacted her well before the eventual trial date.”
(Ibid.)
In Ayala, we observed that while the witness lived a transient lifestyle,
she cooperated with police before the preliminary hearing by telephoning the
investigator when she learned law enforcement was looking for her, meeting
with him and identifying photographs of the persons involved in the murder,
and participating in a walk-through of the crime scene, pointing out where
the victim’s body had been burned. (People v. Ayala, supra, 101 Cal.App.5th
at p. 70.) She underwent a second interview with the investigator, then
appeared at the preliminary hearing. (Ibid.) We noted there was “nothing in
the record to suggest that [the witness] disappeared to avoid testifying, would
have been uncooperative if located or even knew the prosecution was looking
for her.” (Ibid.)
Under those circumstances, we held that while the prosecution
exercised diligence during the two weeks it searched for the witness
immediately before trial, its search was untimely, as “it did nothing to locate
her during the months this matter was repeatedly continued for trial . . . .”
(People v. Ayala, supra, 101 Cal.App.5th at pp. 70-71.) We stated: “The
uncertainty as to when trial would begin does not excuse the prosecution
from timely starting to search for a cooperative witness it actually knew was
missing. The record suggests [the witness] would have been found and
produced had the prosecution begun to look for her even a short time earlier.”
(Id. at p. 71.) Further, the witness’s testimony was “essential to the
prosecution’s case” as she was the only witness who knew the victim and had
percipient knowledge of the events leading up to the murder, including the
motive of the alleged perpetrator, who told a materially different story.
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(Ibid.) The witness’s story was critical to establish the degree of murder, the
lying in wait special circumstance allegation as to both defendants, and for
corroboration of another witness’s testimony regarding the torture special
circumstance allegations. (Ibid.) Thus, we held the witness was not
unavailable, and the court erred by admitting her preliminary hearing
testimony. (Ibid.)
People v. Ayala, supra, 101 Cal.App.5th 62 found parallels to the
circumstances in People v. Cromer, supra, 24 Cal.4th 889, in which the
California Supreme Court reached a similar conclusion. There, the
prosecution had learned of a witness’s disappearance two weeks after the
June 1997 preliminary hearing, but took no action on that information.
(Cromer, at p. 903.) The trial was originally slated to begin in September
1997, but was delayed until January 1998. (Ibid.) The prosecution, however,
took no action to find the witness until six months had passed, in December
1997. (Ibid.) After the case was called for trial, the prosecution obtained
information that she was living with her mother, but the investigators waited
two days to follow up on it, and only then they merely left a subpoena at the
witness’s mother’s home without returning or attempting to find contact
information so they could speak with her mother. (Id. at pp. 903-904.)
Cromer observed any serious efforts to locate the witness were “unreasonably
delayed” and the investigation of promising information “unreasonably
curtailed,” leading to the conclusion that the prosecution failed to exercise
reasonable diligence to secure her attendance at trial. (Id. at p. 905.)
More recently, the high court in People v. Wilson, supra, 11 Cal.5th 259
reached the opposite conclusion on a defendant’s challenge to the availability
of a witness who saw perpetrators to a multiple murder leave the scene of the
crimes: a car wash where the witness worked. (Id. at pp. 270-271.) The
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defendant challenged the court’s admission of the witness’s preliminary
hearing testimony at trial, arguing the witness was not unavailable so it
violated his confrontation rights. (Id. at pp. 287-288.)
The court rejected the contention: “The prosecution initially had no
reason to suspect [the witness] would be . . . reluctant or unavailable . . . he
willingly participated in identification and preliminary hearing proceedings
in June 1998. It was not until March 1999 that the prosecution understood
[the witness] was apprehensive, and not until May 1999 that serious
concerns began to arise about his participation in proceedings. On May 20,
1999, [the witness] was subpoenaed to appear at trial, but failed to do so. [A
detective] tried to contact [the witness] . . . where [he] worked, but failed in
his efforts. [The witness and the detective] spoke several times by telephone
in May and June 1999, and although [the witness] promised he would meet
with [the detective], those meetings did not occur. During these calls, [the
witness] consistently refused to reveal his address or permanent phone
number. [The detective] visited [the witness’s] last known address three
times, but a neighbor told [him] that [the witness] had not been seen there
for about two months, and [the witness’s] ex-girlfriend confirmed he had
moved away to an unknown location after the shootings due to fear of
testifying. [The witness’s] ex-girlfriend had received collect calls from people
looking for [him]. [¶] [The detective] visited [the witness’s workplace] a few
more times in June 1999—once after [the witness] told him the two could
meet there—but [the witness] was never there. [The detective] visited
another location where [the witness] was said to frequent, but he did not see
[the witness] there. In mid-June 1999, after [the witness] failed to make it to
a scheduled meeting with [the detective] at the police station, [the detective]
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confirmed [the witness] was not in custody. These many efforts undertaken
by [the detective] on behalf of the prosecution are the very definition of
‘ “ ‘persevering application, untiring efforts in good earnest, [and] efforts of a
substantial character.’ ” ’ ” (People v. Wilson, supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 291-
292.)
