CourtListener 10379826•In re N.L. CA4/3
Gesamter Gesetzestext
Filed 4/16/25 In re N.L. CA4/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
In re N.L., a Person Coming Under
the Juvenile Court Law.
ORANGE COUNTY SOCIAL
SERVICES AGENCY,
G064642
Plaintiff and Respondent,
(Super. Ct. No. 19DP0311)
v.
OPINION
J.D.,
Defendant and Appellant.
Appeal from an order of the Superior Court of Orange County,
Daphne G. Sykes, Judge. Conditionally reversed and remanded with
directions. Respondent’s request for judicial notice denied.
Paul A. Swiller, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Leon J. Page, County Counsel, Debbie Torez and Chloe R.
Maksoudian, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
No appearance for the Minor.
* * *
In March 2019, the Orange County Social Services Agency (the
Agency) took three-year-old N.L. (Daughter) and five-year-old J.L., Jr. (Son)
into protective custody, alleging general neglect and related claims. The
Orange County Juvenile Court (the court) found the children to be
dependents and ordered reunification services for J.D. (Mother).
In August 2024, following a second permanency placement
hearing, the court found Daughter to be adoptable and terminated parental
rights. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.26.)1 The court found the beneficial
relationship exception to adoption did not apply; however, the court did not
make the required findings under the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA).
Under a hybrid standard of review, we find substantial evidence
to support the court’s substantive rulings, and we find no abuse of its
discretion. As to the ICWA, County Counsel concedes the error, and we agree.
Thus, the court’s order terminating parental rights is conditionally reversed,
and the matter is remanded for the limited purpose of ICWA compliance.
I.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On March 14, 2019, at about 10:30 a.m., Son left the home of
Mother and went next door to a gas station by himself. Son was barefoot,
shirtless, and looking for candy. The worker at the gas station told police that
Son often came into the store looking for food. Police had received a similar
call about three weeks prior. Police determined Mother would be arrested due
1
Further undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare
and Institutions Code. Mother filed this appeal, which only concerns the
court’s section 366.26 rulings as to Daughter. The presumed father never
appeared in court and is not a party.
2
to the reoccurring nature of the issue.
Police went to Mother’s home where Daughter was present and
hungry. Mother told the officers that the father of both children might be in
custody. Police noted that milk inside of the refrigerator appeared to have
gone bad. Mother told police the two children had not had breakfast, stating
that they “were not ‘morning eaters.’’’ Both children complained of hunger
and were provided with snacks.
Mother was taken into custody on charges of child abuse. (Pen.
Code, § 273, subd. (a).) The children were detained at a facility. Daughter
said Mother had left all night and went shopping. Daughter was unable to
answer who was in the home. Mother reported that the children’s father had
left her homeless. Mother’s other child by a different father, 13-year-old C.H.,
had not resided in the home since 2016, when he was found to have sexually
abused Daughter. The Agency conducted a safety assessment and determined
that Son and Daughter were not presently safe in the home due to several
factors, including three or more prior neglect referrals, and three or more
prior abuse referrals.
Jurisdiction/Disposition Proceedings
On March 18, 2019, the Agency filed a juvenile dependency
petition alleging Daughter came within the jurisdiction of the court due to
failure to protect, sexual abuse, no provision for support, and abuse of sibling.
(§ 300, subds. (b)(1), (d), (g), (j).)
On May 15, 2019, the court conducted a jurisdiction/disposition
hearing. Mother waived her rights to a trial and submitted as to the Agency’s
allegations. The court declared Daughter to be a dependent of the court and
removed her from Mother’s custody. The court ordered family reunification
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services for Mother, including substance abuse treatment and testing,
parenting courses, and individual counseling. The court ordered monitored
visitations.
Six-Month Review Hearing
On November 13, 2019, the court conducted a six-month review
hearing. The Agency filed a report before the hearing noting Son and
Daughter were then currently placed together in the same foster home.
