People v. Sernas CA2/2

CourtListener 10387481Calctapp28.04.2025

Gesamter Gesetzestext

Filed 4/28/25 P. v. Sernas CA2/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

THE PEOPLE, B335505

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No.
v. SA070478)

HERIBERTO JUAREZ SERNAS,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a postjudgment order of the Superior Court
of Los Angeles County, Christopher W. Dybwad, Judge.
Affirmed.
Heather J. Manolakas, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Steven D.
Matthews and Ryan M. Smith, Deputy Attorneys General, for
Plaintiff and Respondent.
______________________________________
Facing a potential term of 28 years in prison for sexually
abusing his stepdaughter, appellant Heriberto Juarez Sernas
negotiated a six-year term in exchange for pleading no contest to
one count of committing a lewd act on a child under the age of 14.
(Pen. Code, § 288.)1 Upon completing his prison term, appellant
was deported. A decade later, he moved to vacate his sentence,
claiming ignorance of the immigration consequences of his plea.
(§§ 1016.5, 1473.7.) The trial court denied his motion.
After independent review, we conclude that the motion was
properly denied. Before entering his plea, appellant reviewed the
waiver of his rights—including immigration consequences—with
his attorney and an interpreter. He told the court he understood
all of his rights and all of the consequences and had no questions.
In his motion, appellant claimed he did not understand what he
was doing, 13 years earlier, but the court did not believe him.
Appellant lacked legal status, knew he could be deported at any
time, expressed no concern about future deportation, and made a
rational choice to avoid the risk of a lengthy prison term. No
prejudicial error occurred at the time he entered his plea in 2010.
We affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The Charges Against Appellant
In 2009, appellant was charged with three counts of lewd
acts upon a child under the age of 14, and one count of continuous
sexual abuse. (§§ 288, subd. (a), 288.5, subd. (a).) The victim was
his young stepdaughter, who told police that appellant began
molesting her in 2001, when she was six. According to the
probation report, he began by touching her breasts, thighs, and

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

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vagina. Later, he made her orally copulate him, sodomized her,
and raped her. The victim’s mother learned of the abuse and
moved out with the children. She believed appellant when he
apologized and promised not to do it again. She let him live with
her and the children because he was the “breadwinner.”
Appellant broke his promise and continued to grope and digitally
penetrate the victim’s vagina.
Appellant agreed to speak to police. He initially denied the
abuse. When told that his wife knew of it, he admitted touching
the victim but said it was “an accident and they were playing.”
He accused the victim of being the aggressor, saying she put his
hand repeatedly on her vagina and touched his penis. Appellant
said he touched her vagina for a few seconds then removed his
hand. He admitted getting an erection while holding the victim
on his lap, and thought about doing something more sexual but
decided against it. He also said he had erections while playing
with his young biological children but pushed them away when
he became aroused “because he knew it was not right.”
Appellant Agrees to Plead No Contest
Appellant negotiated a plea. As part of the plea, he
initialed and signed a waiver stating, “I understand that if I am
not a citizen of the United States, I must expect my plea of guilty
or not contest will result in my deportation, exclusion from
admission or reentry to the United States, and denial of
naturalization and amnesty.” (Italics added.)
At a hearing on May 14, 2010, appellant was advised of his
rights against self-incrimination; the nature of the charges; the
possible consequences of a guilty or no contest plea; and the legal
effect on subsequent convictions. The court’s order states, “If you
are not a citizen, you are hereby advised that a conviction of the

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offense for which you have been charged will have the
consequences of deportation, exclusion from admission to the
United States, or denial of naturalization pursuant to the laws of
the United States.”
Finding that appellant expressly, knowingly, intelligently,
and understandingly waived his rights, the court accepted his no
contest plea to count one, a violation of section 288. He was
sentenced to six years in prison, per the terms of his plea
bargain. The remaining counts were dismissed.
Appellant Moves to Vacate His Sentence
In 2023, appellant moved to vacate his plea, arguing that
he “was not properly advised of the immigration consequences of
his guilty plea [and] never understood that his guilty plea to the
charged offenses would forevermore prevent him from becoming a
legal member of the American community. Defendant was
prejudiced by his failure to understand the true immigration
consequences of his guilty plea because he believed he was
innocent.” His lawyer’s threat to withdraw without payment of
additional funds caused appellant to plead guilty. Had he
realized he would be deported to Mexico, he never would have
pleaded guilty.
Appellant declared that he entered this country illegally in
1996, when he was 19. His wife and children are United States
citizens. He worked in a restaurant and was going to get a green
card when he was arrested. He had no prior criminal record. He
declared, “I did not ever do anything to this girl,” and accused her
of making “false charges.” “Because I felt I was innocent,”
appellant wanted to go to trial, but counsel “wanted me to pay
him more money for trial, and I had already paid him all the
money I had.” He pleaded guilty, received a six-year term, and

