CourtListener 10384481•People v. Boyd CA2/4
Gesamter Gesetzestext
Filed 4/24/25 P. v. Boyd CA2/4
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FOUR
THE PEOPLE, B334808
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. BA427109)
v.
AHJEEB JAMAL BOYD,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Richard S. Kemalyan, Judge. Affirmed and
remanded with directions.
Jonathan E. Demson, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Steven D. Matthews and Rama R. Maline,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
The trial court found appellant Ahjeeb Boyd ineligible for
resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.61 at the prima facie
stage after concluding that the record of conviction established
appellant was the actual killer. Appellant contends that nothing
in the record of conviction dispositively establishes he was the
actual killer. He asserts that the felony murder instruction the
jury received allowed it to convict him of first degree murder
without finding he was the actual killer. We affirm but remand to
allow appellant an opportunity to file an amended petition, in
accordance with People v. Patton (2025) 17 Cal.5th 549 (Patton).
BACKGROUND
I. Underlying Crimes2
In the early morning hours of September 29, 1991,
firefighters responded to a call about a car fully engulfed in
flames. After the fire was extinguished, the naked body of a
young woman was found inside, burned beyond recognition. She
was covered in a blood-stained white t-shirt, and there was a
1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code
unless otherwise indicated.
2 The underlying facts are discussed in detail in this court’s
prior nonpublished opinion, People v. Boyd (Oct. 7, 2019,
B288876). We briefly summarize them here to provide context
for the trial court’s ruling. We otherwise do not rely on this
factual background in resolving the issues presented in this
appeal. (See § 1172.6, subd. (d)(3).)
2
burned matchbook between her legs. The woman ultimately was
identified through dental records as Jill S.
An autopsy revealed contusions on Jill’s left arm and an
extensive subdural hematoma on top of her head. Swabs were
taken from her vagina and rectum. There was no soot in Jill’s
airway, and the level of carbon dioxide in her blood was also
consistent with death prior to the burn injuries. However, it was
also consistent with “an acute laryngospasm from flash burns
(i.e., a flash fire caused the larynx to spasm so Jill was not able to
take in any breaths).” The doctor who performed the autopsy
concluded the cause of death was extensive thermal burns, but
noted in his report a possibility her death was caused by
suffocation before the fire.
At trial, a doctor who supervised the autopsy testified that
he mostly concurred with the findings, with two significant
exceptions. First, although he agreed at the time of the autopsy
that the subdural hemorrhages probably were caused by the fire,
he now believed, based on scientific literature, that these injuries
were caused by blunt force trauma significant enough to be
associated with unconsciousness, but not significant enough to
have caused death. Second, he concluded Jill probably died by
suffocation before the fire, though it was possible she was set on
fire and died as a result of thermal burns. He believed there was
a high probability Jill was dead prior to the fire, but could not be
entirely certain.
Fire department testing in 1991 revealed copious amounts
of gasoline, an accelerant, on the t-shirt covering Jill. The vaginal
and rectal swabs were not tested until 2012, when a full single-
source-male DNA profile was obtained from the vaginal swab and
a partial profile was obtained from the rectal swab. The profiles
3
were later compared to appellant’s DNA profile; they matched
exactly.
II. Charges and Conviction
In 2016, the People filed an information charging
appellant—and only appellant—with the 1991 murder of victim
Jill. (§ 187, subd. (a).) The information further alleged two
felony-murder special circumstance allegations under section
190.2, subdivision (a)(17): that appellant murdered Jill while
engaged in the commission of rape (§ 261) and that he murdered
Jill while engaged in the crime of sodomy (§ 286).
During appellant’s jury trial, the People argued that
appellant raped and sodomized Jill and either killed her during
those crimes or intentionally killed her afterward.3 Appellant did
not dispute that his sperm was found in Jill’s vagina, but
contended consensual sex occurred well before and independently
of Jill’s murder.
