CourtListener 10382041•People v. Walters CA4/1
Gesamter Gesetzestext
Filed 4/21/25 P. v. Walters CA4/1
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COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THE PEOPLE, D083672
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v. (Super. Ct. No. SCS326477)
JAMES C. WALTERS,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Carlos Varela, Judge. Affirmed.
Jared G. Coleman, under the appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General,
Eric A. Swenson and Monique Myers, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff
and Respondent.
James C. Walters appeals from a judgment sentencing him to three
years in state prison after a jury convicted him of driving under the influence
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at the San Ysidro border crossing. On appeal, Walters contends the trial
court’s judgment must be reversed under People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d
118 (Marsden) because the trial court failed to conduct an in camera hearing
to investigate his allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel. Walters
argues that four letters he wrote to the court after the jury’s verdict and
before sentencing constituted a Marsden motion. We conclude that Walters’s
letters did not clearly indicate he was requesting substitute counsel and thus
did not obligate the court to conduct a Marsden hearing. Accordingly, we
affirm the trial court’s judgment.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. Prosecution Evidence
On April 3, 2023, a United States Customs and Border Protection
(CBP) officer contacted Walters while he was driving alone in a car through
the San Ysidro Port of Entry. The officer suspected Walters was driving
under the influence (DUI) because Walters smelled of alcohol, had glossy
eyes, staggered coordination, and exhibited arrogant behavior. The CBP
officer requested that California Highway Patrol (CHP) officers respond to
investigate further.
Walters performed poorly on several field sobriety tests administered
by a CHP officer. His blood alcohol content (BAC) was 0.148 percent
according to a preliminary alcohol screening test, and he refused to provide a
second sample. The officer obtained a warrant and Walters was required to
submit to a blood chemical test.
Using retrograde extrapolation, a San Diego County Sheriff’s Regional
Crime Laboratory criminalist testified Walters’s BAC at the time he was
driving would have been between 0.11 percent and 0.21 percent, which is
above the legal limit of 0.08 percent. The criminalist opined that someone
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with a BAC in that range would have been under the influence of alcohol and
could not have operated a motor vehicle safely.
B. Defense Evidence
Walters testified that earlier in the day, he and his friend Arturo went
to Tijuana. Arturo did not drink and agreed to drive them both back to the
United States. The wait time to enter the United States was about two to
three hours long, and eventually Arturo left the car to use the restroom.
While Arturo was gone, a CBP officer approached Walters and asked him to
move the car forward in line. The officer threatened to tow the car if Walters
did not move it, so Walters moved into the driver’s seat and drove the car a
few lengths to the border checkpoint booth. At the booth, Walters told the
CBP officer that his friend was the driver and that he only moved the car
because another officer told him to do so. Walters was then pulled out of the
car, put in a chokehold, and moved to a secondary area for further inspection.
C. Verdict and Sentencing
In December 2023, a jury found Walters guilty of driving under the
influence of alcohol (Veh. Code, § 23152, subd. (a) (count 1)) and driving while
having a measurable blood alcohol (Veh. Code, § 23152, subd. (b) (count 2)).
After the verdict, Walters admitted to a prior felony DUI from 2014.
Consequently, the trial court found the special allegation under Vehicle Code
section 23550.5 true as to both counts. Walters also admitted to a prior
prison term.
After being convicted, Walters wrote four letters to the court. Walters’s
first letter, dated December 23, 2024 and filed January 2, 2024, requested the
court to enter a judgment of acquittal. Walters mentioned “need[ing]
effective assistance of counsel” and cited Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466
U.S. 668 (Strickland), but the only relief he requested was a judgment of
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acquittal. Walters argued “there is no legally sufficient evidentiary basis for
a jury to have finding for, I the defendant . . . to be guilty[.]”
In his second letter, post-marked January 8, 2024 and filed January 11,
2024, Walters informed the court of his belief that proper procedures were
not followed by a border patrol agent involved in his case. Walters concluded
by stating, “I think something is wrong with this case.”
