CourtListener 10404016•People v. Valencia CA3
Gesamter Gesetzestext
Filed 4/29/25 P. v. Valencia CA3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
(Yolo)
----
THE PEOPLE, C098493
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. No. CR2003-2642)
v.
JON VALENCIA,
Defendant and Appellant.
Defendant Jon Matthew Valencia pleaded no contest to attempted murder. In
2004, he stipulated to a sentence that included the upper term for his attempted murder
conviction in addition to a variety of sentence enhancements. In 2022, the trial court
recalled Valencia’s sentence under Penal Code section 1172.75, struck a prior prison term
enhancement, and otherwise reimposed the prior upper term sentence and other
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enhancements.1 On appeal, Valencia contends that the trial court could not impose the
upper term sentence because the aggravating circumstances of the crime were not
stipulated to, found true beyond a reasonable doubt, or based on a certified record of
conviction, as required under sections 1170 and 1172.75, subdivision (d)(2). The People
argue that section 1172.75, subdivision (d)(4) permitted the trial court to reimpose the
upper term sentence. We agree with the People and will affirm the judgment.
BACKGROUND
In 2003, Valencia attacked the mother of his children with a knife and a hammer
after she obtained a restraining order against him. In 2004, Valencia entered into a plea
agreement under which he would plead no contest to attempted murder (§§ 664, 187,
subd. (a)) and receive an upper term sentence of nine years. He also agreed to admit a
deadly weapon enhancement (§ 12022, subd. (b)(1)), an enhancement for great bodily
injury involving domestic violence (§ 12022.7, subd. (e)), a prior strike conviction
(§ 667, subds. (c) & (e)(1)), a prior serious felony enhancement (§ 667, subd. (a)), and a
prior prison term enhancement (§ 667.5, subd. (b)), for an aggregate sentence of 30 years.
At the 2004 sentencing hearing, the parties discussed the agreement:
“[Prosecutor]: Just one other issue given the Blakely [v. Washington (2004)
542 U.S. 296] case. This is a stipulated sentence, and it should be clear, as well as
waiving his right to a jury trial, he’s waiving his right to a jury trial on sentencing.
“[Defense counsel]: Yes, he is. This is a stipulated sentence, and we have
stipulated to the aggravated term in that position, I don’t think Blakely even applies.
“THE COURT: Yeah, I would agree with that.
“[Defense counsel]: And in the event it does, Mr. Valencia is amenable to
waiving his right to a jury trial on the aggravating factors and amenable to the Court
1 Undesignated statutory citations are to the Penal Code.
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finding them based on a finding of preponderance of the evidence provided in the current
Rules of Court.
“THE COURT: You agree with that, Mr. Valencia?
“THE DEFENDANT: Yes.”
Consistent with the stipulated agreement, the trial court imposed an aggregate 30-
year sentence composed of: the upper term sentence of nine years for the attempted
murder conviction, doubled for the prior strike conviction; one year for the deadly
weapon enhancement; the upper term of five years for the great bodily injury
enhancement; five years for the prior serious felony enhancement; and one year for the
prior prison term enhancement.
In 2022, Valencia filed a motion under sections 1172.75 and 1385 requesting
recall of his sentence and resentencing. The trial court set a resentencing hearing.
At the resentencing hearing, the parties disputed the application of current
sentencing laws to Valencia’s sentence. As relevant here, defense counsel argued that the
trial court should impose the lower term sentence on the attempted murder count because
Valencia’s childhood trauma contributed to the commission of the offense. Even if there
were aggravating circumstances, the midterm sentence would be the most that was
warranted. The prosecution argued that the court could maintain an upper term sentence
under section 1172.75 “if that’s what was the original sentence.”