The trial court instructed the jury with CALCRIM No. 520,
First or Second Degree Murder with Malice Aforethought. As
relevant here, that instruction defined the term “implied malice”
using the phrase “natural and probable consequences.” The court
also instructed the jury with CALCRIM No. 521, First Degree
Murder, and CALCRIM No. 540A, Felony Murder: First Degree—
Defendant Allegedly Committed Fatal Act. The latter instruction
set forth three elements the People had to prove to establish guilt
under the felony murder theory: “1. The defendant committed
arson, rape or sodomy; 2. The defendant intended to commit
arson, rape or sodomy; and 3. While committing arson, rape or
3 We granted appellant’s request for judicial notice of the
record from his direct appeal, No. B288876.
4
sodomy, the defendant caused the death of another person.” The
trial court did not instruct the jury on any aiding and abetting
principles.
The jury found appellant guilty of first degree murder. It
also found true “the allegation that the murder of JILL S. was
committed by defendant, AHJEEB BOYD, while said defendant
was engaged in the commission of the crime of rape in violation of
Penal Code section 261, within the meaning of Penal Code section
190.2(a)(17).” The jury found the sodomy felony-murder
allegation false. The trial court sentenced appellant to a term of
life imprisonment without the possibility of parole.
III. Direct Appeal
On direct appeal, appellant challenged his conviction on
three grounds: “(1) there was insufficient evidence to support the
murder conviction; (2) the jury was improperly instructed that he
could be convicted of first degree murder on a natural and
probable consequences theory; and (3) the jury was given
erroneous instructions on unanimity.” (People v. Boyd (Oct. 7,
2019, B288876) [nonpub. opn.].) A different panel of this court
rejected all three contentions and affirmed appellant’s conviction.
As most relevant here, the appellate court specifically
rejected appellant’s contention that the trial court erred by
instructing the jury that he could be convicted under the natural
and probable consequences theory because Senate Bill 1437
abrogated that theory of murder liability. It held that the then-
recent “changes brought by [Senate Bill] 1437 have no application
here,” because that bill “was not intended to change the law of
murder as it applied to the actual killer,” and “defendant was
tried as the actual killer of Jill.” (People v. Boyd (Oct. 7, 2019,
5
B288876) [nonpub. opn.].) The Supreme Court denied appellant’s
petition for review.
IV. Petition for Resentencing
On October 7, 2022, appellant filed a form petition for
resentencing under section 1172.6, checking the box stating he
could no longer be convicted of murder due to changes made by
Senate Bill 1437. On November 15, 2022, the trial court
appointed counsel for appellant and directed the People to
respond to his petition.
On January 13, 2023, the People filed an opposition to the
petition. The People contended appellant was ineligible for relief
as a matter of law because he was tried solely—and therefore
must have been convicted— under the theory that he was the
actual killer. The People attached the jury instructions given in
appellant’s case as an exhibit. The People also attached the
opinion resolving appellant’s direct appeal, but did not cite to or
even mention it in the opposition.
Appellant, through counsel, filed a reply in support of the
petition on June 23, 2023. After briefly summarizing the facts
from the appellate opinion, appellant argued that he satisfied his
prima facie burden because his jury “was instructed on natural
and probable consequences of implied malice on the first-degree
felony murder,” i.e., CALCRIM No. 520. Appellant quoted and
attached two excerpts of the People’s closing argument in support
of this contention. He further asserted, “One may speculate that
the jury may have had doubts whether there was proof beyond a
reasonable doubt that the perpetrator of the rape and the murder
were the same person; perhaps there was one rapist and another
arsonist. Speculation, but at this stage it is unknowable from the
record of conviction to what extent the jury considered the
6
natural and probable consequences instruction and People’s
argument in its deliberations and verdict.” Relying on People v.
Flores (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 974 (Flores), disapproved in part by
Patton, supra,17 Cal.5th 549, and People v. Langi (2022) 73
Cal.App.5th 972 (Langi), appellant also argued that he met his
prima facie burden notwithstanding the People’s assertion that
he was the actual killer.
The trial court heard the petition on September 21, 2023.
Both sides submitted on their written briefs. After reviewing the
legal framework governing section 1172.6 petitions, emphasizing
that “the court may not engage in any fact-finding but is entitled
to rely on the record of conviction,” the trial court examined the
record of conviction. It noted first that “no other individual was
charged in the information with the commission of the offenses.”
