People v. Ordonez CA5

CourtListener 10378071Calctapp14.04.2025

Gesamter Gesetzestext

Filed 4/14/25 P. v. Ordonez CA5

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

THE PEOPLE,
F086015
Plaintiff and Respondent,
(Super. Ct. No. F19902330)
v.

ERIK MANUEL ORDONEZ, OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Fresno County. Timothy A.
Kams, Judge.
Danalynn Pritz, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General,
Michael P. Farrell and Kimberley A. Donohue, Assistant Attorneys General, Eric L.
Christoffersen, Sally Espinoza, and Chung Mi Choi, Deputy Attorneys General, for
Plaintiff and Respondent.
-ooOoo-
INTRODUCTION
Erik Ordonez (appellant) shot and killed Jose Duran, Jr. A jury convicted
appellant of second degree murder (Pen. Code, §§ 187, subd. (a), 189, subd. (b); count 1)1
with an enhancement for the intentional discharge of a firearm causing great bodily injury
or death (§ 12022.53, subd. (d)), two counts of assault with a firearm (§ 245, subd. (a)(2);
counts 2 and 3) and being a felon in possession of a firearm (§ 29800, subd. (a)(1);
count 4). Following trial, appellant admitted two prior strike convictions. (§§ 667,
subd. (d)(1), 1170.12, subd. (b)(1).) The trial court sentenced appellant to 95 years to life
in state prison.
On appeal, appellant raises claims of instructional error, prosecutorial misconduct,
sentencing error, and ineffective assistance of counsel. We conclude no error occurred
and/or any presumed error was harmless. We affirm.
BACKGROUND
I. Testimony of Isabel Duran.
In April 2019, appellant and Isabel Duran (Isabel)2 had been married for 10 years.
They lived together in an apartment with their two daughters, ages eight and 10.
During the last two years of their marriage, appellant and Isabel argued frequently
about appellant’s alcohol use. Isabel testified appellant would become aggressive when
he was drinking and falsely accuse her of infidelity.
On the evening of April 6, 2019, appellant’s cousins came over to the apartment.
They drank and partied in the living room while Isabel and the daughters stayed in a
bedroom. Isabel told appellant she was upset about his drinking, and they argued briefly.
Isabel and the daughters went to sleep around 9:00 p.m. because she had to work
early the next morning. When Isabel got up at 3:00 a.m., appellant and his cousins were

1
All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise indicated.
2
For clarity, we refer to Isabel Duran by her first name. No disrespect is intended.

2.
still drinking in the living room. They were talking in a manner that made her
uncomfortable and scared. Appellant also gave her a certain “look” that he often gave
her, but there was something different about it, and it made her feel unsafe. At this point,
Isabel decided to leave appellant for good.
Isabel got herself and her daughters ready like she normally did. When she told
appellant she was going to work, he responded that she was “going to go fuck somebody
else.” They argued for 30 to 45 minutes, and Isabel assured him that she was leaving to
take their daughters to her father’s house and go to work. She did not tell appellant she
was planning to leave him.
Isabel drove to the home of her father, Jose Duran, Sr. (Senior),3 and told him she
wanted to end her marriage with appellant. Senior agreed to help her move out of the
apartment. She reserved a moving truck, then called her brother, Junior. Junior offered
to help her move, and recruited his girlfriend’s brother, Buddy Henson, to assist them.
Isabel, Senior, Junior, and Henson arrived at the apartment with the moving truck
sometime after 8:00 a.m. Isabel instructed everyone to remain in the living room because
she was concerned appellant would start a fight. Appellant knew Junior and Senior, but
they were not close.
Isabel testified that when she went into the bedroom to collect her belongings,
appellant appeared to be sleeping on the bed. Within five minutes he got up and asked
her what she was doing. Isabel told appellant she was leaving him, and he responded that
she was not. They started to argue and raise their voices. After about 10 minutes, Senior
came to the doorway and told Isabel to be quiet and “just leave.” Senior stepped into the
room and grabbed Isabel’s arm to pull her out, but she resisted. She told Senior that she

3
For clarity, we refer to Jose Duran, Sr. as “Senior,” and Jose Duran, Jr. as “Junior.”
No disrespect is intended.

3.
was always the one who had to be quiet, but she was going to speak her mind and “fight
back this time.”
While Isabel was addressing Senior, appellant grabbed her by the arm and told her
she was not going to leave. She pushed him away and told him to let her go. They were
“kind of hitting each other,” but it was more like a struggle. Appellant let go and stepped
away from her, moving toward the bedroom window and away from the doorway.
Isabel continued to face appellant, but she turned her head toward Senior, who was
still standing in front of the doorway. She continued to tell Senior she was not going to
leave. She heard Senior say, “No.” She looked toward appellant and saw he was holding
a handgun and pointing it at her. She did not see from where the gun came.
Isabel testified she froze when she saw appellant had pointed a gun at her.
Appellant was about 10 feet away, and Senior was standing behind her. Appellant did not
say anything. No one else was in the room.
Isabel felt Senior pull her back by her shirt, then saw Junior run into the bedroom
and jump in front of her. At that moment, appellant fired a single shot, and Junior fell to
the floor. Isabel did not see any blood and initially thought Junior had not been hit.
Junior immediately stood up and ran out of the room. Senior grabbed Isabel and pulled
her out of the bedroom into the hallway. No one made physical contact with appellant
after he fired the shot.
Isabel testified she and Senior stumbled as he pulled her into the hallway, and they
both fell to the floor. Appellant entered the hallway and pointed the gun at Senior, then at
Isabel. He pulled the trigger, but the gun made a “click-click” sound and did not
discharge. Appellant’s cousin, Felix Ordonez (Felix),4 grabbed appellant from behind
and told him to stop and to leave.

4
For clarity, we refer to Felix Ordonez as “Felix.” No disrespect is intended.

4.
Isabel and Senior started to run out of the apartment but stopped when they found
Junior lying on the ground across the threshold of the front door. There was blood
coming from under his chin. Appellant stood in the living room for a few minutes with a
shocked expression, then ran out of the apartment.
Isabel clarified she did not see Henson when appellant fired the fatal shot. She
never saw him go into the bedroom.
On cross-examination, defense counsel asked Isabel if she ever stated during a law
enforcement interview, or testified at the preliminary hearing, that appellant pulled the
trigger when they were standing in the hallway. Isabel responded she did not remember,
noting it had been a long time and she had “tried to block out a lot of things.” She then
conceded she may not have told the prosecutor, but she believed she told “one of the
officers.” A detective who interviewed Isabel subsequently testified she told him
appellant pointed the gun at her in the hallway, but she did not state he pulled the trigger.

II. Senior’s Preliminary Hearing Testimony.

Senior passed away of natural causes before trial. His preliminary hearing
testimony was read into the record in its entirety.
Senior testified that on April 7, 2019, he went to Isabel’s apartment to help her
move out because she had been having problems with appellant. They rented a truck and
went to the apartment with Junior and Henson. When they arrived, appellant was lying
on his bed, and his nephew and cousin were asleep in another bedroom.
Isabel went into the room where appellant was sleeping and started collecting her
things while Junior and Henson moved furniture out of the apartment. Senior heard
appellant and Isabel begin to argue loudly. They were speaking English so he could not
understand what they were saying. He stood in the doorway to the bedroom and watched
them.

5.
Senior testified that after 10 to 15 minutes, appellant retrieved a gun from beneath
his pillow, cocked it, and pointed it at Isabel and him. Senior was standing next to Isabel,
and appellant was about six feet away. Junior came running into the room and stood in
front of Isabel and Senior. Appellant fired the gun and shot Junior. Senior tried to grab
the gun from appellant, but appellant pointed the gun at Isabel and him again. Appellant
then grabbed his jacket and left the house with the gun.
Senior went to Junior and saw he was bleeding from the neck. He cried out for
someone to call for help, and the neighbors called the police.

III. Henson’s Recorded Statement.

Henson testified he did not recall the shooting, claiming he had suffered a head
injury and could not remember anything. He acknowledged that Junior was his sister’s
boyfriend, and remembered helping him move furniture, but could not recollect any other
details. He claimed he did not remember speaking to the police.
A detective testified he interviewed Henson on the night of the shooting. An audio
recording of the interview was admitted into evidence and played for the jury.
Henson stated Junior asked him to help move his sister’s belongings out of her
apartment because she was not getting along with appellant. When they arrived at the
apartment, Junior told Henson that Senior had a bat in his truck, and explained he told
Senior he did not have to worry because they were only there to collect Isabel’s
belongings. Henson expressed concern about getting involved in Isabel’s relationship
with appellant, and Junior responded not to worry because appellant is a “small guy” and
does not “talk to people like that.”
Junior and Henson went into the apartment and started moving furniture onto the
truck. While they were carrying a couch out of the apartment, Henson heard appellant
and Isabel arguing in the bedroom. The argument became louder, and Henson heard
thumping sounds and items falling over, leading him to believe it was becoming physical.