The Wilson court contrasted cases in which courts found deficiencies—
“cases where review did not reveal ‘adequate diligence, [and where] the
efforts of the prosecutor or defense counsel have been perfunctory or
obviously negligent.’ ” (People v. Wilson, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 292.) It
stated: “In contrast, ‘diligence has been found when the prosecution’s efforts
are timely, reasonably extensive and carried out over a reasonable period.’
[Citation.] [The detective’s] efforts to secure [the witness’s] testimony once it
became clear he would no longer cooperate spanned a month and included
pursuit of multiple avenues of inquiry. The efforts were far from perfunctory
or negligent. Simply because Wilson suggests [the detective] could have
taken different steps does not mean those he did take lacked diligence.” (Id.
at p. 293.) Further, the court found the witness’s testimony, while helpful to
the prosecution’s case because he saw his murdered coworker’s vehicle being
hastily driven away, was not critical because he could not positively identify
the defendant. (Ibid.) The court held the prosecution was reasonably
diligent in its efforts to secure the witness’s testimony. (Id. at p. 294.)
C. Contentions
Comparing this case to People v. Ayala, supra, 101 Cal.App.5th 62,
Rodriguez contends the court’s admission of N.R.’s conditional examination
violated his confrontation rights because the prosecution did not demonstrate
she was unavailable for trial, and did not act with reasonable diligence in
attempting to secure her presence. He argues: “As in Ayala—and despite the
15
fact that they feared back in December of 2022 that [N.R.] would not be
available to testify—the prosecution did not reasonably look for [N.R.] until
days prior to the jury trial. During those days, [the investigator] did exactly
what the investigator in Ayala did—he looked for [N.R.] at places she was
previously known to live or hang out, he called her phone numbers, he spoke
to her mother, he looked in the jails, and he notified law enforcement
agencies . . . . Importantly, the investigator did not check any local hospitals
or drug rehabilitation centers or treatment programs even though the
prosecution was aware [N.R.] overdosed on drugs nearly two dozen times.”
According to Rodriguez, N.R.’s testimony was critical to the prosecution
because she was the only person who saw him before the shooting and could
testify why he would have a motive to shoot S.D. He points out she was the
only eyewitness to events directly before and after the shooting. He argues
the error was not harmless under the Chapman standard (Chapman v.
California (1967) 386 U.S. 18); that there was a reasonable possibility it
might have contributed to the verdict.
D. The People Exercised Reasonable Diligence in Attempting to Secure N.R.’s
Appearance at Trial
The circumstances here are more akin to those in People v. Wilson,
supra, 11 Cal.5th 259, and unlike Ayala and Cromer, which involved lengthy
and unexplained delays after the prosecution learned about an individual’s
disappearance before making efforts to locate him or her. (People v. Ayala,
supra, 101 Cal.App.5th at p. 70 [prosecution “did nothing to locate” witness
between late 2017 preliminary hearing and April 2020 trial date]; People v.
