CourtListener 10378203•People v. Samuels CA1/4
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Filed 4/14/25 P. v. Samuels CA1/4
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FOUR
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, A169574
v.
(Alameda County Super. Ct.
WILLIE SAMUELS,
No. 20CR015549B)
Defendant and Appellant.
Defendant Willie Samuels appeals a judgment convicting
him of, among other charges, voluntary manslaughter, illegal
possession of a firearm by a felon, and illegally carrying a loaded
firearm in an incorporated city, and sentencing him to an
aggregate term of 28 years, 4 months in prison. He contends
that: (1) the trial court committed prejudicial error by admitting
evidence suggesting he was a pimp; (2) his firearm convictions
violate the Second Amendment; (3) no substantial evidence was
admitted to establish that the shooting occurred in an
incorporated part of the City of Oakland; and (4) the great bodily
injury enhancement attached to his manslaughter conviction is
invalid. We agree that the great bodily injury enhancement
should be stricken but affirm the judgment in all other respects.
BACKGROUND
In July 2022, Samuels was charged with murder
(Pen. Code,1 § 187, subd. (a); count 1); shooting at an occupied
motor vehicle (§ 246; count 2); possession of a firearm by a felon
(§ 29800, subd (a)(1); count 3); and carrying a loaded firearm in
an incorporated city (§ 25850, subd. (a); count 4). The
information alleged enhancements under counts 1 and 2 for
personally inflicting great bodily injury during the commission of
a felony (§ 12022.7, subd (a)) and personally discharging a
firearm causing great bodily injury and death (§ 12022.53,
subd. (d)). The information also alleged several circumstances in
aggravation (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.421) and that Samuels
had suffered a prior strike conviction.
The following evidence was presented at trial.
Samuels and the victim met in 2020 and immediately
started dating. As set forth in greater detail below, a friend of
the victim testified that she believed the victim started working
as a prostitute shortly after she started dating Samuels and that
she believed Samuels was a pimp.
Fernando Sevilla was charged and tried as Samuel’s co-
defendant. He testified at trial that in the early morning of
November 6, 2020, as he was driving on International Boulevard,
a woman—the victim in this case—called out to him and
approached his car at a traffic light. The woman offered to
engage in a sex act for money. They discussed the price that she
1 All undesignated statutory references are to the Penal
Code.
2
would charge but did not agree to any particular sexual act. The
woman then got into the truck and directed Sevilla to drive to
San Antonio Park. On the way to the park, the woman was
texting someone constantly. Other testimony established that
she was texting Samuels. According to Sevilla, he and the
woman agreed to a price of $200 for a sex act of an undetermined
type, but when he removed his money from his pocket, the
woman took out a gun, pointed it at him, and demanded he give
her all his money. Sevilla estimated that they were parked for a
minute or two before the victim pulled out her gun and asked for
money. After Sevilla complied, the woman got out of his truck,
ran across the street, and got inside a car that was parked with
the lights off.
Sevilla made a three-point turn, pulled up next to the car,
and turned on his headlights. When he pulled alongside the car,
he confronted the driver, who he saw had a large gun in his hand.
The driver of the other car pointed his gun at Sevilla and fired
the gun. Sevilla felt two bullets go past his head and the glass of
the truck’s window rained down on him. Sevilla grabbed his
.45 caliber semiautomatic handgun and fired two bullets at the
driver of the car in response, then drove away.
Through surveillance video, officers identified Samuels as
the driver of the car to which the victim ran after leaving
Sevilla’s truck. Although the surveillance videos did not capture
what happened inside the two vehicles and there was a dispute at
trial as to who fired first, the videos generally depicted the
actions of the defendants and the victim consistent with Sevilla’s
3
testimony. The videos also showed that a little over two minutes
passed between the time that the victim exited Sevilla’s car and
Sevilla’s car pulled up next to Samuel’s car.
One of the bullets from Sevilla’s gun hit the victim in her
head. Samuels drove the victim to Highland Hospital where she
later died. A witness testified that Samuels approached his truck
at the bottom of the driveway to the emergency room holding the
victim in his arms and asking for help. After they placed the
victim in the truck bed, Samuels “turned around and ran and left
me with her.”