6.
Henson told Junior to go check on Isabel. Junior went into the bedroom, then said,
“[W]hat the fuck?” Henson heard thumping sounds and believed “they were fighting and
tussling.” He moved toward the bedroom. Immediately after he reached the doorway
and “glance[d]” inside, he heard a gunshot. Junior was only in the bedroom for 15 to 30
seconds before the shot was fired.
Henson stated that when he glanced into the bedroom the moment before the
gunshot, he saw Isabel, Junior, and appellant. He believed Senior was also in the
bedroom but could not see him “because of all the commotion.” Appellant had a gun,
and everyone else was screaming, “No.” Henson stated that “they were all grabbing each
other” and were “all trying to grab the gun.” Junior was in front of appellant and was
reaching for the gun. Henson described their interaction as “tussling.” However, Henson
specified he did not actually see Junior grab appellant. He also clarified he saw Isabel
near appellant but did not “know if she was trying to grab him too.” Appellant was the
only person with a weapon.
After the shooting, Junior ran out of the bedroom, and Henson followed him.
Appellant was the next person to come out of the bedroom. Henson saw appellant exit
the apartment and put the gun in his pants. Appellant ran toward the street and Henson
chased him. When appellant reached the middle of the street, he took out the gun and
attempted to point it at Henson but dropped it in the process. According to Henson,
appellant looked panicked and “out of it,” like he was on drugs. Appellant picked up the
gun, ran off, and jumped over a brick wall. The police arrived at the apartment moments
later.

IV. Additional Prosecution Evidence.

Appellant was arrested later that morning. Officers located him hiding in a shed in
the backyard of a residence less than a mile from the apartment. The firearm was never
recovered.

7.
The parties stipulated to the results of Junior’s autopsy. The cause of death was
determined to be a single gunshot wound that entered through the lower part of the chin
and exited near the backside of the left shoulder blade.
The parties also stipulated appellant suffered a prior felony conviction and was
prohibited from possessing a firearm pursuant to section 29800, subdivision (a)(1).

V. Defense Evidence.

Felix, appellant’s cousin, testified he went to the apartment the night before the
shooting. He stayed overnight and slept in the living room. The next morning, he saw
two people taking items out of the apartment. Sometime later, he heard a gunshot, then
saw someone come out of the bedroom and fall on the floor. He did not see what
happened in the bedroom.
Appellant testified he was married to Isabel for 10 years. He was not close with
Senior and Junior but had never had any problems with them. He also lived with Junior
at one point. Appellant admitted he was convicted of robbery in 2006.
Appellant started drinking at the apartment around 4:00 p.m. the night before the
shooting. He stayed up drinking with his cousin Felix and his nephew until the sun came
up the next morning. He did not recall arguing with Isabel about his drinking and could
not remember if he saw her before he went to sleep.
Appellant awoke the next morning to Isabel opening dresser drawers in the
bedroom. He asked her what she was doing, and she told him she wanted a divorce and
was tired of his drinking. Appellant was surprised by this and did not know why Isabel
wanted to leave him. He felt “hurt” but did not become angry.
Appellant testified Senior was also in the bedroom. While appellant was still lying
in bed and talking to Isabel about her leaving, Senior approached the foot of the bed and
started yelling and cursing at him in Spanish. Based on his “hostile” and “violent”

8.
demeanor, he thought Senior was going to “pounce” on him. However, Senior did not
touch or threaten him.
Appellant testified he got out of his bed and grabbed his pistol from underneath his
mattress. He knew he was prohibited from owning a firearm but kept it for protection
because he lived in a “bad area.” He held the firearm at his side, and did not point it at
anyone. He told Isabel and Senior to leave the apartment, and they backed into the
hallway. Senior continued to curse at him, and Isabel said she wanted “to get all her
shit.” Appellant looked down the hall and saw Junior and Henson in the living room. He
did not know Henson and did not recognize Junior at first. He asked Isabel who she
brought into the apartment, but she did not respond.
Appellant stepped back into the bedroom, and Junior and Senior followed.
Henson entered soon after. Junior asked appellant, “[W]hat the fuck are you doing?”
Appellant responded that he did not want any problems and told them to leave. He was
still holding the gun down by his side.
Appellant testified he started to panic because he did not know “what these people
are capable of.” Senior continued to curse at him in Spanish, and Junior told him, “[I]f
you have any problems with my family you can deal with me.” Henson then told Junior,
“He ain’t going to do nothing with that gun. Get him.”
Junior “rushe[d]” at appellant and tried to take the gun from him. They wrestled
for control of the gun, but did not throw any punches. Appellant testified he was in fear
for his life, and believed Junior would kill him if he took the gun from him. He noted
Junior was six inches taller and about 25 pounds heavier.
The struggle over the gun lasted “a matter of seconds.” Appellant “gain[ed] some
strength,” pushed Junior off and shot him. Junior was about three to four feet away when
he pulled the trigger. Appellant claimed he did not intend to shoot Junior and “just took a
wild shot.” However, he testified he believed it was necessary to shoot Junior to protect

9.
himself and he had no other choice. Appellant did not see Isabel in the room when he
fired fatal the shot, and he did not remember where Senior and Henson were standing.
After the shooting, Junior fell to the ground, and Senior rushed at appellant and
tried to take the gun. Felix entered the room, immediately grabbed Senior from behind,
and pulled him off appellant. Appellant put the gun in his pants and ran outside. He did
not recall encountering Isabel and Senior in the hallway. He saw Junior lying in the
doorway and jumped over him. He noticed someone chasing him, so he jumped over
some fences and went into a shed. He did not remember what he did with the gun but
denied purposely hiding it.

DISCUSSION

I. The Trial Court Did Not Err by Instructing with CALCRIM No. 3472 in
Response to the Jury’s Question.
In response to a jury note requesting clarification on imperfect self-defense, the
trial court instructed the jury with CALCRIM No. 3472 (Right to Self-Defense: May Not
Be Contrived). Appellant contends this instruction was not supported by the evidence
and erroneously suggested appellant forfeited his right to self-defense by brandishing a
firearm. Alternatively, he argues the trial court should have given the optional language
from CALCRIM No. 3472 specifying that a defendant who uses only nondeadly force
retains the right to self-defense if the victim responds with deadly force. We conclude the
jury was properly instructed, and any presumed error was harmless.

A. Background.

The jury was instructed on imperfect self-defense with CALCRIM No. 571.
During deliberations, the jury sent a note requesting “clarification on imperfect self-
defense – PC 192.” The note read as follows:

“Does a person attempting to remove a firearm from another person, and
that person in possession of the firearm eliminate Imperfect Self Defense as
the person attempting to take the firearm is doing so due to the other person

10.
having it in possession? ‘The person with the firearm originally has created
the circumstances that justifies adversary’s use of force.’ ”

The trial court and counsel conferred off the record and formulated the following
response, which was sent to the jury:

“Imperfect self-defense does not apply when the defendant, through
his own wrongful conduct, has created circumstances that justify his
adversary’s use of force.

“A person does not have the right to self-defense if he or she
provokes a fight or quarrel with the intent to create an excuse to use force.

“Apply these instructions to the facts as you find them.”
The response was a combination of two instructions. The first sentence was drawn
from CALCRIM No. 571, which had already been given to the jury. The second sentence
was drawn from CALCRIM No. 3472, which was not given when the trial court initially
instructed the jury.
Defense counsel confirmed on the record that appellant had no objection to the
response as written. The court also asked appellant directly if he agreed to the response,
and appellant answered, “Yes.”

B. Standard of review.

In a criminal case, a trial court must instruct on the general principles of law
relevant to the issues raised by the evidence. (People v. Diaz (2015) 60 Cal.4th 1176,
1189.) Instruction is required for those legal principles “ ‘closely and openly connected
with the facts before the court, and which are necessary for the jury’s understanding of
the case.’ [Citations.]” (Ibid.) Conversely, “[i]t is error to give an instruction which,
while correctly stating a principle of law, has no application to the facts of the case.
[Citation.]” (People v. Guiton (1993) 4 Cal.4th 1116, 1129.)
Substantial evidence must exist for a trial court to provide a particular jury
instruction. (People v. Cole (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1158, 1206.) In this context, substantial

11.
evidence “would allow a reasonable jury to make a determination in accordance with the
theory presented under the proper standard of proof. [Citation.]” (Ibid.) In other words,
“[s]ubstantial evidence is evidence sufficient to ‘deserve consideration by the jury.’ ”
(People v. Barton (1995) 12 Cal.4th 186, 201, fn. 8.)
Section 1138 requires a trial court to provide information to a deliberating jury
upon request regarding “any point of law arising in the case.” “Where the original
instructions are themselves full and complete, the court has discretion under section 1138
to determine what additional explanations are sufficient to satisfy the jury’s request for
information. [Citation.]” (People v. Beardslee (1991) 53 Cal.3d 68, 97.) However, if the
trial court elects to respond by giving supplemental jury instructions, the correctness of
those instructions presents a question of law, which we review de novo. (People v.
Franklin (2018) 21 Cal.App.5th 881, 887, fn. 4; see People v. Posey (2004) 32 Cal.4th
193, 217–218; People v. Cole, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 1210.)
“When considering a claim of instructional error, we view the challenged
instruction in the context of the instructions as a whole and the trial record to determine
whether there is a reasonable likelihood the jury applied the instruction in an
impermissible manner. [Citation.]” (People v. Houston (2012) 54 Cal.4th 1186, 1229.)
We presume jurors are intelligent persons capable of understanding and correlating all
instructions given. (People v. Gonzales (2011) 51 Cal.4th 894, 940; People v. O’Malley
(2016) 62 Cal.4th 944, 991.) “We interpret the instructions so as to support the judgment
if they are reasonably susceptible to such interpretation, and we presume jurors can
understand and correlate all instructions given. [Citation.]” (People v. Vang (2009) 171
Cal.App.4th 1120, 1129.)
C. We decline to find forfeiture.
As a threshold matter, respondent contends appellant forfeited the instant
instructional error claim by failing to object below. Appellant argues the alleged error is

