People v. Erving CA2/5

CourtListener 10381298Calctapp18.04.2025

Gesamter Gesetzestext

Filed 4/18/25 P. v. Erving CA2/5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FIVE

THE PEOPLE, B331940

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. A520896)
v.

ALBERT ERVING, JR.,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Jacqueline Lewis, Judge. Affirmed, and
remanded with directions.

Victor J. Morse, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Nicholas J. Webster and Amanda V.
Lopez, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

******
Albert Erving, Jr. (defendant) appeals the trial court’s
order denying his petitions for resentencing under Penal Code1
section 1172.6.2 He contends the trial court engaged in
impermissible judicial factfinding by relying on the preliminary
hearing transcript to deny the petition at the prima facie stage.
In light of the recent decision by the California Supreme Court
in People v. Patton (2025) 17 Cal.5th 549 (Patton), the trial court
did not err in summarily denying his petition, but we remand to
give defendant the opportunity to amend his petition with
specific facts.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
I. Facts3
A. The underlying crimes
On the evening of June 30, 1976, Lillian Pixley (Pixley) put
her elderly sister Grace Ella Parent (Parent) to bed. All of the

1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code
unless otherwise indicated.

2 Effective June 30, 2022, section 1170.95 was renumbered
section 1172.6, with no change in text (Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 10).
We therefore refer to the law formerly codified at section 1170.95
as section 1172.6.

3 We summarize these facts from the transcripts of the
preliminary hearing conducted on August 24 and 25, 1976.

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lights were turned off and the drapes were closed. At
approximately 4:30 a.m. the following morning, a newspaper
delivery person saw that the drapes were open, a light was on in
Parent’s apartment, and a porch light that was usually on was
off. When Pixley awoke and checked on her sister the next
morning, Parent had a two-and-a-half inch slit on the left side of
her neck and several stab wounds to the abdomen and liver. She
had been sexually assaulted and strangled to death.
Later that same morning, Pixley’s neighbor—Ralph Webb
(Webb)—awoke to find a hole in his back screen door. A wallet
containing cash and credit cards, and a set of keys along with a
scorpion pendant key chain were missing from his home.
B. Defendant’s parole and arrest
Defendant, who was paroled on June 22, 1976, called his
parole officer in the early hours of July 1, 1976, and arranged to
meet the following day. Defendant sounded “slightly excited” and
at times almost incoherent. Defendant failed to show up on July
2, and couldn’t be located at his provided addresses. On July 4,
the parole officer took defendant into custody for failing to keep
the parole officer apprised of his whereabouts. Defendant agreed
to a search of his person and property, which revealed a scorpion
pendant key chain—later determined to be from the Webb
residence.
C. Defendant’s confession4
At the police station, a detective from the homicide bureau
interviewed defendant, informing him that the scorpion pendant
key chain was identified by its owner and that the police had

4 About 24 hours after defendant confessed, the detective
dictated the statement to a secretary, who typed the statement
into a report. The confession was not recorded.

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retrieved a palm print from the murder scene. After being
advised of his constitutional rights, defendant stated, “I
committed the crime.”
Defendant related the following. Around 1:00 a.m. on July
1, he walked to a housing tract, climbed over a wall, opened a
fence and walked into a patio area. He entered the residence
through a back door and entered a bedroom where a woman was
sleeping on a bed. Defendant removed his clothes, jumped on the
woman, grabbed her by the throat and started strangling her
until the woman started to froth at the mouth, and her
movements became less erratic. Defendant had vaginal and anal
intercourse with the woman, then went to the kitchen and
retrieved a butcher knife. He stabbed the woman several times
and cut her throat; when he was certain she was dead he had
vaginal and anal intercourse with her again. Defendant cleaned
the blood from his body and replaced the knife in the kitchen,
then put his clothes back on, wiped surfaces to remove his
fingerprints, took the victim’s red wallet, wristwatch, and a
paring knife, and exited the residence. He buried the knife,
threw away the wallet and wristwatch, and returned to his
mother’s house at daylight.
Defendant agreed to retrace his steps and show the
detectives where he discarded the stolen items. He led them to
the areas where they recovered the knife and wristwatch (but not
the red wallet) and pointed out the house where he assaulted and
murdered Parent.
On returning to the police station, defendant informed the
officers that he had more details to reveal. Defendant said he
was not sexually satisfied after he raped and murdered Parent
and went to apartments nearby to find “another lady.” He

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entered one residence by punching a hole in the screen door;
inside, he found a man and a woman sleeping. After
deliberating, he decided he could not overpower the man and
rape the woman without getting caught, so he took a wallet and a
set of keys on a key chain, before exiting the house. He
attempted to enter another residence but it was locked and he
left the area. Defendant again accompanied the police officers to
the crime scenes to verify his story.
Defendant pointed out both the Webb residence, and the
third residence that was locked. Defendant remembered he had
discarded the red wallet in some bushes, and the officers
recovered it. He also led the police to the spot where he had
secreted the set of keys taken from the Webb residence.
D. Charging, plea, conviction and appeal
On August 27, 1976, the People charged defendant with
first degree murder (§ 187), rape (former § 261.2, now § 261,
subdivision (a)(2)), sodomy (§ 286), and two counts of burglary (§
459). The People further alleged that the murder was committed
during the commission and attempted commission of a burglary
and rape. The People additionally alleged that defendant had
suffered five prior convictions.
On December 21, 1976, defendant pled guilty to first degree
murder.5 The trial court struck the prior convictions and
remaining counts.
The trial court sentenced defendant to life in state prison.
The judgment was affirmed on direct appeal. (People v. Erving
(Aug. 12, 1977, No. 30077) [nonpub. opn.] (Erving).)

