In re J.F. CA2/8

CourtListener 10378208Calctapp14.04.2025

Gesamter Gesetzestext

Filed 4/14/25 In re J.F. CA2/8
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION EIGHT

In re J.F. et al., Persons Coming B335063
Under the Juvenile Court Law.

LOS ANGELES COUNTY (Los Angeles County
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN Super. Ct. Nos. 23LJJP00259A–B)
AND FAMILY SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

Jeremiah F.,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County. Debra L. Gonzales, Commissioner. Affirmed.
Linda S. Votaw, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy,
Assistant County Counsel, and Peter Ferrera, Principal Deputy
County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
_________________________________
INTRODUCTION
Jeremiah F. (Father) appeals from jurisdictional findings
and dispositional orders, declaring his children dependents of the
juvenile court under Welfare and Institutions Code1 section 300,
subdivisions (b) and (j), removing them from his custody, and
terminating jurisdiction with a custody order placing the children
with their mother. On appeal, Father challenges the sufficiency
of the evidence supporting the jurisdictional findings and removal
order. He also contends the juvenile court committed reversible
error in denying his motion to replace his appointed counsel, in
refusing to admit certain evidence, in terminating jurisdiction,
and in restricting Father’s visitation to supervised. We conclude
none of Father’s arguments have merit, and accordingly, affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
1. Initial dependency investigation
Father and Amanda F. (Mother) are the divorced parents of
two children: J.F., a boy born in August 2013, and A.F., a girl
born in January 2015. Prior to the start of these dependency
proceedings, a family law court awarded sole legal and physical
custody of the children to Father, and visitation to Mother,
consisting of three weekends per month and every week from
Thursday through Friday. The family law court also previously
granted Father’s request for a domestic violence restraining order
against Mother. The restraining order was in effect until
January 2024.
On July 7, 2023, the Los Angeles County Department of
Children and Family Services (DCFS) received a referral alleging

1 Unless otherwise stated, all further undesignated statutory
references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.

2
medical neglect of J.F. by Father. According to the reporting
party, Mother took J.F. to the emergency room earlier that day
because he was having difficulty breathing related to asthma.
The child was administered oxygen and medications. When
Father arrived at the hospital, he was informed that J.F. was
going to be admitted to the intensive care unit. However, Father
disagreed with the doctor’s assessment and decided to take J.F.
home against medical advice.
That same day, the investigating social worker, along with
two public health nurses, went to Father’s residence. Father
came outside and spoke with them. He stated that J.F. was
doing well and “breathing fine.” He also reported that he took
J.F. home against the doctor’s advice because a respiratory
therapist at the hospital told him the child was “fine.” Father
denied that J.F. was diagnosed with asthma, and explained that
the child had seasonal allergies as well as a cold a few days
earlier. Although Father indicated that J.F. had an inhaler, he
did not know the name of the child’s primary care doctor. Father
allowed the social worker and nurses to meet briefly with J.F.
outside the home. After the child provided his name and age,
Father instructed him to go back inside. Father declined the
social worker’s request to interview the children and conduct a
home assessment.
Later that day, the social worker met with Mother and the
children during Mother’s visitation time with them. Mother
indicated that J.F. had been diagnosed with asthma and used an
inhaler when he was wheezing. She reported that she took J.F.
to the Children’s Hospital Los Angeles (CHLA) because she
noticed that he was lethargic and walking slowly to the car, and
he told her that his chest was “hurting really bad.” After Father

3
arrived at the hospital, she went to the waiting room due to the
protective order in place between them. Mother later learned
that the medical staff wanted to admit J.F., but Father declined
to follow their advice. At the social worker’s request, Mother
agreed to take J.F. to a local hospital or urgent care to be cleared
medically.
In his interview with the social worker, J.F. reported that
he could not sleep the night before, and that Father gave him the
inhaler but it did not work. J.F. further stated that Mother took
him to the hospital because he was not feeling well and his chest
was “hurting.” J.F. was aware that the hospital wanted to keep
him there, but Father disagreed and took him home. J.F.
indicated that he would use his inhaler when he had a “hard time
breathing,” though Father told him that the inhaler was “not
good for him.” J.F. also stated that he used to be allergic to two
cats that Father had at his home because his eyes would swell up
and he would have difficulty breathing. However, J.F. believed
he was no longer allergic to the cats because he stopped having
those symptoms.
DCFS subsequently received a report that, on July 8, 2023,
Mother brought J.F. back to the CHLA emergency room due to
exacerbated symptoms of asthma. It was reported that the
attending physician had not been able to stabilize J.F., and the
child might need to be admitted for further care. It also was
reported that the police escorted Father from the hospital
premises because he was being disruptive and making a scene.
The medical staff was concerned that Father would not agree to
J.F. being hospitalized if the physician was unable to stabilize
the child and send him home.

4
In an interview with DCFS, the hospital social worker
indicated that, when Father arrived at CHLA on July 8, 2023, he
raised his voice at the front desk staff and demanded to see J.F.
A paternal uncle who accompanied Father began to record the
interaction despite being repeatedly asked to put his cell phone
away. Although Father was told that he would see the child
shortly, he refused to wait and snuck into the restricted area.
After several hours, the hospital staff asked law enforcement to
escort Father from the premises based on his refusal to comply
with the staff’s directives. Before leaving the hospital, Father
was able to see J.F. and speak to the attending physician. The
physician explained in detail what was wrong with J.F., and even
allowed Father to listen to the child’s breathing with his
stethoscope. J.F. was discharged to Mother’s care on July 9, 2023
after responding well to treatment. The hospital social worker
assessed that Mother was compliant, forthcoming, and genuinely
concerned for J.F.’s well-being. The social worker also noted that
Father was more focused on the fact that Mother made him go to
the hospital rather than on J.F.
During a July 10, 2023 telephone conversation with DCFS,
Father expressed being upset that the agency instructed Mother
to take J.F. for a medical clearance given that he had sole custody
of the children. In response, DCFS explained that it needed to
verify J.F. was medically cleared, and that the custody order
allowed Mother to seek medical treatment for the children on an
emergency basis. Father also complained that Mother took J.F.
to CHLA rather than a hospital in their local area, and that she
failed to disclose the name of the hospital to him. In addition,
Father accused Mother of being a hypochondriac and having
mental health issues, and claimed she was not making correct