Cromer, supra, 24 Cal.4th at pp. 903-904 [six-month delay].) Rodriguez
suggests an inordinate delay by his argument that the People should have
known of N.R.’s unavailability as of December 2022, but the point is both
16
unsupported by the record and does not establish unreasonable delay in
search efforts. The impetus for the prosecutor’s December 2022 request
for N.R.’s conditional examination was not suspicion that N.R. would
disappear or avoid trial, but that she would overdose and that her ”life [was]
in jeopardy.” And only a few months passed from the time of her conditional
examination in January 2023 and the April 2023 start of trial. In the
meantime, there was no indication that N.R., who had acknowledged receipt
of her trial subpoena on March 24, 2023 and confirmed five days before
trial that she would appear, was unwilling to do so. This makes the
circumstances like People v. Wilson, supra, 11 Cal.5th 259, where the
prosecution “initially had no reason to suspect [the witness] would be . . .
reluctant or unavailable . . . . ” (Id. at p. 291.) The circumstances here did
not trigger any obligation on the prosecution to take preventative measures
to stop N.R. from disappearing. (Accord, People v. Friend (2009) 47 Cal.4th 1,
68 [record did not reflect the prosecutor had any knowledge of or reason to
know of a substantial risk that a witness, though transient, would flee or
otherwise disappear; it is only “when there is knowledge of ‘a “substantial
risk” ’ that an ‘ “important witness would flee,” ’ ” is a prosecutor “required to
‘ “take adequate preventative measures” to stop the witness from
disappearing’ ”].)
It is true that N.R. did not appear for a scheduled meeting with the
prosecutor on April 21, 2023, a few days before trial. That day, however, N.R.
confirmed with the district attorney investigator that she had a new phone
number, which he attempted to call. The investigator also made efforts the
day before trial to search for N.R. in a transient camp, then on the day of trial
phoned her without success, leading to issuance of a bench warrant.
17
Once N.R. failed to appear on the day of trial, the investigator over the
course of three days on April 28, 29 and 30, 2023, searched no less than 26
locations where she had reportedly been seen. Rodriguez criticizes the search
for failing to look for N.R. at hospitals or rehabilitation centers, but, as in
Wilson, that investigators could have made additional efforts does not mean
the effort they did make was insufficient. (People v. Wilson, supra, 11 Cal.5th
at p. 293.) Additionally, there was no indication N.R. was hospitalized during
that time, so Rodriguez has not established such a check would have yielded
information about her whereabouts. (Accord, People v. Windfield (2021) 59
Cal.App.5th 496, 513 [responding to argument that People were not diligent
in locating witness who had moved to another state by contacting hospitals
and other medical establishments; “defendants have not established that [the
witness] was indeed hospitalized, so there is no reason to believe that such a
check would have yielded information about her whereabouts. Defendants
cite no authority requiring the prosecution to engage in such a search absent
a reason [to] believe it would yield useful information . . . .”].) The
prosecution’s efforts, coupled with the fact that the People possessed security
camera audio recordings of the shooting, which N.R. did not directly witness,
compel us to hold the People exercised reasonable diligence in attempting to
locate her. The trial court thus did not err in admitting her prior recorded
testimony at trial.
II. Court’s Instruction With CALCRIM No. 3475
At the People’s request and over Rodriguez’s counsel’s objection that it
lacked support in the evidence, the court instructed the jury with a modified
version of CALCRIM No. 3475: “The lawful occupant of a property may
request that a trespasser leave the property. If the trespasser does not leave
within a reasonable time, and it would appear to a reasonable person that the
18
trespasser poses a threat to property or the owner or occupants, the lawful
occupant may use reasonable force to make the trespasser leave. [¶]
Reasonable force means the amount of force that a reasonable person in the
same situation would believe is necessary to make the trespasser leave. [¶]
If the trespasser resists, the lawful occupant may increase the amount of
force he or she uses in proportion to the force used by the trespasser and the
threat the trespasser poses to the property. [¶] When deciding whether the
lawful occupant used reasonable force, consider all the circumstances as they
were known to and appeared to the defendant and consider what a
reasonable person in a similar situation with similar knowledge would have
believed. If the lawful occupant’s beliefs were reasonable, the danger does
not have to actually have existed.”
The court also gave instructions on self-defense (CALCRIM No. 505),
provocation (CALCRIM No. 522); voluntary manslaughter based on imperfect
self-defense (CALCRIM No. 571), the right to self-defense in a mutual combat
or initial aggressor situation (CALCRIM No. 3471), and the fact that a claim
of self-defense may not be contrived (CALCRIM No. 3472). The court gave a
separate instruction explaining that the right to use of force in self-defense
continues only as long as the danger exists or reasonably appears to exist
(CALCRIM No. 3474).