The court next observed that the jury expressly “found that the
murder was committed by petitioner while he was engaged in the
crime of rape.”
The court then turned to the jury instructions, noting that
it viewed as “significant” that the jury was instructed with
CALCRIM Nos. 520, 521, 540A, 548, and 730 but was not
instructed “on aiding and abetting nor on accomplice liability.”
The court stated that “[a]lthough CALCRIM No. 520 references
natural and probable consequences, the presence of this term in
the subject instruction should not infer that a natural and
probable consequences theory was utilized by the People under
the 1172.6 concept.” It continued, “[t]he jury was clearly
instructed on felony murder, but this alone does not necessitate
resentencing nor does it imply that petitioner has proved a prima
facie case because SB 1437 and Penal Code 1172.6 do not provide
a vehicle for resentencing the actual perpetrator of the offense. …
7
Even if the jury opted for felony murder, there’s no indication in
the record of conviction that petitioner was not the actual killer.”
It added, “in the court’s judgment, there’s no indication that the
People argued anything other than the defendant being the
actual killer.”
The trial court then addressed appellant’s arguments.
First, it reiterated that CALCRIM No. 520 “does not import into
the crime of murder, the case law relating to the distinct natural
and probable consequences doctrine developed in the context of
aiding and abetting.” The court next acknowledged that “[t]he
People did argue, briefly, a concept of implied malice,” but
reiterated that “there was no aiding and abetting instruction that
was given to the jury,” and without such instruction the jury
could not have imputed malice to appellant. The court noted that
any “hesitation” about that argument “is overly contrary to the
totality of circumstances in the case.” The court distinguished
Flores on the ground that it concerned preliminary hearing
testimony in the context of a plea, and Langi on the ground that
neither instruction at issue there, including the CALJIC
instruction on aiding and abetting, was given in this case.
In light of the above, the court concluded that appellant
“has not established a prima facie case for relief.” It accordingly
denied the petition.
Appellant timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
I. Contentions
On appeal, appellant abandons the arguments he made
below in favor of the new contention that the felony-murder
instruction allowed the jury to convict him of first degree murder
without deciding he was the actual killer. He asserts that
8
“nothing in appellant’s record of conviction dispositively
establishes the identity of the actual killer, a factual issue the
resolution of which would require an evidentiary hearing at
which both parties have the opportunity to present new or
additional evidence on that or any other material issue.”
Accordingly, he contends, the trial court “contraven[ed] the clear
wording and intent of the statute and violat[ed] appellant’s state
and federal constitutional rights to due process” by denying his
petition.
Respondent notably does not challenge appellant’s change
of argument between the trial court and this court. It instead
asserts that appellant’s argument is foreclosed by the doctrine of
collateral estoppel, because the appellate opinion stated that the
“changes by SB 1437 have no application here” and appellant
“was tried as the actual killer of Jill.” Respondent alternatively
argues that the trial court correctly determined that the record of
conviction shows appellant was the actual killer.
After briefing was completed, the Supreme Court issued its
opinion in Patton, supra, 17 Cal.5th 549. We invited the parties
to submit supplemental letter briefs addressing Patton and its
applicability to this appeal. Respondent filed a brief arguing that
Patton is distinguishable because a jury found that appellant was
the actual killer under a still-valid theory. Alternatively, it
contends that “[t]o the extent any comparison can be made with
Patton, appellant at best made only conclusory allegations of
entitlement to section 1172.6 relief, which the Patton Court found
were insufficient for relief,” and urges us to deny any request for
remand. In his subsequently filed brief, appellant contends
Patton is inapplicable because it involved a plea and the record of
conviction appeared to demonstrate that Patton was the actual
9
perpetrator of the attempted murder to which he pled. He
alternatively contends that if we find Patton applicable, the
appropriate disposition would be that ordered in Patton: a
remand to permit him to file an amended petition, should he seek
to do so.