Before closing argument, Samuels admitted the prior strike
allegation.
The jury found Samuels not guilty of murder but guilty of
voluntary manslaughter and guilty of the remaining charges. It
also found the great bodily injury and firearm enhancements
true.2
Samuels was sentenced to an aggregate term of 28 years,
4 months in prison.
2 The jury found Sevilla guilty of voluntary manslaughter
with various enhancements, shooting at an occupied motor
vehicle with various enhancements and carrying a loaded firearm
in a city. His appeal is pending separately. Samuels’ request
that this court take judicial notice of the record in Sevilla’s
appeal is granted.
4
DISCUSSION
I.
A.
Prior to trial, the court heard three in limine motions
regarding the admissibility of evidence that the victim was a
prostitute and Samuels was a pimp. First, Samuels moved to
exclude all evidence that he was a pimp on the grounds that the
evidence was irrelevant, inadmissible under Evidence Code
section 1101, subdivision (a), and should be excluded under
Evidence Code section 352. His motion identified some of the
objectionable evidence as “hearsay statements made by the
deceased victim to her family members, as well as financial
records and social media records linking them” and evidence
regarding “an incident in which defendant was shot by the family
of a young woman whom defendant was alleged to have
attempted to secure as a prostitute.” At the same time, Sevilla
moved to admit evidence that the victim engaged in prostitution,
and also to admit the victim’s statements to others that Samuels
was a pimp. Sevilla argued, “The statements to others reflects
the decedent’s state of mind, to prove the reason why she knew to
have the codefendant meet her and assist her in this encounter
that started as an act of prostitution but turned into a robbery.”
Finally, the prosecutor moved to exclude evidence that that the
victim was a prostitute, although the prosecutor acknowledged
that “the people cannot preclude Defendant Sevilla from
testifying that he was a customer that evening, that he was
robbed, that there were acts of prostitution.”
5
Following a hearing, the trial court ruled that evidence
suggesting that Samuels was a pimp and that the victim had
engaged in prostitution would be admissible at trial. With
respect to the admission of evidence that the victim may have
been involved in prostitution, the court explained, “I think this
evidence is significant in the sense that, first off it would, from
the Court’s perspective, provide the trier of fact with some
context as to how and why these three folks’ lives are now forever
intertwined. [¶] . . . [¶] . . . [This case] ain’t a whodunit. This is a
what-is-it. And I mention that because this evidence I do feel
could directly and significantly relate to the people’s theory of the
case and certainly to any potential defenses that I understand
are going to be raised at trial. I think this evidence would go a
long way in explaining the initial meeting between the
complaining witness and Mr. Sevilla. It would explain the initial
meeting between Mr. Sevilla and Mr. Samuels and their
subsequent—I don’t know what you want to call it—dispute,
argument, conflict, disagreement, whatever it’s going to turn out
to be. And I think it helps to explain why this interaction
occurred at all and why everybody acted as they did.” The court
found further that the victim’s statements to others “with respect
to her understanding of [Samuels’s] role in prostitution [is] also
. . . relevant, not for the truth of those statements, but rather, I
think from the Court’s perspective, to explain her conduct on
November 6th after leaving Mr. Sevilla’s truck.” The court
added, “I think testimony and evidence as it relates to that could
very well explain for the trier of fact why she went to Mr.
6
Samuels’s vehicle . . . rather than anywhere else. That could be
explained. [¶] It would help shed light on whether or not she did
in fact go there of her own volition or because she had no choice
in the matter, and it may very well be circumstantial evidence of
[Samuels’s] knowledge of the complaining witness’s actions when
she met up with Mr. Sevilla.”
B.
At trial, consistent with the court’s ruling, the victim’s best
friend testified that after the victim started dating Samuels, she
stopped spending time with her old friends and spent all her time
with Samuels in parts of East Oakland that were known for
prostitution. The witness explained that she was concerned the
victim was involved in prostitution and, on a couple of occasions,
she asked her about it. Although the victim denied that she was
engaging in prostitution, based on the victim’s responses, the
witness did not believe her. The witness testified that she had
never spoken to Samuels about prostitution, but that on one
occasion he told the witness that she could come to his “team.”
