People v. O'Brien CA4/2

CourtListener 10377143Calctapp11.04.2025

Gesamter Gesetzestext

Filed 4/11/25 P. v. O’Brien CA4/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent, E082833

v. (Super. Ct. No. FWV19001320)

MICHAEL PATRICK O’BRIEN, OPINION

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County. Ingrid A. Uhler,

Judge. Affirmed.

Siri Shetty, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and

Appellant.

Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney

General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Eric A. Swenson, and

Christopher P. Beesley, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

1
I.

INTRODUCTION

After defendant and appellant Michael Patrick O’Brien successfully appealed in

light of People v. Tirado (2022) 12 Cal.5th 688 (Tirado), on remand defendant urged the

trial court to dismiss or reduce the firearm enhancement to a lesser included

enhancement. The trial court refused, leaving the original sentence fully intact.

Defendant again appeals, arguing the trial court abused its discretion in declining to strike

or impose a lesser enhancement because the court did not properly apply the public safety

exception under section 1385. We disagree and affirm.

II.
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FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Defendant had a son with his ex-girlfriend, Desseray Mariscal. Shortly after they

broke up, Mariscal began a relationship with the victim, Rudy Areyan. (O’Brien I, supra,

E074516.)

Mariscal and Areyan got into an argument when they were doing laundry together

at a laundromat. Mariscal left the laundromat with her son in her car and told Areyan that

she needed to “cool off.” Areyan followed Mariscal in his car as she drove away.

Mariscal texted him, telling him to go away, but he continued following her. (O’Brien I,

supra, E074516.)

1
The factual background is drawn from this court’s unpublished prior appeal
from defendant’s direct appeal, case No. E074516. (People v. O’Brien (June 22, 2021,
E074516) [nonpub. opn.], as modified on denial of reh'g (July 7, 2021) (O’Brien I).)

2
While driving, Mariscal called defendant and told him about the situation.

Defendant was concerned about his son and told Mariscal to meet him where he was. He

told Mariscal that he would “deal with it.” Mariscal drove to where defendant was

located. (O’Brien I, supra, E074516.)

According to Mariscal, when she arrived at defendant’s location, defendant was

outside waiting for her and Areyan, who was still following her. Mariscal and Areyan

then parked, and Areyan got out of his car and walked toward defendant. But, according

to an eyewitness, Mariscal was following Areyan when he parked. After he parked,

defendant got out of the passenger seat of Mariscal’s car and walked toward Areyan.

(O’Brien I, supra, E074516.)

When Areyan approached defendant, defendant pulled out a gun and shot Areyan

in the top of the head. Areyan’s wounds were consistent with being shot while bending

over and facing defendant. Defendant then ran to Mariscal’s car, got inside, and Mariscal

drove away and dropped him off near the freeway. (O’Brien I, supra, E074516.)
2
A jury convicted defendant of first degree murder (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a) )

and found true the allegation that he discharged a firearm, causing great bodily injury or

death, in the commission of the crime (§ 12022.53, subd. (d)). The trial court found that

defendant had a prior conviction that qualified as both a prior serious felony (§ 667, subd.

(a)) and a strike prior (§ 667, subds. (b)-(i)). The court sentenced defendant to 75 years

to life, consisting of an indeterminate term of 25 years to life for the murder, doubled for

2
Unless otherwise noted, all further statutory references are the Penal Code.

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defendant’s prior strike conviction, plus 25 years for the firearm enhancement. (See

O’Brien I, supra, E074516.) Defendant’s conviction was affirmed on direct appeal in

O’Brien I.

In his appeal, defendant asserted, among other things, that the trial court failed to

recognize its discretion to consider reducing the firearm enhancement to a lesser included

enhancement. We originally disagreed and affirmed the judgment. However, after

defendant petitioned for review, the California Supreme Court resolved in Tirado that

trial courts have discretion to reduce section 12022.53 firearm enhancements to

uncharged lesser included enhancements. In light of that decision, the Supreme Court

transferred defendant’s case back to this court for further consideration. We remanded

the matter to allow the trial court to consider whether to reduce the firearm enhancement

in light of Tirado and to resentence defendant accordingly. (People v. O’Brien (July 8,

2022, E074516) [nonpub. opn.] (O’Brien II).)

Upon remand, noting defendant’s “extreme mental illness” and difficult

childhood, defendant’s counsel requested a full resentencing a hearing and urged the trial

court to dismiss the firearm enhancement and prior strike conviction under the factors

outlined in amended section 1385. Specifically, counsel argued that the court should

consider dismissing the prior strike because: (1) multiple enhancements were alleged; (2)

application of enhancements resulted in a sentence over 20 years in state prison; (3) the

offense was connected to mental illness, specifically PTSD related to a 2016 gunshot

wound; (4) the offense was connected to childhood trauma, including the loss of an

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important parental figure to gang violence when he was 16 years old; (5) defendant’s

efforts at rehabilitation, including his participation in programs at the CDCR; and (6)

defendant’s youth of being 23 years old at the time of the offense. In support, counsel

submitted a biopsychosocial assessment, a CDCR certificate indicating defendant had

completed 156 hours of anger management, and numerous character letters.

