People v. Holmes CA4/2

CourtListener 10379853Calctapp16.04.2025

Gesamter Gesetzestext

Filed 4/16/25 P. v. Holmes CA4/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent, E083168

v. (Super.Ct.No. FELSS1004244)

JOSEPH RUBEN HOLMES, OPINION

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County. Kawika Smith,

Judge. Affirmed.

John L. Staley, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and

Appellant.

Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney

General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Arlene A. Sevidal, Andrew

Mestman and Jon S. Tangonan, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

1
Joseph Ruben Holmes appeals his commitment to an indeterminate term in the

custody of the State Department of State Hospitals as a sexually violent predator. He

argues his constitutional rights to due process and equal protection were violated because

the commitment trial proceeded while he was mentally incompetent. We find no

constitutional violation and affirm.

BACKGROUND

In 2010, the San Bernardino County District Attorney petitioned to have Holmes

committed indefinitely as a sexually violent predator under Welfare and Institutions Code

section 6600, et seq., also known as the Sexually Violent Predator Act (SVPA). In 2011,

the court found the petition supported by probable cause under Welfare and Institutions

Code section 6602, and Holmes was transferred from county jail to a state hospital.

In 2019, Holmes moved to dismiss the petition. The motion raised arguments

similar to those raised in this appeal. Holmes (acting through counsel) asserted that to

proceed with a trial on the petition while he is legally incompetent would violate his right

to due process, in part because negligent mental health treatment he received at the state

hospital caused his incompetency. He also argued his right to equal protection was

violated because the SVPA denied him protections afforded to those committed under the

Mentally Disordered Offender Act (MDOA) (Pen. Code, § 2962 et seq.) or found not

guilty by reason of insanity (Pen. Code, § 1026 et seq.). In 2020, the trial court denied

the motion to dismiss.

2
In October 2023, the trial court admitted the prosecution’s exhibits in support of

the petition and ordered an evaluation of Holmes’s mental competence to stand trial

under Penal Code section 1368. The evaluation, filed in December 2023, found Holmes

incompetent, observing that due to “uncontrolled psychotic symptoms” he “would have a

compromised ability to maintain appropriate courtroom behavior” and would have

difficulty assisting or communicating rationally with his attorney. Also in December

2023, the court heard argument on the petition.

In January 2024, the trial court granted the petition, finding Holmes “meets the

criteria of a sexually violent predator.”

DISCUSSION

Holmes argues the trial court violated his constitutional right to due process by

proceeding with trial on the petition while he was incompetent to stand trial. He

acknowledges, however, that we will “most likely view” People v. Moore (2010) 50

Cal.4th 802 (Moore) “as binding authority and reject his due process claim.” He is

correct.

In Moore, our Supreme Court applied a four-factor balancing test from Morrissey

v. Brewer (1972) 408 U.S. 471, 481 to determine “‘what process is due’ a potential civil

committee.” (Moore, supra, 50 Cal.4th at p. 819.) The four factors are “(1) the private

interest that will be affected by the official action; (2) the risk of an erroneous deprivation

of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional

or substitute procedural safeguards; (3) the government’s interest, including the function

3
involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute

procedural requirement would entail; and (4) the dignitary interest in informing

individuals of the nature, grounds, and consequences of the action and in enabling them

to present their side of the story before a responsible government official.” (Ibid.)

“Balancing all the foregoing factors, and placing special weight on the ‘paramount’

interest in public safety,” the Court concluded “due process does not require mental

competence on the part of someone undergoing a commitment or recommitment trial

under the SVPA.” (Id. at p. 829.)

Holmes argues Moore was “incorrectly decided” for the reasons articulated in the

case’s dissent. (See Moore, supra, 50 Cal.4th at p. 829-837 (dis. opn. of Moreno, J.).)

Recognizing that is not a position we could adopt (see Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior

Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450, 456-457), he raises the claim “to preserve his right to ask the

California Supreme Court to reconsider [Moore] and to preserve it for federal

review . . . .” As we are bound by Moore, we therefore reject the argument without

further discussion.

Holmes also attempts to distinguish Moore based on his allegation—asserted in

both his motion to dismiss and again on appeal—that he received “negligent mental

health treatment” while incarcerated, contributing to his now being incompetent to stand

trial. Moore discusses no such allegation. Holmes offers no reasoned argument,

however, as to why this distinction should matter to any of the factors applied in Moore,

or why it might otherwise allow us to reach a different conclusion than Moore about what

4
due process requires. For similar reasons, Holmes’s allegation that the Legislature has

been “negligent” because it has failed to “enact procedures to restore a SVP defendant to

competency” since 2010, when Moore was decided, is also unavailing. Moore’s binding

holding precludes our reaching a different outcome on these arguments.