The witness did not “know what he meant” by “my team,” but she
assumed that it meant engaging in prostitution. When the
witness was asked whether she told a defense investigator that
Samuels tried to convince her to do sex work for him, she
responded that she “didn’t say that” and clarified that she said
she did not “know what the situation was but that’s what [she]
was feeling like.” She explained that his use of the word “team”
made her think Samuels was talking about prostitution.
7
On cross-examination by Sevilla’s attorney, the witness
testified that the victim told the witness that Samuels had a
“team” of “females” who were “making money” for him. When the
witness testified that the victim never used the word “pimp” in
describing Samuels, she was asked to refresh her memory by
reviewing the report prepared by an investigator following his
interview with the witness. After reading the report, the witness
acknowledged telling the investigator that the victim told her
that Samuels was a pimp, but explained that her statement to
the investigator was based on her understanding or
interpretation of the victim’s statement that Samuels had women
working for him.
Other evidence admitted at trial also suggested that
Samuels was a pimp. A different friend of the victim testified
that, after the victim started spending time with Samuels, the
victim’s demeanor changed. She was “distant,” “not as vibrant,”
and “she seemed scared almost.” The victim posted photos and
videos on her social media account that depicted Samuels and her
with “stacks of money” and a picture that depicted two handguns
with the words, “his and hers.” In addition, a police detective
testified that, four days prior to the shooting, the victim took
Samuels to the hospital for treatment after he was shot at a
motel known for prostitution activity, where the victim had
rented a room.
C.
On appeal, Samuels argues that the trial court erred in
admitting evidence that suggested he was a pimp. The Attorney
8
General argues that Samuels forfeited this argument by failing to
object when the matter was raised at trial. Alternatively, the
Attorney General argues that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in admitting the evidence and that any possible error
was harmless.
Initially, we reject the Attorney General’s argument that
Samuels forfeited this argument by failing to object in the trial
court. “The general rule is that ‘when an in limine ruling that
evidence is admissible has been made, the party seeking
exclusion must object at such time as the evidence is actually
offered to preserve the issue for appeal.’ ” (People v. Brown
(2003) 31 Cal. 4th 518, 547.) Despite this general rule, “a
sufficiently definite and express ruling on a motion in limine may
also serve to preserve a claim.” (Ibid.; see People v. Morris (1991)
53 Cal.3d 152, 189, overruled on another point in People v.
Stansbury (1995) 9 Cal.4th 824, 830, fn. 1 [“a specific objection to
a particular body of evidence” advanced and ruled upon
definitively on a motion in limine can preserve the issue for
appeal].)
Here, the record demonstrates that the trial court made a
sufficiently definite and express ruling as to the admissibility of
the victim’s statement in response to the motions in limine and
that thereafter, contrary to the Attorney General’s
characterization, counsel repeatedly asserted hearsay objections
to the witness’s testimony regarding the victim’s statements.
Accordingly, Samuels’s challenge to the admissibility of the
victim’s statement was properly preserved.
9
The record is less clear, however, that Samuels has
preserved for appeal his challenge to any other evidence
introduced at trial suggesting that Samuels was a pimp, such as
the friend’s descriptions of the victim’s social media posts. While
Samuels’s motion in limine specifically sought to exclude all
evidence that he was a pimp on the grounds that the evidence
was irrelevant and inadmissible under Evidence Code
sections 1101, subdivision (a), and 352 and his counsel reasserted
those arguments at the hearing on the motions, the trial court
did not expressly rule on the admissibility of any evidence other
than the victim’s statements. As the Attorney General notes,
Samuels’s own statements suggesting that he was a pimp were
introduced at trial without objection. Shortly thereafter,
however, while discussing his hearsay objection to the victim’s
statement, Samuels’s counsel clarified his understanding of the
court’s in limine ruling: “My understanding is the Court’s in
limine ruling had to do with relevance, and that if [Sevilla’s
counsel] or [the prosecutor] could elicit valid testimony that was
not in violation of, for example, the hearsay rule, then that was a
proper subject.” On this record, we decline to find that Samuels
has forfeited the argument, asserted in his in limine motion, that
evidence offered to prove that he was a pimp was generally
irrelevant and inadmissible under Evidence Code sections 1101
and 352.
D.