Mother had completed a 12-hour parenting program and a 16-week substance
abuse program. Mother had also been attending AA meetings, was
participating in therapy, and a personal empowerment program. Mother was
having 10 hours of supervised visitation per week.
The Agency recommended the children continue to be dependent
children of the court, that reunification services continue, and that the court
should schedule the matter for a 12-month review hearing. The court adopted
the Agency’s recommendations.
12-Month Review Hearing
On May 7, 2020, the court had scheduled a 12-month permanency
review hearing. The Agency filed a status review report in advance of the
hearing. The Agency recommended the court continue family reunification
services. Mother contested the recommendation, and the parties stipulated to
a later date for the contested hearing, which was then continued several
times, in part, due to the ongoing Covid-19 epidemic.
During an interview in June 2020, Daughter reported seeing a
fight between Mother and her current boyfriend. Daughter had a large, oval
shaped dark purple bruise on her upper right leg. Daughter reported Mother
4
had hit her and Son with a shoe after getting mad. In July 27, 2020, the
Agency changed its recommendation to termination of reunification services,
and suitable placement.
12 and 18-Month Review Hearing
On October 15, 2020, the court conducted a combined 12 and 18-
month review hearing. The court read and considered five reports filed by the
Agency. The Agency recommended the court terminate reunification services
and schedule a section 366.26 permanency planning hearing. The court
followed the Agency’s recommendations.
First Section 366.26 Hearing
On March 22, 2021, the court conducted the first section 366.26
hearing. The Agency recommended that the termination of parental rights at
this time would be detrimental. The Agency noted Mother had maintained
regular visits and contact with the children, and they would benefit from the
continued relationship. The children were living separately with nonrelative
caregivers who were willing and capable of providing a stable and permanent
environment, but the caregivers were not willing to become legal guardians
as of the date of the hearing. The court adopted the recommendations of the
Agency and set the matter for further proceedings.
Developments Before a Second Section 366.26 Hearing
In September 2021, Daughter was placed with C. S. and R. S.
(who would later become the de facto parents).
In February 2022, the Agency reported that Daughter (who was
now six years old and in kindergarten) was doing well in her placement. Son
5
was in a separate placement. The de facto parents expressed an interest in
adopting Daughter. Mother’s visitations were inconsistent, and the de facto
parents expressed a concern in Daughter’s numerous negative behaviors
when visits were cancelled.
From August 2022 to November 2022, the Agency reported that
Mother had cancelled four of 13 visitations with little notice. On one occasion,
Daughter described that Mother “knows when my birthday is, but she didn’t
know it passed already.”
In February 2023, it was reported that Daughter had repeatedly
expressed that she wanted to live with de facto parents, and to have only
visits with Mother. Daughter’s therapist recommended adoption: “For the
past four years, she has been in limbo in terms of where her home is. She
asks questions almost on a daily basis . . . regarding where she will end up
living. She is clearly anxious about this and needs to know that she is in a
forever home. In my experience, adoption has typically been sought for a
child of this age. She appears to be very attached to her [de facto] parents and
has been in the home for 16 months. She also seems to be well connected at
her school with her teacher and school personnel.”
Second Section 366.26 Hearing
On June 12, 2024, the court began a second section 366.26
hearing. Six witnesses testified over several weeks. At the conclusion of the
hearing in August, the court found Daughter to be adoptable, found that the
beneficial relationship exception did not apply, and terminated parental
rights (the hearing and the court’s ruling will be covered in greater detail in
the discussion section of this opinion). The court made no oral or written
ICWA findings.
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II.
DISCUSSION
Mother claims A) the court erred by finding the beneficial
relationship exception did not apply; and B) that conditional reversal is
required because the court failed to make ICWA findings. We shall analyze
each claim.
