People v. Chatalian CA2/6

CourtListener 10379822Calctapp16.04.2025

Gesamter Gesetzestext

Filed 4/16/25 P. v. Chatalian CA2/6
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SIX

THE PEOPLE, 2d Crim. No. B334487
(Super. Ct. No. 2023016568)
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Ventura County)

v.

BRIAN CHATALIAN,

Defendant and Appellant.

Brian Chatalian appeals from the judgment after a jury
convicted him of indecent exposure with a prior conviction of that
offense (Pen. Code, § 314, subd. 1). The trial court found true
allegations that he served a prior prison term and was on parole
when the offense was committed. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule
4.421(b)(3) & (4).) The court sentenced Chatalian to three years
in state prison.
Chatalian contends the trial court erred when it admitted
evidence of uncharged prior incidents of indecent exposure, and
the conviction is not supported by sufficient evidence of his
intent. We affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Current offense
Chatalian was found lying face down unresponsive in a
parking lot and was taken by ambulance to the hospital. He was
heavily intoxicated and did not know where he was. He could tell
nurse C.V. only his first name. He was not able to engage in
conversation with the nurses.
Chatalian was placed in an emergency room bed in a dimly
lit room directly across from the nurses’ station. The room was in
the central “hub of the emergency department,” with high foot
traffic of staff, patients, and family members. The room had a
glass door with the curtains open to allow nursing staff to observe
him to ensure his safety.
C.V. walked by Chatalian’s room 15 to 20 minutes after his
arrival. His hospital gown was raised to his chest. His hand was
in his underwear and he appeared to be masturbating. She
asked him to stop. He made eye contact with her and continued
masturbating. He complied with her second request to stop.
About thirty minutes later, C.V. saw him masturbating
again. He continued after making eye contact with her but
stopped after her second request.
C.V. later saw Chatalian sitting up. His hospital gown was
now completely off, his boxer shorts were down almost to his
knees, and he was stroking his penis. C.V. could see his penis
and genitals. She asked him to stop and told him he was in a
public area and was not allowed to expose himself in that
manner. He made eye contact with her and continued
masturbating. He shouted, “Fuck you. Do you know who I am?
Who the fuck are you? I’m the king.”
Charge nurse M.B. later saw from her desk that Chatalian

2
was masturbating. His shorts were pulled down and she saw his
erect penis exposed. He made eye contact with her. She yelled
from her desk for him to stop. He made no attempt to conceal his
actions. He stopped masturbating when she got to the doorway of
his room.
Chatalian continued yelling in intervals during the two and
a half hours he was in the hospital. At some point, he told M.B.
to leave him alone and go home. He also told C.V. to leave him
alone so he could sleep.
Chatalian’s masturbation made C.V. feel “very
uncomfortable.” She found it “very unsettling, and when
included with the aggression and shouting, it was very
threatening.” M.B. felt “uncomfortable” and was “very
frustrated” because she was “sitting there watching a grown man
continue to masturbate in front of [her] no matter how many
times [she] asked him to stop.”
When police arrived, Chatalian was intoxicated. He was
momentarily unsteady on his feet but walked to the police car
without falling. He gave his full name and conversed with
officers, answering some questions but not others. He followed
instructions to sit down. The officers believed Chatalian
understood them and could respond appropriately.
Prior incidents
On motion of the prosecution and over defense objection,
the trial court admitted evidence that Chatalian committed three
prior incidents of indecent exposure. (Evid. Code,1 §§ 1101, subd.
(b), 1108, 352.) The incidents, which were all within 18 months
before the current offense, occurred outside a pizzeria, inside a

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Evidence
Code.

3
bank, and inside a fast-food restaurant.
1. Pizzeria incident
A 17-year-old girl walking by a pizzeria saw Chatalian
standing in front. His pants were around his knees and his
genitals were exposed. He was screaming and masturbating.
When he looked in her direction he masturbated faster and said
the word “cum” (ejaculation) to her. She changed her route to
avoid him.
Police officers responded and found Chatalian heavily
intoxicated. His shorts were down toward his knees and his
lower body was completely exposed. An officer saw Chatalian’s
erect penis and testicles, and saw him masturbating. When
Chatalian saw the officer, he sat on the ground and covered
himself with his clothing.
At the jail, Chatalian made sexually explicit comments to
the prebooking nurses, spoke to them about his penis (which he
referred to as “the king”), and asked them, “How bad do you want
me?”
2. Bank incident
Chatalian was in line at a bank. He was not paying
attention and had trouble standing. The manager thought he
might be disabled and brought him into an office. She believed
he was coherent and knew what he was doing. As she pulled out
a chair for him, he put both hands on her chest and moaned. He
then unbuckled his belt, took out his penis, and masturbated,
moaning and breathing heavily. The manager was disgusted.
She screamed and ran out of the office.
Chatalian passed out. After police woke him, he said he
had been drinking. At the jail, he yelled several times to a female
probation officer that he “wanted to lick every part of her body.”