In the third letter, dated January 21, 2024 but not post-marked until
February 16, 2024, Walters stated that he had asked his attorney to file a
“writ” or “appeal” or “acquittal request” but the attorney told him to wait and
he did not know why. Walters devoted several pages of this letter to his
version of what had happened at the border crossing and complained that he
was “receiving no to very little assistance from the public defender office.”
Walters’s sole request in this letter was for the court to subpoena a border
agent involved in the case. Walters concluded by stating the case was a
“complete setup on the part of the border patrol agent.”
In his fourth letter, dated February 15, 2024 and also post-marked
February 16, 2024, Walters complained about the lack of communication
between himself and his public defender. Walters informed the court about
motions and research he had conducted for his case. Walters wrote, “[m]y
current attorney seems to be burden [sic] with heavy caseload. I am receiving
no assistant[.]” Walters also stated, “[m]y attorney though might be a good
attorney. However, I am receiving little to no assistance.” Walters’s sole
request in the letter was for “an in court session look-up” of one or two pieces
of evidence he believed were relevant to his case. He concluded by stating:
“I request this to prevent an injustice. [¶] I further request relief be given.”
At sentencing on February 20, 2024, the court acknowledged it was in
receipt of the first two letters dated January 2 and January 11. In pertinent
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part, the following conversation took place between the court, public defender
Michael Roderick, and district attorney Katherine Johnson regarding the
letters:
“MR. RODERICK: Yes, your Honor.
“Although, Mr. Walters would like to address the Court
about—he believes that there should be—the ability for a
new trial prior to sentencing.
“I was advising him that I think that that is a question for
the appeal, but Mr. Walters would like to address the
Court.
“THE COURT: All right. Mr. Walters?
“THE DEFENDANT: Yes, your Honor.
“I sent another letter. Speaking with the guy that was
giving me a handful of stuff—although, when I requested
the information from the officer, the border patrol agent
that told me to move the car forward, tried to locate
anything—I guess, a Brader request or something—could
not locate that.
“It was brought to my knowledge that it’s called an AT set
(phonetically), or AT-something officer—it should have
been in court. And also there’s maybe some video evidence
of this. And so I was asking for a new trial date.
“THE COURT: All right. And, Mr. Roderick, what is your
position?
“MR. RODERICK: Your Honor, I believe that the district
attorney and the defense both tried to get information. The
cameras I think that it was—you said it was . . .
“MS. JOHNSON: The cameras have been purged. If the
defendant is referring to the cameras that are at the Border
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Patrol Station, they had been purged by the time any
request was made by either of us.
“Regardless, this—neither of these requests constitutes
grounds for a new trial at this point.
“THE COURT: I am going to deny the request for a new
trial.
“I did also want to address the letter. There was a letter
submitted addressing Strickland, and I don’t know if—I
wanted to address that today because I did read it.
“Anything further on that?
“(Counsel conferring with the defendant.)
“MR. RODERICK: We are all set, your Honor. We are
ready to proceed.
“THE COURT: Anything further on that?
“MR. RODERICK: No, your Honor.
“THE COURT: All right. I did read the letter submitted by
Mr. Walters in this case. Again, it addresses ineffective—
this is for counsel—I don’t see any grounds for that. It’s
really—there is a request for an acquit[tal] based on
Strickland. I didn’t see any basis for that. He actually lays
no groundwork for that or any facts to support that request.
So I’m going to deny his request for an acquittal.
“And again, I understand that you will be appealing this
case, Mr. Walters, so then the Court of Appeal can address
the work of everyone in this particular case, okay?
“So given that, I’m ready to proceed with the sentencing.”
The court sentenced Walters to three years in state prison.
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DISCUSSION
Walters contends the trial court erred when it failed to hold a Marsden
hearing after he sent the four letters to the court in which he complained
about his attorney’s ineffectiveness after the jury verdict and before
sentencing. Walters argues the four letters constituted a Marsden motion.
The People argue there was no Marsden error because Walters’s letters did
not clearly indicate that he sought to discharge and replace his attorney.
