People v. Calderon CA2/6

CourtListener 10378122Calctapp14.04.2025

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Filed 4/14/25 P. v. Calderon CA2/6

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SIX

THE PEOPLE, 2d Crim. No. B333591
(Super. Ct. No. 2023002941)
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Ventura County)

v.

RICHARD CALDERON,

Defendant and Appellant.

Richard Calderon appeals following a trial at which a jury
convicted him of two counts of assault with force likely to produce
great bodily injury (Pen. Code1, § 245, subd. (a)(4); counts 1 and
3) and two counts of conspiracy to commit battery (§ 182, subd.
(a)(1); counts 2 and 4). After a bifurcated proceeding on
aggravating factors, the court sentenced appellant to a total
prison term of four years.

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
Appellant contends: (1) the trial court erroneously
admitted gang evidence; (2) the evidence was insufficient to prove
conspiracy to commit battery, and those convictions violated due
process; and (3) the pattern jury instruction on the meaning of
“agreement” in a conspiracy was incorrect under the
circumstances of this case. We will affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Appellant and cellmate Librado Ruiz were gang members
who, according to in-custody gang rules, were under the more
extensive Southern California Sureño gang umbrella while in
custody. After an in limine ruling admitting evidence of
appellant’s gang affiliation and one prior gang-related incident,
the parties stipulated that, in April 2023, appellant “admitted
engaging in criminal conduct on October 28, 2021, that was done
for the benefit of and in association with a criminal street gang,
Westside Locos, with the specific intent to promote, further, and
assist in criminal conduct by gang members. On April 18, 2023,
[appellant] further admitted to being a member and active
participant in the Westside Locos criminal street gang.”
Appellant had “West Side” tattooed across his chest and “Locos”
across his abdomen.
Each inmate entering the county jail was classified by
sheriff deputies depending on factors like their commitment
crime, sophistication level, or propensity for violence. Each
classification was associated with a color. Red bands signified a
violent history. Orange bands denoted protective custody, which
could include individuals like gang dropouts, law enforcement
cooperators, and those convicted of domestic violence against
women.

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Gang members under the Sureño umbrella operated under
their own rules and guidelines while in custody. Sureño gang
members were obligated to act if a fellow member was in distress,
had any issue, or was committing a crime. Such action did not
require formal communication in advance; it could “operate[] . . .
in the moment.”
Sureños were bound to attack protective custody inmates.
Additionally, if a Sureño had information that somebody was a
potential or actual gang dropout, the Sureño would be expected to
“handle the issue.” The Sureño might tell the person to “roll it
up,” meaning tell classification they had been told to leave. If the
person refused, the next step would be to assault them,
essentially forcing a unit transfer.
Alvaro H. Incident
Alvaro H. once belonged to the South Side gang. The words
“Sick Side,” a reference to the gang, were tattooed on his face.
Alvaro had since been “jumped out” of the gang—he “got beat up”
and left the gang. He no longer considered himself a gang
member when he entered jail in early 2023. He had been telling
people he was no longer going to be part of the gang.
On February 3, 2023, Alvaro transferred to a housing unit
that contained appellant and Ruiz. About 15 minutes after his
arrival, Alvaro was aggressively approached as he headed to a
shower. Alvaro saw “a couple hands” and fought back “all in self-
defense.” Alvaro testified he ended up in the fight because
“[p]eople know me. People spread words about people. So
somebody must have been—somebody knew I was in custody.”
Sheriff’s Service Technician Melissa Padilla monitored the
inmates from a booth. She did not see how the fight involving
Alvaro, Ruiz, and appellant began. She saw appellant and Ruiz

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punching Alvaro, who was “in a ball-shaped form protecting his
face from the punches . . . .”
Deputy Sheriff Angel Guerrero responded to the fight.
Guerrero issued verbal commands to stop fighting, but the fight
continued. Guerrero saw appellant and Ruiz punching and
kicking Alvaro, who had his hands over his face. Guerrero never
saw Alvaro strike either appellant or Ruiz.
Alvaro experienced swelling on his face and had some
breathing difficulty. His eyeballs were injured. It took him
around a month to fully recover. Alvaro did not recall telling a
nurse he was jumped by two or more people. After the fight,
appellant had a laceration to his left eyebrow, as well as blood on
his cheek and left eyebrow.
At some point after the fight, Alvaro was rehoused to
protective custody class. Responding to a hypothetical, Deputy
Anthony Malagon agreed assault of a gang dropout or somebody
who may be in questionable gang standing would be consistent
with the understanding, motive, and desire to have that person
removed from the section.
Steven S. Incident
Steven S. had sustained convictions related to domestic
violence and was housed in protective custody. One afternoon in
April 2023, Steven was in a tunnel connecting the jail and the
courthouse. Due to a miscommunication, jail staff allowed three
red band individuals—appellant, Ruiz, and another inmate—into
the tunnel with Steven. Steven was asked which band he was.
As soon as they found out Steven’s band, appellant and Ruiz
immediately started “pounding on” him. Steven was both
punched and kicked. Deputies eventually arrived and secured
appellant and Ruiz.