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served three years. He was deported upon his release and rarely
sees his wife and teenage children.
Appellant asserted, “I had no idea that I would be deported
as a result of my guilty plea. Nobody said a word to me about
deportation at the time.” Because he was stressed and not
thinking straight, “I just signed and initialed the papers put in
front of me and pled guilty.”
Appellant’s counsel declared that sex offenses by
noncitizens require deportation. Appellant cannot return to the
United States unless his conviction is vacated. Appellant
admittedly signed a waiver stating that a guilty plea “will result
in my deportation.” However, the court did not orally advise
appellant that he could be deported.
In supplemental papers, appellant declared that he “never
made the statements attributed to me by the police at the time of
my arrest, or the statements I made were misconstrued.” Though
he told officers that the victim was “aggressive,” he was referring
to her attitude, not sexual aggression toward him. He often
touched her, but not sexually. He admitted saying he knew it
was “not right” to have sexual feelings toward his own children,
but he intended to include his stepdaughter in that statement.
Appellant had lived with his wife and two young daughters.
If he had known he would be deported for pleading guilty, “I
never would have done it.” He had a good job in the restaurant
business. He would rather go to prison for many years than live
in Mexico, separated from his family.
In opposition, the district attorney argued that appellant’s
motion should be denied as untimely. He knew the actual
consequences of his plea when he was deported 10 years ago. His
claim fails on the merits because he executed a waiver form,

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which is a proper substitute for a verbal admonishment by the
court. He was warned about the consequences and was facing a
possible sentence of 28 years for molesting a child. He did not
show that deportation was a consideration when he entered a
plea and was facing a lengthy prison term.
The evidence against appellant was strong: He admitted
touching the victim’s vagina, though he blamed the child’s
“aggression” for it. He admitted to being sexually aroused by the
victim and by his own children. It is not reasonably probable
that he would have elected to go to trial rather than accept the
offer of a six-year term.
At the plea hearing, the court asked appellant if he spoke
to his lawyer about possible defenses and the consequences of his
plea; whether he read the advisement form with the assistance of
his lawyer and the interpreter; whether he initialed and signed
the advisement to indicate that he “understood all of [his] rights
and all of the consequences”; whether he gave up his rights; and
whether he had any questions. Appellant agreed to everything
and had no questions. The court warned him that “for no reason
may you come back later and change your mind” once it
announced his sentence.
The Initial Ruling on Appellant’s Motion
The trial court denied appellant’s motion. His executed
waiver acknowledged that his plea “will result in my
deportation.” The form was translated and signed by appellant
and his attorney, who certified that he explained the
consequences of the plea to appellant. In court, appellant was
asked if he understood the form and told the court that he
understood all of his rights and the consequences. It was
unnecessary to repeat the admonishment orally.

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The court rejected appellant’s “self-serving declarations”
that he was not “thinking straight” when he signed and initialed
the waiver. Counsel reviewed the waiver with appellant, whose
claim that “nobody said a word” about deportation “is not
credible” in light of the executed waiver, which the interpreter
certified was fully translated into Spanish. Appellant did not
carry his burden of showing prejudice. He received a substantial
benefit by agreeing to a deal that reduced his exposure from 28 to
six years. The court did not believe his claim that he would have
gone to trial to avoid deportation. He attended the preliminary
hearing, where the victim testified. He was aware of all the
evidence, yet chose to plead no contest.
Appellant’s Motion for Reconsideration
Appellant moved for reconsideration. He submitted a
declaration from trial counsel Leonard Levine, who stated that
his custom and practice is to review the waiver form with a client
and check off each provision after reviewing it. His check mark
“indicates that I did review” the immigration provision with
appellant; however, “I do not believe I advised Mr. Sernas beyond
the terms of the form.” Appellant declared that he never saw a
medical report stating that the victim’s vagina and anus showed
no sign of sexual abuse. Had he seen the report, he would never
have pleaded guilty because it proves his innocence.
The court heard testimony from appellant and defense
counsel Levine, who testified that he did “not specifically
remember” appellant’s case. He did not tell appellant that he
would not be deported. Levine believed that he reviewed the
evidence with appellant, including the sexual abuse exam, and
explained why a no contest plea “was a reasonable option, and he
agreed to do it.” He did not recall giving immigration advice