Holmes’s equal protection claim is not similarly foreclosed by Supreme Court

authority. Nevertheless, it is unpersuasive.

Holmes argues that “‘“the first prerequisite to a meritorious claim under the equal

protection clause is a showing that the state has adopted a classification that affects two

or more similarly situated groups in an unequal manner.”’” (People v. McKee (2010) 47
1
Cal.4th 1172, 1202 (McKee) (italics omitted).) His argument on this point is that the due

process rule established in Moore—that someone undergoing an SVPA commitment or

recommitment trial need not be mentally competent for the commitment trial to

proceed—violates equal protection in its contrast with the treatment of a defendant

committed after entering a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity or one civilly

committed or recommitted under the MDOA. He reasons that a “defendant who enters a

1
The parties have framed their arguments around the standard articulated in
McKee, even though at the time briefing was conducted, our Supreme Court had already
clarified the equal protection inquiry in People v. Hardin (2024) 15 Cal.5th 834 (Hardin).
In Hardin, the Court held “courts no longer need to ask at the threshold whether the two
groups are similarly situated for purposes of the law in question. The only pertinent
inquiry is whether the challenged difference in treatment is adequately justified under the
applicable standard of review. The burden is on the party challenging the law to show
that it is not.” (Id. at pp. 850-851.) We address the arguments the parties have made
under McKee, but note that we would reach the same conclusion under Hardin.

5
plea of not guilty by reason of insanity must be legally competent to be tried,” and “[a]

MDO defendant must be competent.”

Holmes’s reasoning does not hold water. Any criminal defendant has a

constitutional right not to be tried on criminal charges while mentally incompetent.

(Moore, supra, 50 Cal.4th at p. 818.) The authority Holmes cites applies this principle in

the context of defendants found not guilty by reason of insanity or civilly committed

under the MDOA. (See People v. Prince (1988) 203 Cal.App.3d 848, 851 [after

defendant found not guilty by reason of insanity, criminal proceedings were suspended

and defendant was committed to state hospital]; People v. Blackburn (2015) 61 Cal.4th

1113, 1129 (Blackburn) [“By definition, every mentally disordered offender has

previously been deemed competent to stand trial . . . .”].) But the same is true for an

alleged sexually violent predator, who also must have been previously deemed competent

to stand criminal trial. (See § 6600, subd. (a)(1) [sexually violent predator is “a person

who has been convicted of a sexually violent offense against one or more victims . . . .”].)

Instead, a proper comparison is between a commitment or recommitment trial

under the SVPA and a civil commitment or recommitment trial under the MDOA or a

proceeding to confine or extend the confinement for treatment of a person found not

guilty by reason of insanity. Those subject to such proceedings are similarly situated, in

that though connected to an underlying criminal case, they are potentially subject to

involuntary civil commitment for treatment of a mental disorder. (See Conservatorship

6
of Eric B. (2022) 12 Cal.5th 1085, 1095.) The question Holmes fails to address at all is

whether these groups are treated in an unequal manner.

They are not. Under Moore, the offender need not be mentally competent for an

SVPA commitment or recommitment trial to proceed. (Moore, supra, 50 Cal.4th at p.

829.) The same is true under the MDOA. (See Blackburn, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 1125

[construing Pen. Code, § 2972, subd. (a) “to establish a default rule that a court must

obtain a personal waiver of the defendant’s right to a jury trial before holding a bench

trial,” but “when the trial court finds substantial evidence that defendant lacks the

capacity to make a knowing and voluntary waiver, control of the decision shifts to

defense counsel”].) The same is true for defendants found not guilty by reason of

insanity. (See Hudec v. Superior Court (2015) 60 Cal.4th 815, 828-829 [“If a [Pen.

Code] section 1026.5 extension hearing could not proceed until any doubts about the

respondent’s competence were resolved, the issue of [the] respondent’s continuing

mental illness, central to the hearing under [Pen. Code] section 1026.5, subdivision

(b)(1), would tend to be subsumed within nonstatutory proceedings on mental

competence, and the hearing called for by section 1026.5 could be indefinitely

delayed”].)

Thus, Holmes fails to establish even the “‘“first prerequisite”’” for a successful

equal protection claim under McKee, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 1202, unequal treatment of

similarly situated groups. We would reach the same disposition under Hardin, supra, 15

7
Cal.5th at p. 851, analyzing “whether the challenged difference in treatment was

adequately justified under the applicable standard of review.”

DISPOSITION

The commitment order is affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

RAPHAEL
J.

We concur:

FIELDS
Acting P. J.

MENETREZ
J.

8

Setzen Sie Ihre Recherche in ChatGPT oder Claude fort

Verbinden Sie Omnilex, um den Rechtskorpus über Ihren KI-Assistenten zu durchsuchen.