Samuels argues that the evidence offered to prove that he
was a pimp was inadmissible character evidence, violated the
10
hearsay rule, and should have been excluded under Evidence
Code section 352. Evidence Code section 1101, subdivision (a)
states the general rule that “evidence of a person’s character or a
trait of his or her character (whether in the form of an opinion,
evidence of reputation, or evidence of specific instances of his or
her conduct) is inadmissible when offered to prove his or her
conduct on a specified occasion.” Hearsay evidence, defined by
statute as an out-of-court statement that is offered to prove the
truth of the matter asserted, is also generally inadmissible except
as provided by law. (Evid. Code § 1200, subd. (a), (b).) Finally,
evidence that is not inadmissible under Evidence Code
section 1101, subdivision (a), or the hearsay rule may be excluded
nonetheless under Evidence Code section 352 “if its probative
value is substantially outweighed by the probability that its
admission will (a) necessitate undue consumption of time or
(b) create substantial danger of undue prejudice, of confusing the
issues, or of misleading the jury.”
We find it unnecessary to decide whether the court erred in
admitting evidence suggesting that Samuels was a pimp because
we conclude that any such error was harmless. Contrary to
Samuels’s argument, the alleged improper admission of the
evidence did not violate his Fourteenth Amendment right to due
process. (See People v. Partida (2005) 37 Cal.4th 428, 439 [“the
admission of evidence . . . results in a due process violation only if
it makes the trial fundamentally unfair” (italics omitted)].)
Accordingly, we apply the prejudice standard applicable to state
law error (People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836), not the
11
standard for constitutional error (Chapman v California (1967)
386 U.S. 18, 24), in evaluating whether reversal is required.
(People v. Albarran (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 214, 232 [only on
“rare and unusual occasions” can admission of evidence result in
an error of such magnitude so as to raise federal due process
concerns and trigger Chapman review].)
Samuels contends that “[t]here is a reasonable chance that
if the jurors had not heard that appellant was a pimp, they would
have declined to convict appellant of any homicide offense or of
shooting at an occupied motor vehicle . . . because the jurors
would have been more likely to find that appellant acted in
reasonable self-defense.” He explains: “The jurors were likely to
conclude from the evidence suggesting that appellant was a pimp
that he was in the area where the shooting occurred for a
nefarious purpose, such as prostitution or robbing ‘johns.’ If that
was the case, appellant presumably would have been ready and
willing to use his gun for the accomplishment of those purposes
and not merely for self-defense.” We are not persuaded.
First, even without the additional suggestive evidence
identified in the motion in limine, we agree with the Attorney
General that “the jury would be able to infer that Samuels was
there to manage [the victim’s] encounter with Sevilla.” There
was considerable evidence that the victim was engaged in
prostitution, including Sevilla’s own testimony, which the
prosecutor agreed could not be excluded. Samuels himself did not
object to the evidence of prostitution. Other evidence showed
that Samuels was the victim’s boyfriend, whether or not he was
12
also her pimp. And the evidence further showed that the victim
was texting with Samuels while she was in Sevilla’s truck, and
that upon leaving she went directly to Samuels’s car, where he
had been waiting, armed. Given the direct and circumstantial
evidence of the nature of Sevilla’s encounter with the victim and
her communications with Samuels throughout, we think the jury
would have developed a similar understanding of Samuels’s role
during the events in question even if the trial court had granted
his motion in limine.
Second, even if the jury did not draw the specific inference
from this other evidence that Samuels was the victim’s pimp, we
see no reasonable probability that it would have made a different
assessment of whether he was acting in self-defense when he
exchanged gunfire with Sevilla. In closing argument, the
prosecutor did not suggest that it made any difference whether
Samuels was only the victim’s boyfriend or also her pimp:
“They’re working as girlfriend-boyfriend, pimp-prostitute,
however you want to say it.” Sevilla’s counsel also did not place
significant emphasis on the distinction in closing: “And there’s
this understanding based on the evidence in this case that the
relationship between Ms. Sandoval and Mr. Samuels is this
pimp-prostitution dynamic, even a boyfriend-girlfriend thing as
well.” Moreover, he argued that the evidence was relevant only
“to give you some context and understanding as to why the two of
them are together that night and working together that night
and why they’re interacting with Mr. Sevilla.” As the Attorney
General adds, “[a]ny prejudicial harm was also reduced by the
13
fact that the parties told the jury that no one was charged with
pimping or pandering, and it should not use such evidence to
evaluate Samuels’s character.” For example, Sevilla’s counsel
told the jury that he was not judging or criticizing Samuels for
being a pimp. During rebuttal, the prosecutor reminded the jury,
“[N]obody is charged with prostitution. Nobody is charged with
human trafficking. Nobody is charged with any of that. [¶] If I
were to belabor that point, I would be ignoring my duty. I would
not be following the law. And I would be engaging in smoke
screens and distractions that are unnecessary to this inquiry.”