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beyond what is written in the waiver form. It was his practice to
review the waiver form with the client.
Appellant testified that Levine never said “one word” to
him about deportation and did not use a Spanish interpreter
when they reviewed the waiver form. However, he told the court
in 2010 that he reviewed with counsel the facts of the case, any
possible defenses, and the consequences of entering the plea. He
replied “yes” when the court asked, “Did you understand
everything that was said to you?” He also replied “yes” when the
court asked if he was assisted by an interpreter and if he read
and understood the form “with the assistance of your lawyer and
the interpreter.” He had answered the court’s questions “in a
truthful manner.”
Appellant conceded that he came to the United States
illegally. He knew that he could be deported at any time. He did
not think that committing crimes could result in deportation,
only that working in the United States could result in
deportation.
Appellant claimed no recollection of the waiver form, or the
judge’s questions, or entering a plea, or the preliminary hearing
when the victim testified, or speaking to detectives after he was
arrested. He did, however, deny making incriminating
statements to police.
The Court’s Second Ruling
In a written order, the court rejected appellant’s claim that
nobody discussed the form with him: He was “flatly contradicted”
by the waiver form itself and the transcript of the plea hearing.
Appellant stated that he crossed the border illegally. He
conceded that “based on [his] illegal status, [he] could be deported
or removed from the country at any time.” He was confronted by

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a threat he made to the victim to have her deported because she
lacked legal status in the United States.
The court discredited appellant’s statement that he did not
know he could be deported: It contradicts his threat to the
victim, and it defies common sense that he would think the
criminal case would have no impact because “he knew he was
deportable for any reason at all.” No possible plea could avoid
deportation for his crime. Appellant waited 10 years to vacate
his plea, long after he was deported.2
Appellant claimed innocence, but was confronted with
statements he made to police. He denied saying any of it—that
he had an erection when the victim sat on his lap, that he
touched the victim’s genitals and thigh with his hand, that the
victim touched his penis, that he got dressed so his wife would
not see his erection, or that the victim was sexually aggressive
and said she wanted to be with him. The court found no part of
his testimony credible. It denied the motion. He appeals. (§§
1237, subd. (b), 1473.7, subd. (f).)
DISCUSSION
Analysis Under Section 1016.5
Appellant initialed and signed a waiver form stating, “I
must expect my plea of guilty or no contest will result in my
deportation.” He maintains that the waiver is not enough,
insisting that the court had to orally advise him of immigration
consequences during the plea hearing under section 1016.5.3

2 The court noted that if it vacated the plea, “[t]he case
doesn’t get dismissed; [it] simply becomes active again.”
3 “Prior to acceptance of a plea of guilty or nolo contendere
to any offense punishable as a crime under state law, except
offenses designated as infractions under state law, the court shall

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“To prevail on a motion to vacate under section 1016.5, a
defendant must establish that (1) he or she was not properly
advised of the immigration consequences as provided by the
statute; (2) there exists, at the time of the motion, more than a
remote possibility that the conviction will have one or more of the
specified adverse immigration consequences; and (3) he or she
was prejudiced by the nonadvisement.” (People v. Totari (2002)
28 Cal.4th 876, 884.)
Appellant is mistaken that a court must recite aloud the
contents of a signed waiver. Courts “may rely upon a defendant’s
validly executed waiver form as a proper substitute for a personal
admonishment.” (People v. Panizzon (1996) 13 Cal.4th 68, 83.)
“[A] defendant who has signed a waiver form upon competent
advice of his attorney has little need to hear a ritual recitation of
his rights by a trial judge. The judge need only determine
whether defendant had read and understood the contents of the
form, and had discussed them with his attorney.” (In re Ibarra
(1983) 34 Cal.3d 277, 286.)
Courts have held that section 1016.5 does not require an
oral admonition. (People v. Ramirez (1999) 71 Cal.App.4th 519,
521 [no statutory language “states the advisements must be
verbal, only that they must appear on the record”]; People v.
Gutierrez (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 169, 175 [court may rely on
executed form]; People v. Quesada (1991) 230 Cal.App.3d 525,

administer the following advisement on the record to the
defendant: [¶] If you are not a citizen, you are hereby advised
that conviction of the offense for which you have been charged
may have the consequences of deportation, exclusion from
admission to the United States, or denial of naturalization
pursuant to the laws of the United States.” (§ 1016.5, subd. (a).)