Because we find that the four letters did not constitute a Marsden motion, we
affirm the trial court’s judgment.
A judge’s decision on whether to grant or deny a Marsden motion is
subject to review under abuse of discretion. (Marsden, supra, 2 Cal.3d at
p. 123.) “ ‘[T]he trial court is not required to conduct a Marsden hearing on
its own motion.’ ” (People v. Lucero (2017) 18 Cal.App.5th 532, 539.) Rather,
a trial court has a duty to conduct a Marsden hearing when either the
defendant personally, or the defendant’s counsel, expresses the desire for
substitution of counsel. (People v. Martinez (2009) 47 Cal.4th 399, 418
(Martinez).) Although no formal motion is necessary, there must be at least
some clear indication by a defendant that they want a substitute attorney.
(People v Richardson (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 479, 484.) “The mere fact that
there appears to be a difference of opinion between a defendant and his
attorney over trial tactics does not place a court under a duty to hold
a Marsden hearing.” (People v. Lucky (1988) 45 Cal.3d 259, 281.)
Our Supreme Court has emphasized that courts have no duty to
conduct a Marsden hearing unless the defendant clearly indicates they are
requesting that their counsel be replaced. In Martinez, supra, 47 Cal.4th
399, for example, the Supreme Court addressed whether the trial court was
required to conduct a Marsden hearing after receiving four letters from
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Martinez’s sisters complaining that defense counsel had failed to
communicate adequately with Martinez after the initial interview. (Id. at
pp. 415, 417.) In their first letter, the sisters referred to a denial of the “right
to an adequate defense” and asked on behalf of Martinez for a “candid, face-
to-face discussion with his attorney.” (Id. at p. 415.) The first letter noted
that the attorney had “excellent recommendations and appears to be
supremely qualified and well-respected. However, [they were] extremely
frustrated with [the] situation.” (Id. at pp. 415–416.) The second letter
described their unsuccessful efforts to contact the attorney and called for the
court to acknowledge or recognize the problem. (Id. at p. 416.) The third
letter asserted Martinez had faced numerous challenges communicating with
his attorney and that Martinez did not wish to change his attorney to avoid
further delay of the case. (Ibid.) This letter requested for the court to
intervene and facilitate some communication between Martinez and the
attorney. (Ibid.) The fourth letter noted that there was still no
communication between the attorney and Martinez. (Ibid.)
Our Supreme Court held that “even if we were to view the letters sent
by defendant’s sister as emanating from defendant, those letters do not
contain a ‘clear indication’ from the defendant that he desired substitution of
counsel on the ground of counsel’s deficiencies.” (Martinez, supra, 47 Cal.4th
at p. 418.) The trial court did not have a duty to conduct an inquiry
regarding the defendant’s belief about his attorney’s incompetence, unless the
defendant had made by some clear indication that he wished to substitute
counsel. (Ibid.) The court reasoned that the letters did not imply a request,
but simply complained about the lack of communication and a request for the
court to improve the attorney-client communication. (Id. at p. 418.)
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Other Supreme Court cases are to the same effect. In People v. Dickey
(2005) 35 Cal.4th 884, the defendant argued that he had attempted to make a
motion for the appointment of different counsel for the penalty phase of his
death penalty trial and that the court erred when it did not conduct the
required Marsden hearing. (People v. Dickey, at p. 918.) The court found the
defendant had not moved to request new counsel for the penalty phase but
was rather seeking separate counsel “for the purposes of preparing a motion
for a new trial based on, among other grounds, incompetence of counsel
during the guilt phase.” (Ibid.) The court reasoned that even though the
defendant complained about his attorney’s performance at the guilt phase,
the defendant “did not clearly indicate he wanted substitute counsel
appointed for the penalty phase.” (Id. at pp. 918–920.)