A. Beneficial Relationship Exception
At the section 366.26 hearing, the juvenile court determines a
permanent plan for the child, and may generally order adoption,
guardianship, or long-term foster care. (In re J.C. (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th
503, 528.) “‘[T]here is strong preference for adoption over the alternative
permanency plans.’” (In re Anthony B. (2015) 239 Cal.App.4th 389, 394–395.)
Ordinarily, if the juvenile court finds the child adoptable it must
then terminate parental rights. (In re E.T. (2018) 31 Cal.App.5th 68, 76.) “‘In
order to avoid termination of parental rights and adoption, a parent has the
burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, that one or more of
the statutory exceptions to termination of parental rights . . . apply.’” (Ibid.)
In this part of the discussion, we will: 1) consider the legal
principles regarding the beneficial relationship exception to the preference for
adoption; 2) summarize the relevant court record, and 3) analyze whether the
court’s ruling is supported by substantial evidence and/or whether the court’s
ruling constitutes an abuse of discretion.
1. Relevant Legal Principles
Under the beneficial relationship (or parental bond) exception, a
parent is required to show three things: “(1) regular visitation and contact,
7
and (2) a relationship, the continuation of which would benefit the child such
that (3) the termination of parental rights would be detrimental to the child.”
(In re Caden C. (2021) 11 Cal.5th 614, 631 (Caden C.).)
“The first element—regular visitation and contact—is
straightforward. The question is just whether ‘parents visit consistently,’
taking into account ‘the extent permitted by court orders.’” (Caden C., supra,
11 Cal.5th at p. 632.) “As to the second element, courts assess whether ‘the
child would benefit from continuing the relationship.’ [Citation.] Again here,
the focus is the child. And the relationship may be shaped by a slew of
factors, such as ‘[t]he age of the child, the portion of the child’s life spent in
the parent’s custody, the “positive” or “negative” effect of interaction between
parent and child, and the child’s particular needs.’” (Ibid.) “Concerning the
third element—whether ‘termination would be detrimental to the child due
to’ the relationship—the court must decide whether it would be harmful to
the child to sever the relationship and choose adoption.” (Id. at p. 633.)
As to the first two elements, the substantial evidence standard of
review applies. (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 639–640.) “The
determination that the parent has visited and maintained contact with the
child ‘consistently,’ taking into account ‘the extent permitted by the court’s
orders’ [citation] is essentially a factual determination. It’s likewise
essentially a factual determination whether the relationship is such that the
child would benefit from continuing it.” (Ibid.)
“The third element—whether termination of parental rights
would be detrimental to the child—is somewhat different. As in assessing
visitation and the relationship between parent and child, the court must
make a series of factual determinations. These may range from the specific
features of the child’s relationship with the parent and the harm that would
8
come from losing those specific features to a higher-level conclusion of how
harmful in total that loss would be. The court must also determine, for the
particular child, how a prospective adoptive placement may offset and even
counterbalance those harms. In so doing, it may make explicit or implicit
findings ranging from specific benefits related to the child’s specific
characteristics up to a higher-level conclusion about the benefit of adoption
all told. All these factual determinations are properly reviewed for
substantial evidence.” (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 640.)
“[T]he court must also engage in a delicate balancing of these
determinations as part of assessing the likely course of a future situation
that’s inherently uncertain. The decision . . . require[s] assessing what the
child’s life would be like in an adoptive home without the parent in his life.
[Citation.] The court makes the assessment by weighing the harm of losing
the relationship against the benefits of placement in a new, adoptive home.
And so, the ultimate decision—whether termination of parental rights would
be detrimental to the child due to the child’s relationship with his parent—is
discretionary and properly reviewed for abuse of discretion.” (Caden C.,
supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 640.)
2. The Operative Section 366.26 Hearing
On June 12, 2024, the court began the section 366.26 hearing.
Prior to its ruling on August 29, 2024, the court read, considered and
admitted into evidence 19 reports filed by the Agency dating from December
8, 2022, to July 15, 2024. The court heard testimony from six witnesses.