4
3. Fast-food incident
The manager of a fast-food restaurant saw Chatalian
seated in the dining room with his zipper down and his hand
inside his pants. His hand was moving and she could see part of
his penis. When she approached him and asked if he was going
to purchase anything, he continued to move his hand inside his
pants. The restaurant was busy and other customers also noticed
his actions.
Chatalian appeared to be intoxicated but he understood the
manager’s statements. As she walked him out of the restaurant,
he asked if she “knew who the sexiest man in the world was.” He
started to walk away but then turned and “speed walk[ed]”
towards her. She went inside the restaurant and called police.
A police officer asked Chatalian what he was doing with his
hand down his pants. He responded, “show my huge penis.”
DISCUSSION
Uncharged prior offenses
Chatalian contends the trial court abused its discretion
when it admitted evidence of uncharged prior incidents of
indecent exposure. We disagree.
1. Statutory provisions
Evidence of prior bad acts is generally “inadmissible when
offered to prove [a person’s] conduct on a specified occasion.”
(§ 1101, subd. (a).) But section 1101 does not prohibit “the
admission of evidence that a person committed a crime, civil
wrong, or other act when relevant to prove some fact (such as
motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge,
identity, [or] absence of mistake or accident . . .).” (§ 1101, subd.
(b).) “The least degree of similarity (between the uncharged act
and the charged offense) is required in order to prove intent.”

5
(People v. Ewoldt (1994) 7 Cal.4th 380, 402.)
Section 1108, subdivision (a) provides, “In a criminal action
in which the defendant is accused of a sexual offense, evidence of
the defendant’s commission of another sexual offense or offenses
is not made inadmissible by Section 1101, if the evidence is not
inadmissible pursuant to Section 352.” “ ‘Sexual offense’ ”
includes violation of Penal Code section 314. (§ 1108, subd.
(d)(1)(A).) Evidence may be admitted pursuant to section 1108
for any proper purpose, including to show a defendant’s
propensity or disposition to commit a sexual offense. (People v.
Falsetta (1999) 21 Cal.4th 903, 922-924.)
Chatalian does not contend the prior offenses were
irrelevant under sections 1101 or 1108. He contends instead that
the trial court abused its discretion in admitting the evidence
because “its probative value is substantially outweighed by the
probability that its admission will (a) necessitate undue
consumption of time or (b) create substantial danger of undue
prejudice, of confusing the issues, or of misleading the jury.”
(§ 352.)
We review for abuse of discretion the admission of prior
offenses pursuant to sections 1101, 1108, and 352. (People v.
Falsetta, supra, 21 Cal.4th at pp. 917-919.) “[T]he discretionary
ruling will ‘ “not be disturbed on appeal except on a showing that
the court exercised its discretion in an arbitrary, capricious or
patently absurd manner that resulted in a manifest miscarriage
of justice.” ’ ” (People v. Nguyen (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 1096,
1119.)
2. Trial court’s exercise of discretion
Chatalian contends the record does not show the trial court
exercised its section 352 discretion regarding the prior offenses.

6
He is incorrect.
“[A]lthough the record must affirmatively show that the
trial court weighed prejudice against probative value in
admitting evidence of prior bad acts,” we may “infer an implicit
weighing by the trial court on the basis of record indications well
short of an express statement” such as “argument of counsel or
comments by the trial court, or both, touching on the issues of
prejudice and probative value from which we might infer that the
court was aware of the Evidence Code section 352 issue and thus
of its duty to weigh probative value against prejudice.” (People v.
Padilla (1995) 11 Cal.4th 891, 924.)
The trial court here conducted the required weighing. The
parties’ briefs, which the court stated it read, discussed the
standards for section 352 balancing regarding admission of the
prior incidents. The trial court stated the defense argument was
“fairly characterized as a 352 consideration that since these are
identical charges to what’s being charged here that it’s liable to
unduly prejudice the jury, overcoming any probative value.” The
court noted that section 1108 permitted use of prior incidents for
propensity, and that the degree of similarity was important
regarding lack of mistake under section 1101. The court stated
the “issue outstanding then is prejudice versus probative value.”
The court specifically considered whether the touching of
the bank manager’s breast was admissible regarding sexual
intent but ruled that fact was not “of such inflammatory value to
keep it from coming in.” The court considered the number of
witnesses for the prior incidents and said it would view the police
body camera videos to “get a sense of how much time is likely to
be consumed and whether, in light of the concerns expressed, I’m
going to direct [the prosecutor to] pare it down from that.” The