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After the attack, Steven experienced migraines. His face
was swollen and hurt. His ribs were bruised. Appellant and
Ruiz had no apparent injuries. In a hypothetical based on this
incident, Deputy Malagon indicated the attack was consistent
with how Sureños operate.
DISCUSSION
Admission of Gang Evidence
Appellant argues the gang evidence about him should have
been excluded under Evidence Code section 1101 as substantially
more prejudicial than probative. We disagree.
Evidence Code section 1101 “limits the admissibility of so-
called ‘propensity’ or ‘disposition’ evidence offered to prove a
person’s conduct on a particular occasion.” (People v. Daveggio
and Michaud (2018) 4 Cal.5th 790, 822-823; Evid. Code, § 1101,
subd. (a).) This rule, however, does not prohibit admission of
crimes or other acts to prove some other fact, such as motive or
intent. (Evid. Code, § 1101, subd. (b).) If the evidence is relevant
under Evidence Code section 1101, subdivision (b), “the trial
court must next determine whether the evidence’s probative
value is ‘substantially outweighed by the probability that its
admission [would] . . . create substantial danger of undue
prejudice, of confusing the issues, or of misleading the jury.’”
(People v. Chhoun (2021) 11 Cal.5th 1, 26; Evid. Code, § 352.)
We review admission of evidence for abuse of discretion.
(People v. Alvarez (1996) 14 Cal.4th 155, 201.) We will not
disturb the trial court’s ruling “‘“‘unless there is a showing that
the trial court acted in an arbitrary, capricious, or absurd
manner resulting in a miscarriage of justice.’”’” (People v.
Mataele (2022) 13 Cal.5th 372, 414.)

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The limited gang evidence admitted here bore directly on
appellant’s motive and intent. “‘“[B]ecause a motive is ordinarily
the incentive for criminal behavior, its probative value generally
exceeds its prejudicial effect, and wide latitude is permitted in
admitting evidence of its existence.”’” (People v. McKinnon (2011)
52 Cal.4th 610, 655 (McKinnon).) Without the gang evidence to
elucidate appellant’s incentives for acting and to provide context,
the jury would have had difficulty making sense of his behavior.
Moreover, the conspiracy counts required proof appellant
intended to agree to commit battery. (§ 182.) Such intent would
be opaque without a basic understanding of the gang backdrop.
Despite appellant’s contrary assertion, the gang evidence
was relevant to the motive and intent for the Alvaro H. incident.
While the prosecution did not establish, “by direct means,” that
appellant knew Alvaro was a gang dropout or in bad standing,
the circumstances permitted this inference. (McKinnon, supra,
52 Cal.4th at p. 656.) Alvaro had been telling people he was no
longer going to be part of the gang. He had been jumped out of
the gang. He testified “[p]eople spread words about people,” and
“somebody knew [he] was in custody.” The rapidity of appellant’s
attack on Alvaro following his arrival substantiates this
testimony. Especially given the possibility of a self-defense claim
as to this incident, the gang evidence was highly probative of
appellant’s motive and intent.
Even if we assume the gang evidence was unnecessary to
prove the assault on Steven S., any resulting error was harmless
under any standard given the evidence’s strength on that count.
Indeed, appellant does not argue for reversal of that assault
count. As for the remaining three counts, the gang evidence’s
significant probative value was not substantially outweighed by

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any prejudicial effect of that limited, largely sanitized evidence.
No abuse of discretion occurred as to any of those counts.
Sufficiency of the Evidence
Appellant argues the evidence is insufficient to sustain the
conspiracy convictions. He urges federal constitutional and state
law error. We conclude the evidence is sufficient. “Our task is
clear. ‘On appeal we review the whole record in the light most
favorable to the judgment to determine whether it discloses
substantial evidence—that is, evidence that is reasonable,
credible, and of solid value—from which a reasonable trier of fact
could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.’”
(People v. Cravens (2012) 53 Cal.4th 500, 507.) “In so doing, a
reviewing court ‘presumes in support of the judgment the
existence of every fact the trier could reasonably deduce from the
evidence.’” (People v. Avila (2009) 46 Cal.4th 680, 701.) “‘We do
not reweigh evidence . . . . Resolution of conflicts and
inconsistencies in the testimony is the exclusive province of the
trier of fact.’” (People v. Brown (2014) 59 Cal.4th 86, 106.)
“Conspiracy ‘“is an inchoate offense, the essence of which is
an agreement to commit an unlawful act.”’ . . . This crime has
four elements: (1) the existence of an agreement between at least
two persons; (2) the specific intent to agree to commit an offense;
(3) the specific intent to commit the offense that is the object of
the agreement; and (4) an overt act in furtherance of the
conspiracy, which may be committed by any conspirator.” (People
v. Ware (2022) 14 Cal.5th 151, 163 (Ware).) “‘[I]t is not necessary
to establish the parties met and expressly agreed; rather, “a
criminal conspiracy may be shown by direct or circumstantial
evidence that the parties positively or tacitly came to a mutual
understanding to accomplish the act and unlawful design.”’”