Similarly, in People v. Valdez (2004) 32 Cal.4th 73 (Valdez), the
defendant argued the trial court erred in denying three separate motions for
substitution of counsel. (Valdez, at p. 91.) In the first Marsden hearing,
Valdez argued defense counsel had “fail[ed] to (1) communicate with him
about the case, (2) speak with numerous witnesses, and (3) file pretrial
motions on his behalf[.]” (Id. at p. 92.) The trial court denied his motion,
finding counsel was properly handling the case. (Ibid.) Over Valdez’s
objections, “[t]he court informed defendant that counsel made the ultimate
determination whether or not to file certain motions.” (Ibid.) At a second
Marsden hearing, Valdez made similar complaints. (Ibid.) The court rejected
the motion. (Id. at p. 93.)
Later, Valdez provided a two-page handwritten letter to the court,
requesting to be heard outside of the prosecutor’s presence. (Valdez, supra,
32 Cal.4th at p. 93.) In the letter, Valdez indicated he would like to give the
court a “written testimony of this whole case.” (Ibid.) At a third hearing, the
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court asked, “ ‘Why did you give me the letter? What did . . . you want the
court to do?’ ” (Id. at p. 94.) The defendant offered no affirmative response
when asked if his “ ‘motion [was] one to relieve [counsel]’ ” but during the
course of the hearing defendant “complained about his defense and argued
that additional witnesses should be questioned.” (Id. at p. 97.) The court
denied the motion. (Id. at p. 95.)
Valdez argued that at the third hearing, the trial court did not satisfy
his request for a Marsden hearing. (Valdez, supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 96.)
Rejecting this argument, the Supreme Court noted Valdez’s letter merely
indicated he wanted to meet with the judge outside of the presence of the
prosecutor and that during the hearing, he “neither requested a Marsden
hearing by name nor did he ask for counsel to be replaced.” (Id. at p. 97.)
Accordingly, “the court was under no duty to hold a Marsden hearing.” (Id. at
p. 96.)
As in each of these cases, Walters’s letters contained no clear indication
of a request for substitute counsel. The first letter made a request for the
court to enter a judgment of acquittal, but no reference to substitution of
counsel. Walters mentioned “need[ing] effective assistance of counsel” and
cited Strickland, but the trial court construed this as part of his request for
an acquittal, which the court denied.
The second letter simply aired grievances by Walters and informed the
court of his belief that proper procedures were not followed. This letter also
contained no reference to substitution of counsel or appointment of new
counsel.
The court at sentencing only mentioned receiving the first two letters,
and the third and fourth letters do not have a court stamp indicating the date
they were received or filed. It appears that the third and fourth letters were
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both mailed on February 16, 2024, four days before the sentencing hearing.
Thus, the record does not establish that they were received by the court
before sentencing.
Even if the court had received these two letters, however, they also
failed to clearly request a substitution of counsel. The third letter was mostly
devoted to Walters’s version of what happened at the border crossing and his
belief that the case was a “complete setup on the part of the border patrol
agent.” Although Walters made references to his attorney not providing
enough assistance, the only request he made was for the court to subpoena a
border agent involved in the case.
As for the fourth letter, Walters only made a request for the court to
“look-up” one or two pieces of evidence he believed were relevant to his case.
He concluded the fourth letter by writing, “I further request relief be given.”
Once again, he never mentioned substitution of counsel or asked to have a
new attorney appointed. Although Walters complained about lack of
communication from his public defender, the relief he was requesting was for
the court to step in and provide the evidence Walters believed was missing.
Finally, Walters had an opportunity to address the court at the
beginning of the sentencing hearing, but he said nothing about requesting
appointment of a new attorney. His defense counsel began by informing the
court that Walters wished to address the court about “a new trial prior to
sentencing.” After the court gave Walters permission to speak, he mentioned
sending “another letter” and explained why he was “asking for a new trial
date” based on some evidence that “should have been in court.” The court
denied Walters’s request for a new trial. Walters’s argument was therefore
directed to obtaining a new trial, not requesting substitute counsel.
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Because we conclude that Walters made no clear request for
appointment of a new attorney, we hold the trial court was not obligated to
conduct a Marsden hearing.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
BUCHANAN, J.
WE CONCUR:
O’ROURKE, Acting P. J.
DATO, J.
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