7
court ruled the prior incidents were admissible but excluded
evidence that they resulted in convictions.
The court stated that “the legislature has made a finding
presumptively—well, certainly presumptively—that the
probative value outweighs any prejudicial impact, particularly
where the offense did not involve any conduct that is more
extreme.” Our Supreme Court has recognized the legislative
intent that section 1108 create a “presumption in favor of
admissibility.” (People v. Cordova (2015) 62 Cal.4th 104, 133;
People v. Loy (2011) 52 Cal.4th 46, 62.) The record here shows
the trial court understood its obligation to weigh the probative
value against its prejudicial impact.
3. Factors regarding admissibility
In weighing admissibility pursuant to sections 1108 and
352, five “particularly significant” factors are: “(1) whether the
propensity evidence has probative value, e.g., whether the
uncharged conduct is similar enough to the charged behavior to
tend to show defendant did in fact commit the charged offense;
(2) whether the propensity evidence is stronger and more
inflammatory than evidence of the defendant’s charged acts; (3)
whether the uncharged conduct is remote or stale; (4) whether
the propensity evidence is likely to confuse or distract the jurors
from their main inquiry, e.g., whether the jury might be tempted
to punish the defendant for his uncharged, unpunished conduct;
and (5) whether admission of the propensity evidence will require
an undue consumption of time.” (People v. Nguyen, supra, 184
Cal.App.4th at p. 1117.) Those factors support the trial court’s
exercise of discretion here.
a. Probative value
First, the prior offenses had significant probative value to

8
show intent and absence of mistake or accident. They supported
the conclusion that Chatalian willfully exposed his genitals in the
presence of others, and did so for the purpose of sexual arousal,
gratification, or affront. (Pen. Code, § 314, subd. 1; People v.
Archer (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 402, 404-405.) His sexual
motivation was demonstrated when he masturbated faster as a
girl walked by the pizzeria and he made a statement to her about
ejaculation. He demonstrated his sexual motivation in the bank
when he placed his hands on the manager’s chest before exposing
his penis and masturbating. He admitted he masturbated in the
fast-food restaurant for the purpose of showing his penis. All the
victims were affronted by his unwanted conduct. And his blatant
display of his genitals in public places in the prior incidents
refuted any inference that he mistakenly relied on a perception of
privacy in his hospital room.
While similarity is “a relevant factor for the court to
consider in exercising its discretion [citation], dissimilarity alone
does not compel exclusion of the evidence. ‘ “[T]he charged and
uncharged crimes need not be sufficiently similar that evidence of
the latter would be admissible under Evidence Code section 1101,
otherwise Evidence Code section 1108 would serve no purpose. It
is enough the charged and uncharged offenses are sex offenses as
defined in section 1108.” ’ ” (People v. Cordova, supra, 62 Cal.4th
at p. 133.) The acts here were similar in that all showed his
intent to expose his genitals in public for sexual gratification or to
affront others.
Chatalian’s intoxication in the hospital does not distinguish
it from the previous offenses. He was intoxicated in all the
offenses, and even passed out after exposing himself at the bank.
The fact that Chatalian was brought to the hospital by

9
ambulance rather than going there voluntarily is not significant
because the jury could conclude he knew he was in a public place
when he regained consciousness and exposed himself.
b. Comparative seriousness
Regarding the second factor, the prior offenses were not
more inflammatory than the charged offense, but were “similar in
character.” (People v. Falsetta, supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 919.) They
all involved Chatalian violating the same Penal Code section by
exposing his genitals and masturbating in public and making
sexual statements or shouting obscenities to women. In some
regards, the charged offense was more serious because it involved
multiple incidents over a period of several hours with victims
who were obligated to continue interacting with him.
c. Remoteness
The third factor—remoteness in time—does not favor
exclusion because the prior offenses all occurred in the preceding
calendar year, only 10 to 18 months before the charged offense.
d. Danger of confusion
The evidence does not support the fourth factor, the
likelihood of confusing or distracting the jury. All were separate
incidents in different places against unrelated victims. The jury
was properly instructed that evidence of the uncharged offenses
“is only one factor to consider along with all the other evidence”
and “is not sufficient by itself to prove” the charged offense.
(CALCRIM No. 1191A, modified.)
e. Consumption of time
Chatalian is correct that the prior crimes evidence took a
significant amount of trial time. One victim and one or two police
officers testified as to each incident, and body camera evidence
was shown. The testimony for the prior offenses consumed 153