The trial court summarized its view of the crime, saying, “To me, the callousness
and the indifference that you showed just shows a terrible lack of humanity. It’s—the
ripple effect of it is that, from the prior statement made by the victims, your son passed
away early later on anyway, at least indirectly as a result of this terrible trauma on the
family. It affected everyone in the family; the health and emotional problems of the
father, and the health and emotional problems of the surviving victim. It’s—it’s difficult
to reconcile with what you’ve stated on the record and what your attorney has stated on
the record. [¶] You’ve expressed some remorse, at least today. That means perhaps
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you’re on the right path to redemption. I don’t really know. But what I do know is the—
you still pose a threat to public safety. It’s hard to come to any other conclusion based on
the total depravity of the crime.” The court thus concluded that it was not in the interest
of justice to strike any of the enhancements and took the sentencing triad for the
attempted murder count, as well as the issue of Valencia’s childhood trauma, under
submission.
In supplemental briefing, Valencia argued that, under section 1170,
subdivision (b)(2), the trial court could only impose the upper term sentence if the
aggravating facts of the crime had been stipulated to or found true beyond a reasonable
doubt by a jury or judge. He also argued that the lower term should be imposed based on
the childhood trauma and abuse he suffered. In opposition, the People cited
section 1172.75, subdivision (d)(4), which states, “unless the court originally imposed the
upper term, the court may not impose a sentence exceeding the middle term,” arguing
that the trial court was authorized to reimpose the upper term sentence under that
provision. The People further argued that the court had no sentencing discretion because
Valencia had stipulated to the upper term sentence. Finally, they asserted that Valencia
had stipulated to the aggravating facts because he expressly waived his right to a jury trial
on those factors in the original sentencing hearing.
In a written order, the trial court concluded that section 1170, subdivision (b) did
not apply to plea agreements. It further reasoned that, even if the statute applied, the
parties had reviewed the probation report at the initial sentencing and had not disputed
the facts it contained. Valencia had therefore stipulated to the aggravating circumstances.
The court also rejected as unsupported Valencia’s claims that he had suffered childhood
trauma. The court thus concluded that the upper term was still permissible. The court
reimposed the original sentence, except for the one-year prior prison term enhancement.
Valencia filed a timely notice of appeal.
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DISCUSSION
Section 1172.75 provides that “[a]ny sentence enhancement that was imposed
prior to January 1, 2020, pursuant to subdivision (b) of Section 667.5, except for any
enhancement imposed for a prior conviction for a sexually violent offense as defined in
subdivision (b) of Section 6600 of the Welfare and Institutions Code[,] is legally invalid.”
(§ 1172.75, subd. (a).) The statute also establishes a process for recalling sentences that
include now-invalid prior prison term enhancements and resentencing affected
defendants. (§ 1172.75, subds. (b)-(e).) It requires the “Secretary of the Department of
Corrections and Rehabilitation and the county correctional administrator of each county
[to] identify those persons in their custody currently serving a term for a judgment that
includes an enhancement described in subdivision (a) and [to] provide the name of each
person, along with the person’s date of birth and the relevant case number or docket
number, to the sentencing court that imposed the enhancement.” (§ 1172.75, subd. (b).)
Upon receiving this information, “the court shall review the judgment and verify that the
current judgment includes a sentencing enhancement described in subdivision (a).”
(§ 1172.75, subd. (c).) If the judgment includes such an enhancement, “the court shall
recall the sentence and resentence the defendant.” (Ibid.) Resentencing under the statute
“shall result in a lesser sentence than the one originally imposed as a result of the
elimination of the repealed enhancement, unless the court finds by clear and convincing
evidence that imposing a lesser sentence would endanger public safety.” (§ 1172.75,
subd. (d)(1).) Resentencing under this section “shall not result in a longer sentence than
the one originally imposed.” (Ibid.)