12.
not subject to forfeiture because it pertains to the People’s burden of proof and the trial
court’s sua sponte duty to provide correct statements of law.
We decline to find forfeiture. Although defense counsel did not object to the
challenged portion of CALCRIM No. 3472, section 1259 permits the appellate court to
“review any instruction given, refused or modified, even though no objection was made
thereto in the lower court, if the substantial rights of the defendant were affected
thereby.” Appellant argues the instructions were so misleading they prevented the jury
from properly considering his self-defense claim, effectively lowering the People’s
burden of proof. If the instant claim was meritorious, the alleged instructional error
would have affected his substantial rights. Therefore, the instant claim is cognizable on
appeal despite appellant’s failure to object below.5 (See People v. Hillhouse (2002) 27
Cal.4th 469, 503 [“Instructions regarding the elements of the crime affect the substantial
rights of the defendant, thus requiring no objection for appellate review”]; People v.
Flood (1998) 18 Cal.4th 470, 482, fn. 7; People v. Smithey (1999) 20 Cal.4th 936, 976–
977, fn. 7.)
D. Instructional error did not occur.
1. CALCRIM No. 3472 was supported by substantial evidence.
We conclude the record supported CALCRIM No. 3472 as given. The evidence
showed appellant brandished a firearm during an argument with his ex-wife inside of
their apartment. The argument was undoubtedly tense and emotional, but there was no
threat of violence until appellant introduced a firearm. At most, the argument involved
yelling and cursing, and according to Isabel, a minor physical struggle when appellant
grabbed her by the arm and told her she was not going to leave. Once appellant drew the
firearm, Junior entered the room and positioned himself between appellant and his family.

5
For similar reasons, we do not find appellant forfeited the other instructional error
claims raised in this appeal.

13.
According to Henson and appellant, Junior attempted to grab the firearm before he was
shot.
Under these circumstances, the jury could have reasonably found appellant
provoked a fight or quarrel to create an excuse to use force by escalating a verbal
argument into a potentially deadly conflict. When appellant drew his firearm, there was
no evidence he was in imminent danger of suffering bodily injury. In this context, his act
of drawing the firearm was a brandishing, which inherently conveys an implicit threat to
use deadly force. (See § 417, subd. (a)(2) [defining brandishing as drawing or exhibiting
a firearm in a rude, angry, or threatening manner, or using a firearm in any fight or
quarrel].) This threat was particularly acute because appellant drew the firearm during a
domestic dispute. Because Isabel had just told appellant she wanted a divorce, there was
reason to believe he might be angry or irrational. Junior reacted by going into the
bedroom and attempting to either shield his family from the firearm or forcefully disarm
appellant. Therefore, the jury could have reasonably concluded appellant’s self-defense
claim was contrived because he unjustifiably escalated the argument by brandishing his
firearm and used Junior’s reaction as an excuse to use deadly force.
Appellant argues the evidence overwhelmingly established that Isabel and her
“clan” were the aggressors, and thus, there was no evidence appellant provoked the fight
or quarrel that led to the need for self-defense. But even according to appellant’s own
testimony, he drew his firearm in response to Senior, his father-in-law, yelling and
cursing as his ex-wife was packing to move out. Senior was unarmed. He did not touch
or threaten appellant, and they never had problems in the past. Appellant responded to
Senior by escalating the conflict from angry words to the threat of deadly force. This
sudden escalation caused Junior to intervene, which according to appellant led to the
shooting. Accordingly, CALCRIM No. 3472 was supported by substantial evidence, and
this claim lacks merit.

14.
2. The trial court was not obligated to instruct with the optional
language from CALCRIM No. 3472.
Appellant contends that even if CALCRIM No. 3472 was supported by substantial
evidence, the trial court erred by failing to give the following optional language from the
instruction:

“However, if the defendant used only non-deadly force, and the opponent
responded with such sudden and deadly force that the defendant could not
withdraw from the fight, then the defendant had the right to defend himself
with deadly force and was not required to try to stop fighting.”
This optional language was added to CALCRIM No. 3472 in September 2022 in
accordance with the holding in People v. Ramirez (2015) 233 Cal.App.4th 940 (Ramirez).
(See Bench Notes to CALCRIM No. 3472.) Based on Ramirez, appellant contends
instruction with CALCRIM No. 3472, or the exclusion of the optional language, misled
the jury by suggesting appellant forfeited his right to self-defense if he only provoked a
nondeadly quarrel.
We are not persuaded. In Ramirez, the defendants sought out rival gang members
for a fight. (Ramirez, supra, 233 Cal.App.4th at p. 944.) One of the defendants,
Armando, brought a firearm in his sweatshirt pocket, but “did not set out intending to
shoot anyone.” (Ibid.) After the defendants located and confronted the rival gang
members, a fistfight broke out. (Ibid.) During the fight, Armando saw one of the rival
gang members raise his hand holding an object that looked like a firearm. (Id. at p. 945.)
In response, Armando pulled his own firearm from his sweatshirt and fatally shot the
rival gang member. (Ibid.)
The trial court instructed the jury with CALCRIM No. 3472, which did not
include the above optional language. (Ramirez, supra, 233 Cal.App.4th at pp. 945–946.)
In closing argument, the prosecutor argued CALCRIM No. 3472, as given, precluded any
claim of self-defense even if the defendants only intended to instigate a fight involving
nondeadly force. (Ramirez, at pp. 945–946.) On appeal, Ramirez held that, given the

15.
evidence at trial, CALCRIM No. 3472, in conjunction with the prosecutor’s argument,
deprived the defendants of their self-defense theory. (Ramirez, at pp. 947–948.) It
reasoned that if the defendants intended to start a nonlethal fight, they did not lose the
right to defend themselves when the victims responded with deadly force. (Ibid.) Thus,
Ramirez held that under the circumstances, CALCRIM No. 3472 “erroneously required
the jury to conclude that in contriving to use force, even to provoke only a fistfight,
defendants entirely forfeited any right to self-defense.” (Ramirez, at p. 953.)
The optional language in CALCRIM No. 3472 remedies the instructional issue
implicated by the unique factual circumstances in Ramirez. For this reason, it only
applies to the “rare case in which a defendant intended to provoke only a nondeadly
confrontation and the victim responds with deadly force.” (People v. Eulian (2016)
247 Cal.App.4th 1324, 1334.)
Here, there is no reason to believe CALCRIM No. 3427 misled the jury because
there was no evidence appellant intended to provoke a nondeadly confrontation. Unlike
in Ramirez, appellant never attempted to instigate a fistfight. According to his own
testimony, he responded to Senior’s angry words by drawing his firearm, a clear threat to
use deadly force. Thus, it is irrelevant whether the jury was instructed regarding
appellant’s right to use deadly force in self-defense after provoking a nonlethal fight,
because there was no evidence supporting this theory at trial. Therefore, the trial court
was not obligated to give the optional language, and instructional error did not occur.

E. Any presumed error was harmless.

Even assuming the trial court erred in instructing the jury with CALCRIM
No. 3472, the alleged error was not prejudicial. Depending upon the basis of the claimed
error, instructional error is reviewed under either Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S.
18, 24 (Chapman) or People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 (Watson). Under the
more stringent Chapman standard, which applies to errors of constitutional dimension,

16.
reversal is required unless the reviewing court can conclude beyond a reasonable doubt
that the error did not contribute to the verdict. (Chapman, at p. 24.) Under the
alternative Watson standard, which applies to errors of state law, reversal is not required
unless it is reasonably probable the defendant would have obtained a more favorable
result had the error not occurred. (Watson, at p. 836.)
We need not decide whether the Chapman or Watson standard for prejudicial error
applies here because the error was harmless under either standard. As we explained
above, the record conclusively established appellant did not provoke a nondeadly quarrel.
By brandishing a firearm during a domestic dispute, appellant conveyed an implicit threat
to use that firearm, escalating a verbal argument into a potentially deadly confrontation.
Appellant’s right to self-defense after using nondeadly force was not at issue.
Accordingly, even if CALCRIM No. 3472 was erroneously given, it could not have
contributed to the jury’s determination that appellant did not act in self-defense.
Appellant claims the error was particularly prejudicial because CALCRIM
No. 3472 was given in response to a juror question about whether appellant’s possession
of a firearm was relevant to imperfect self-defense. He argues the trial court’s response
misled the jury by implying appellant forfeited his right to self-defense by brandishing a
firearm, regardless of the surrounding circumstances. He also contends the prosecutor’s
argument that appellant “didn’t have a right to bring that gun out” compounded the
purported error.
We disagree. The trial court did not suggest the jury make a specific factual
finding or ignore any relevant evidence. It did not imply that the act of brandishing the
firearm was “wrongful conduct” that “provoke[d] a fight or quarrel.” Rather, the trial
court instructed on legal principles applicable to the jury’s question about the significance
of appellant’s display of a firearm, specifying that the jurors must apply the instructions
“to the facts as [they] find them.” In the absence of contrary indication, we presume the

17.
jury understood and followed these instructions. (People v. Fauber (1992) 2 Cal.4th 792,
823; People v. Thornton (2007) 41 Cal.4th 391, 441.)
Because there is no basis to conclude CALCRIM No. 3427, as given, misled the
jury, the verdict rendered in this trial was surely unattributable to the purported error.
(Sullivan v. Louisiana (1993) 508 U.S. 275, 279.) We therefore conclude beyond a
reasonable doubt that the alleged instructional error did not contribute to the verdict, and
this claim lacks merit. (See Chapman, supra, 386 U.S. at p. 24.) Likewise, it is not
reasonably probable that the verdicts would have been more favorable to appellant absent
the purported error. (See Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d at p. 836.) Any presumed error was
harmless.