5
judgment calls on behalf of the children. With respect to the
July 7, 2023 hospital visit, Father reiterated that, even though
the emergency room doctor wanted J.F. to remain in the hospital,
he decided to take the child home because a respiratory therapist
said he was doing well. Father also recalled that he told the
hospital staff that J.F. needed to rest in his own bed, and that he
would seek medical attention for the child if necessary.
On July 13, 2023, Father again declined DCFS’s request to
conduct a home assessment. When the social worker asked if he
had scheduled a followup visit with J.F.’s primary care doctor,
Father stated he was working on it. In response to the social
worker’s request that he inform her when that visit was
scheduled, Father questioned why she cared and then stated he
would think about it.
In a followup interview, Mother told DCFS that she took
J.F. back to CHLA on July 8, 2023 because the child was having
difficulty breathing. She also stated that J.F. started wheezing
again a few days later, but he used his inhaler and was feeling
better. While Mother denied being diagnosed with any mental
health issues, she admitted she sought therapy for depression
during her relationship with Father. J.F. similarly reported to
DCFS that Mother took him back to the hospital after he told her
that his chest was hurting. J.F. also confirmed that he had an
inhaler at Father’s home, but only used it if his chest hurt
“[r]eally bad.” The child described feeling safe in both parents’
homes.
As part of its investigation, DCFS spoke with Dr. Lourdes
Escalona, the emergency room physician who treated J.F. during
his July 7, 2023 visit. According to Dr. Escalona, she made it
clear to Father that J.F.’s airways “were very swollen,” and

6
explained to him in detail the purpose of each medication that
she administered. After treating J.F., Dr. Escalona informed
Father that the child would need to be admitted to the hospital
and likely taken to the intensive care unit because he was not
responding to the treatment as well as she hoped. Father
refused, however, to have J.F. admitted to the hospital, and
stated that the child needed to go home and “relax.” Dr. Escalona
attempted to reason with Father, but noted that “nothing [she]
said to him worked.” She also hoped that a paternal uncle who
was present at the hospital and claimed to be a medic in the
military could help change Father’s mind. But after reviewing
J.F.’s medical chart which showed his oxygen levels were
improving with the treatment, the uncle supported Father’s
decision to take the child home. Dr. Escalona further reported
that Father refused to sign the paperwork indicating that he was
removing J.F. from the hospital against medical advice. At one
point, Father and the uncle asked the doctor whether J.F. would
die if he left the hospital. Although Dr. Escalona replied that she
could not answer that question with certainty, Father took the
child home.
The respiratory therapist who treated J.F. at the hospital
informed DCFS that the child “came in with increased difficulty
breathing secondary to an asthma attack, where he required
extra support and continuous breathing treatments to help
reverse his condition.” The therapist also reported that when
J.F. left the hospital, he “still requir[ed] oxygen” and “needed
another dose of the hour long medication.” The therapist denied
that Father consulted with him prior to taking the child home.
For its initial report, DCFS also obtained copies of some of
J.F.’s records from his July 7 and 8, 2023 hospital visits.

7
According to the hospital social worker’s report, Father requested
that another medical team care for J.F. during the July 7 visit,
and then decided to remove the child from the hospital against
medical advice. Father refused to engage in a discussion with the
medical staff about admitting J.F. to the hospital, and became
verbally aggressive toward them. The report noted that the
medical team felt strongly that J.F.’s removal from the hospital
“puts him in imminent danger and would advise that [he] be
taken to the nearest [e]mergency [r]oom.” It also noted that
Mother told the staff that Father belonged to a church that did
not believe in Western medicine. A July 7 note from the charge
nurse stated that Father was observed removing J.F.’s “IV, EKG
leads, [and] Pox monitor,” and that he left with the child against
the advice of Dr. Escalona and without signing the necessary
paperwork. A patient discharge summary from the July 8 visit
indicated that J.F. was diagnosed with status asthmaticus, and
included instructions to follow up with the child’s primary care
doctor “within 1-2 days unless otherwise specified.”
2. Section 300 petition
On July 31, 2023, DCFS filed a non-detained petition for
J.F. and A.F. under section 300, subdivisions (b) and (j). The
petition alleged the children were at substantial risk of harm
based on Father’s medical neglect of J.F.
On August 3, 2023, Father reported to DCFS that he took
J.F. to his primary care doctor. He also claimed that he twice
called the social worker to provide this information, but there
was no answer. The social worker noted that she did not receive
any calls from Father during her regular work hours or any
voicemail messages from him. When the social worker asked
Father if he was willing to provide medical information about

8
J.F., Father indicated that he would give the information to his
attorney. He also stated that he wanted to be present during any
interviews that the social worker conducted with the children.
At a hearing held on August 14, 2023, Father and Mother
each made their first appearance in the case, and were appointed
counsel. The juvenile court ordered that the children remain
released to their parents under the existing family law order, and
set the matter for an adjudication hearing. The court also
ordered the parents to make the children available to DCFS, the
children’s counsel, and any public health nurses, and to comply
with any home visits conducted by DCFS. In addition, the court
ordered Father to provide DCFS with information about the
children’s current doctors.
3. DCFS’s jurisdiction/disposition report
For DCFS’s jurisdiction/disposition report, the dependency
investigator interviewed Mother and the children regarding the
allegations in the section 300 petition. In her interview, Mother
recalled that, on the day she took J.F. to the hospital, she picked
up the children for her visitation time and noticed that J.F. did
not look well. His shoulders were hunched over and he labored to
breathe. Mother decided to take J.F. to CHLA because it
specialized in children, and she believed he would get better
treatment there. Mother brought J.F. back to CHLA the
following day because DCFS told her the child needed to be
medically cleared, and she thought it was best to take him to the
same hospital that previously treated him. Mother believed that
Father would not approve of her taking J.F. to the doctor because
he took a holistic approach to medical treatment that Mother
considered to be extreme. Mother also expressed concern about
J.F.’s asthma and allergies to cats, which Father owned. Mother