Daughter’s current social worker, Jose Castaneda, testified that
he had been assigned to the case since April. Castaneda said that a couple of
weeks before his assignment, he had met with Mother and the de facto
9
parents. In a report dated June 11, 2024, Castaneda stated that Daughter
was adoptable and that parental rights be terminated, which was the
Agency’s recommendation. Castaneda had spoken to the de facto parents
who wanted to adopt Daughter.
Daughter’s prior social worker, Juan Gavia, testified that he had
been assigned to the case in approximately April 2022. Gavia testified that he
had made varied recommendations regarding the permanent plan for
Daughter. Gavia had made numerous recommendations to terminate
parental rights, but there were two occasions where he did not recommend
terminating parental rights. Gavia’s current (personal) recommendation at
the time of his testimony was not to terminate parental rights. Gavia
admitted that when numerous visitations by Mother were cancelled it was
harmful to Daughter.
Mother testified that she has a caring, loving, beautiful
relationship with Daughter. Mother said that her late arrivals for some of her
visitations were not a reflection on the love she has for Daughter. Mother
said that her opinion was that the de facto parents were rude. When asked
about missed visitations (the questioner noted that about 25 percent of
visitations were missed according to a February 27, 2024, Agency report),
Mother testified that she still wanted more visits. Mother said she
understood that Daughter became very sad and distraught when she would
miss visitations.
Dr. Jessica Borelli testified that she was a psychologist
specializing in attachment relationships, and she was hired by Mother’s
counsel. Based on the Agency reports and her own observations, Borelli
opined Daughter had a very strong attachment to Mother. Borelli admitted
that Mother’s missed visitations had been challenging. Borelli testified that
10
she was not in a position to evaluate Daughter’s relationship with the de
facto parents. Borelli admitted that adoption may provide Daughter stability
and psychological resources to move through life.
Dr. Alyssa Byerly testified that she was Daughter’s therapist.
Byerly testified that Daughter “has reported to me that she gets very stressed
before and after visits with [Mother]. She has reported that she gets stressed
when her mom does not come to visits, and she gets stressed when she is
separated from her foster father.” As far as visitations, Byerly said that
Daughter “has expressed and reported confusion that she can attend the
visits and her mom can’t.” Byerly testified that Daughter has reported that
the source of her stress “is often the uncertainty, whether mom is going to
confirm visits or not.”
R.S. testified that he was one of two de facto parents and had
been caring for Daughter for about three years at the time of the hearing.
R.S. said that he and his wife had gone through all the necessary foster
parent training and been approved to adopt Daughter after an assessment
had been completed in their home. R.S. testified that it was his family’s
desire to adopt Daughter because: “She’s become family. When she’s in
distress, we’re the ones that comfort her. When she falls, we’re the ones who
put the band-aid on.” As far as visitations, R.S. testified that he would
frequently take Daughter to the location, but Mother would not show up. For
example, R.S. testified that of the 34 visits that had been made available to
Mother so far this year, Mother had shown up for only 20 of them. And of
those 20 visits, Mother showed up on time to only two of them. R.S. testified
Daughter “gets anxious and [it] starts with the car ride. She gets anxious and
then nervous and as we wait there’s a time check and then behaviors begin to
escalate waiting to see if mom will make it.”
11
After hearing oral arguments from counsel, the court began by
stating that “this is not an easy case at all.” After ruling as to Son, the court
ruled as to Daughter that “this child is both generally and specifically
adoptable.” As a result, the court ruled that “the burden has shifted . . . to
mother for her to demonstrate the sufficiency of the evidence in the three
prongs of Caden C.”
The court ruled as to “the first prong, the Court finds that the
visitation has been sporadic and inconsistent. This unpredictability is the
hallmark of instability.”