II. The Trial Court’s Instruction on Transferred Intent (CALCRIM No. 562)
Was Not Misleading.
Appellant contends the trial court’s instruction on transferred intent (CALCRIM
No. 562) was incomplete and misleading because it did not specify appellant’s mental
state also transferred to his unintended target. Specifically, he claims the instruction
erroneously suggested that if he intended to kill Isabel but accidentally killed Junior, he is
guilty of murder regardless of whether he acted in the heat of passion or imperfect self-
defense. We conclude the jury was properly instructed.

A. Background.

The trial court’s instruction on the doctrine of transferred intent read, in pertinent
part:

“If the defendant intended to kill one person, but by mistake or
accident killed someone else instead, then the crime, if any, is the same as if
the intended person had been killed.” (See CALCRIM No. 562.)
Appellant did not object to the instruction or request a modification.

18.
B. The jury was properly instructed.

“[T]he doctrine of transferred intent applies when the defendant intends to kill one
person but mistakenly kills another.” (People v. Bland (2002) 28 Cal.4th 313, 317.) In
this circumstance, “the law transfers the felonious intent from the object of the assault to
the actual victim…. ‘[T]he crime is exactly what it would have been if the person against
whom the intent to kill was directed had been in fact killed.’ ” (People v. Clayton (1967)
248 Cal.App.2d 345, 349–350.) Thus, a defendant “who premeditates a killing but kills
the wrong person is guilty of a premeditated, not just intentional, murder. [Citation.]”
(People v. Bland, at p. 319, fn. 1.) Similarly, “a defendant is guilty of no crime if his
legitimate act in self-defense results in the inadvertent death of an innocent bystander.”
(People v. Levitt (1984) 156 Cal.App.3d 500, 507, disapproved of on another ground by
People v. Johnson (2016) 62 Cal.4th 600, 649, fn. 6.) Transferred intent also applies to
voluntary manslaughter. (See People v. Carlson (1974) 37 Cal.App.3d 349, 355.)
In accordance with these principles, the trial court specified in CALCRIM No. 562
that if appellant intended to kill one person but accidentally killed another, “the crime, if
any, is the same as if the intended person had been killed.” Additionally, in CALCRIM
No. 570 and CALCRIM No. 571, the trial court instructed that “[a] killing that would
otherwise be murder is reduced to voluntary manslaughter” if appellant killed “because of
a sudden quarrel or in the heat of passion” or “in imperfect self-defense.”
Considered together, these instructions clearly communicated that if the jury found
appellant intended to kill Isabel but accidentally killed Junior, he is guilty of voluntary
manslaughter if he acted in the heat of passion or imperfect self-defense. (See People v.
Holmes, McClain and Newborn (2022) 12 Cal.5th 719, 791 [we presume jurors are able
to integrate all instructions given].) Nothing in the instructions suggested the jury should
disregard appellant’s mental state if it found Junior was not his intended target.

19.
Accordingly, appellant has not demonstrated a reasonable likelihood that the jury
understood the instructions in the way he asserts, and this claim is without merit.6

III. Appellant Was Not Prejudiced by the Trial Court’s Failure to Instruct with
CALCRIM No. 3470 (Right to Self-Defense or Defense of Another (Non-
Homicide)).
Appellant claims the trial court erroneously failed to instruct the jury on self-
defense on counts 2 and 3, the assault with a firearm charges as to Isabel and Senior.
(See CALCRIM No. 3470.) He argues the error was prejudicial because it allowed the
jury to convict him of the assault counts even if they believed he acted in lawful self-
defense. We need not determine whether the self-defense instruction was supported by
substantial evidence because any presumed error was harmless.
A. Background.
The trial court instructed the jury on perfect self-defense with CALCRIM No. 505.
This instruction defined perfect self-defense as it pertains to homicide, specifying
appellant is “not guilty of murder or manslaughter if he was justified in killing someone
in self-defense.” The court also gave CALCRIM No. 571, which defined voluntary
manslaughter based on imperfect self-defense.
As to the assault with a firearm counts, the trial court gave CALCRIM No. 875,
which set forth the elements of the offense. The instruction included the optional element
that appellant “did not act in self-defense.” However, the trial court did not give
CALCRIM No. 3470, which defines the legal standard for lawful self-defense for
nonhomicide offenses.7
CALCRIM No. 3470 and CALCRIM No. 505 both articulate the standard for
lawful self-defense but differ as to “the type of the threat the defendant believed they

6
Because we conclude the trial court did not commit instructional error, we need
not address appellant’s claim he was prejudiced by the instruction.
7
Defense counsel did not request the trial court give this instruction.

20.
faced.” (People v. Waxlax (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 579, 591.) To justify a homicide,
which involves the use of deadly force, the defendant must have believed they were “in
imminent danger of being killed or suffering great bodily injury.” (CALCRIM No. 505,
see People v. Humphrey (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1073, 1082.) To justify a lesser use of force,
such as an assault, the defendant must only have feared that any bodily injury or unlawful
touching was imminent. (CALCRIM No. 3470; see People v. Minifie (1996) 13 Cal.4th
1055, 1064.) Both instructions specify that regardless of the type of force employed, the
defendant must have “used no more force than was reasonably necessary to defend
against that danger.” (CALCRIM Nos. 505, 3470, see People v. Minifie, at p. 1065.)

B. Standard of review.

When self-defense is raised as a defense to assault charges, the prosecution must
prove beyond a reasonable doubt the defendant did not act in self-defense, just as it must
prove any other element of the crime. (CALCRIM No. 875, see People v. Lee (2005)
131 Cal.App.4th 1413, 1429.) Instructional errors that misdescribe an element of an
offense or are incomplete and misleading are subject to the prejudice standard set forth in
Chapman. (People v. Schuller (2023) 15 Cal.5th 237, 251.) Under this standard, reversal
is required unless the reviewing court can conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the
error did not contribute to the verdict. (Chapman, supra, 386 U.S. at p. 24.)

C. Any presumed error was harmless.

Appellant contends substantial evidence supported CALCRIM No. 3470, and its
erroneous omission allowed the jury to convict him of the assault counts without
considering whether he acted in lawful self-defense. Even assuming appellant is correct,
the error was harmless. Based on the jury’s findings and our review of the record, we
conclude the absence of CALCRIM No. 3470 could not have contributed to the verdicts
rendered.

21.
Appellant did not testify that he pointed the firearm at Isabel and Senior in self-
defense. He only claimed he acted in self-defense when he shot Junior. He denied
pointing the firearm at anyone else in the bedroom and did not recall encountering Senior
and Isabel in the hallway. In other words, according to appellant, the assaults never
happened. Consistent with this testimony, defense counsel argued to the jury that
appellant was not guilty of the assault with a firearm charges because the assaults did not
occur. Thus, a finding that appellant committed the assaults in self-defense would have
been inconsistent with appellant’s testimony and the defense theory as to those counts.
We also observe the jury rejected appellant’s claim that he acted in perfect or
imperfect self-defense when he shot Junior. Imperfect self-defense requires an actual but
unreasonable belief that deadly force was necessary to defend against the imminent threat
of great bodily injury or death. (People v. Rios (2000) 23 Cal.4th 450, 461; see In re
Christian S. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 768, 771; CALCRIM No. 571.) Additionally, as the jury
was instructed, imperfect self-defense is inapplicable if “the defendant, through his own
wrongful conduct, has created circumstances that justify his adversary’s use of force.”
(CALCRIM No. 571, see In re Christian S., p. 773, fn. 1.) Therefore, the jury necessarily
found appellant did not actually believe in the need for self-defense, or that his own
wrongful conduct (i.e. drawing a firearm during a verbal argument) created circumstances
under which Junior was justified in responding in self-defense.
The jury’s rejection of imperfect self-defense is significant to our prejudice
analysis because the murder and the assaults were part of the same confrontation.
According to appellant’s testimony, he feared for his safety not just because of Junior’s
actions, but due to the allegedly aggressive conduct of his fellow assailants. As defense
counsel argued to the jury, lethal force was necessary because appellant was “trapped” in
the bedroom. The jury rejected this, finding appellant either did not actually believe
lethal force was necessary, or that he forfeited his right to self-defense through his own
wrongful conduct.
22.
The prosecution evidence established appellant pointed the firearm at Isabel and
Senior immediately before firing the fatal shot, and again after Isabel and Senior retreated
into the hallway. Under any reasonable interpretation of the evidence, Isabel and Senior
did not present any more of a threat to appellant than Junior. Given the jury’s finding that
appellant did not act in even imperfect self-defense when he shot Junior, we fail to see
how the jury could have separately found that, moments before and after the shooting,
appellant actually and reasonably believed pointing the firearm at Senior and Isabel was
necessary to defend against imminent danger of bodily injury.
As appellant observes, self-defense was the “central disputed issue” in this case.
The issue was thoroughly litigated at trial, and the jury rejected it. Based on this finding
and our review of the evidence, we are convinced beyond a reasonable doubt the guilty
verdicts rendered in the trial were unattributable to the omission of CALCRIM No. 3470.
(See Sullivan v. Louisiana, supra, 508 U.S. at p. 279.) Accordingly, the alleged
instructional error was harmless, and this claim lacks merit.