II. Legal Principles
Under the felony-murder rule as it existed at the time of
appellant’s trial, a defendant could be found guilty of murder
despite lacking express or implied malice, if a victim died during
the course of an inherently dangerous felony and the defendant
intended to commit the underlying felony. (People v. Wilson
(2023) 14 Cal.5th 839, 868.) “The law changed effective January
1, 2019, however, when the Legislature enacted Senate Bill 1437.
With the goal of ‘more equitably sentenc[ing] offenders in
accordance with their involvement in homicides’ [citation],
Senate Bill 1437 significantly changed the scope of murder
liability for defendants who did not actually kill or intend to kill
anyone, including those prosecuted on a felony-murder theory
[citation].” (Ibid.) After the enactment of Senate Bill 1437,
section 189 now limits felony-murder liability to (1) the actual
killer; (2) anyone who, “with the intent to kill, aided, abetted,
counseled, commanded, induced, solicited, requested, or assisted
the actual killer in the commission of murder in the first degree”;
and (3) anyone who “was a major participant in the underlying
felony and acted with reckless indifference to human life.” (§ 189,
subds. (e)(1), (2), (3).)
“Senate Bill 1437 also created a procedural mechanism for
those convicted of murder under prior law to seek retroactive
relief.” (People v. Wilson, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 869.) That
provision, currently codified at section 1172.6, requires
10
petitioners to “first, file a facially valid petition that states the
statutory requirements for relief (id., subd. (b)), and, second,
make a ‘prima facie showing’ (id., subd. (c)), before a court must
issue an order to show cause and hold an evidentiary hearing on
the ultimate question of resentencing at which the People will
bear the burden of defending a conviction under the amended
law.” (Patton, supra,17 Cal.5th at p. 556.)
The initial inquiry, concerning the facial validity of the
petition, is one of “minimal compliance.” (Patton, supra,17
Cal.5th at p. 562.) The prima facie inquiry at issue here is also
limited. (Ibid., citing People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 971
(Lewis).) However, the Supreme Court recently clarified in
Patton that it is not “simply duplicative of the facial inquiry.”
(Patton, supra, at p. 562.) Instead, it is “‘analogous’ to the prima
facie inquiry in habeas corpus proceedings.” (Ibid.) The trial
court generally must accept a petitioner’s factual allegations as
true and may only reject them on credibility grounds if the
record, including the court’s own documents, contains facts
refuting the allegations. (Ibid.) “Conclusory allegations, such as
the checkbox ones offered here, are particularly subject to
refutation by the record of conviction.” (Id. at p. 564.) The
Supreme Court did not limit these pronouncements to situations
in which a petitioner pled to a crime; we accordingly conclude the
standards articulated in Patton are applicable here.
The record of conviction includes “the charging documents,
jury instructions, verdicts, and to a limited extent any prior
appellate opinion.” (People v. Lovejoy (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th
860, 864; see § 1172.6, subd. (d)(3) [allowing the court to consider
at the subsequent evidentiary hearing stage only the “procedural
history of the case recited in any prior appellate opinion”].) It
11
also includes express jury findings, which generally are given
preclusive effect (People v. Curiel (2023) 15 Cal.5th 433, 441,
460), and closing arguments counsel made during the petitioner’s
trial (People v. Lopez (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 1, 13 (Lopez)). The
record of conviction “will necessarily inform the trial court’s
prima facie inquiry under section [1172.6], allowing the court to
distinguish petitions with potential merit from those that are
clearly meritless.” (Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 971.) However,
a petitioner’s allegation that he or she is eligible for relief “is not
refuted by the record unless the record conclusively establishes
every element of the offense.” (Curiel, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p.
463.)
