CourtListener 10381229•People v. Simms CA3
Gesamter Gesetzestext
Filed 4/18/25 P. v. Simms CA3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
(Sacramento)
----
THE PEOPLE, C100250
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. No. 93F04222)
v.
LAMAR SIMMS,
Defendant and Appellant.
Defendant Lamar Simms appeals the trial court’s denial of his petition for
resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6.1 Appointed counsel filed a brief
requesting our independent review under People v. Delgadillo (2022) 14 Cal.5th 216
(Delgadillo) and People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436. Separately, Simms filed a
supplemental brief contending that: (1) the trial court committed prejudicial error in
failing to consider his youth at the time of the crime; (2) defense counsel rendered
1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
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ineffective assistance in failing to raise Simms’s youth at the hearing; and (3) the trial
court failed to apply the required beyond a reasonable doubt standard of proof. We
affirm.
BACKGROUND
An amended information filed in 1993 charged Simms and codefendant Damian
Mitchell with the murder of R.J. (§ 187, subd. (a); count one). It alleged that Mitchell
personally used a 12-gauge shotgun (§ 12022.5, subd. (a)) and that Simms was a
principal in the offense in which one or more principals was armed with a firearm
(§ 12022, subd. (a)). The information further alleged that Simms assaulted R.J. with a
12-gauge shotgun (§ 245, subd. (a)(2); count two) and that Simms personally used the
firearm in the assault (§ 12022.5, subd. (a).)
The facts of the underlying offense are described in our prior appellate opinions,
which we cite only to summarize the background of this case. (People v. Simms (Mar. 10,
2022, C092723) [nonpub. opn.]; People v. Simms (Feb. 9, 1996, C017594) [nonpub.
opn.].) R.J. and Simms were involved in a dispute. Simms paged Mitchell and entered
the codes “911” for emergency and “187” for murder. Simms took a 12-gauge shotgun
from the trunk of his car and waited for Mitchell to arrive. Simms pumped and primed
the weapon to verify that it was loaded. When Mitchell arrived, he asked, “ ‘ “[W]ho’s
[R.J.]?” ’ ” Simms and R.J. began arguing again, and the argument escalated into a
physical altercation. R.J. stabbed Simms in the chest, and Simms dropped the shotgun.
Mitchell picked up the shotgun and pointed it at R.J. As R.J. backed away with his hands
up, Simms told R.J. to “ ‘ “kiss his momma good-bye.” ’ ” Mitchell fired once, striking
R.J. in the upper chest and neck. R.J. died at the scene.
The jury found Simms guilty on both counts and found both enhancements true.
The trial court sentenced him to 15 years to life plus one year consecutive for the
section 12022, subdivision (a) enhancement. This court affirmed the conviction on direct
appeal. (People v. Simms, supra, C092723.)
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In 2019, Simms filed a petition under what is now section 1172.6 to have his
murder conviction vacated and to be resentenced. (People v. Simms, supra, C092723.)
The trial court denied the petition at the prima facie stage. We reversed the order and
remanded to the trial court with directions to issue an order to show cause and to hold an
evidentiary hearing. (Ibid.)
On remand, the trial court issued an order to show cause, received briefs from the
parties, and conducted an evidentiary hearing at which Simms called Mitchell as a
witness. The court also admitted the People’s exhibit, which contained the clerk’s and
reporter’s transcripts from Simms’s original trial.
After the parties submitted posthearing briefs, the trial court conducted a further
hearing and issued a written order denying the petition. Based on its review of the
People’s exhibit and the testimony at the hearing, the court found Simms “guilty, beyond
a reasonable doubt, as an aider and abettor of the express or implied malice murder” of
R.J. It thus denied his petition for resentencing.
Simms timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
I.
Simms’s appointed counsel filed a brief asking this court to conduct an
independent review of the record to determine whether there are any arguable issues on
appeal. (Delgadillo, supra, 14 Cal.5th at pp. 231-232; People v. Wende, supra, 25 Cal.3d
436.) Counsel and this court advised Simms of his right to file a supplemental brief
within 30 days after the opening brief was filed. Simms filed a supplemental brief.
In Wende, our state Supreme Court held that an appellate court must review the
entire record in direct appeals where appointed counsel submits a brief raising no specific
issues or describing the appeal as frivolous. (Delgadillo, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 221.)
This procedure applies “to the first appeal as of right and is compelled by the
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constitutional right to counsel under the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States
Constitution.” (Ibid.)
In Delgadillo, our state Supreme Court held that the Wende procedure does not
apply to a trial court’s order denying a petition for postconviction relief under
section 1172.6. (Delgadillo, supra, 14 Cal.5th at pp. 221-222.) In such cases, when a
defendant files a supplemental brief, “the Court of Appeal is required to evaluate the
specific arguments presented in that brief and to issue a written opinion.” (Id. at p. 232.)
The court is not required to conduct an “independent review of the entire record to
identify unraised issues,” although it has discretion to do so. (Ibid.)
Appointed counsel argues that Delgadillo’s limitations do not apply here because,
unlike in Delgadillo, the trial court in this case denied Simms’s petition after issuing an
order to show cause and conducting an evidentiary hearing. Counsel points out that
defendants have a constitutional right to appointed counsel in habeas corpus and coram
nobis proceedings if they establish a prima facie case for relief. (Delgadillo, supra,
14 Cal.5th at p. 228.) Discussing People v. Shipman (1965) 62 Cal.2d 226, 232,
Delgadillo explained that “when ‘an indigent petitioner has stated facts sufficient to
satisfy the court that a hearing is required, his claim can no longer be treated as frivolous
and he is entitled to have counsel appointed to represent him.’ ” (Delgadillo, at p. 228.)