9
stated that after J.F. was diagnosed with asthma, Father told the
child he would not use an inhaler because it was bad for him.
In his interview, J.F. indicated that on the day that Mother took
him to the hospital, he was wheezing but could breathe. The
child also confirmed that he suffered the same symptoms on
other occasions. When asked what treatment he received, J.F.
reported that Father would give him oils and pills.
Although the dependency investigator also attempted to
interview Father, he would not agree unless the interview could
be recorded. Because DCFS’s policy did not permit recorded
interviews, the dependency investigator was unable to meet with
him. While Father did provide the name of a pediatrician, when
the dependency investigator contacted the doctor’s office, she was
informed that neither child was a patient there. In response to
DCFS’s request for clarification about the children’s current
doctor, Father stated that further questions should be directed to
his attorney. As a result, DCFS had not been able to determine
who the children’s primary pediatrician was or where they had
received medical care. In addition, Father still had not granted
DCFS access to his home for a safety assessment.
In its jurisdiction/disposition report, DCFS also attached
additional records from CHLA. The records showed that Mother
brought J.F. to the emergency room in May 2022 for a persistent
cough and difficulty breathing that started after the child came
from Father’s home. The doctor’s notes from that visit indicated
that J.F.’s symptoms were most likely due to a mild asthma
exacerbation and cat allergy, and that the child’s condition
improved with treatment. The doctor’s notes from J.F.’s July 7,
2023 visit stated that Dr. Escalona explained to Father that the
child’s condition was serious, and that she pleaded with him to

10
allow the medical team to continue the necessary treatment.
The notes also stated that Father requested that J.F.’s “IV, cable
and oxygen” be removed, and that he removed the “O2 Sat” on his
own before the doctor had a chance check the child’s oxygen level
on room air. The doctor’s notes from J.F’s July 8, 2023 visit
indicated that, while the child had not completely improved, he
was “safe enough to be discharged” with a medication plan.
4. Children’s detention from Father
At a hearing held on October 4, 2023, the juvenile court
noted its prior order allowing the children to remain in Father’s
home was conditioned upon him making the children available to
DCFS and providing information about their medical providers.
The court indicated that Father did not appear to be following
that order, and advised his counsel that Father needed to comply
with all conditions of the children’s release.
In an addendum report filed on October 5, 2023, DCFS
stated that Father continued to refuse its request to interview
the children and to assess his home. Because Father would not
allow DCFS to visit his residence or meet with the children
unless he could record any contact, the agency had not been able
to complete this portion of its investigation. DCFS also noted
that it had not received any further information from Father
about the children’s current medical care.
On October 12, 2023, counsel for DCFS and counsel for the
children joined in requesting that the juvenile court detain the
children from Father and place them with Mother. The children’s
counsel reported that Father refused to allow an investigator
from her office to visit his home, and that she was unable to
confirm if the children still felt safe in Father’s care. Father’s
counsel objected to a change in placement, arguing that Father’s

11
request to record his contact with DCFS was reasonable and not
a denial of access to the children. In addition, Father’s counsel
asked the court to continue the adjudication hearing so that she
could review a banker’s box of documents that Father brought to
court that day.
After hearing from counsel, the court detained the children
from Father, released them to Mother pending the adjudication
hearing, and granted Father monitored visitation in a DCFS-
approved setting. The court also continued the adjudication
hearing to allow Father’s counsel time to review the documents
that he provided to her. At a separate hearing attended by
Father and his counsel, the court denied Father’s request to
appoint a new attorney.
On October 19, 2023, Father told the social worker that he
recently took the children for physical exams, but he refused to
provide any further information and directed the social worker to
contact his attorney. Father also refused to provide Mother with
any medical information regarding the children, and objected to
her taking the children to the doctor and having J.F. tested for
allergies without his approval. Father later reported that the
children’s last physical exams were in July 2023. However, he
again refused the social worker’s request for additional
information.
On November 1, 2023, Father’s counsel asked the court to
grant a further continuance. His counsel noted that Father
provided her with additional documents the previous week, but
she was unable to review them because she was out due to
illness. The court again found good cause to continue the
adjudication hearing. The court also reiterated to the parties

12
that both Mother and Father shared medical and educational
rights over the children.
In a series of last-minute-information reports, DCFS stated
that the children had dental exams in November 2023 and
physical exams in December 2023. DCFS also noted that, on
November 27, 2023, Mother reported that J.F. required breathing
treatment after being around cats during a visit with Father.
DCFS opined that Father knew J.F. was allergic to cats but
continued to expose the child to that allergen despite its
triggering effects on his asthma. DCFS further opined that,
while Mother had shown an ability to meet the children’s needs,
Father had not demonstrated that he understood the importance
of placing the children’s medical and emotional needs first.
DCFS recommended the court sustain the section 300 petition
and terminate jurisdiction with a family law order granting joint
legal custody to both parents and sole physical custody to Mother.
5. Jurisdictional and dispositional hearing
Starting on January 9, 2024, the juvenile court held a
combined jurisdictional and dispositional hearing. In addition to
receiving into evidence DCFS’s various reports, the court
admitted three exhibits offered by Father. Those exhibits
consisted of medical records for the children’s July 22, 2023 visit
to the Palmdale Urgent Care, and a July 31, 2023 prescription for
an albuterol inhaler for J.F. The court denied Father’s request to
admit additional exhibits consisting of numerous character
reference letters from Father’s friends, family, and fellow church
members.
Father was called to testify at the hearing by his counsel.
According to his testimony, Father observed J.F. have mild
wheezing and coughing on a few occasions. While Mother told