A “petitioner who, despite having access to counsel upon
submission of a facially sufficient petition, offers only conclusory
allegations of entitlement to relief, in response to a record of
conviction that demonstrates the petitioner’s conviction was
under a still-valid theory, has not, thereby, made a prima facie
showing.” (Patton, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 564.) Thus, although
the “‘prima facie bar was intentionally and correctly set very low’”
(Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 972), it is not on the floor. A
petitioner “confronting a record of conviction that demonstrates
relief is unavailable ha[s] the burden of coming forward with
nonconclusory allegations to alert the prosecution and the court
to what issues an evidentiary hearing would entail.” (Patton,
supra, at p.567.) A petitioner may satisfy this burden by, for
instance, pointing to “specific facts that identify someone else as
the direct perpetrator.” (Ibid.) “But absent specific facts, no such
dispute arises, . . . from mere latent, speculative possibilities;
that is, a hypothetical alternate direct perpetrator cannot be
conjured from thin air or a legal conclusion.” (Ibid.)
12
We review de novo the trial court’s determination whether
a petitioner has made a prima facie showing. (People v. Harden
(2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 45, 52.)
III. Analysis
We first address, briefly, respondent’s contention that
collateral estoppel precludes appellant’s current argument.
Collateral estoppel, also known as issue preclusion, prevents the
relitigation of issues that have already been decided. (Curiel,
supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 451.) It simultaneously protects litigants
from the burden of relitigating the same issue and promotes
judicial economy. (Ibid.) For collateral estoppel to apply, several
threshold requirements must be satisfied. “‘First, the issue
sought to be precluded from relitigation must be identical to that
decided in a former proceeding. Second, this issue must have
been actually litigated in the former proceeding. Third, it must
have been necessarily decided in the former proceeding. Fourth,
the decision in the former proceeding must be final and on the
merits. Finally, the party against whom preclusion is sought
must be the same as, or in privity with, the party to the former
proceeding.’” (Id. at pp. 451-452.) The party seeking to apply the
doctrine bears the burden of establishing these requirements.
(Id. at p. 452.)
Here, respondent contends appellant cannot relitigate
whether he was the actual killer, because that was already
decided on direct appeal. Appellant replies that respondent
misreads the opinion, which “never states that appellant was
‘found guilty as the actual killer.’” We decline to resolve this
issue for two reasons. First, as a general rule, collateral estoppel
is forfeited if not raised in the trial court. (People v. Harden,
supra, 81 Cal.App.5th at p. 52.) The People argued below that
13
appellant was the actual killer, but did not invoke the doctrine of
collateral estoppel. Second, even if we were inclined to exercise
our discretion to excuse the forfeiture, which we are not (see In re
Sheena K. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 875, 887 fn. 7), there is no need to
reach the issue because appellant’s argument, which we exercise
our discretion to address, fails on the merits.
For purposes of the felony-murder doctrine, “actual killer”
means “someone who ‘personally killed’ the victim.” (People v.
Vang (2022) 82 Cal.App.5th 65, 89-90.) An actual killer is the
direct, and not merely the proximate, cause of a victim’s death.
(Id. at p. 90.) As the trial court found, the record of conviction
demonstrates that appellant was tried and convicted as the
actual killer of Jill and therefore can still be guilty of murder
under the felony-murder doctrine. (See § 189, subd. (e)(1).)
Appellant was the only person the information charged
with the crime, and he was the only one tried. Although the
People argued alternative theories of murder, all were predicated
on appellant being the sole, actual killer. “The jury was not
instructed on accomplice liability, aider and abettor liability, or
liability under the theory defendant counseled, commanded,
induced, solicited, requested, or assisted the actual killer in the
commission of murder in the first degree or [rape]. The jury was
not instructed on liability by virtue of defendant having been a
major participant in the underlying felony.” (Lopez, supra, 78
Cal.App.5th at p. 15.) The jury expressly found that “the murder
of JILL S. was committed by defendant, AHJEEB BOYD, while
said defendant was engaged in the commission of the crime of
rape. . . .”
Appellant asserts the record nevertheless does not foreclose
the possibility he was not the actual killer. He contends the case
14
is “substantially identical” to Lopez, supra, 78 Cal.App.5th 1, in
which the court found the petitioner satisfied his prima facie
burden notwithstanding a lack of instructions on accomplice or
aider and abettor liability and a true finding on a robbery-murder
special circumstance.