According to the biopsychosocial assessor, defendant appeared to be “authentic

throughout the assessment and provided insight.” Defendant acknowledged his gang

involvement and noted that he was raised in a neighborhood where drug use and violence

were rampant. Defendant began abusing methamphetamine when he was 16 years old

and relied on drugs as a coping mechanism for the violence he experienced from his

father and witnessed in his neighborhood. At that age, defendant also lost his uncle to

gang violence, and according to his mother, this was a pivotal loss that changed the

trajectory of defendant’s life. As a young adult, defendant developed PTSD after nearly

dying from a gunshot wound. Defendant acknowledged to the assessor that he has “acted

impulsively and with anger throughout his life” and that he has “struggled with

controlling his anger and aggression towards others.”

At the hearing, defendant’s counsel maintained defendant was entitled to a full

resentencing hearing. Counsel also reiterated that defendant’s conduct was connected “to

his post-traumatic stress of being a victim of [a] gunshot wound in 2016” and argued “the

nexus between the PTSD and the aggression impulsivity and unpredictability are tied

together in the mental health issue which would weigh in favor of the granting of the

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motion.” The trial court declined to conduct a full resentencing hearing, stating it did not

have jurisdiction to do so. The prosecutor thereafter pointed out that section 1385,

subdivision (c) states certain factors the court should consider in deciding whether or not

to strike or give a lesser gun enhancement and argued the court should not strike the gun

enhancement or impose a lesser gun enhancement. The prosecutor also stated that the

court did not have jurisdiction to consider “other issues outside of the scope that it’s on

for remitter,” and that even if “under an abundance of caution, that if the Court were able

to I would still argue that he wouldn’t be appropriate for another Romero motion to be

granted. I know he’s asked for that previously the Court has denied it from my

recollection. I don’t see any changes. This is a recent strike. I don’t think the Court,

even if it did have jurisdiction, my request would be that the Court still not grant any sort

of Romero motion, even if it did have jurisdiction to argue as such. And with that, I

would submit.”

After further argument by defense counsel, the trial court gave a detailed

explanation of its ruling as follows: “For the record, I did have an opportunity to review

the presentence investigation report, all the materials submitted on behalf of the

defendant for his petition—strike that, for the remitter, including the motion for

resentencing and the People’s opposition. [¶] In terms of using my discretion to strike

the prior serious/violent felony that was found true, I don’t believe I have jurisdiction to

relitigate that issue. I am only empowered to act in accordance with the directions from

the Court of Appeal. And they remanded it solely for the purpose of reducing the

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firearm enhancement. If I did have the authority I would stand by my original ruling in

denying the striking of the prior strike for the same reasons stated at the time of

sentencing. [¶] As far as reducing the enhancement pursuant to [section]

12022.53[, subdivision] (b)(c) or [section] 12022.5, I believe that if the Court should do

this at the defendant’s request it would be contrary to the furtherance of justice and

reduction of the enhancement would endanger public safety. Again, the Court cannot

lose sight of the heinous actions of the defendant in shooting and killing an unarmed man

during an ambush. I reread two of the victim impact letters submitted by his brother and

wife and it is very clear that to reduce the defendant’s sentence would be an injustice to

them after they poured out their grief and trauma to the court during the sentencing

hearing. Mr. Areyan will never have an opportunity to return to his family. The

defendant has a lengthy history of violent conduct, starting with stabbing two students

with pencils when he was 13 years old; a conviction for [section] 245[, subdivision]

(a)(4), involving the stabbing of two victims in 2013; and domestic violence and criminal

threats in 2017. In addition, I don’t believe the factors outlined in . . . [s]ection 1385

subsection (c), subsection (2) subsection (A) through (I) support the reduction of the

enhancement. The sentence has nothing to do with racial discrimination; only one single

enhancement was imposed since the strike is a penalty provision not an enhancement,

according to case authority cited by the prosecution. And aside from the firearm

enhancement, the defendant was sentenced to 50 years to life on the murder conviction,

so the firearm enhancement could not result in a sentence over 20 years. However, if the

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Court does consider it to be two enhancements and imposing the enhancement does result

in a sentence over 20 years, the Court still is using its discretion not to reduce the

enhancement because public safety and the interest of justice weighs against reducing the

enhancement. [¶] Based upon the defendant’s willfulness, deliberation, and

premeditation, and lying in wait, the Court does not believe that any mental illness, prior

victimization or childhood trauma substantially contributed to the defendant’s

involvement in the commission of the murder. He was raised by two working parents

that tried their best. In all the cases that he received school sanctions, including

suspensions for stabbing two students with pencils and tagging his gang on school

property, his parents almost always responded to calls from the school in an attempt to

handle the situations. I note at one point they tried to send him to military school in

hopes to get away from his chosen gang lifestyle. His claims of child abuse by his father

are not supported by any other evidence. To the contrary, his mother denied having any

knowledge of abuse nor have any other family members come forward to substantiate his

claims. And by his own admission, in most instances the physical punishment at the

hands of his father sounded more like an attempt to discipline rather than child abuse. In

review of the defendant’s own statement in support of his petition, it is clear that his

parents did what all parents would do when faced with a child that, as his mother said,

made choices that she did not condone or agree with. I do appreciate his family members

and friends writing character letters on his behalf, but to say that he was simply

misguided is not an accurate portrayal of who he is and what he has done. [¶] As far as