IV. The Trial Court Did Not Err in Failing to Instruct the Jury on a Prohibited
Possessor’s Right to Temporarily Possess a Firearm in Lawful Self-defense.
(CALCRIM No. 2514.)
Appellant asserts the trial court was obligated to instruct the jury he was not guilty
of being a felon in possession of a firearm (§ 29800, subd. (a)(1); count 4) if he only
temporarily possessed the firearm for purposes of self-defense. (See CALCRIM
No. 2514.) We conclude the instruction was not supported by substantial evidence.
A. Background.
Appellant stipulated he was previously convicted of a felony and prohibited from
possessing a firearm pursuant to section 29800, subdivision (a)(1). The trial court
instructed the jury with CALCRIM No. 2511 (Possession of Firearm by Person
Prohibited Due to Conviction—Stipulation to Conviction). Defense counsel did not
request the trial court give CALCRIM No. 2514 or otherwise object.

23.
B. Standard of review.
“A trial court is required to instruct sua sponte on any defense, including self-
defense, only when there is substantial evidence supporting the defense, and the
defendant is either relying on the defense or the defense is not inconsistent with the
defendant’s theory of the case.” (People v. Villanueva (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 41, 49; see
People v. Breverman (1998) 19 Cal.4th 142, 157, disapproved of on another ground by
People v. Schuller, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 260, fn. 7.) We review claims of instructional
error de novo. (People v. Cole, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 1210.)
C. CALCRIM No. 2514 was not supported by substantial evidence.
A person who is statutorily prohibited from possessing a firearm may do so for
purposes of self-defense, but only under narrowly circumscribed conditions. (People v.
King (1978) 22 Cal.3d 12, 24 (King).) In King, our high court explained that in enacting
former section 12021, the predecessor to section 29800, the Legislature did not intend to
deny prohibited possessors from using a firearm in self-defense in emergency situations.
(King, at p. 15.) Thus, a prohibited person may possess a firearm for purposes of self-
defense, but only under the following conditions: 1) the person reasonably believed he or
she was in immediate danger of great bodily injury; 2) the immediate use of force was
necessary to defend against that danger; 3) the firearm became available to the person
without predesign or planning; 4) the possession was no longer than necessary to defend
against the danger; 5) no other means of avoiding the danger were available; and 6) the
use was reasonable under the circumstances. (Id. at p. 24.) CALCRIM No. 2514
explains that if the above conditions are met, the defendant is not guilty of unlawful
possession of a firearm.
The facts in King illustrate the narrowness of this exception. The defendant was a
guest at a birthday party. (King, supra, 22 Cal.3d at p. 16.) A fight broke out and several
party crashers attempted to break down the front door and smashed a window. (Id. at
pp. 17–18.) A woman gave the defendant a firearm from her purse, and he fired it into
24.
the air to frighten the intruders. (Id. at p. 18.) The defendant was charged with, inter alia,
possession of a concealable firearm by a felon (former § 12021). (King, at pp. 19–20.)
King held that under these circumstances it was error not to instruct the jury the
defendant was not guilty if he only temporarily possessed the firearm for purposes of
self-defense. (Id. at pp. 26–27.)
Here, unlike in King, the evidence conclusively established appellant did not
temporarily possess the firearm without predesign or planning. Appellant described the
firearm as “my pistol” and kept it secreted between his mattresses while he was sleeping.
He knew he was prohibited from owning or possessing a firearm but acquired it for
“protection” because he “lived in a bad area.” In other words, he kept the firearm for
general defense to respond to potential future threats. It was available during the conflict
with Isabel and her family because he had acquired it in advance.
People v. McClindon is instructive. (People v. McClindon (1980) 114 Cal.App.3d
336.) There, the defendant, a felon, was awakened by noise outside of his bedroom
window. (Id. at p. 339.) He picked up a pistol that he kept on his nightstand, pulled up
the curtain, and fired three shots. (Ibid.) At trial, the defendant admitted he kept the
firearm by his bed for protection. (Ibid.) McClindon rejected the defendant’s claim he
was entitled to an instruction on temporary possession of a firearm for self-defense,
reasoning his “possession of the pistol was admittedly not brief and further it was not
without design or prior possession.” (Id. at p. 340.)
The evidence in the instant case is nearly identical to McClindon. Appellant
admitted he obtained the firearm well in advance of the shooting for general self-defense.
There was no evidence possession was temporary or without predesign or planning.

25.
Accordingly, we conclude CALCRIM No. 2514 was not supported by substantial
evidence, and instructional error did not occur.8
V. The Trial Court Did Not Err in Failing to Give an Unanimity Instruction.
In supplemental briefing, appellant contends the trial court erred in failing to give
an unanimity instruction as to the assault with a firearm counts (§ 245, subd. (a)(2);
counts 2 and 3) and the felon in possession of a firearm count (§ 29800, subd. (a)(1);
count 4). (See CALCRIM No. 3500.) We conclude no such instruction was required.
A. Applicable law – jury unanimity.
In a criminal case, a jury verdict must be unanimous. (U.S. Const., 6th Amend.;
Cal. Const., art. I, § 16; People v. Anzalone (2013) 56 Cal.4th 545, 555.) In addition, “the
jury must agree unanimously the defendant is guilty of a specific crime. [Citation.]”
(People v. Russo (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1124, 1132.) “[W]hen violation of a criminal statute
is charged and the evidence establishes several acts, any one of which could constitute the
crime charged, either the state must select the particular act upon which it relied for the
allegation of the information, or the jury must be instructed that it must agree
unanimously upon which act to base a verdict of guilty. [Citation.]” (People v. Jennings
(2010) 50 Cal.4th 616, 679.) Under these circumstances, absent election by the
prosecution, an unanimity instruction must be given sua sponte. (People v. Riel (2000)
22 Cal.4th 1153, 1199.) The purpose of this requirement is “ ‘to eliminate the danger that
the defendant will be convicted even though there is no single offense which all the jurors
agree the defendant committed.’ ” (People v. Russo, at p. 1132.)

B. The assault with a firearm charges did not warrant an unanimity
instruction because the prosecution made a clear election.
Appellant argues an unanimity instruction was required for counts 2 and 3 because
there was evidence of two separate assaults. As we explained above, the prosecution

8
Because we conclude CALCRIM No. 2514 was not supported by the evidence, we
need not address appellant’s claim he was prejudiced by its absence.