But Delgadillo also made clear that the state high court’s “Shipman precedents have
never extended the right to counsel to an appeal from a ruling in an ameliorative
legislative scheme.” (Ibid.) Because section 1172.6 is an ameliorative scheme, Wende’s
independent review procedures do not apply.
II.
Turning to the issues raised in Simms’s supplemental brief, we first consider his
contention that the trial court erred in failing to consider his youth at the resentencing
hearing. Simms was 18 years old at the time of the crime. He relies on People v. Pittman
(2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 400, 417, which held that youth is relevant to determining whether
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a defendant formed the requisite mental state for implied malice murder. Pittman
explained that “[r]ecent appellate cases have concluded nearly uniformly that a
defendant’s youth—defined, roughly, as being 25 years of age and younger—is a factor
within the totality of circumstances relevant to the requisite mental state for felony
murder.” (Id. at p. 416.) The court reasoned that “[t]he policy interests underlying the
felony-murder cases—that youth is relevant to a criminal defendant’s ability to perceive
risk and consequences, and therefore to the level of culpability—apply equally in the
context of implied malice murder.” (Id. at p. 417.) That is because “the implied malice
mental state—conscious disregard for human life [citation]—is similar to the ‘reckless
indifference to human life’ standard applicable to felony murder. [Citation.] Indeed, the
concept of reckless indifference to human life has a subjective component that expressly
incorporates the ‘conscious[] disregard’ of ‘ “the significant risk of death [the
defendant’s] actions create.” ’ ” (Ibid.) In light of these similarities, the court saw “no
reason not to apply the principle articulated in the felony-murder cases” to a case of
implied malice murder. (Ibid.; see also People v. Jimenez (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 994,
1005 [noting California cases that “require consideration of a young adult offender’s age
in resentencing petitions involving implied malice murder convictions”].)
In this case, the trial court found Simms guilty, beyond a reasonable doubt, not
only as an aider and abettor of implied malice murder but also as an aider and abettor of
express malice murder. Indeed, the court’s ruling and analysis principally focused on
express malice murder, finding that Simms had “articulated his intent to kill [R.J.] by
calling [his] residence two days before the shooting” and “then directed Mitchell to his
location with the express purpose of murdering” R.J. Simms offers no argument for
extending the rationale of Pittman to express malice murder, which requires not merely
knowledge that a perpetrator’s acts are dangerous to human life and conscious disregard
of human life but a specific intent to kill. (Compare People v. Powell (2021)
63 Cal.App.5th 689, 713 with People v. Johnson (2016) 62 Cal.4th 600, 640-641.)
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Accordingly, even if the court erred in failing to consider Simms’s youth when
determining whether he was guilty of aiding and abetting implied malice murder, that
error was harmless given the court’s separate finding that he was guilty under an express
malice theory. In light of this conclusion, we need not address Simms’s additional
contention that his attorney rendered prejudicially ineffective assistance of counsel by
failing to raise the issue of his youth at the section 1172.6 evidentiary hearing.
Finally, we reject Simms’s claim that the trial court failed to hold the People to
their burden of proving his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Under section 1172.6,
subdivision (d)(3), at the hearing after the trial court issues an order to show cause, “the
burden of proof shall be on the prosecution to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the
[petitioning defendant] is guilty of murder or attempted murder under California law as
amended by the changes to Section 188 or 189 made effective January 1, 2019.” “A
finding that there is substantial evidence to support a conviction for murder . . . is
insufficient to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the petitioner is ineligible for
resentencing.” (Ibid.)
Simms maintains that the trial court applied only a substantial evidence standard
when evaluating the evidence before it. A reviewing court, however, presumes the trial
court was aware of, and followed, governing law in rendering its decision. (See, e.g.,
People v. Bryant, Smith and Wheeler (2014) 60 Cal.4th 335, 398; People v. Thomas
(2011) 52 Cal.4th 336, 361.) We see nothing in the trial court’s ruling that would rebut
this presumption. To the contrary, the record affirmatively demonstrates that the court
knew and applied the proper standard. The parties’ arguments to the trial court explicitly
invoked the beyond a reasonable doubt standard. The court’s ruling expressly cited that
standard, acknowledged that the substantial evidence standard does not apply, and found
“that the evidence demonstrates, beyond a reasonable doubt, that [Simms] is guilty” of
murder. Accordingly, even without the customary presumption, the record establishes
that the trial court applied the beyond a reasonable doubt standard of proof in deciding
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Simms’s section 1172.6 petition. (See People v. Cody (2023) 92 Cal.App.5th 87, 110
[“when we consider the transcript as a whole, particularly the court’s explicit final ruling,
we find that the trial court applied the correct beyond a reasonable doubt burden of
proof”]; People v. Oliver (2023) 90 Cal.App.5th 466, 481, fn. 6.)
DISPOSITION
The order denying Simms’s petition is affirmed.
/s/
FEINBERG, J.
We concur:
/s/
EARL, P. J.
/s/
BOULWARE EURIE, J.
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