5 The appellate record does not contain a transcript of the
plea hearing and the record fails to show if defendant admitted
the truth of any factual basis at the time he entered his plea.

5
II. Procedural Background
On October 17, 2022 and on April 10, 2023, defendant filed
form petitions for resentencing of his murder conviction, alleging
in a conclusory fashion that he “could not presently be convicted
of murder . . . because of changes made to [P]enal Code §§ 188
and 189.”6
On April 20, 2023, the People filed a response contending
defendant was ineligible for resentencing because he was
prosecuted as the sole and actual perpetrator. With the response,
the People attached as exhibits a copy of this court’s opinion
in Erving, supra, No. 30077, as well as transcripts of the
preliminary hearing and the original sentencing hearing.
On April 26, 2023, defendant filed a reply brief arguing the
court could not consider the preliminary hearing transcript
because he did not stipulate to any factual basis for his plea.
On June 15, 2023, the trial court denied both petitions.
The court denied the October 2022 petition as (1) duplicative of a
previously denied petition, and (2) without merit because the
preliminary hearing transcript supported a finding that
defendant was the actual killer and thus not entitled to relief
under section 1172.6. The court also denied the petition filed on
April 10, 2023, as duplicative of the October 2022 petition.
Defendant timely filed this appeal.
DISCUSSION
Defendant argues that the trial court erred in summarily
denying him relief under section 1172.6.

6 Defendant had previously filed a petition with the same
allegations, which the trial court denied because defendant was
the “actual killer.”

6
In 2018, our Legislature amended the definition of
“murder” in our State to preclude a jury from “imput[ing]” the
“[m]alice” element of that crime “based solely on [a defendant’s]
participation in a crime.” (§ 188, subd. (a)(3).) Our Legislature’s
purpose was to ensure that “[a] person’s culpability for murder
[is] premised upon that person’s own actions and subjective mens
rea.” (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 1, subd. (g).) As amended, liability
for murder is limited to persons (1) who are the actual killer; (2)
who aided and abetted the actual killer in the murder (that is,
who acted with the intent to kill); or (3) who were a major
participant in the underlying felony that resulted in the killing,
but only if they also acted with reckless indifference to human
life. (§§ 188, subd. (a)(3), 189, subd. (e).)
Section 1172.6 is the procedural vehicle by which persons
convicted of murder in a now-final judgment can seek to vacate
convictions that do not satisfy the currently permissible theories
for homicide liability. (§ 1172.6, subd. (a).) Summary denial of a
so-called section 1172.6 petition is appropriate only if the
defendant petitioning for relief fails (1) to file a facially valid
petition, or (2) to make a “prima facie case for relief” under the
statute. (Id., subds. (b) & (c); Patton, supra, 17 Cal.5th at pp.
558-559, 562.) A defendant files a facially valid petition as long
as he “recit[es]” “section 1172.6’s requirements.” (Id. at p. 562.)
A prima facie case for relief entails a “more demanding”
“inquiry.” (Id. at p. 566.) To evaluate whether a petition
establishes a prima face case, a court must take the petition’s
factual allegations as true and ask “‘“whether the petitioner
would be entitled to relief if [those] allegations were proved.”’”
(People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 971.) “‘However, if the
record, including the court’s own documents [from the record of

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conviction], “contain[s] facts refuting the allegations made in the
petition,” then “the court is justified in making a credibility
determination adverse to the petitioner”’” and summarily
denying the petition. (Ibid.) Where a petition makes only
“conclusory allegations” (including those made by “checkbox”),
the record of conviction controls and summary denial is
appropriate. (Patton, at pp. 564-565.) But where a petition
“points to specific facts” indicating that the defendant was
convicted on a now-invalid theory, there is a “material fact
dispute” necessitating an evidentiary hearing and precluding
summary denial. (Id. at p. 567.) Thus, where, as here, the record
of conviction establishes that defendant was the actual killer, a
defendant seeking to avoid summary denial must allege “specific
facts that identify someone else as the direct perpetrator” (rather
than merely allude to a “hypothetical alternate direct
perpetrator”). (Ibid.)
The trial court did not err in summarily denying
defendant’s identical section 1172.6 petitions in this case. Here,
the evidence presented at the preliminary hearing indicates that
defendant was the actual killer of Parent. A court examining
whether a defendant who has entered a plea has made a prima
facie case may look to the preliminary hearing, even if the
defendant did not adopt the preliminary hearing transcript as a
factual basis for the plea. (Patton, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 569 &
fn. 12.) Because the allegations in defendant’s petitions are
conclusory and do not point to “specific facts that identify
someone else as the direct perpetrator,” the record of conviction
makes clear that defendant was the actual killer and that his
petitions may be summarily denied. (Id. at p. 567; People v.
Delgadillo (2022) 14 Cal.5th 216, 233.)

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However, because Patton was the first decision to draw the
distinction between conclusory and factual allegations and
because defendant has so requested, we will remand the matter
to the trial court to give defendant the opportunity to amend his
petition to allege “specific facts” “identify[ing] someone else as the
direct perpetrator.”
DISPOSITION
The order of June 15, 2023, denying defendant’s section
1172.6 petition is affirmed, but we remand this matter to
the superior court with directions to consider an amended
petition should defendant, within 30 days of the issuance of the
remittitur, seek to file one.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS.

______________________, P.J.
HOFFSTADT

We concur:

_________________________, J.
BAKER

_________________________, J.
MOOR

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