13
him in the past that J.F. was diagnosed with asthma, she refused
to provide him with any documentation of the diagnosis. Prior to
July 2023, Father last took the children to a doctor in early 2021,
and they were both found to be in good health. In July 2023,
following J.F.’s second visit to the emergency room, Father took
the children for checkups at Palmdale Urgent Care, where no
followup care was ordered. Father believed that J.F. could have
mild asthma or seasonal allergies. He acknowledged that J.F.
had a prescription for an inhaler, which child used six or seven
times over the past two years. There were occasions when Father
suggested that J.F. use the inhaler, and other times when he left
the inhaler in the child’s room and told him to use it if he needed
it.
Before J.F. went to stay with Mother on July 7, 2023, the
child had a cold and difficulty sleeping, but was feeling better.
Mother later told Father that she was taking J.F. to the hospital,
but she did not disclose which one. When Father arrived at
CHLA, he felt that the doctor and hospital social worker were
inexplicably hostile and accusatory toward him. Father’s
understanding of J.F.’s condition at the time was that the child
was in the exact same state as when he left Father’s home. He
believed J.F. had some mild wheezing and cold symptoms, but
was otherwise doing well. Father claimed the doctor refused his
request for a second opinion, and physically grabbed his arm
when he said wanted to take the child home. Father assured the
hospital staff that he would take J.F. to an emergency room if
there were any signs of oxygen deprivation. He denied knowing
that there was a medical advisement for J.F. to remain at the
hospital for more breathing treatments.

14
The following day, J.F. went back to Mother’s home. Later
that evening, Mother told Father that she was again taking J.F.
to CHLA, but did not explain why. When Father arrived at the
hospital, he waited 15 minutes to see J.F., and then entered the
emergency area without permission so that he could make
medical decisions for his son. Father was later asked to leave the
premises for violating hospital policy, and he complied.
Father testified that he did not medically neglect J.F. in
July 2023 because the child had a cold and needed to rest at
home to heal. Father believed Mother initiated the dependency
case to regain custody of the children after she lost custody “due
to her instability.” Father was asked if he would permit DCFS
and the children’s counsel to enter his home without recording
them if the children were returned to him. Father replied that he
would “take it as a situation by situation,” and that he remained
concerned about granting access based on “several inaccuracies”
that were reported about him. Father wanted the juvenile court
to award him sole legal and physical custody of the children with
monitored visitation for Mother.
The jurisdictional and dispositional hearing resumed on
January 12, 2024. Counsel for DCFS and counsel for the children
joined in asking the court to sustain the petition as pled and
remove the children from Father. They also joined in requesting
that the court terminate its jurisdiction with a custody order
granting sole physical custody to Mother, and joint legal custody
to both parents with tie-breaking authority to Mother. They also
requested monitored visitation for Father. Father’s counsel
asked the court to dismiss the petition in its entirety, and to
either release the children to Father or grant him unmonitored
and overnight visitation.

15
The juvenile court sustained the petition as pled, and
declared J.F. and A.F. dependents of the court under section 300,
subdivisions (b) and (j). The court removed the children from
Father and placed them with Mother. The court also ordered the
termination of jurisdiction over the children, but stayed the
termination pending the receipt of a juvenile custody order
grating joint legal custody to both parents, sole physical custody
to Mother, and supervised visitation to Father. The court set the
matter for a juvenile custody order hearing.
6. Termination of dependency jurisdiction
On January 25, 2024, Mother informed DCFS that the
children returned from a recent visit with Father and disclosed
spending time at Father’s home. Mother stated that Father’s
cats were not present in the home, but J.F. was exposed to cat
hair during the visit and experienced symptoms of asthma when
he returned to Mother. DCFS reported that Father’s home was
not approved for visits because he continued to deny access to his
home for an assessment.
On January 26, 2024, the court held the hearing on the
proposed juvenile custody order. Father’s counsel stated that she
discussed DCFS’s latest report with Father, and that J.F. was
only at his home for a short period to pick up some clothes. His
counsel also stated that Father believed that jurisdiction had
been terminated, and he was allowed to take the children to his
home as long as a monitor was present. The children’s counsel
expressed concern that Father placed J.F. “in a situation where
he knew [the child] could have an asthma attack, and he did it
because he believed the court had dismissed jurisdiction, and he
was free to do what he wanted.” In response, the court
emphasized that, under its existing order, Father’s visits were

16
not to take place at his home because it still had not been
assessed by DCFS. After hearing extensive argument from
counsel, the court signed the custody and visitation order and
lifted the stay terminating jurisdiction.
Father timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
1. Denial of motion to substitute counsel
Father contends the juvenile court erred in denying his
motion to substitute appointed counsel under People v. Marsden
(1970) 2 Cal.3d 118 (Marsden), and that following the denial of
the motion, his attorney provided ineffective assistance of
counsel. We conclude Father’s claims lack merit.
On October 12, 2023, the originally scheduled date of the
adjudication hearing, Father made a Marsden motion to replace
his court-appointed attorney. At a Marsden hearing held with
Father and his counsel, the juvenile court asked Father why he
wanted a new attorney. Father explained that, over the past five
weeks, he repeatedly tried to reach his attorney by e-mail and
telephone, and that she did not respond until about a week ago.
He also stated that, when they did talk, he “was not able to get
the guidance or advice [he] was looking for legally.” Father noted
that he was not questioning his counsel’s competence, but he was
concerned that she had done nothing to prepare for the case. In
response, counsel noted that she had an extensive conversation
with Father at the initial hearing, but acknowledged there had
been about a week delay in communicating with him following
DCFS’s filing of its jurisdiction/disposition report. Counsel added
that she “would defer to the court if [Father] believes there has
been a breakdown in communication.”