When resentencing an eligible defendant, the “court shall apply the sentencing
rules of the Judicial Council and apply any other changes in law that reduce sentences or
provide for judicial discretion so as to eliminate disparity of sentences and to promote
uniformity of sentencing.” (§ 1172.75, subd. (d)(2).) At the resentencing hearing, the
court may consider postconviction factors such as a defendant’s disciplinary record and
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rehabilitative efforts while incarcerated; evidence that age, time served, or diminished
physical condition have reduced the defendant’s risk of future violence; and evidence of
changed circumstances such that continued incarceration is contrary to the interest of
justice. (§ 1172.75, subd. (d)(3).) “Unless the court originally imposed the upper term,
the court may not impose a sentence exceeding the middle term unless there are
circumstances in aggravation that justify the imposition of a term of imprisonment
exceeding the middle term, and those facts have been stipulated to by the defendant, or
have been found true beyond a reasonable doubt at trial by the jury or by the judge in a
court trial.” (§ 1172.75, subd. (d)(4).) This requirement tracks section 1170,
subdivision (b), which limits courts’ discretion to impose upper term sentences. That
provision states that a “court may impose a sentence exceeding the middle term only
when there are circumstances in aggravation of the crime that justify the imposition of a
term of imprisonment exceeding the middle term and the facts underlying those
circumstances have been stipulated to by the defendant or have been found true beyond a
reasonable doubt at trial by the jury or by the judge in a court trial.” (§ 1170,
subd. (b)(2).)
We review a trial court’s resentencing decision for abuse of discretion. (People v.
Garcia (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 848, 856.) Questions of statutory interpretation are
reviewed de novo. (People v. Gonzalez (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1138, 1141.)
We begin by addressing appealability. Although neither party questions this
court’s authority to decide Valencia’s appeal, an appellate court has an independent
obligation to assure itself of its own jurisdiction. (Doe v. Regents of University of
California (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 282, 291.) “[S]ection 1172.75 does not authorize a
defendant to seek resentencing on his or her own motion or petition. Rather the process
is triggered by the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation identifying a defendant
as a person serving a sentence that includes a prior prison term enhancement.” (People v.
Cota (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 318, 332.) In this case, the record does not include a referral
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from the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation; and it appears that Valencia filed
his own motion initiating the recall procedure.2
We nevertheless conclude that the trial court had jurisdiction to review Valencia’s
sentence and resentence him. There is no dispute in this case that Valencia’s original
judgment included a qualifying enhancement. It is also clear that, under such
circumstance, section 1172.75, subdivision (b) required the Department of Corrections
and Rehabilitation to provide Valencia’s name and other information to the court that
sentenced him. Under well-established principles, we presume that an official duty like
that under section 1172.75, subdivision (b) has been performed (Evid. Code, § 664; see
People v. Bagsby (2024) 106 Cal.App.5th 1040, 1068), and there is nothing in the record
that would refute that presumption in this case. We thus proceed to the merits of
Valencia’s challenge.
Valencia argues that the trial court erred because it reimposed the upper term
sentence and relied on facts that he did not admit and that were not found to be true
beyond a reasonable doubt at trial, as required under section 1170, subdivision (b). We
conclude this contention lacks merit.
As noted above, under section 1172.75, subdivision (d)(4), a resentencing court
“may not impose a sentence exceeding the middle term unless there are circumstances in
aggravation that justify the imposition of a term of imprisonment exceeding the middle
2 In their respondent’s brief, the People stated on information and belief that the trial
court received notice from the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, and they
offered to provide this court with the relevant documentation. Pursuant to California
Rules of Court, rule 8.155(a), we directed the People to file with this court the relevant
documents or material filed or lodged in the superior court, evidencing the filing or
lodging in the superior court. The People responded with a document listing inmate
names and a declaration from the district attorney’s office stating the declarant’s belief
that the trial court had been provided with the document. Because the People’s
submission does not clearly establish that either the list of names or the declaration was
filed or lodged in the trial court, we decline to augment the record with them. (Cal. Rules
of Court, rule 8.155(a).)