26.
evidence established appellant pointed the firearm at Isabel and Senior in the bedroom
immediately before firing the fatal shot, and again once they had retreated into the
hallway. Appellant suggests that, absent an unanimity instruction, the jury could have
convicted appellant of the assaults without unanimously agreeing on the specific
assaultive act.
We conclude no unanimity instruction was required because the prosecutor elected
to rely solely on the assault in the hallway to prove the assault charges. “The prosecution
can make an election by ‘tying each specific count to specific criminal acts elicited from
the victims’ testimony’—typically in opening statement and/or closing argument.
[Citation.]” (People v. Brown (2017) 11 Cal.App.5th 332, 341; see e.g. People v.
Hawkins (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 1428, 1455 [prosecutor made an effective election by
repeatedly asserting in argument the facts that formed the basis for the count]; People v.
Jantz (2006) 137 Cal.App.4th 1283, 1292 [prosecutor informed the jury in argument that
the criminal threats charge was based on a specific threat described by a specific
witness]; People v. Diaz (1987) 195 Cal.App.3d 1375, 1382 [prosecutor tied each count
to specific criminal acts].) “[T]here is an implicit presumption that the jury will rely on
the prosecution’s election and, indeed, is bound by it.” (People v. Brown, at p. 341.)
Thus, where the prosecution makes an election, an unanimity instruction is not required.
(Ibid.)
The record shows the prosecutor informed the jury of its election in clear and
direct terms. During closing argument, the prosecutor stated that counts 2 and 3 pertain
“to what happened in the hallway.” While addressing the evidence supporting these
counts, she only discussed Isabel’s testimony that appellant pointed a gun at her and
Senior “in the hallway.” Anticipating defense counsel’s response, the prosecutor urged
the jury to credit Isabel’s allegation despite her prior inconsistent statements regarding the
hallway assault. Moreover, the prosecutor never argued or suggested the jury should find
appellant guilty of counts 2 and 3 based on his assaultive conduct in the bedroom.
27.
Appellant notes the prosecutor also mentioned Isabel’s testimony that appellant
pointed the firearm at her and Senior in the bedroom. However, she only did so while
addressing the evidence supporting the murder count. She explained that Isabel testified
appellant pointed the firearm at her immediately before Junior “dove in front of the
bullet.” Given the context, it was clear the prosecutor was discussing this testimony to
support her theory that appellant intended to kill Isabel but unintentionally killed Junior.
She never suggested appellant’s conduct in the bedroom, rather than the hallway,
supported the assault charges. In short, nothing in the prosecutor’s discussion of the
evidence supporting the murder charge undermined the clarity of her election on the
assault charges.
Appellant’s reliance on People v. Melhado is unavailing. (People v. Melhado
(1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 1529.) There, the defendant was charged with a single count of
making criminal threats (§ 422) for threatening employees at an auto repair shop.
(Melhado, at p. 1532.) The evidence established the defendant went to the shop twice in
one day, and each time threatened to blow up the shop with a hand grenade. (Id. at
p. 1533.) On appeal, Melhado held an unanimity instruction was required and rejected
the respondent’s claim that the prosecution made an election during closing argument.
(Id. at p. 1539.) It reasoned that while the prosecution placed more emphasis on one
event than others, it did not adequately inform the jury that it had elected to seek a
conviction based solely on that event. (Id. at p. 1536.)
Here, the prosecutor did not merely emphasize one act over another. Unlike in
Melhado, the prosecutor expressly told the jury that the charges in question were based
on a specific act – appellant pointing his firearm at Isabel and Senior in the hallway. This
was a clear statement of election. We therefore conclude the trial court did not err in
failing to give an unanimity instruction on counts 2 and 3, and this claim is without merit.

28.
C. The being a felon in possession of a firearm charge did not warrant an
unanimity instruction because there was only evidence of a single act of
possession.
Appellant also contends an unanimity instruction was required for count 4,
claiming the evidence showed two discrete acts of possession: acquisition of the firearm
prior to the shooting for general defense, and use of the firearm during the confrontation
with Junior. This distinction is not supported by the record. Appellant admitted he
acquired the firearm before the shooting for general defense and described it as “my
pistol.” On the morning of the shooting, he kept the firearm secreted between his
mattresses while he was sleeping alone in the bedroom. When he drew the firearm from
his bed to use during the confrontation, it was already in his possession.
Contrary to appellant’s claim, there was no evidence of “distinct possessions
separated by time and space.” (People v. Hernandez (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 559, 574.)
Rather, the evidence conclusively established appellant retained continuous possession of
the firearm. An unanimity instruction is warranted “if there is evidence that more than
one crime occurred, each of which could provide the basis for conviction under a single
count.” (People v. Grimes (2016) 1 Cal.5th 698, 727.) Because the evidence showed
only a single continuous act of unlawful possession, an unanimity instruction was not
required. Accordingly, we conclude no instructional error occurred, and we reject this
claim.9

VI. Appellant Fails to Show Defense Counsel was Ineffective for Failing to Object
to Various Arguments Made by the Prosecutor.
Appellant contends defense counsel should have objected to several alleged
instances of prosecutorial misconduct during closing argument. We conclude the record
does not support his ineffective assistance of counsel claims.

9
Because we conclude unanimity instructions were unwarranted, we need not
address appellant’s claims that he was prejudiced by the alleged errors.

29.
A. Standard of review.
Prosecutorial misconduct occurs when “ ‘[a] prosecutor … uses deceptive or
reprehensible methods to persuade the jury.’ ” (People v. Parson (2008) 44 Cal.4th 332,
359.) “When a claim of misconduct is based on the prosecutor’s comments before the
jury … ‘ “the question is whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury construed
or applied any of the complained-of remarks in an objectionable fashion.” ’ ” (People v.
Gonzales and Soliz (2011) 52 Cal.4th 254, 305.)
“To preserve a claim of prosecutorial misconduct for appeal, a defendant must
make a timely and specific objection and ask the trial court to admonish the jury to
disregard the improper argument. [Citation.]” (People v. Gonzales and Soliz, supra, 52
Cal.4th at p. 305.) Appellant concedes defense counsel did not object to the alleged acts
of misconduct. Thus, we must determine whether the failure to object rises to the level of
ineffective assistance of counsel.
To prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the claimant must
establish counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and
that prejudice occurred as a result. (Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 687–
688.) “Prejudice is shown when there is a ‘reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A
reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the
outcome.’ ” (People v. Jennings (1991) 53 Cal.3d 334, 357.) The defendant has the
burden of showing both deficient performance and resulting prejudice. (People v. Lucas
(1995) 12 Cal.4th 415, 436.)

B. Appellant was not prejudiced by defense counsel’s failure to object to the
prosecutor’s statements regarding the legal standard for heat of passion
voluntary manslaughter.
While explaining the concept of heat of passion voluntary manslaughter, the
prosecutor gave the example of a person discovering his or her spouse in bed with

30.
another person, and “they can’t control themselves and they lose all matter of being able
to comprehend how to act properly and they take a gun and they shoot the person that’s
having this affair.” The prosecutor then stated:

“But it has to be a reasonable response to a situation. So, Ladies and
Gentlemen, is it a reasonable response that when somebody – your wife
comes home and says they are leaving you and is moving out that you take
out a gun and you shoot that person? Would that be a reasonable way to
respond? Or would maybe another response be to push him out of the
room, or to shut the door … the laws in the State of California do not allow
somebody to take out a gun and then use deadly force and shoot that
person.”
Appellant contends this was a misstatement of the law. He notes the correct legal
standard for heat of passion is whether provocation was sufficient to induce a reasonable
person of average disposition to “ ‘act rashly without due deliberation and reflection,’ ”
not whether it would cause such a person to kill. (People v. Beltran (2013) 56 Cal.4th
935, 939, 942.) He analogizes the instant case to People v. Najera, which held the
prosecutor misstated the law by suggesting the proper standard for heat of passion was
whether “a reasonable person [would] do what the defendant did.” (People v. Najera
(2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 212, 223, italics omitted (Najera).)
Respondent concedes the prosecutor’s comments “approached the improper
argument in Najera,” but argues appellant was not prejudiced by defense counsel’s failure
to object. We agree. In assessing prejudice, we consider the prosecutor’s remarks “ ‘[i]n
the context of the whole argument and the instructions.’ ” (People v. Centeno (2014) 60
Cal.4th 659, 667.) Immediately after the prosecutor made the above comments, she
urged the jury to review the applicable standard for heat of passion “because that is not
what was going on here.” The prosecutor then articulated the correct standard for heat of
passion: “Defendant was provoked, as a result, the Defendant acted [rashly] and under
the influence of intense emotion and obscured his reasoning or judgment, and the
provocation would have caused a person of average disposition to act rashly and without

31.
due deliberation that is from passion rather than judgment.” This statement was
consistent with the trial court’s instruction on heat of passion voluntary manslaughter
with CALCRIM No. 570, which is a correct statement of law. The jury was also
instructed with CALCRIM No. 200 that it must follow the trial court’s instructions even
if they conflict with the attorney’s comments. We presume the jury understood and
followed the trial court’s instructions. (See People v. Sanchez (2001) 26 Cal.4th 834,
852; People v. Boyette (2002) 29 Cal.4th 381, 436.) Thus, to the extent the prosecutor’s
comments were misleading, the prejudicial effect was minimal.
Further, contrary to appellant’s claim, he did not rely on a heat of passion defense
at trial. Appellant denied becoming angry when Isabel said she was leaving him. He
never claimed he acted under the influence of intense emotion that obscured his
judgement. (See CALCRIM No. 570, see People v. Beltran, supra, 56 Cal.4th at
pp. 938–939.) Consistent with appellant’s testimony, defense counsel did not mention
heat of passion during closing argument. She focused exclusively on perfect and
imperfect self-defense and asked the jury to find appellant not guilty of murder on those
bases. Given the lack of evidence of heat of passion and appellant’s reliance on a
different theory, there is no basis to conclude the prosecutor’s comments resulted in
prejudice.
Defendant nonetheless maintains the jury could have found he acted in the heat of
passion based on his testimony he was in fear and panicking during the confrontation
with Junior. But as we explained above, in rejecting imperfect self-defense, the jury
found appellant did not actually believe lethal force was necessary to defend himself, or
that his own wrongful conduct justified Junior responding in self-defense. Given these
findings, the jury could not have also reasonably concluded appellant was in such a state
of fear and panic that he acted rashly and without due deliberation, regardless of the
prosecutor’s comments.