Rodriguez contends for several reasons the court prejudicially erred by
instructing the jury with CALCRIM No. 3475. He first argues the instruction
was irrelevant and lacking evidentiary support in that the People did not
present evidence that S.D. was a “lawful occupant” of the garage, and thus
entitled to eject him. He argues S.D. “did not rent an apartment at the
complex and no evidence was presented that residing in the garage area was
permitted” and asserts “[t]he garage itself was not an apartment.” He
19
further contends that even if S.D. was a lawful occupant of the garage, the
record lacks evidence he (Rodriguez) attempted to enter the garage, was
inside it, or that S.D. asked him to leave. Finally, Rodriguez contends the
instruction violated his federal due process rights by lessening the
prosecution’s burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt he did not act in
self-defense. He maintains the error was prejudicial under both People v.
Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818 and Chapman v. California, supra, 386 U.S.
18.6
Even if Rodriguez could establish there was an insufficient evidentiary
basis to give the instruction, he cannot demonstrate it had any effect on the
verdict. The fact of the matter is that if CALCRIM No. 3475 was inapplicable
to the facts as presented at trial, it would have been ignored by the jury.
Rodriguez focuses on the absence of evidence indicating that he ever
entered the garage and what he believes is the absolute lack of any evidence
showing that S.D. asked him to leave in the minutes preceding the shooting.
But if Rodriguez is correct, the instruction he complains about was irrelevant
and superfluous. The prosecutor’s rebuttal argument itself made this point
6 If a trial court’s instructional error violates the United States
Constitution, the standard stated in Chapman v. California, supra, 386 U.S.
18, requires the People to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did
not contribute to the verdict (People v. Pearson (2013) 56 Cal.4th 393, 463),
and this court to decide “ ‘ “whether it is clear beyond a reasonable doubt that
a rational jury would have reached the same verdict absent the error.” ’ ”
(People v. Bryant (2014) 60 Cal.4th 335, 395.) But if the court’s error violates
only California law, the standard is that stated in People v. Watson, supra, 46
Cal.2d 818 which permits the People to avoid reversal unless “ ‘it is
reasonably probable that a result more favorable to the appealing party
would have been reached in the absence of the error.’ ” (People v. Mower
(2002) 28 Cal.4th 457, 484.) Rodriguez maintains the error was prejudicial
under Watson with regard to the absence of supporting substantial evidence
and Chapman with regard to the due process violation.
20
when it mentioned CALCRIM No. 3475. It posited that the instruction could
offer guidance, but only if the jury found a specific set of three circumstances:
“[1] someone shows up unannounced at your house, and [2] you ask them to
leave, and [3] you ask them, “ ‘Are we done? Are we good?’ ” (Italics added.)
Even if there was testimony that could support the occurrence of the first and
third circumstances, the premise for Rodriguez’s contention is that there was
absolutely no evidence the second circumstance ever occurred. As framed,
the prosecutor’s argument conceded that in that case, the instruction was
inapplicable.
Indeed, the court specifically told the jurors that “[s]ome of these
instructions may not apply, depending on your findings about the facts of the
case. Do not assume just because I give a particular instruction that I am
suggesting anything about the facts. After you have decided what the facts
are, follow the instructions that do apply to the facts as you find them.” We
presume the jury followed this instruction. (People v. Winbush (2017) 2
Cal.5th 402, 457.) And it is well settled that “giving an irrelevant or
inapplicable instruction is generally ‘ “only a technical error which does not
constitute ground for reversal.” ’ ” (People v. Cross (2008) 45 Cal.4th 58, 67;
People v. Eulian (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 1324, 1335.) Nor can Rodriguez
successfully argue that such an allegedly inapplicable instruction reduced the
prosecution’s burden of proof. (People v. Chism (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1266, 1299.)
III. Section 12022.53, Subdivision (d) Enhancement
A. Background
On the murder charge, the jury found true an allegation that Rodriguez
personally and intentionally discharged a firearm and proximately caused
death to a person other than an accomplice under section 12022.53,
subdivision (d). It also found true the section 12022.5, subdivision (a)
21
allegation that Rodriguez personally used a firearm in the commission of the
offense. The People in their sentencing statement asked the court to impose
the section 12022.53, subdivision (d) enhancement consecutively to the
murder sentence, arguing that striking or staying that punishment would not
be in the interest of justice.