The parties’ arguments were focused elsewhere. The
sequence of events—including the two minutes the victim spent
in Sevilla’s truck and the similar amount of time she was in
Samuels’s car before Sevilla pulled up and the defendants
exchanged fire—was captured in a video shown to the jury, with
testimony about the video and about audio captured by the city’s
ShotSpotter system. The prosecutor argued that this evidence,
along with the fact that both men had guns “at the ready,”
showed that the defendants were engaged in mutual combat, and
she pointed to conduct by both defendants after the shooting that
undermined a claim of self-defense by either of them, including
false statements Sevilla made to various people and Samuels’s
flight from the hospital. Sevilla’s counsel focused on the
audiovisual and forensic evidence that Samuels shot first and
more times overall, and to a lesser extent on his client’s
testimony that the victim had robbed him after agreeing on a
price for a sex act. Likewise focusing on the audiovisual
14
evidence, Samuels’s counsel responded by arguing that Samuels
saw Sevilla with the gun before Samuels fired, so he acted in self-
defense even if the jury were to conclude that he was the first to
shoot. He also sought to cast doubt on Sevilla’s testimony that
the victim robbed him, pointing out, for example, that Samuels
did not drive away when she got in the car, and to other evidence
suggesting that Sevilla was the aggressor.
The jury found that neither defendant had justifiably acted
in self-defense, but also that neither one possessed the mental
state required for murder. None of the parties’ arguments on
these critical questions turned on the precise nature of the
relationship between Samuels and the victim. Again, even
without the pieces of evidence that Samuels sought to exclude,
other evidence showed that he knew the victim was engaged in
prostitution, that he arrived armed and was there to assist her,
that he was communicating with her while she was in Sevilla’s
truck, that he had time with her in the car before Sevilla drove
up, and that he fled from the hospital after leaving her in the bed
of a pickup truck. Particularly in light of the parties’ arguments
and their focus on the audiovisual evidence, we see no reasonable
probability that the jury would have found that Samuels acted in
self-defense if the trial court had excluded the other evidence
suggesting more directly that he was a pimp.
II.
Samuels contends that his conviction under section 29800,
subdivision (a), for unlawful possession of a firearm by a person
with a felony conviction violates the Second Amendment of the
15
United States Constitution. He acknowledges that California
courts have consistently rejected Second Amendment challenges
to section 29800, subdivision (a), on the theory that only law-
abiding citizens are protected by the Second Amendment. (See
People v. Odell (2023) 92 Cal.App.5th 307, 316–317; People v.
Alexander (2023) 91 Cal.App.5th 469, 478–479; People v. Ceja
(2023) 94 Cal.App.5th 1296, 1299–1301.) These case rely on
District of Columbia v. Heller (2008) 554 U.S. 570, 626–627, in
which the court observed that that “nothing in [its] opinion
should be taken to cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the
possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill, or laws
forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive places such as
schools and government buildings, or laws imposing conditions
and qualifications on the commercial sale of arms” and McDonald
v. City of Chicago (2010) 561 U.S. 742, 786, in which the court
reiterated that nothing in its decision should cast doubt on laws
prohibiting, among other things, “ ‘the possession of firearms by
felons and the mentally ill.’ ”
In his opening brief, Samuels relied on United States v.
Duarte (9th Cir. 2024) 101 F.4th 657 to argue that these
California Court of Appeal decisions have been wrongly decided
and that reliance on the above quoted language in Heller and
McDonald is misplaced. In his reply, he concedes that the Ninth
Circuit decision was vacated and ordered reheard en banc.