32.
Considering the jury’s findings, the lack of evidence supporting heat of passion,
and the limited significance of the prosecutor’s comments, there is no reasonable
probability defense counsel’s failure to object contributed to the verdict. Accordingly,
appellant did not suffer prejudice, and this claim fails.

C. The prosecutor did not suggest appellant had no right to self-defense
under any circumstance or a duty to retreat. Defense counsel was not
ineffective for failing to object.
As noted above, during closing argument, the prosecutor remarked that instead of
shooting his firearm, appellant could have pushed his alleged assailants “out of the room”
or “shut the door.” Later, while addressing appellant’s self-defense claim in rebuttal, the
prosecutor stated:

“The Defendant is the one that pulled out the gun. The Defendant is the
one that put himself in this situation, which goes to whether this was lawful
self-defense. It was not, Ladies and Gentlemen. This is the morning time,
broad daylight or morning. This is not like four men that he’s never met
before break into his house and take his stuff…. So again, what is
appropriate? What was the appropriate thing to do? He only had a gun.
Well, you know what, Ladies and Gentlemen, he didn’t have a right to bring
that gun out. Nobody charged him, okay. He had his fists. He had a way
to shut the door.”

Appellant contends the prosecutor erroneously suggested he had no right to use a
firearm under any circumstance and a duty to retreat before exercising his right to lawful
self-defense. We are not persuaded. The prosecutor’s remarks highlighted the evidence
supporting her position that appellant’s self-defense claim was not reasonable. She
explained that appellant was the first and only person to draw a weapon, and he did so in
response to no more than a verbal argument with his then wife and in-laws. Her
statement that appellant “didn’t have a right to bring that gun out” did not imply that
appellant had no general right to defend himself, regardless of the nature of the threat
faced. Rather, it was an observation that appellant drew his firearm even though he was
not facing any imminent threat. This was a fair comment on the evidence and was

33.
relevant to whether appellant’s subsequent discharge of the firearm was an act of lawful
self-defense.
Similarly, the prosecutor’s argument that appellant had alternatives to lethal force
did not imply he was legally obligated to retreat. Her suggestion that appellant could
have shut the door or pushed everyone out of the bedroom highlighted the
unreasonableness of appellant’s self-defense claim. As the prosecutor argued, appellant
was not facing any imminent threat of great bodily injury or death. It follows that the
reasonable course of action would have been to use nonlethal force or no force at all. The
prosecutor never suggested appellant was required to retreat from the threat of deadly
force. Her point was that appellant never faced such a threat, and thus, the use of deadly
force was not reasonable.
In short, the prosecutor did not misstate the law or otherwise mislead the jury. Her
remarks fell within the wide latitude afforded prosecutors to vigorously argue their case
and make fair comment upon the evidence. (People v. Ledesma (2006) 39 Cal.4th 641,
726.) Because we conclude the prosecutor’s remarks were not objectionable, appellant
fails to show defense counsel was ineffective for failing to object.

D. The prosecutor did not commit misconduct by arguing that appellant’s
testimony was not truthful. Defense counsel was not ineffective for
failing to object.
Appellant claims the prosecutor committed misconduct by asserting at various
points in closing argument that appellant’s testimony was not truthful. Most notably,
while addressing appellant’s self-defense claim, the prosecutor made the following
statement:

“[Y]ou have to believe everything the Defendant was saying to buy that
argument. This is why it’s glaringly clear that the Defendant was not being
truthful. His own witness, Felix Ordonez, who was really asleep on the
couch, not in the room at the time, didn’t see anything, but then when the
Defendant took the stand he said that Felix came in and he was putting
[Senior] in a chokehold, okay. Well, if that were true don’t you think Felix

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would have said that here in court? But he didn’t. Don’t believe what the
Defendant told you, Ladies and Gentlemen, because he is lying. He is not
being truthful. He has a prior conviction for a felony, and he has a motive
to lie here, okay. His story is completely different than the other
individuals that were there, completely different from … Henson,
completely different from Isabel, and completely different from [Senior].”
Later, during rebuttal, the prosecutor argued: “And now [four] years later he
comes in here and he makes up a story claiming that it’s self-defense. A story that’s
180 degrees different than any of the other witnesses that testified about what happened.”
We conclude the prosecutor’s remarks were not improper. “Referring to the
testimony … of a defendant as ‘lies’ is an acceptable practice so long as the prosecutor
argues inferences based on evidence rather than the prosecutor’s personal belief resulting
from personal experience or from evidence outside the record. [Citation.]” (People v.
Edelbacher (1989) 47 Cal.3d 983, 1030.) “[H]arsh and colorful attacks on the credibility
of opposing witnesses are permissible” so long as they are reasonably warranted by the
evidence. (People v. Arias (1996) 13 Cal.4th 92, 162, italics omitted; see People v.
Sandoval (1992) 4 Cal.4th 155, 180.)
The prosecutor’s argument that appellant’s self-defense testimony lacked veracity
had support in the record. She was careful to note that appellant’s testimony differed
greatly from the testimony and statements of other witnesses. She also relied on
appellant’s prior felony conviction, which was introduced by stipulation. (See Evid.
Code, § 788 [felony conviction admissible for impeachment). Lastly, the prosecutor
suggested appellant had a motive to lie, presumably based on his interest in the outcome
of the trial. Such argument was permissible, particularly given the clear inconsistences
between appellant’s testimony and the evidence. (See People v. Bunyard (1988)
45 Cal.3d 1189, 1222, abrogated on another ground by People v. Diaz (2015) 60 Cal.4th
1176, 1191; Evid. Code, § 780, subd. (f); CALCRIM No. 226.)
Appellant also claims the prosecutor improperly suggested his defense was
fabricated by defense counsel. This assertion is not supported by the record. The

35.
prosecutor’s remarks were clearly directed at appellant, not his representation. Nothing
the prosecutor said could be construed as an attack on the integrity of defense counsel.
The prosecutor’s argument that appellant’s testimony was not truthful was fair
comment on the evidence and not objectionable. We therefore conclude appellant fails to
show defense counsel was ineffective for failing to object, and we reject this claim.
VII. Cumulative Error.
Appellant raises a claim of cumulative error. He contends that, based on the
totality of some of the errors identified above, he suffered a fundamentally unfair trial.
We disagree.
“Under the ‘cumulative error’ doctrine, errors that are individually harmless may
nevertheless have a cumulative effect that is prejudicial.” (In re Avena (1996) 12 Cal.4th
694, 772, fn. 32.) A claim of cumulative error is essentially a due process claim. (People
v. Rivas (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 1410, 1436.) The test is whether the defendant received
a fair trial. (Ibid.)
We reject appellant’s claim of cumulative error because we have denied all his
individual claims. (See People v. Bradford (1997) 14 Cal.4th 1005, 1057 [cumulative
prejudice argument rejected because each individual contention lacked merit or did not
result in prejudice].) Taking all of appellant’s claims into account, we are satisfied that he
received a fair adjudication.

VIII. Appellant’s Challenge to the Trial Court’s Victim Restitution Order is
Forfeited. Defense Counsel Was Not Ineffective for Failing to Object.
The trial court ordered appellant to pay $3,807 in restitution to the California
Victim’s Compensation Board (CVCB) based on a claim from A.H. Appellant claims the
order should be stricken because there was insufficient evidence the claimant was a
victim of his crimes. We conclude the claim is forfeited because defense counsel did not
object to the restitution order, and we reject appellant’s corresponding ineffective
assistance of counsel claim.

36.
A. Background.
The probation report included a “Restitution Request” from the CVCB stating it
had paid A.H. $3,807 for her claim for “Mental Health Expenses,” and requesting the
court order appellant to pay restitution in the same amount to the CVCB. At the
sentencing hearing, the trial court ordered appellant pay $3,807 in restitution to the
CVCB. Appellant did not object or request a hearing to dispute the restitution order.
(See § 1202.4, subd. (f)(1).)
B. Applicable law – direct restitution and the CVCB.
Under the California Constitution, a crime victim is entitled to restitution. (Cal.
Const., art. I, § 28(b)(13).) Section 1202.4, which governs victim restitution, requires the
court to order restitution “in every case in which a victim has suffered economic loss as a
result of the defendant’s conduct.” (§ 1202.4, subd. (f).) The term “victim” is defined to
include, as pertinent here, persons who sustained economic loss as a result of the crime
and were the actual victim’s “spouse” or were “living in the household of the victim.”
(§ 1202.4, subd. (k)(3).) Economic loss includes “[m]ental health counseling expenses.”
(Id., subd. (f)(3)(c).)
The CVCB pays claims to victims from California’s Restitution Fund. (Govt.
Code, § 13950, subd. (b); see People v. Brown (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 1213, 1221, fn. 4.)
“[W]hen direct victim restitution has been satisfied by the victim’s application to the
[CVCB], the amounts a defendant is ordered to pay as direct victim restitution are instead
paid to the Restitution Fund.” (People v. Holman (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 1438, 1452;
see § 1202.4, subd. (f)(2).)
C. The claim is forfeited.
Respondent contends appellant forfeited his challenge to the restitution order by
failing to object below. We agree. “A defendant wishing to argue on appeal that there is
no factual basis for a restitution order must object on that ground in the trial court to
preserve the issue for appeal.” (People v. Mays (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 1232, 1237.)
37.
Accordingly, we conclude that by failing to object, appellant “forfeited any claim that the
order was … unwarranted by the evidence.” (People v. Brasure (2008) 42 Cal.4th 1037,
1075.)