10
pages of the reporter’s transcript, compared to 201 pages for the
current offense. Nevertheless, this is not a case where “the time
consumed trying the uncharged offenses so dwarfed the trial on
the current charge as to unfairly prejudice the defendant.”
(People v. Frazier (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 30, 42.) Chatalian
concedes that the “critical question” at trial was whether “he
intended to direct public attention” to his genitals for a sexual
purpose. Because evidence of a defendant’s state of mind “is
almost inevitably circumstantial” (People v. Bloom (1989) 48 Cal.
3d 1194, 1208), we conclude this factor does not favor exclusion.
Weighing these factors, we conclude admission of the prior
crimes evidence was not “ ‘ “arbitrary, capricious or patently
absurd.” ’ ” (People v. Nguyen, supra, 184 Cal.App.4th at p.
1119.)
4. Due process
Because the court did not abuse its discretion in admitting
the prior crimes evidence, we conclude its admission did “not
offend due process” and did not “render [Chatalian’s] trial
fundamentally unfair.” (People v. Falsetta, supra, 21 Cal.4th at
pp. 913, 915.)
Substantial evidence
Chatalian does not dispute that he exposed his genitals in a
public place. He contends instead that substantial evidence did
not establish he did so to direct public attention to his genitals for
the purpose of sexual arousal, gratification, or affront. We are
not persuaded.
The court correctly instructed the jury regarding the
elements of indecent exposure (Pen. Code, § 314, subd. 1):
“1. The defendant willfully exposed his genitals in the
presence of another person or persons who might be offended or

11
annoyed by the defendant’s actions;
“AND
“2. When the defendant exposed himself, he acted lewdly
by intending to direct public attention to his genitals for the
purpose of sexually arousing or gratifying himself or another
person, or sexually offending another person.
“Someone commits an act willfully when he or she does it
willingly or on purpose. It is not required that he or she intend to
break the law, hurt someone else, or gain any advantage.
“It is not required that another person actually see the
exposed genitals.” (CALCRIM No. 1160; People v. Archer, supra,
98 Cal.App.4th at pp. 405-406.)
On appeal, “we review the whole record to determine
whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential
elements of the crime . . . beyond a reasonable doubt. [Citation.]
The record must disclose substantial evidence to support the
verdict—i.e., evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid
value. . . . In applying this test, we review the evidence in the
light most favorable to the prosecution and presume in support of
the judgment the existence of every fact the jury could reasonably
have deduced from the evidence.” (People v. Zamudio (2008) 43
Cal.4th 327, 357.)
“The standard of review is the same when the prosecution
relies on circumstantial evidence.” (People v. Vu (2006) 143
Cal.App.4th 1009, 1024.) “Evidence of a defendant’s state of
mind is almost inevitably circumstantial, but circumstantial
evidence is as sufficient as direct evidence to support a
conviction.” (People v. Bloom, supra, 48 Cal.3d at p. 1208.) The
jury here was similarly instructed: “An intent and mental state
may be proved by circumstantial evidence.”

12
Substantial evidence here supports the jury’s verdict.
Chatalian was in direct view of a nurses’ station in a busy
hospital corridor. He was warned it was a public place where he
could not expose himself. He exposed his genitals by removing
his hospital gown and pulling down his shorts. He demonstrated
his intent to derive sexual gratification when he continued
exposing himself and masturbating while making eye contact
with the nurses. And his repeated conduct as nurses pleaded
with him to stop was evidence of his intent of “sexually insulting
or offending the other person.” (People v. Archer, supra, 98
Cal.App.4th at p. 406, italics omitted.)
Nor did evidence of Chatalian’s intoxication preclude a
guilty verdict. The jury was properly instructed that it could
consider evidence of voluntary intoxication “in deciding whether
the defendant acted with the specific intent to direct public
attention to his genitals for the purpose of sexually arousing or
gratifying himself or another person, or sexually offending
another person.” (CALCRIM No. 3426, modified; Pen. Code,
§ 29.4.) The evidence of Chatalian’s intoxication included the
extent to which he did or did not answer questions or follow
instructions, his ability to walk without falling, and the opinions
of those who interacted with him. We do not reweigh the
evidence but defer to the jury’s evaluation of the credibility of
witnesses and its resolution of conflicts in the testimony. (People
v. Mumin (2023) 15 Cal.5th 176, 202.) Substantial evidence
supports the jury’s determination that notwithstanding his
intoxication, Chatalian acted with the required intent.
The jury could also properly rely on the prior incidents as
evidence of intent. Our Supreme Court has “long recognized ‘that
if a person acts similarly in similar situations, he probably

13
harbors the same intent in each instance’ [citations] and that
such prior conduct may be relevant circumstantial evidence of the
actor’s most recent intent.” (People v. Robbins (1988) 45 Cal.3d
867, 879.) Chatalian’s sufficiency of the evidence challenge fails.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

BALTODANO, J.

We concur:

GILBERT, P. J.

CODY, J.

14
David R. Worley, Judge

Superior Court County of Ventura

______________________________

Laini Millar Melnick, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Kenneth C. Byrne and Sophia A. Lecky,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

Setzen Sie Ihre Recherche in ChatGPT oder Claude fort

Verbinden Sie Omnilex, um den Rechtskorpus über Ihren KI-Assistenten zu durchsuchen.