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533–534 [admonition need not be given orally].) “The advisement
need not be in the exact language of section 1016.5 and can be in
writing. Substantial compliance is all that is required.” (People
v. Araujo (2016) 243 Cal.App.4th 759, 762.)
We agree with the cases holding that section 1016.5 is
satisfied if the written advisement appears in the appellate
record and the court questions the defendant to ensure he
understood the advisements and had the opportunity to discuss
immigration consequences with counsel. Appellant does not
dispute that the court asked him if he discussed the waiver form
with counsel, whether he understood it, and if he had any
questions. The record shows that appellant was specifically
advised in the waiver form that he would be deported. Appellant
cannot show prejudice because he was properly advised.
Analysis Under Section 1473.7
Section 1473.7 authorizes a motion to vacate a conviction or
sentence by someone who is no longer imprisoned. Relief is
appropriate when “[t]he conviction or sentence is legally invalid
due to prejudicial error damaging the moving party’s ability to
meaningfully understand, defend against, or knowingly accept
the actual or potential adverse immigration consequences of a
conviction or sentence. A finding of legal invalidity may, but
need not, include a finding of ineffective assistance of counsel.”
(Id., subd. (a)(1).)
The court must vacate a conviction if a preponderance of
the evidence shows prejudicial error affecting the moving party’s
ability to meaningfully understand the actual or potential
consequences of a guilty or no contest plea. (People v. Vivar
(2021) 11 Cal.5th 510, 517 (Vivar).) “[S]howing prejudicial error
under section 1473.7, subdivision (a)(1) means demonstrating a

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reasonable probability that the defendant would have rejected
the plea if the defendant had correctly understood its actual or
potential immigration consequences.” (Id. at p. 529.)
On appeal, we exercise our independent judgment to
determine if the facts satisfy the statute; however, “[i]n section
1473.7 proceedings, appellate courts should . . . give particular
deference to factual findings based on the trial court’s personal
observations of witnesses.” (Vivar, supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 527–
528.)
When courts assess whether a defendant would have
rejected a plea, they consider the totality of the circumstances,
which “include the defendant’s ties to the United States, the
importance the defendant placed on avoiding deportation, the
defendant’s priorities in seeking a plea bargain, and whether the
defendant had reason to believe an immigration-neutral
negotiated disposition was possible.” (Vivar, supra, 11 Cal.5th at
pp. 529–530.) Appellant must corroborate factual assertions with
“ ‘ “objective evidence.” ’ ” (Id. at p. 530; People v. Espinoza (2023)
14 Cal.5th 311, 316, 321 (Espinoza).)
The trial court found that appellant understood the
immigration consequences of his plea. It expressly noted that it
had “the opportunity to observe [appellant’s] demeanor” and
found that “his testimony was not credible.” We defer to the
court’s credibility assessment. (Vivar, supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp.
527–528; In re Long (2020) 10 Cal.5th 764, 774.)
The court “[did] not find credible” appellant’s testimony
that he had no idea he could be deported because of his criminal
case. He testified, twice, that he knew he could be deported “at
any time” due to his lack of legal status. The court found “not
credible” appellant’s testimony that no interpreter translated the

12
waiver form into Spanish because the reporter’s transcript shows
that it was translated. It wrote, “In view of the objective evidence
of the actual advisement and the potential for a greater penalty
after trial, the Court does not find his testimony credible that he
would have gone to trial had he been properly advised of the
immigration consequences.” Appellant “received a substantial
benefit from the plea agreement” in that his six-year sentence
was far below the statutory maximum of 28 years.
Appellant’s attorney testified to his belief that he reviewed
with appellant the report of the victim’s sexual abuse exam. The
court did not credit appellant’s testimony that he did not see the
report. He also heard the victim testify at the preliminary
hearing. The police report showed that his wife moved out of the
home with the children when she learned he abused her
daughter, before the victim reported it to authorities; she rejoined
him when he promised it would not happen again.
In light of this evidence—with a victim who described
years’-long abuse in detail and reported it to her mother—it was
rational for appellant to reach a plea agreement. There is no
evidence showing that he focused on deportation, rather than
securing a shorter prison sentence. The record of the plea
hearing shows no questions from appellant indicating concern
about possible deportation.
If a defendant says at a plea hearing that deportation
would affect his decision, and counsel assures him that “the
Government would not deport him if he pleaded guilty,” this
contemporaneous evidence of his desire to avoid deportation can
be a basis to withdraw a guilty plea. (Lee v. United States (2017)
582 U.S. 357, 360, 369 (Lee) [137 S.Ct. 1958, 198 L.Ed.2d 476].)
“Courts should not upset a plea solely because of post hoc