D. Appellant’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim is meritless because
the record indicates the victim was entitled to restitution.
Appellant argues that if this court finds the issue is forfeited, the restitution order
should still be reversed because its imposition was attributable to ineffective assistance of
counsel. He asserts the record does not show “who [A.H.] is,” and thus, there was
insufficient evidence she was a victim of appellant’s crimes.
This assertion does not comport with the record. A.H. was not an unknown party.
The record plainly shows that A.H. is Henson’s sister, and that she was in a dating
relationship with Junior. Throughout the trial, witnesses referred to A.H. as either
Junior’s wife or his girlfriend. During his law enforcement statement, Henson explained
that A.H. and Junior were “married, but not fully married.” Thus, the record suggests
A.H. was Junior’s spouse and/or cohabitant.
Any ambiguity as to whether A.H. was a “victim” under section 1202.4 was
clarified by the CVCB’s payment of benefits. Under the CVCB’s eligibility statutes,
compensation for those who were not the actual victim of the crime is limited to the same
categories of persons as direct restitution. (Gov. Code, § 13955, subd. (c).) This includes
the actual victim’s spouse, or a person who lived in the same household as the actual
victim. (Id., § 13955, subds. (c)(1), (c)(2).) Therefore, A.H.’s eligibility for CVCB
benefits indicates she was a “victim” within the meaning of section 1202.4. (See
§ 1202.4, subd. (k)(3).)
Based on this record, there is no reason to believe the restitution order was
unwarranted. Accordingly, appellant fails to meet his burden of showing that but for
defense counsel’s failure to object, it is reasonably probable the restitution order would

38.
not have issued. (See People v. Jennings, supra, 53 Cal.3d. at p. 357.) The ineffective
assistance of counsel claim fails.

IX. Appellant’s Claim That the Trial Court Should Have Dismissed His Firearm
Enhancement Pursuant to Section 1385, Subdivision (c)(2)(C), is Forfeited.
Defense Counsel Was Not Ineffective for Failing to Request Dismissal on This
Ground Because the Subdivision is Inapplicable.

In supplemental briefing, appellant claims the trial court erred by failing to dismiss
his firearm enhancement (§ 12022.53, subd. (d)) at sentencing pursuant to section 1385,
subdivision (c)(2). Specifically, he argues the trial court should have dismissed the
firearm enhancement pursuant to subdivision (c)(2)(C), which applies where “[t]he
application of an enhancement could result in a sentence of over 20 years.”
We agree with respondent that the claim is forfeited because appellant did not
request the trial court dismiss the enhancement. We also reject appellant’s ineffective
assistance of counsel claim because section 1385, subdivision (c)(2)(C) is inapplicable to
appellant’s sentence.
A. Background.
The trial court sentenced appellant to 95 years to life in state prison as follows.
On count 1, the court sentenced appellant to 15 years to life, tripled based on appellant’s
prior strike convictions, for a term of 45 years to life. (§ 667, subd. (e)(2)(A)(i).) As to
the section 12025.53, subdivision (d) firearm enhancement on count 1, the trial court
imposed an additional term of 25 years to life. On count 2, the trial court sentenced
appellant to 25 years to life based on his prior strike convictions (§ 667, subd.
(e)(2)(A)(ii)), to be served consecutively to count 1. Sentences on counts 3 and 4 were
ordered to run concurrently.
Prior to sentencing, defense counsel requested the trial court dismiss one or both
of appellant’s prior strike conviction findings pursuant to People v. Superior Court
(Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497. The trial court denied the request based on appellant’s

39.
“significant criminal history.” Defense counsel did not request the trial court dismiss the
use of a firearm enhancement.10
B. Applicable Law – section 1385, subdivision (c).
Effective January 1, 2022, Senate Bill No. 81 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.) (Stats. 2021,
ch. 721, § 1) amended section 1385 to add subdivision (c), which provides, in part:

“(1) Notwithstanding any other law, the court shall dismiss an
enhancement if it is in the furtherance of justice to do so, except if
dismissal of that enhancement is prohibited by any initiative statute.

“(2) In exercising its discretion under this subdivision, the court
shall consider and afford great weight to evidence offered by the defendant
to prove that any of the [listed] mitigating circumstances ... are present.
Proof of the presence of one or more of these circumstances weighs greatly
in favor of dismissing the enhancement, unless the court finds that
dismissal of the enhancement would endanger public safety.” (§ 1385,
subd. (c)(1)–(2).)
Appellant relies on the following enumerated mitigating circumstance listed in
section 1385, subdivision (c)(2)(C): “The application of an enhancement could result in a
sentence of over 20 years. In this instance, the enhancement shall be dismissed.”
C. The claim is forfeited.
Under section 1385, a criminal defendant has “the right to ‘invite the court to
exercise its power by an application to strike a count or allegation of an accusatory
pleading.’ ” (People v. Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367, 375.) However, “complaints

10
While pronouncing judgment the firearm enhancement, without prompting from
counsel, the trial court stated: “The Court acknowledges [that due to] the recent changes
in the law, as well as decisions from the higher courts, the Court may have some ability to
modify or strike that enhancement[.] I choose not to do so. I think it would be
completely and wholly inappropriate to do so in this case. That enhancement is 25 years
to life.” It appears this was a refence to the trial court’s discretion to strike or modify a
firearm enhancement pursuant to sections 1385, subdivision (a) and 12022.53,
subdivision (h). (See People v. Tirado (2022) 12 Cal.5th 688, 692; People v. McDavid
(2024) 15 Cal.5th 1015, 1020.)

40.
about the manner in which the trial court exercises its sentencing discretion … cannot be
raised for the first time on appeal.” (People v. Scott (1994) 9 Cal.4th 331, 356.) Thus,
“any failure on the part of a defendant to invite the court to dismiss under section 1385 …
forfeits [the] right to raise the issue on appeal.” (People v. Carmony, at p. 374; see
People v. Coleman (2024) 98 Cal.App.5th 709, 724 [defendant forfeited his claim the
trial court was required to dismiss enhancements pursuant to section 1385,
subdivision (c)(2) by failing to request dismissal below].)
Appellant did not request the trial court dismiss the firearm enhancement. As a
result, the trial court had no occasion to exercise its discretion in accordance with
section 1385, subdivision (c)(2). Accordingly, the claim is forfeited.

D. Defense counsel was not ineffective because section 1385,
subdivision (c)(2)(C) does not apply to appellant’s sentence.
Appellant argues that even if the claim is forfeited, he is still entitled to relief
because he suffered ineffective assistance of counsel. He contends that section 1385,
subdivision (c)(2)(C) necessarily requires dismissal of the firearm enhancement because
his sentence exceeded 20 years.
Appellant’s broad reading of section 1385, subdivision (c)(2)(C) does not comport
with its plain language. “ ‘When interpreting statutes, we begin with the plain,
commonsense meaning of the language used by the legislature. [Citation.] If the
language is unambiguous, the plain meaning controls.’ [Citation.] ‘[W]henever possible,
significance must be given to every word [in a statute] in pursuing the legislative
purpose[.]’ ” (People v. Rodriguez (2012) 55 Cal.4th 1125, 1131.)
Section 1385, subdivision (c)(2)(C) states an enhancement shall be dismissed if its
application “could result in a sentence of over 20 years.” (Italics added.) The verb
“result” means “[t]o be a physical, logical, or legal consequence.” (Black’s Law Dict.
(12th ed. 2024) p. 1576, col. 1.) Thus, the subdivision only applies when, as a
consequence of the enhancement, the sentence is (or could be) over 20 years. (See

41.
Couzens et al., Sentencing Cal. Crimes (The Rutter Group 2024) § 12:11 [“There will be
no entitlement to relief unless it is the application of the term for the enhancement that
results in a sentence of longer than 20 years”].) Conversely, section 1385,
subdivision (c)(2)(C) does not apply where a defendant’s sentence is greater than
20 years before the enhancement is applied, because the sentence does not exceed
20 years as a result of the enhancement.
Here, appellant was sentenced to 45 years to life on count 1 alone. The trial court
also imposed a consecutive sentence of 25 years to life on count 2. Even without the
additional term of 25 years to life from the firearm enhancement, appellant’s sentence
was already well in excess of 20 years. Accordingly, section 1385, subdivision (c)(2)(C)
does not apply. We therefore conclude appellant fails to show defense counsel was
ineffective for failing to request dismissal of the enhancement on this ground, because the
request would have been futile. (See People v. Thompson (2010) 49 Cal.4th 79, 122.)
Likewise, appellant fails to demonstrate he was prejudiced by counsel’s allegedly
deficient performance. The ineffective assistance of counsel claim is without merit.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.

LEVY, Acting P. J.
WE CONCUR:

MEEHAN, J.

DE SANTOS, J.

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