In his sentencing memorandum, Rodriguez urged the court to exercise
its discretion to strike the section 12022.53, subdivision (d) enhancement. He
asserted that section 12022.53, subdivision (h) gave the court discretion to do
so, and listed factors the court was required to consider in making its
decision, including mitigating factors that the victim “was a provoker of, and
willing participant in, the incident”; the crime stemmed from “an unusual
circumstance that is unlikely to recur”; and he had no prior record, or an
insignificant record of criminal conduct. Citing People v. Tirado (2022) 12
Cal.5th 688, he asked the court to impose a lesser enhancement in
furtherance of the interests of justice if it were to decline to strike the section
12022.53, subdivision (d) allegation.
Rodriguez’s sentencing hearing took place in June 2023. At the
hearing, the court initially acknowledged that “defense is moving that I
exercise discretion that is newly found discretion, legally to strike the gun
allegation. My strong tentative, given the nature of that offense, is to not
strike it. It’s a murder involving a firearm. That’s the only discretion I
have.”
Rodriguez’s counsel argued the additional 25-year-to-life enhancement
was “disproportionate to what took place in this case.” He mentioned
Rodriguez’s lack of any criminal history and minimal record and argued: “In
this particular case, because the law on its face, that the court has a
discretion because the supreme court has ruled that the court has discretion,
22
based upon the totality of circumstances, to determine whether the additional
25 to life is appropriate or not. [¶] And I would ask the court to take into
consideration the totality of factors in this case, take into consideration the
underlying current in this case, take into consideration the background and
upbringing of the various participants in this particular case. And I’d ask the
court to consider quite seriously to strike the gun allegation in this matter.”
The prosecutor pointed out the murder was “senseless and
unprovoked”; that Rodriguez “could have walked away and could have ended
this” but instead came back to pick a fight and murder S.D. He pointed out
the case was “unique” for the presence of audio evidence of the events leading
up to the murder, which showed S.D. asking, “Are we done?” indicating the
conflict was over, and Rodriguez escalating matters. Counsel pointed out
that Rodriguez kept firing the gun even after it had malfunctioned, and that
he “had no remorse [and was] completely devoid of emotion. And through his
own will and volition murdered [S.D.]. [¶] So for all of those reasons, the
court should absolutely impose the 12022.53[, subdivision] (d) allegation.”
The court denied Rodriguez’s request to strike the enhancement and
imposed it: “Initially, there’s a motion before the court to strike the
12022.53[, subdivision] (d) allegation. I’ve considered that motion. I’m going
to deny that motion. The very nature of this offense involves the use of a
firearm to effectuate the murder and as such I think it’s an appropriate part
of this sentence. [¶] . . . [¶] As to the special allegation, pursuant to . . .
section 12022.5[, subdivision] (a), four years will be ordered but the
punishment will be struck, pursuant to [section] 654, as it’s duplicative of the
next allegation, which is [section] 12022.53[, subdivision] (d) where I’ll order
another 25 years to life to be served consecutive for the maximum
punishment available by law of 50 years to life.”
23
B. Legal Principles
A sentencing court, “in the interest of justice pursuant to [s]ection
1385” may “strike or dismiss an enhancement otherwise required to be
imposed” under section 12022.53. (§ 12022.53, subd. (h); People v. McDavid
(2024) 15 Cal.5th 1015, 1020-1021; People v. Tirado, supra, 12 Cal.5th at p.
692 [“[T]he statutory framework [of section 12022.53] permits a court to
strike the section 12022.53[, subdivision] (d) enhancement found true by the
jury and to impose a lesser uncharged statutory enhancement instead”].)
People v. Tirado held that the court’s discretion under this sentencing
scheme included striking a section 12022.53 enhancement and then imposing
a lesser included, uncharged section 12022.53 enhancement when the facts
supporting the lesser enhancement were alleged and found true by the jury.
(People v. Tirado, supra, 12 Cal.5th at pp. 692, 700.) “[T]he main issue in
Tirado was whether a court after striking a section 12022.53, subdivision (d)
enhancement may impose a lesser included subdivision (b) or (c)
enhancement . . . .” (People v. McDavid, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 1030.) Tirado
did not decide whether the court could also impose a lesser included,
uncharged enhancement under statutes other than section 12022.53, such as
section 12022.5, subdivision (a). (McDavid, at p. 1030.)