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assertions from a defendant about how he would have pleaded
but for his attorney’s deficiencies. Judges should instead look to
contemporaneous evidence to substantiate a defendant’s
expressed preferences.” (Id. at p. 369.) This is particularly true
if the defendant’s testimony lacks credibility. (People v. Garcia
(2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 1059, 1066–1067.)
Appellant was deported upon completion of his sentence,
yet did not seek relief for a decade. From this, it can be inferred
that appellant knew the consequences of his plea and accepted
them. In Vivar, by contrast, Vivar promptly sought relief; within
a month of sentencing, he wrote letters to the court objecting to
an immigration hold. This was contemporaneous evidence that
avoiding deportation was important to him. (Vivar, supra, 11
Cal.5th at pp. 520–522, 530–531.) No contemporaneous evidence
supports a finding that appellant was concerned about
deportation, unlike the defendants in Vivar and Lee, supra, 582
U.S. 357.
Relief may be appropriate if an expert declares that the
defendant could have pleaded to “immigration-safe dispositions.”
(Espinoza, supra, 14 Cal.5th at pp. 321, 325.) Appellant
presented no evidence that such a plea was available when he
faced four felony charges of sexually abusing a child.4 The
possibility of an immigration-safe plea is pure speculation.
We acknowledge appellant’s testimony that he came to the
United States in 1996, married an American, has two American
children, and worked at a restaurant until his arrest in 2009. He
testified that he knew he lacked legal status when he arrived

4 Deportation is federally mandated for crimes of moral
turpitude and aggravated felonies. (8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A).)

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here as an adult, and knew he could be deported “at any time.”
His situation is unlike that described in other cases.
For example, in Espinoza, the defendant entered the
United States at age 13, was “a lawful permanent resident,” and
his attorney “did not mention” that his plea for manufacturing
drugs would have immigration consequences and assured
Espinoza that “ ‘everything was going to be fine.’ ” (Espinoza,
supra, 14 Cal.5th at pp. 317–318; see People v. Lopez (2022) 83
Cal.App.5th 698, 706 [defendant came to the U.S. at age 13];
People v. Mejia (2019) 36 Cal.App.5th 859, 872 [defendant came
to the U.S. at age 14].) The defendant in Vivar came to the
United States at age six, was here 40 years, and had no ties to
Mexico. (Vivar, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 530.)
Appellant did not come here as a child, was not a lawful
permanent resident, and was advised that his plea “will result in
my deportation.” Counsel testified that he did not tell appellant
that he would not be deported.
By contrast, in People v. Manzanilla (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th
891 and People v. Curiel (2023) 92 Cal.App.5th 1160, the plain
language in the waiver form was undermined by inaccurate
advice. There was contemporaneous objective evidence
substantiating the defendants’ claims of misunderstanding
immigration consequences. In Manzanilla, counsel advised that
the plea would “ ‘[change] his status [and] he [would] have [an]
immigration hearing’ . . . to avoid actually stating that
deportation would ensue,” and Manzanilla told the court directly
that he would not plead guilty if he would be deported.
(Manzanilla, at pp. 900, 905–906.) In Curiel, counsel
misrepresented that avoiding jail time would avoid adverse
immigration consequences like deportation. (Curiel, at pp. 1176–

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1177.) In Lee, supra, 582 U.S. at page 361, the defendant
repeatedly asked if he would face deportation; counsel incorrectly
assured him that he would not.
We conclude that no prejudicial error occurred when
appellant’s plea was taken in 2010. He heard the victim’s
testimony, was advised of the immigration consequences of his
plea, voiced no concern, faced a long prison term if convicted, and
nothing indicates he could secure an immigration-safe disposition
for sexually abusing a child. No contemporaneous evidence
shows a misunderstanding. His motion was properly denied.
DISPOSITION
The postjudgment order denying appellant’s motion to
withdraw his plea and vacate judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

LUI, P. J.
We concur:

ASHMANN-GERST, J.

CHAVEZ, J.

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