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(People v. Johnson (2013) 57 Cal.4th 250, 264, italics omitted
(Johnson).)
Substantial evidence supports the conspiracies to commit
battery of Steven S. and Alvaro H. Appellant and Ruiz were
cellmates and both Sureños. (See Ware, supra, 14 Cal.5th at
p. 168 [“‘[C]ommon gang membership may be part of
circumstantial evidence supporting the inference of a
conspiracy’”].) Their gang affiliation could oblige them to attack
gang dropouts or those in questionable standing (Alvaro H.).
That affiliation also required them to attack individuals classified
as protective custody (Steven S.). Appellant’s and Ruiz’s
coordinated attacks imply agreements to fulfill their shared gang
obligations. (People v. Thompson (2016) 1 Cal.5th 1043, 1111,
italics omitted [“‘“The existence of a conspiracy may be inferred
from the conduct, relationship, interests, and activities of the
alleged conspirators before and during the alleged conspiracy”’”]
(Thompson).)
Appellant maintains “[t]here was insufficient evidence of
an agreement in this case because, as far as the evidence shows,
it was at least as likely that appellant and Ruiz acted
independently based on their Sureño training . . . as that they
entered into an express or tacit prior agreement to act.”
However, “[w]here the circumstances reasonably justify the trier
of fact’s findings, a reviewing court’s conclusion the
circumstances might also reasonably be reconciled with a
contrary finding does not warrant the judgment’s reversal.”
(People v. Zamudio (2008) 43 Cal.4th 327, 358.) Appellant’s
alternative explanation for the evidence does not justify reversal.

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Allegedly Erroneous Jury Instruction
Pursuant to CALCRIM No. 415, the jury received this
instruction: “An agreement may be inferred from conduct if you
conclude that members of the alleged conspiracy acted with a
common purpose to commit the crime.” Appellant contends that
“because action with a common purpose to commit a crime could
exist in this case without a mutual understanding established in
advance, and thus without an agreement, this instruction was
incorrect in this case.” We disagree.
“‘An appellate court reviews the wording of a jury
instruction de novo and assesses whether the instruction
accurately states the law.’” (People v. Lewis (2023) 14 Cal.5th
876, 900.) “The challenged instruction is viewed ‘in the context of
the instructions as a whole and the trial record to determine
whether there is a reasonable likelihood the jury applied the
instruction in an impermissible manner.’” (People v. Mitchell
(2019) 7 Cal.5th 561, 579.) “‘A defendant challenging an
instruction as being subject to erroneous interpretation by the
jury must demonstrate a reasonable likelihood that the jury
understood the instruction in the way asserted by the
defendant.’” (People v. Solomon (2010) 49 Cal.4th 792, 822.) We
review claims of instructional error de novo. (People v. Thomas
(2023) 14 Cal.5th 327, 382.)
The challenged portion of CALCRIM No. 415 accurately
states the law, and there is no reasonable likelihood the jury
misunderstood or misapplied the instruction. CALCRIM No. 415
does not state an agreement must be inferred from conduct with a
common criminal purpose. Nor does it indicate conduct with a
common criminal purpose alone constitutes an agreement.
Rather, the language merely identifies one category of evidence

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the jury may use to infer an agreement. (See Thompson, supra,
1 Cal.5th at p. 1111.) This language does not suggest an
agreement can exist without a mutual understanding. (See
Johnson, supra, 57 Cal.4th at p. 264.) As to the relative timing of
agreement and action, CALCRIM No. 415 explicitly instructed:
“The overt act must happen after the defendant has agreed to
commit the crime.”
Counsels’ argument further illuminated the instruction’s
meaning. (People v. Huggins (2006) 38 Cal.4th 175, 193.)
Regarding Steven S., the prosecutor argued appellant and Ruiz
moved together and “shared a common purpose. And from that,
you can infer that there was a meeting of the minds. That there
was an agreement . . . .” This statement delineates an agreement
from conduct with a common purpose. Likewise, defense counsel
argued: “The act itself doesn’t show the meeting of the minds
and be careful of that.” Although the court told the jury to follow
the instructions if it believed the attorneys’ comments conflicted
with them, these arguments presented no such conflict. Rather,
the arguments reflected the instruction’s commonsense meaning.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

CODY, J.

We concur:

GILBERT, P. J. BALTODANO, J.

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Paul W. Baelly, Judge
Superior Court County of Ventura
______________________________

Jeffrey Manning-Cartwright, under appointment by the
Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Steven D. Matthews, Supervising
Deputy Attorney General, and Amanda V. Lopez, Deputy
Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

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