17
The juvenile court denied Father’s motion. The court
stated that Father’s counsel appeared often in its court, and that
she was an “extremely experienced” and “very dedicated”
attorney. The court also noted that if counsel needed additional
time to gather information to prepare for the case, she could seek
a continuance. Based on the information provided by Father,
the court found there was not a sufficient breakdown in
communication to warrant the appointment of a new attorney.
Following the denial of Father’s motion, his counsel requested a
continuance of the adjudication hearing so that she could review
a banker’s box of documents that Father provided to her that day.
The court found good cause for counsel’s request and granted the
continuance.
Marsden, supra, 2 Cal.3d 118 addresses the circumstances
under which criminal defendants have a right to the substitution
of appointed counsel and the procedures to be employed by the
trial courts in determining whether those circumstances exist.
(In re Samuel A. (2021) 69 Cal.App.5th 67, 73, fn. 3.) “Because
parents have a statutory and due process right to competent
counsel in dependency proceedings, a comparable mechanism for
challenging the adequacy of their representation by appointed
counsel has been recognized by the courts.” (Ibid.; accord, In re
M.P. (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 441, 455; In re V.V. (2010)
188 Cal.App.4th 392, 398.) Relying on the Marsden model,
juvenile courts have permitted the parents in dependency cases
“to air their complaints about appointed counsel and request new
counsel be appointed.” (In re V.V., at p. 398.)
When a criminal defendant brings a Marsden motion to
substitute appointed counsel, “ ‘the trial court must permit the
defendant to explain the basis of his contention and to relate

18
specific instances of inadequate performance. A defendant is
entitled to relief if the record clearly shows that the appointed
counsel is not providing adequate representation or that
defendant and counsel have become embroiled in such an
irreconcilable conflict that ineffective representation is likely to
result.’ ” (People v. Taylor (2010) 48 Cal.4th 574, 599.) “ ‘We
review the denial of a Marsden motion for abuse of discretion.’
[Citation.] ‘Denial is not an abuse of discretion “unless the
defendant has shown that a failure to replace counsel would
substantially impair the defendant’s right to assistance of
counsel.” ’ ” (People v. Streeter (2012) 54 Cal.4th 205, 230.)
In this case, the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion
in denying Father’s Marsden motion. The court allowed Father
to explain why he was seeking the appointment of new counsel
and to provide any examples of inadequate performance by his
current attorney. The court also allowed counsel an opportunity
to respond to Father’s reported complaints about a lack of contact
and lack of preparation. In addition, the court indicated that it
was willing to grant a continuance of the adjudication hearing if
counsel needed additional time to gather evidence or investigate
the case. Indeed, immediately following the Marsden hearing,
the court granted counsel’s continuance request so that she could
review documents that she recently received from Father. Based
on the totality of information presented at the Marsden hearing,
the court reasonably determined that Father and his counsel had
not become embroiled in such an irreconcilable conflict that
ineffective representation was likely to result.
Father also argues that, following the denial of his
Marsden motion, his counsel provided ineffective assistance in
preparing and presenting his case. “A parent seeking to establish

19
ineffective assistance of counsel must show both that counsel
failed to act in a manner to be expected of a reasonably
competent attorney practicing in the field of juvenile dependency
law, and that it is ‘ “reasonably probable that a result more
favorable to the appealing party would have been reached in the
absence of the error.” ’ ” (In re M.F. (2022) 74 Cal.App.5th 86,
108–109.) On direct appeal, “appellate courts further limit their
review to consider only those claims ‘ “where ‘there simply could
be no satisfactory explanation’ ” ’ ” for the alleged error. (Id. at
p. 109.)
Here, Father’s complaints about his counsel’s performance
generally concern the tactical decisions that his attorney made
about what evidence to offer or object to at the adjudication
hearing. In particular, Father asserts that his counsel failed to
object to hearsay statements in DCFS’s reports, to cross-examine
the social worker about the contents of the reports, to offer into
evidence unspecified records from the family law case, and to
timely obtain and present the children’s most recent medical
records. On this record, however, we cannot say that counsel’s
decisions about how to best present Father’s case to the juvenile
court “had no rational tactical purpose,” or that Father would
have obtained a more favorable result “but for [his] counsel’s
failings.” (In re N.S. (2020) 55 Cal.App.5th 816, 843.) Father’s
ineffective assistance claim accordingly fails.
2. Exclusion of Father’s character reference evidence
Father argues the juvenile court erred in refusing to admit
the numerous character reference letters that his counsel offered
into evidence at the jurisdictional and dispositional hearing.
We find no abuse of discretion in the juvenile court’s ruling.

20
A juvenile court is vested with broad discretion in ruling on
the admissibility of evidence. (In re A.S. (2018) 28 Cal.App.5th
131, 153.) The court’s evidentiary ruling will be reversed only if
there is a clear showing that it exceeded the bounds of reason.
(In re Jordan R. (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 111, 121.) Even where
the court abuses its discretion in ruling on the admissibility of
evidence, “ ‘[a] judgment shall not be reversed by reason of
erroneous exclusion of evidence unless a miscarriage of justice is
shown.’ ” (In re N.V. (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 25, 31.) In a
dependency case, a miscarriage of justice is shown “only if the
reviewing court finds it reasonably probable the result would
have been more favorable to the appealing party but for the
error.” (In re Celine R. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 45, 60.) “ ‘While a
parent in a juvenile dependency proceeding has a due process
right to a meaningful hearing with the opportunity to present
evidence,’ ” the right to present evidence “ ‘is limited to relevant
evidence of significant probative value to the issue before the
court.’ ” (In re Thomas R. (2006) 145 Cal.App.4th 726, 733.)
Here, Father’s proffered evidence consisted of 21 character
reference letters. The majority of the letters were from Father’s
friends and fellow church members, and described his positive
relationship with his children. A letter from Father’s pastor
explained that the church Father attended was not opposed to
modern medicine, and a letter from Mother’s sister described
Mother’s alleged character for dishonesty. While some of the
letters were dated in October or December 2023, most were
undated. None of the authors of the letters were offered as
witnesses at the jurisdictional and dispositional hearing.
The juvenile court acted within its broad discretion in
excluding this evidence. As DSCF’s counsel pointed out at the