After Rodriguez’s sentencing hearing, the California Supreme Court
decided in People v. McDavid, supra, 15 Cal.5th 1015 that trial courts had
such discretion. (Id. at p. 1030.) The court in McDavid resolved a split
among appellate courts as to whether trial courts had the discretion to
impose an uncharged lesser included firearm offense outside of section
12022.53 after striking under section 12022.53, subdivision (h) a charged and
proven section 12022.53 firearm enhancement. (McDavid, at pp. 1022-1023.)
McDavid held: “[W]hen a court has exercised its discretion under [section
24
12022.53,] subdivision (h), to strike a section 12022.53 enhancement and
finds that no other section 12022.53 enhancement is appropriate, the second
sentence of subdivision (j) is inapplicable and does not bar the court from
imposing a lesser included, uncharged enhancement under a law other than
section 12022.53.” (McDavid, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 1030.)
We review a trial court’s determination concerning dismissal of a
firearm enhancement for abuse of discretion. (See People v. Gonzalez (2024)
103 Cal.App.5th 215, 225.) If the party attacking the sentence does not
clearly show that the sentencing decision was irrational or arbitrary, “ ‘ “the
trial court is presumed to have acted to achieve legitimate sentencing
objectives, and its discretionary determination to impose a particular
sentence will not be set aside on review.” ’ ” (People v. Carmony (2004) 33
Cal.4th 367, 376-377.) Where a court fails to recognize the full scope of its
sentencing discretion, “ ‘the appropriate remedy is to remand for resentencing
unless the record “clearly indicate[s]” that the trial court would have reached
the same conclusion “even if it had been aware that it had such discretion.” ’ ”
(People v. Salazar (2023) 15 Cal.5th 416, 424.)
C. Contentions
Rodriguez contends the record does not reflect the trial court was
aware of its authority to strike the section 12022.53, subdivision (d) firearm
enhancement and instead impose the enhancement under section 12022.5.
He points out the court in People v. Tirado, supra, 12 Cal.5th 688 did not
address whether a court could substitute an enhancement under a different
law, such as section 12022.5, subdivision (a). Though he acknowledges his
sentencing memorandum asked the court to impose a lesser enhancement if
it did not strike the section 12022.53, subdivision (d) enhancement, he argues
the court did not acknowledge it had such discretion. Rodriguez further
25
argues the court abused its discretion when it considered inappropriate
factors and disregarded appropriate factors in refusing to strike the
enhancement. He maintains the court’s refusal to dismiss the enhancement
violated his Fourteenth Amendment due process rights.
D. Analysis
We need not decide whether the trial court at sentencing was aware of
its discretion under People v. McDavid, supra, 15 Cal.5th 1015. We hold
another resentencing hearing is not necessary because whether or not the
court was aware of this discretion, it undoubtedly would not have exercised
it. That is, this record “ ‘ “clearly indicate[s]” that the trial court would have
reached the same conclusion “even if it had been aware that it had such
discretion.” ’ ” (People v. Salazar, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 425.)
Here, Rodriguez alerted the court to its “newly found discretion” under
People v. Tirado, supra, 12 Cal.5th 688, and the court acknowledged his
request that it exercise that discretion but declined to impose any lesser
firearm enhancements. The court’s implied finding was that the interests of
justice did not support striking the section 12022.53, subdivision (d)
enhancement. If the trial court declined to impose a 10- or 20-year firearm
enhancement under section 12022.53, subdivision (b) or (c) under Tirado, it
would not have exercised its discretion to impose a three-, four-, or 10-year
enhancement under section 12022.5, subdivision (a). The record in our view
clearly indicates that the court would not have chosen to substitute a lesser
firearm enhancement even had People v. McDavid, supra, 15 Cal.5th 1015
been decided prior to Rodriguez’s sentencing.
We recognize that “[w]hen the applicable law governing the defendant’s
sentence has substantively changed after sentencing, it is almost always
speculative for a reviewing court to say what the sentencing court would have
26
done if it had known the scope of its discretionary powers at the time of
sentencing.” (People v. Salazar, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 431.) This record
presents no such speculation, however, and falls within the exception to that
rule.
Having reviewed all the circumstances of Rodriguez’s sentencing in this
record, we conclude remand for resentencing is unwarranted.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
O’ROURKE, Acting P. J.
WE CONCUR:
DATO, J.
CASTILLO, J.
27
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