CourtListener 10380668•In re A.J. CA1/3
Gesamter Gesetzestext
Filed 4/17/25 In re A.J. CA1/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
In re A.J., a Person Coming Under
the Juvenile Court Law.
THE PEOPLE,
A168972
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v. (Alameda County
Sup. Ct. Nos. JV01253602,
A.J.,
JV01253603)
Defendant and Appellant.
A.J. appeals from a juvenile court order that sustained a petition
charging him with assault with a deadly weapon and inflicting great bodily
injury. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 602.) He contends insufficient evidence
supported the findings. In particular, he argues insufficient evidence
supported the court’s finding that he did not act in self-defense. We affirm.
BACKGROUND
In November 2022, 17-year-old A.J. and a friend approached Jane
Doe — an unhoused woman living in People’s Park in Berkeley — to buy
marijuana. Just before retrieving the marijuana, Jane recalled A.J. had
previously robbed her. She turned to her friend, John Doe, and said, “ ‘This
person robbed me before.’ ” John proceeded to hold A.J. from behind in “a
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bear hug,” pinning his arms. The two fell to the ground. John released A.J.,
who ran away from the park.
Minutes later, A.J. and his friend returned. The two began swinging a
board or pole towards Jane and another park resident. John picked up a
broken broomstick, approximately one foot in length, and hit each minor
once. He did not hit them hard and simply wanted to get their attention.
When attempting to back away, John fell, and the broomstick fell out of his
hands. He curled up and used his hands to shield his face and head from A.J.
and his friend, who were swinging their objects at him. Police officers
stopped the fight and collected a “four-by-four wood stick” and metal pole
covered in blood. A.J. had a busted lip but no broken bones. John had three
large lacerations on his head requiring approximately 16 staples.
The district attorney filed a juvenile wardship petition alleging A.J.
committed felony assault with a deadly weapon, with personal infliction of
great bodily injury on John. (Pen. Code, §§ 245, subd. (a)(1), 12022.7, subd.
(a), undesignated statutory references are to this code.) After a hearing, the
juvenile court concluded A.J. did not act in self-defense, and it found true
allegations that A.J. committed an assault with a deadly weapon and
intentionally inflicted great bodily injury. It sustained the petition and
declared A.J. to be a ward of the court.
DISCUSSION
A.J. contends there was insufficient evidence to support the juvenile
court’s findings regarding assault with a deadly weapon because he acted in
self-defense. He also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting
the finding that he used deadly force to inflict great bodily injury. We find
neither contention persuasive.
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“ ‘The standard of proof in juvenile proceedings involving criminal acts
is the same as the standard in adult criminal trials.’ ” (In re Babak S. (1993)
18 Cal.App.4th 1077, 1088.) We review the entire record in the light most
favorable to the judgment “to determine whether it discloses substantial
evidence—that is, evidence which is reasonable, credible, and of solid value—
such that a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt.” (People v. Johnson (1980) 26 Cal.3d 557, 576–578.)
First, substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s finding that
A.J. did not act in self-defense. Assault with a deadly weapon requires proof
that a defendant committed an assault by means of force likely to produce
bodily injury. (§ 245, subd. (a).) “ ‘To justify an act of self-defense for [an
assault charge], the defendant must have an honest and reasonable belief
that bodily injury is about to be inflicted on him.’ ” (People v. Minifie (1996)
13 Cal.4th 1055, 1064.) “The threat of bodily injury must be imminent.” (Id.
at p. 1064.) And the use of force must be reasonable under the
circumstances. (Id. at pp. 1064–1065.)
A.J. argues he reasonably feared John would attack him based on their
first encounter in the park — during which John held him in a bear hug. We
disagree. Any peril A.J. experienced from that interaction was not “ ‘ “one
that, from appearances, must be instantly dealt with.” ’ ” (In re Christian S.
(1994) 7 Cal.4th 768, 783 [fear must be immediate and present rather than
prospective or in the near future], italics omitted.) After that initial incident,
A.J. fled the park, only to return minutes later. The court could reasonably
conclude A.J. was not in imminent fear of danger or fearing for his safety
based on the first interaction.
Even if A.J. was in imminent fear of danger — which we do not find —
the record nevertheless reflects A.J. used more force than was reasonably
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necessary to defend against that danger. (People v. Hernandez (2011)
51 Cal.4th 733, 747.) Drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the
juvenile court’s findings, John hit A.J. lightly, just enough to capture A.J.’s
attention. (People v. Johnson, supra, 26 Cal.3d at pp. 576–578.) After John
fell to the ground and dropped the broomstick, he simply shielded himself
against A.J. He did not have any object with which to protect himself or
retaliate. A.J. nonetheless repeatedly swung and hit John in the head with a
metal pole, hard enough that there was blood left on the pole and John
required 16 staples to close the resulting lacerations. Given that John was
unarmed and his hands in the air, it was no longer reasonable for A.J. to
believe his use of force was necessary. (People v. Jones (1961) 191 Cal.App.2d
478, 482 [“A misdemeanor assault must be suffered without the privilege of
retaliating with deadly force”].)
A.J.’s reliance on Jane and John’s inconsistent statements at the
hearing — that Jane initially denied selling marijuana in the park but later
admitted to doing so, and John initially denied he had hit A.J. — and on
A.J.’s version of the events is misplaced. Conflicting testimony does not
warrant reversal — we defer to the trier of fact’s credibility determinations.
(In re Cheri T. (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 1400, 1404.) Substantial evidence
supports the juvenile court’s finding A.J. did not act in self-defense.
Second, A.J. contends insufficient evidence supports the finding that he
used deadly force and inflicted great bodily injury. The record reflects
otherwise. Assaults are punishable when committed “with a deadly weapon
or instrument other than a firearm” or “by any means of force likely to
produce great bodily injury,” injury that is significant or substantial. (§ 245,
subd. (a)(1).) The victim’s injury is immaterial — the statute focuses on the
force likely to produce great bodily injury. (People v. Aguilar (1997)
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16 Cal.4th 1023, 1028 [“whether the victim in fact suffers any harm is
immaterial”].) A.J. admitted he used a metal pole to hit John in the head
three times. The evidence that the pole was covered in blood underscored the
inference that it was used forcefully. Moreover, John’s testimony established
that the force used was likely to cause, and in fact did cause, significant head
injuries. John received 16 staples to close wounds on his head. Since the
incident, he has suffered constant headaches, dizziness, loss of balance and
memory problems, and sensitivity to bright lights, conditions he did not have
before the incident. These resulting injuries were “not insignificant, trivial or
moderate.” (People v. McDaniel (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 736, 748 [defining
great bodily injury].) We find no merit in A.J.’s attempt to minimize the
seriousness of this assault as “minor.” Substantial evidence supported the
juvenile court’s finding that he committed assault with a deadly weapon and
inflicted great bodily injury.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
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_________________________
RODRÍGUEZ, J.
WE CONCUR:
_________________________
TUCHER, P. J.
_________________________
FUJISAKI, J.
A168972; In re A.J.
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