21
hearing, Father had not disclosed the names of the letters’
authors to DCFS, nor provided any indication that these
individuals might have relevant information. Because none of
the authors were present to testify at the hearing, they could not
be subject to cross-examination about the content of their letters.
In addition, the court reasonably could find that the letters had
minimal relevance to the issues before it. There was no dispute
that Father had a loving and caring relationship with children.
The pertinent question before the court was whether Father
medically neglected J.F., and whether such conduct placed the
children at substantial risk of harm at the time of the
jurisdictional and dispositional hearing. The letters describing
Father’s strong character and positive interactions with the
children were not directly probative on any disputed issue.
Moreover, even if we were to conclude that the juvenile
court abused its discretion in refusing to admit the evidence, any
such error would have been harmless. Father has not shown
there is a reasonable probability that he would have obtained a
more favorable result had the court considered the character
reference letters at either the jurisdictional or dispositional stage
of the proceedings. On this record, Father has failed to
demonstrate reversible error in the juvenile court’s ruling.
3. Sufficiency of the evidence supporting the
jurisdictional findings and dispositional order
Father challenges the sufficiency of the evidence
supporting the juvenile court’s jurisdictional findings and
dispositional order. He argues the evidence was insufficient to
show that he medically neglected J.F. in July 2023, or that the
children were at risk of such neglect in the future. He also
asserts there was insufficient evidence to establish that the

22
children would be at substantial risk of harm if returned to his
care, or that removal was the only reasonable means of protecting
them from that risk. We conclude substantial evidence supported
the juvenile court’s exercise of jurisdiction over the children and
its order removing them from Father’s custody.
3.1. Standard of review
We review challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence
underlying jurisdictional findings and dispositional orders for
substantial evidence. (In re I.J. (2013) 56 Cal.4th 766, 773.)
“ ‘ “In making this determination, we draw all reasonable
inferences from the evidence to support the findings and orders of
the dependency court; we review the record in the light most
favorable to the court’s determinations; and we note that issues
of fact and credibility are the province of the trial court.” ’ ”
(Ibid.) “When reviewing a finding that a fact has been proved by
clear and convincing evidence, the question before the appellate
court is whether the record as a whole contains substantial
evidence from which a reasonable fact finder could have found it
highly probable that the fact was true.” (Conservatorship of O.B.
(2020) 9 Cal.5th 989, 1011.)
3.2. Substantial evidence supported the
jurisdictional findings
In exercising jurisdiction, the juvenile court sustained
the following language in counts b-1 and j-1 of the section 300
petition: “The child [J.F.] suffers from asthma. On 07/07/2023,
the child was medically examined and found to be suffering from
increased difficulty breathing secondary to an asthma attack.
The child’s airways were very swollen and the child’s oxygen level
was very low and required continuous breathing treatments,
oxygen and medication to help reverse the child’s condition.

23
On 07/07/2023, the child’s father . . . left the hospital with the
child against medical advice. On 07/08/2023, the child was
medically examined and diagnosed with status asthmaticus.
Such medical neglect of the child [J.F.] on the part of the father
endangers the child’s physical health and safety, and places the
child and the child’s sibling [A.F.] at risk of serious physical
harm, damage, danger and medical neglect.”
Section 300, subdivision (b), provides that a child comes
within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court if “[t]he child has
suffered, or there is a substantial risk that the child will suffer,
serious physical harm or illness, as a result of . . . [¶] . . . [t]he
failure or inability of the child’s parent . . . to adequately
supervise or protect the child.” (Id., subd. (b)(1)(A).) Under
section 300, subdivision (j), the court may assert jurisdiction if
“[t]he child’s sibling has been abused or neglected, as defined in
subdivision (a), (b), (d), (e), or (i), and there is a substantial risk
that the child will be abused or neglected, as defined in those
subdivisions.” (Id., subd. (j).) “Although section 300 requires
proof the child is subject to the defined risk of harm at the time of
the jurisdiction hearing [citations], the court need not wait until
a child is seriously abused or injured to assume jurisdiction and
take steps necessary to protect the child. [Citations.] The court
may consider past events in deciding whether a child presently
needs the court’s protection.” (In re Cole L. (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th
591, 601–602.) “ ‘A parent’s “ ‘[p]ast conduct may be probative of
current conditions’ if there is reason to believe that the conduct
will continue.” ’ ” (In re J.A. (2020) 47 Cal.App.5th 1036, 1048.)
In this case, the juvenile court reasonably could find that
Father medically neglected J.F. in July 2023. The evidence
showed that J.F. suffered from chronic asthma, and that the child