Appellant is correct that his jury and the jury in Lopez
received similar instructions, specifically CALCRIM Nos. 540A,
730, and an instruction, presumably CALCRIM No. 520, that “An
act causes death if the death is the direct, natural, and probable
consequence of the act and the death would not have happened
without the act. A natural and probable consequence is one that
a reasonable person would know is likely to happen if nothing
unusual intervenes.” (Lopez, supra, 78 Cal.App.5th at p. 16; see
id. at p. 17 [noting jury received CALCRIM No. 520].) The Lopez
court reasoned, “The jury instructions created the possibility the
jury convicted defendant of felony murder and found to be true
the robbery-murder special-circumstance allegation without
finding him to have been the actual killer. The jury was not
instructed it had to find defendant personally killed the victim to
convict him; the jury was instructed it only had to find defendant
committed an act that caused the victim’s death. The jury might
have found defendant, though not the actual killer, participated
somehow in the home invasion robbery, and the victim’s death
was the direct, natural, and probable consequence of an act
committed in the course of his participation. As defendant posits,
‘the jury could have taken a realistic view of the prosecution’s
circumstantial evidence and determined beyond a reasonable
doubt that [defendant] was involved in the robbery that resulted
in the death, but that [defendant] may or may not have been the
actual killer.’” (Id. at p. 20.)
15
We find Lopez distinguishable in two crucial and related
respects. First, the underlying felonies and evidence in support
of them differ. In Lopez, a home invasion robbery was at issue;
here, the underlying crime was a rape. Although the defendant in
Lopez was prosecuted on the theory that he acted alone, the
record contained evidence—the defendant’s testimony—that
another person was at the scene and committed the robbery and
murder while defendant was in another room. (See Lopez, supra,
78 Cal.App.5th at pp. 9, 19.) Here, defense counsel did not
dispute that, “[b]ased on the presence of sperm, one must
reasonably conclude that Mr. Boyd and [Jill] engaged in some
sort of sex.” The jury found that sex to be rape, and further found
that appellant murdered Jill while engaged in the rape, rejecting
his argument that she was killed at some later point in time.
Second, Lopez pre-dates Patton, which clarified that a
section 1172.6 petitioner cannot satisfy his or her burden at the
prima facie stage with conclusory allegations when confronted
with a record of conviction that demonstrates the petitioner’s
conviction was under a still-valid theory. (Patton, supra, 17
Cal.5th at p. 567.) A petitioner may point to “specific facts that
identify someone else as the direct perpetrator,” but cannot
simply hypothesize the existence of another perpetrator; “absent
specific facts, no such dispute arises” to warrant an evidentiary
hearing. (Ibid.)
In response to the People’s showing in the trial court,
appellant invited the court to speculate that there was a second
perpetrator. Here, he relies exclusively on the felony-murder
instruction without pointing to anything in the judicially noticed
record of conviction even remotely suggesting he was not the
actual killer. While a similar showing was sufficient in Lopez,
16
the court there discussed at length the underlying facts and
evidence in the record of conviction from which the jury
theoretically could have found the defendant guilty on a now-
impermissible theory. (See Lopez, supra, 78 Cal.App.5th at pp.
19-20.) Appellant has not endeavored to direct this court to
anything similar. In light of the jury’s findings and remainder of
the record in this case, we are not persuaded he has carried his
prima facie burden under Patton.
However, as noted above, appellant requested in his
supplemental brief that the matter be remanded to give him an
opportunity to file an amended petition pleading additional facts
to comply with Patton. As he correctly observes, such a request
was granted in Patton, “out of an abundance of caution.” (Patton,
supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 569.) We grant the request and order the
matter remanded to the trial court with directions to consider an
amended petition should appellant, within 30 days of that
remand, seek to file one. “We express no opinion on the viability
of any additional facts [appellant] might allege.” (Ibid.)
17
DISPOSITION
We remand this matter to the trial court with directions to
consider an amended petition should appellant, within 30 days of
that remand, seek to file one. We otherwise affirm the judgment
of the trial court.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
COLLINS, J.
We concur:
ZUKIN, ACTING P. J.
DAUM, J.*
* Judge of the Los Angeles County Superior Court, assigned
by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the
California Constitution.
18
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