(United States v. Duarte (9th Cir. 2024) 108 F.4th 786.)
In People v. Richardson (2025) 108 Cal.App.5th 1203, 1207
(Richardson), the court held that a defendant’s “convictions for
16
being a felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition are
constitutional because only law-abiding citizens are among the
class of people covered by the text of the Second Amendment.”
The court rejected the defendant’s argument that the Supreme
Court’s decision in New York State Rifle & Pistol Association, Inc.
v. Bruen (2022) 597 U.S. 1 altered the prior California and
Supreme Court precedent on this issue. The court explained that
in Bruen the court found New York’s concealed carry law
unconstitutional “because the law impermissibly prevented ‘law-
abiding citizens with ordinary self-defense needs from exercising
their right to keep and bear arms.’ ” (Richardson, at p. 1210.)
The Richardson court observed that in Bruen, the court expressly
acknowledged that its decision was consistent with Heller and
McDonald and emphasized that the petitioners in that case “were
‘law-abiding’ citizens and, as such, ‘part of “the people” whom the
Second Amendment protects.’ ” (Ibid.)
The Richardson court also rejected the defendant’s reliance
on the Ninth Circuit’s decision United States v. Duarte (9th Cir.
2024) 101 F.4th 657. The court wrote that, as we noted above,
“the Ninth Circuit granted rehearing en banc in that case, and
the decision in Duarte has since been vacated” but also explained
that “even assuming Duarte remains good law, we are not bound
by decisions of the Ninth Circuit [citation], and we find more
persuasive the California authority discussed above upholding
the constitutionality of sections 29800, subdivision (a)(1), and
30305, subdivision (a)(1).” (Richardson, supra, 108 Cal.App.5th
at p. 1213.)
17
Finally, we note that it is not necessary to exclude felons
from the class of people “protected by the Second Amendment”
because, as the court concluded in People v. Anderson (2024)
104 Cal.App.5th 577, the law that prohibits defendant’s
possession of a firearm is “ ‘consistent with the principles that
underpin’ the nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation.”
(Id. at pp. 588–589.) In that case, after conducting an exhaustive
analysis of historic firearm legislation, the court found that
“historical evidence shows that individuals were disarmed as a
preventative measure when the law assessed they were unwilling
to respect sovereign authority, and they were disarmed as a
sanction for criminal conduct, whether or not involving physical
violence.” (Id. at pp. 598–600.) On that record, the court had “no
trouble concluding that in the founding era, [defendant] could
have been disarmed as punishment for at least one of [his]
crimes” where defendant had been convicted for several crimes
involving moral turpitude including maliciously and intentionally
shooting at an inhabited dwelling or motor vehicle (§ 246) and
assault with a deadly weapon other than a firearm (§ 245,
subd. (a)(1)). (People v. Anderson, supra, 104 Cal.App.5th at
p. 600.) Here, Samuels has made no attempt to challenge the
court’s analysis in Anderson, and as in that case, we too would
have no trouble concluding that in the founding era, he could
have been disarmed as punishment for his prior conviction for
home invasion robbery in concert (§ 211; 212.5, subd. (a)).
Accordingly, we affirm Samuels’s conviction under section 29800,
subdivision (a).
18
III.
Under section 25850, subdivision (a), “A person is guilty of
carrying a loaded firearm when the person carries a loaded
firearm on the person or in a vehicle while in any public place or
on any public street in an incorporated city, city and county, or in
any public place or on any public street in a prohibited area of an
unincorporated area of a county or city and county.”
As with his other firearm conviction, Samuels contends
that his conviction on this count violates the Second Amendment.
He acknowledges that his “analysis concerning the felon-in-
possession statute, requiring the People to justify that law with a
historical analogue, is largely the same as it is for the law
criminalizing the carrying of a loaded firearm in an incorporated
city. Carrying a loaded firearm is a form of firearm possession.
Therefore, both statutes proscribe a form of firearm possession.
If the felon-in-possession statute cannot survive the Bruen test,
then the law criminalizing the carrying of a loaded firearm in an
incorporated city also cannot survive that test.” Because
Samuels fails to differentiate his argument on this count from his
argument regarding section 29800, subdivision (a) and we have
rejected his argument with regard to the illegal possession
charge, this claim fails as well.