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term, and those facts have been stipulated to by the defendant, or have been found true
beyond a reasonable doubt at trial by the jury or by the judge in a court trial,” “[u]nless
the court originally imposed the upper term.” In People v. Brannon-Thompson (2024)
104 Cal.App.5th 455, 466-467, we explained that, “[g]iving this language its plain
meaning, it is evident the Legislature intended the new burden of proof amendments to
section 1170, subdivision (b) [to] apply only if the trial court is imposing the upper term
for the first time at a section 1172.75 resentencing. Section 1172.75, subdivision (d)(4)
is, therefore, an exception to the general rule that the trial court must apply ameliorative
changes in the law at a section 1172.75 resentencing.” Consistent with this conclusion,
and as the People contend, the trial court in this case could reimpose the upper term
sentence on the attempted murder conviction, without Valencia’s stipulation to or a
factual finding beyond a reasonable doubt of the aggravating circumstances, because the
court previously imposed the upper term sentence at Valencia’s original sentencing
hearing in compliance with his stipulated plea agreement. The court thus did not err
when it resentenced Valencia to the upper term.
We recognize that, after Brannon-Thompson was decided, our colleagues on the
Sixth District Court of Appeal, in People v. Gonzalez (2024) 107 Cal.App.5th 312,
interpreted section 1172.75, subdivision (d)(4) differently. Gonzalez “acknowledge[d]
that the plain language of section 1172.75, subdivision (d)(4), on its face, could be
interpreted as not requiring proof of aggravating factors before reimposing an upper term
sentence.” (Gonzalez, at pp. 328-329.) It observed, however, that the statute’s words
could also reasonably be read to “simply restrict the scope of defendants eligible to
receive the upper term at resentencing to those who previously received the upper term,
instead of creating a condition or exception independently justifying the imposition of the
upper term. Under such an interpretation, a defendant would be eligible for the upper
term but could not receive it in the absence of aggravating factors stipulated to by the
defendant or proven beyond a reasonable doubt to the trier of fact.” (Id. at p. 329.) The
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court adopted the latter interpretation because “allowing a court to resentence a defendant
to an upper term sentence without proof beyond a reasonable doubt of aggravating
factors, would run afoul of the Sixth Amendment implications identified” in People v.
Lynch (2024) 16 Cal.5th 730. (Gonzalez, at p. 330.) In Lynch, our Supreme Court
explained “that the Sixth Amendment jury trial right is triggered by section 1170[,
subdivision (b)]’s substantive requirements governing imposition of an upper term
sentence.” (Lynch, at p. 762.)
We respectfully disagree that the Gonzalez court’s reading of section 1172.75,
subdivision (d)(4) is necessary to avoid a conflict with the Sixth Amendment. Under the
Sixth Amendment, “any fact that exposes a defendant to a greater potential sentence must
be found by a jury, not a judge, and established beyond a reasonable doubt.”
(Cunningham v. California (2007) 549 U.S. 270, 281.) But section 1172.75,
subdivision (d)(4) creates an exception to the factfinding requirement in section 1170,
subdivision (b). (People v. Brannon-Thompson, supra, 104 Cal.App.5th at pp. 466-467.)
Under section 1172.75, subdivision (d)(4), a resentencing court may select the upper term
without relying on aggravating factors if the upper term was previously imposed. In that
circumstance, no factfinding is required before a resentencing court may again sentence a
defendant to the upper term, and the Sixth Amendment is not implicated. (See People v.
Lynch, supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 759 [“It is the requirement of additional factfinding that
brings the Sixth Amendment into play”]; see also id. at p. 756 [“in this context, what the
Sixth Amendment requires is necessarily informed by what the state statutory scheme
requires”].) Because the trial court in this case originally imposed the upper term on
Valencia’s attempted murder conviction, it was permitted under section 1172.75,
subdivision (d)(4) to do so again upon resentencing. It thus committed no error in
selecting the upper term of nine years for Valencia’s attempted murder conviction.
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DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
/s/
FEINBERG, J.
We concur:
/s/
DUARTE, Acting P. J.
/s/
MESIWALA, J.
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