The court continued as to “the second prong, there’s undisputably
a loving relationship between mother and daughter.” However, the court
noted various “problem/issues” resulting from Mother’s sporadic and
inconsistent visitations which included: “moments of parentification; missed
cues by mom; frustration; chronic letdowns; and behavior, which effectively
communicates that the child is not the priority week after week.” The court
stated that as a result, Daughter was exhibiting various negative behaviors,
including: “depression; anxiety; self-harm; [and] acting out, to name a few,
directly related to these visits and relationship with mother.”
“The court finds this relationship does not outweigh the benefits
[and] permanence of adoption. I find it will be detrimental to continue it in
the legal guardianship context. [¶] I also find insufficient evidence that the
sibling-relationship exception applies.” The court noted that “the wishes of
the child, consistent with the child’s age” had been considered and the
Agency’s reports had been admitted into evidence. The court found by clear
and convincing evidence that Daughter was likely to be adopted. The court
then terminated parental rights.
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3. Application and Analysis
Here, under the first element of Caden C., Mother maintained
some visitations with Daughter; however, there was substantial evidence to
support the court’s explicit finding that the visitations were sporadic and
inconsistent and therefore this element was not met. (See Caden C., supra, 11
Cal.5th at p. 632 [“The question is . . . whether ‘parents visit consistently,’
taking into account ‘the extent permitted by court orders’”].)
Under the second element of Caden C., there was some evidence
Mother’s relationship with Daughter was to some extent positive. However,
the testimony of some of the witnesses, and the voluminous evidence in the
Agency’s reports—particularly the evidence about the missed visitations by
Mother, and the impacts that these missed visitations caused to Daughter—
provides substantial evidence to support the court’s ruling that Daughter’s
relationship with Mother overall was not beneficial. (See Caden C., supra, 11
Cal.5th at p. 632; see also In re G.B. (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 1147, 1165–1166
[“‘“it is only in an extraordinary case that preservation of the parent’s rights
will prevail over the Legislature’s preference for adoptive placement”’”].)
Indeed, Mother’s inconsistency as to Daughter’s needs were part
of what caused the intervention by the dependency court in the first instance.
Therefore, Mother’s subsequent failure to maintain consistency with
Daughter’s visitations was a legitimate and lawful concern for the court when
making its ruling to terminate parental rights. (See In re Katherine J. (2022)
75 Cal.App.5th 303, 309 [a parent’s failure “to surmount the issues that
initially brought the child into dependency care” can be considered as one
factor in the parental-benefit exception analysis].)
Finally, under the third element of Caden C., when “weighing the
harm of losing the relationship against the benefits of placement in a new,
13
adoptive home,” we find that the court was plainly conversant with the
applicable legal authorities governing its ruling. (See Caden C., supra, 11
Cal.5th at p. 640.) The court noted at the start that this was not an “easy
case,” and the court then engaged in a thoughtful and thorough analysis. In
sum, we find that the court did not reach its determination in an arbitrary or
capricious manner. (See In re Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 318 [noting
“when a court has made a custody determination in a dependency proceeding,
‘“a reviewing court will not disturb that decision unless the trial court has
exceeded the limits of legal discretion by making an arbitrary, capricious, or
patently absurd determination”’”].)
In sum, we hold that the factual elements of the court’s ruling
were supported by substantial evidence, and we further hold that the court
otherwise did not abuse its discretion when it ruled that the benefit exception
to the statutory preference for adoption did not apply. (See Caden C., supra,
11 Cal.5th at pp. 640–641 [a juvenile court’s determination regarding the
parental-benefit exception is reviewed under a hybrid standard of review].)
Mother argues In re Scott B. (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 452 (Scott
B.), compels a different result. We disagree.
In Scott B., the child was nine years old when he was placed in
foster care and 11 years old when the juvenile court terminated his mother’s
parental rights. The child had lived with his mother his whole life prior to
removal. (Scott B., supra, 188 Cal.App.4th at p. 471.) He needed special
education services, had behavior problems at school, had problems
interacting with his peers, and had bladder control issues. (Id. at pp. 455–
456.) When the child learned he might be adopted, his behavior regressed to
growling and biting. (Id. at p. 458.) He stated that if his foster parent adopted
him, he would run away because he wanted to live with his mother. (Id. at p.