Samuels’s argument that there was insufficient evidence
that the shooting took place in a part of Oakland that was
incorporated fares no better. At trial, when discussing the
instructions with the parties, the court indicted that it would
instruct the jury with CALCRIM No. 2530, including that “I will
19
add Oakland as the incorporated city.” Defense counsel did not
object. Then, the court instructed the jury pursuant to
CALCRIM No. 2530 as follows: “The defendants are charged in
Count Four with unlawfully carrying a loaded firearm on his
person in violation of Penal Code section 25850(a). [¶] To prove
that a defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove
that: [¶] 1. The defendant carried a loaded firearm on his person;
[¶] 2. The defendant knew that he was carrying a firearm;
[¶] AND [¶] 3. At that time, the defendant was in a public place
or on a public street in an incorporated city. [¶] . . . Oakland is an
incorporated city. . . .”
On appeal, Samuels does not dispute that Oakland is an
incorporated city or that the court should have taken judicial
notice of that fact. He argues, however, that the court did not
take judicial notice of the fact and as such, the court improperly
usurped the jury’s fact-finding function by instructing the jury
that Oakland was an incorporated city. Accordingly, what
Samuels asserts is not a deficiency in proof but rather an
instructional error. For the reasons discussed below, any error in
that regard was harmless.
Our determination of this issue is governed by People v.
Flood (1998) 18 Cal.4th 470 (Flood). In Flood, the defendant was
found guilty of the offense of evading a vehicle operated by a
pursuing peace officer resulting in serious bodily injury. There
was undisputed evidence that the individuals in the vehicle “were
employed as police officers by the City of Richmond.” (Id. at
p. 490.) In its instruction, however, the trial court did not inform
20
the jurors that they must determine whether the persons in the
pursuing motor vehicle were peace officers, an essential element
of the crime, nor did it provide them with the statutory definition
of “peace officer”; instead, the court “informed the jury—in
conformity with the uncontradicted evidence that had been
presented at trial—that the police officers in that vehicle were
peace officers, thus effectively removing this element of the crime
from the jury’s consideration.” (Id. at p. 475.) The court found
the error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. (Id. at p. 507.)
The court explained that “reversing defendant’s conviction
because of an instructional error concerning an uncontested,
peripheral element of the offense, which effectively was conceded
by defendant, was established by overwhelming, undisputed
evidence in the record, and had nothing to do with defendant’s
own actions or mental state, would erode the purpose and
rationale of the harmless error doctrine and promote disrespect
for the judicial system.” (Ibid.)
Here, as Samuels concedes, the undisputed evidence
showed that the shooting occurred in Oakland. The fact that
Oakland is an incorporated city is both undisputed in this case
and subject to mandatory judicial notice. (Evid. Code, § 451,
subd. (a) [“Judicial notice shall be taken of . . . [t]he decisional,
constitutional, and public statutory law of this state and of the
United States and the provisions of any charter described in
Section 3, 4, or 5 of Article XI of the California Constitution”];
Gov. Code, § 57380 [“Courts shall take judicial notice of the
organization and existence of the cities incorporated pursuant to
21
this division”].) While the trial court erred by failing to make the
conclusion compelled by the proof, i.e., to take mandatory judicial
notice before informing the jury, we can say, beyond a reasonable
doubt, that the error complained of did not contribute to the
verdict obtained. (Flood, supra, 18 Cal.4th at pp. 504–507.)
IV.
Samuels argues that the great bodily injury finding under
section 12022.7, subdivision (a), on count 1 must be reversed
because it is unauthorized. Respondent agrees that the
enhancement is unauthorized under section 12022.7, subdivision
(g), which provides, “This section shall not apply to murder or
manslaughter.” We agree and direct the trial court to set aside
the enhancement and the sentence imposed thereon.
DISPOSITION
The great bodily injury enhancement (§ 12022.7, subd. (a))
is stricken from count 1. The judgment is affirmed in all other
respects.
GOLDMAN, J.
WE CONCUR:
STREETER, Acting P. J.
SIGGINS, J. *
* Retired Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeal, First Appellate
District, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI,
section 6 of the California Constitution.
22
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