24
required significant medical intervention on July 7, 2023, due to
swollen airways and difficulty breathing. The emergency room
physician who treated J.F. that day decided the child would need
to be admitted to the hospital and likely placed in the intensive
care unit for continued oxygen and other treatment. However,
when Father arrived at the hospital, he insisted on taking J.F.
home against the doctor’s medical advice. Even after the doctor
explained the seriousness of J.F.’s condition and expressed that
she could not be certain whether he would die if he left the
hospital, Father still chose to take the child home. While Father
claimed that he decided to remove J.F. from the hospital because
a respiratory therapist told him the child was fine, the therapist
who treated J.F. denied ever making this statement. The
evidence further showed that, when Mother brought J.F. back to
the emergency room the following day, Father became disruptive
and had to be escorted from the premises by the police because he
refused to comply with the hospital staff’s directives. The
hospital social worker who met with Father on that occasion
observed that he was more focused on his conflict with Mother
than on the well-being of his child.
The juvenile court also reasonably could find that both J.F.
and A.F. were at substantial risk of harm at the time of the
jurisdictional and dispositional hearing. During his testimony at
the hearing, Father maintained that he did not medically neglect
J.F. when he removed him from the hospital in July 2023 because
Father believed the child merely had a cold and needed to rest at
home. Even though the treating physician determined that J.F.
needed supplemental oxygen and other interventions because of
his difficulty breathing, Father testified that the child “was doing
well” when he first saw him at the hospital and “was in the exact

25
same state” as when he left Father’s home earlier that day.
Moreover, despite the overwhelming evidence that Father took
J.F. home against the doctor’s advice, Father testified that he
was not aware of any medical advisement that the child needed
to remain hospitalized for further breathing treatments. A
parent’s refusal to accept responsibility for the conduct giving
rise to the dependency proceedings supports a finding the child
faces a current risk of harm. (In re E.E. (2020) 49 Cal.App.5th
195, 213; In re D.B. (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 613, 622.) Indeed,
“[o]ne cannot correct a problem one fails to acknowledge.” (In re
Gabriel K. (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 188, 197.) Given Father’s
failure to recognize how his medical neglect of J.F. placed the
child in imminent physical danger, the court reasonably could
infer that there was an ongoing risk that A.F.’s medical needs
would likewise be neglected. On this record, the juvenile court’s
exercise of jurisdiction was supported by substantial evidence.
3.3. Substantial evidence supported the
dispositional order
“ ‘At the dispositional hearing, a dependent child may not
be taken from the physical custody of the parent under section
361 unless the court finds there is clear and convincing evidence
there is or would be a substantial danger to the child’s physical
health, safety, protection, or physical or emotional well-being if
returned home, and that there are no reasonable means to
protect the child’s physical health without removing the child.’ ”
(In re D.P. (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 1058, 1065.) In determining
whether to remove a child, the court “may consider the parent’s
past conduct and current circumstances, and the parent’s
response to the conditions that gave rise to juvenile court
intervention.” (In re D.B. (2018) 26 Cal.App.5th 320, 332.)

26
The court “must also consider whether there are any reasonable
protective measures and services that can be implemented to
prevent the child’s removal from the parent’s physical custody.”
(Ibid.) “The parent need not be dangerous and the minor need
not have been harmed before removal is appropriate. The focus
of the statute is on averting harm to the child.” (In re T.W. (2013)
214 Cal.App.4th 1154, 1163; accord, In re D.B., at p. 328.)
Here, the same evidence that supported the juvenile court’s
jurisdictional findings based on Father’s medical neglect of J.F.
also supported its removal order. (§ 361, subd. (c)(1); In re D.B.,
supra, 26 Cal.App.5th at p. 332.) Throughout the dependency
proceedings, Father continued to deny that he endangered J.F.
when he took the child from the hospital against medical advice.
In his testimony, Father made clear that he believed that his own
assessment of J.F.’s medical condition was superior to that of the
attending doctors at CHLA. He also continued to rationalize his
decision to remove the child from the hospital despite the doctor’s
warning that doing so placed the child in danger. Father failed to
show that he gained any insight into the issues that gave rise to
these proceedings. Instead, he testified that Mother initiated the
dependency case as part of a plan to regain custody of the
children after she lost custody in the family law case.
Furthermore, the record shows that Father repeatedly
refused to cooperate with DCFS or to allow a safety inspection of
his home in violation of the juvenile court’s order. When asked at
the jurisdictional and dispositional hearing whether he would be
willing to grant DCFS and the children’s counsel access to his
home without recording them, Father stated that he “would take
it as a situation by situation.” Contrary to Father’s claim, the
juvenile court did not base its removal order on his inability to

27
get along with the case social worker. Rather, the court
explained that it was basing its decision on Father’s resistance to
following medical advice and his pattern of placing other
concerns before the children’s well-being. In challenging both the
jurisdictional findings and removal order, Father also claims that
DCFS misrepresented the extent of J.F.’s illness as evidenced by
the medical reports. The record, however, shows that the medical
team at CHLA who treated J.F. in July 2023 regarded his
condition as serious, and strongly believed that removing the
child from the hospital without further treatment would place
him in imminent danger. Given the totality of the record, the
court reasonably could find that Father’s conduct posed a
substantial risk of harm to his children, and that such risk could
only be obviated by removing the children from his custody. The
juvenile court’s removal order was supported by substantial
evidence.
4. Order terminating jurisdiction over the children
Father argues the juvenile court failed to properly apply
section 361.2 when it placed the children with Mother at the
jurisdictional and dispositional hearing. Father asserts that
when, as here, the juvenile court places a child with a previously
noncustodial parent under section 361.2, it “may not terminate
jurisdiction until it analyzes in a subsequent hearing whether
ongoing supervision of the child is necessary.” Father’s claim is
legally incorrect.
Section 361.2 governs the placement of a child following
removal from a parent’s custody. It states, in relevant part, that
“[i]f a court orders removal of a child pursuant to Section 361, the
court shall first determine whether there is a parent of the child,
with whom the child was not residing at the time that the events