14
466.) The appellate court held these reasons were compelling to find that
termination of parental rights was detrimental to the child and reversed the
juvenile court’s order. (Id. at pp. 471, 473.)
We find Scott B. to be distinguishable. Here, Daughter was three
years old when she was placed in foster care, and eight years old at the time
the court terminated parental rights. For about five years Daughter had not
lived with Mother, and for about three years prior to the section 366.26
hearing, Daughter appeared to have a healthy and loving relationship with
her de facto parents. That is, unlike the situation in Scott B., in this case
there was ample evidence that Daughter had formed a positive and stable
attachment to her prospective adoptive parents. (See also In re Autumn H.
(1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 567, 576 [the juvenile “court properly concluded no
exceptional situation existed to forego adoption”]; In re A.G. (2020) 58
Cal.App.5th 973, 995 [“‘the parent must show more than frequent and loving
contact, an emotional bond with the child, or pleasant visits–the parent must
show that he or she occupies a parental role in the life of the child’”].)
To reiterate and conclude, we affirm the court’s challenged
rulings, which were made at the August 29, 2024, section 366.26 hearing.
B. The Indian Child Welfare Act
The ICWA is a comprehensive federal law concerning the removal
of Indian children from their families. (25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.) “The court,
county welfare department, and the probation department have an
affirmative and continuing duty to inquire whether a child for whom a
petition under Section 300 . . . may be or has been filed, is or may be an
Indian child.” (§ 224.2, subd. (a).) A duty of further inquiry is triggered if
there is “information suggesting that either the parent of the child or the
15
child is a member or citizen, or may be eligible for membership or citizenship,
in an Indian tribe.” (§ 224.2, subd. (e)(1).)
“If the court makes a finding that proper and adequate further
inquiry and due diligence as required in this section have been conducted and
there is no reason to know whether the child is an Indian child, the court may
make a finding that the [ICWA] does not apply to the proceedings, subject to
reversal based on sufficiency of the evidence.” (§ 224.2, subd. (i)(2).)
On August 29, 2024, the court made no required ICWA findings
prior to terminating parental rights. On this record, we must conclude that
the court erred, and the challenged orders must be conditionally reversed to
allow for ICWA compliance. (See In re L.S. (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 1183, 1197
[failure to “determine whether the ICWA applies is prejudicial error”].)
On February 13, 2025, the Agency requested that this court take
judicial notice of certain ICWA documents filed after the termination of
parental rights (Mother opposes the request). The Agency’s motion was made
several months after the section 366.26 hearing; therefore, we deny the
Agency’s request for judicial notice. (See In re Sabrina H. (2007) 149
Cal.App.4th 1403, 1416 [“Appellate courts rarely accept postjudgment
evidence or evidence that is developed after the challenged ruling is made”].)
“Accordingly, we conditionally reverse . . . and remand the
matters to allow [the Agency] and the juvenile court to rectify their errors
and to take all other necessary corrective actions.” (In re T.G. (2020) 58
Cal.App.5th 275, 280–281, 298–299 [conditional reversal proper when
juvenile court fails to make the findings required under the ICWA].)
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III.
DISPOSITION
The orders terminating parental rights are conditionally
reversed. On remand, the court shall conduct further proceedings, as needed,
for the limited purpose of ensuring full compliance with the ICWA and
related California law. If the court finds, after proper inquiry and notice, that
Daughter is not an Indian child as defined by the ICWA, the order
terminating parental rights shall be reinstated. Alternatively, if the court
determines the ICWA applies, the court shall vacate the order terminating
parental rights and conduct further proceedings consistent with the ICWA.
MOORE, ACTING P. J.
WE CONCUR:
SANCHEZ, J.
SCOTT, J.
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