28
or conditions arose that brought the child within the provisions of
Section 300, who desires to assume custody of the child. If that
parent requests custody, the court shall place the child with the
parent unless it finds that placement with that parent would be
detrimental to the safety, protection, or physical or emotional
well-being of the child.” (Id., subd. (a).)
Under section 361.2, subdivision (b), once the juvenile court
places the child with a noncustodial parent, it has three options
on how to proceed. (In re Jaden E. (2014) 229 Cal.App.4th 1277,
1281; In re Karla C. (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 1236, 1243.) “The
court may order the noncustodial parent to assume custody of the
child, terminate juvenile court jurisdiction and enter a custody
order. (§ 361.2, subd. (b)(1).) It may continue juvenile court
jurisdiction and require a home visit within three months, after
which the court may make orders as provided in subdivision
(b)(1), (2) or (3). (§ 361.2, subd. (b)(2).) Or the court may order
reunification services to be provided to either or both parents and
determine at a later review hearing under section 366.3 which
parent, if either, shall have custody of the child. (§ 361.2,
subd. (b)(3).)” (In re Karla C., at p. 1243.)
Here, the juvenile court chose the first option. After
removing the children from Father’s custody, the court placed
them with Mother as a nonoffending and previously noncustodial
parent. The court then terminated its jurisdiction over the
children and issued a juvenile custody order that granted joint
legal custody to both parents, sole physical custody to Mother,
and supervised visitation to Father. In deciding to terminate
jurisdiction, the court found that continued supervision over the
children was not necessary, and that releasing the children to

29
Mother’s custody would not be detrimental to their safety,
protection, and physical or emotional well-being.
Citing In re Austin P. (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 1124 (Austin
P.), Father contends the juvenile court lacked the authority to
terminate jurisdiction at the dispositional hearing, and instead
was required to hold a separate hearing to determine whether
continued supervision was necessary. That case however, solely
concerned whether the juvenile court was required to terminate
its jurisdiction once it placed a child with a noncustodial parent
under section 361.2. Austin P. concluded that, based on the plain
language of section 361.2, subdivision (b), the juvenile court had
the option “to grant ‘custody’ to the nonoffending noncustodial
parent, but continue its jurisdiction and provide reunification
services to either the offending parent, the nonoffending parent,
or both parents.” (Austin P., at p. 1131.) However, Austin P. also
expressly recognized that there was another option under
section 361.2, subdivision (b), which was to “grant sole legal and
physical custody to the nonoffending noncustodial parent and
terminate jurisdiction.” (Austin P., at p. 1131.)
Section 361.2 therefore “permits the juvenile court to
terminate its jurisdiction at disposition after placing the
dependent child with a noncustodial parent and ordering that
parent to become the legal and physical custodian of the child.”
(In re Destiny D. (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 197, 208–209.) The court
also “retains the discretion in an appropriate case to terminate
its jurisdiction at the close of a disposition hearing when it finds
services and continued court supervision are not necessary to
protect the child.” (Id. at p. 208.) As our colleagues in Division
Seven explained, to “hold otherwise and conclude that court
supervision must be continued, even absent a continuing risk of

30
harm, simply because the protective and custody orders that
eliminated the risk were made at the conclusion of a disposition
hearing, rather than a subsequent review hearing, would be
wholly at odds with the fundamental goal of the dependency
system to return the child to his or her custodial parent and
terminate dependency jurisdiction as soon as circumstances
permit.” (Ibid.) The order terminating jurisdiction at the close of
the jurisdictional and dispositional hearing thus complied with
section 361.2.
5. Order for supervised visitation for Father
Last, Father challenges the juvenile court’s custody order
restricting his contact with the children to supervised visitation.
He claims the visitation order must be reversed because it lacked
any legal or factual support. We disagree.
When terminating jurisdiction over a dependent child,
section 362.4 authorizes the juvenile court to issue “an order
determining the custody of, or visitation with, the child.” (Id.,
subd. (a).) Section 362.4 further provides that the order “shall
continue until modified or terminated by a subsequent order of
the superior court,” and directs that the order be filed in a
pending family court proceeding (id., subd. (b)) or, if there is
none, as part of a new family court file (id., subd. (c)). In making
a custody or visitation order under section 362.4 (commonly
referred to as an “exit order”), the court’s “ ‘focus and primary
consideration must always be the best interests of the child.’ ”
(In re T.S. (2020) 52 Cal.App.5th 503, 513.) The juvenile court is
not restrained by any preferences or presumptions that ordinarily
apply in family court. (In re Nicholas H. (2003) 112 Cal.App.4th
251, 268.) We review a juvenile court’s exit order for abuse of
discretion. (In re M.R. (2017) 7 Cal.App.5th 886, 902.)

31
In this case, we find no abuse of discretion in the juvenile
court’s order for supervised visitation for Father. As previously
discussed, the evidence showed that J.F. suffered from chronic
breathing issues related to asthma, which periodically required
prompt medical attention, and at times, even hospitalization.
When Father removed J.F. from the hospital while the child was
receiving necessary medical treatment, he placed his child at risk
of serious harm, but never accepted responsibility for his conduct.
Furthermore, throughout the proceedings, Father repeatedly
denied DCFS access to his home for a safety inspection, failed to
provide DCFS with the requested medical information about the
children, and refused to make the children available to their
counsel or the case social worker. Father took these actions in
direct violation of the juvenile court’s orders, and continued to do
so even after the court informed Father that he needed to comply.
Shortly before the January 26, 2024 hearing on the custody
and visitation order, Father brought the children into his home
because he assumed jurisdiction had been terminated and he was
free to do so. Given Father’s willingness to disregard the advice
of the children’s doctors and the court orders with which he
personally disagreed, the juvenile court reasonably could find
that the children’s best interests required that their visits with
Father remain supervised. On this record, the juvenile court did
not abuse its discretion in issuing the visitation order.

32
DISPOSITION
The juvenile court’s jurisdictional findings and
dispositional orders are affirmed.

VIRAMONTES, J.

WE CONCUR:

STRATTON, P. J.

WILEY, J.

33

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