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the PTSD caused by being a victim of a shooting at age 21, there doesn’t seem to be any

evidence that this prior victimization had substantially contributed to the defendant’s

involvement in the murder when you see his pattern of assaultive conduct far preceded

this incident and he made the choice to become a member of a gang. Losing Joseph, his

father figure at age 16, I am sure was a very difficult time for him. But again, based upon

his school records and by his own admissions, he exhibited a pattern of violence before

the loss. [¶] In review of the final factors outlined in [section] 1385[, subdivision] (c),

the current offense is a violent felony. The defendant was not a juvenile when he

committed the offense. The enhancement is not based upon a prior that is more than five

years old, and, obviously, the firearm was operable and loaded. [¶] In reviewing the

biopsychosocial assessment, what was extremely troubling was reading the defendant’s

statements about his violent tendencies, which does in fact endanger public safety, quote,

‘Dad has a bad temper and I have a bad temper too. I did violent stuff thinking it was

okay. I am a compulsive thinker. Most of the things I do is in a violent way because

that’s what I’m used to.’ He feels on edge and paranoid during encounters with

strangers, acquaintances and even close peers. And as a defense mechanism, he often

acts out before someone can get the best of him. He further admitted that, quote, ‘When I

have violent outbursts, I take everything to the extreme,’ unquote. His mother also noted

these violent outbursts even when the defendant was a young child. [¶] During his prior

incarceration to state prison, prior to the murder, he participated in the exact same

programs he participated in now. And obviously, his attendance then did not have any

9
effect in changing his attitude and behavior towards violence. [¶] And finally, despite

the letters indicating that the defendant is remorseful for the commission of the murder,

not once, in any documents reviewed by the Court did he ever share his own personal

statement of remorse, which again, is a factor to consider when protecting the interest of

public safety. [¶] So, for all the reasons stated above, I am not going to use my

discretion to reduce the firearm enhancement to any lesser charge and the previous

sentence imposed by this court shall remain.” Defendant timely appealed.

III.

DISCUSSION

Defendant contends the matter must be remanded for a new sentencing hearing

because the trial court abused its discretion in determining whether to dismiss the firearm

enhancement or to impose a lesser included enhancement. Specifically, he claims the

court did not properly apply the public safety exception under section 1385 because the

statute requires the court to evaluate whether he poses a danger to public safety when he

is released rather than at the time of sentencing, including whether his release is subject

to a further risk determination by the Board of Parole. The People respond that the trial

court did not abuse its discretion, analyzed the appropriate factors, and the record does

not affirmatively show the court failed to consider defendant’s risk of danger to the

public at the time of his potential release on parole.

Our Supreme Court has recently clarified the framework within which a trial court

must review requests to strike enhancements in this situation, as well as the proper

10
analysis for assessing the harmlessness of an error where a trial court fails to properly

exercise its discretion. (See People v. Walker (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1024, 1033-1035

(Walker) [interpreting section 1385, subdivision (c)(2)]; People v. Salazar (2023) 15

Cal.5th 416, 425 [explaining requirements of harmless error analysis under similar

circumstances].)

Under section 12022.53, subdivision (h), “[t]he court may, in the interest of justice

pursuant to [s]ection 1385 and at the time of sentencing, strike or dismiss an

enhancement otherwise required to be imposed by this section.” The court may also

impose a lesser included, uncharged section 12022.53 enhancement if facts supporting

imposition of the lesser enhancement have been alleged and found true. (See People v.

Tirado, supra, 12 Cal.5th at p. 697.)

In October 2021, the Governor signed Senate Bill No. 81 that added a new

subdivision (c) to section 1385. (Stats. 2021, ch. 721; People v. Mendoza (2023) 88

Cal.App.5th 287, 295 (Mendoza).) Senate Bill No. 81 amended “section 1385 to specify

mitigating circumstances that the trial court should consider when deciding whether to

strike enhancements from a defendant’s sentence in the interest of justice.” (People v.

Lipscomb (2022) 87 Cal.App.5th 9, 16.)

Section 1385, subdivision (c)(1) states: “Notwithstanding any other law, the court

shall dismiss an enhancement if it is in the furtherance of justice to do so.” Under section

1385, subdivision (c)(2), “In exercising its discretion under this subdivision, the court

shall consider and afford great weight to evidence offered by the defendant to prove that

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any of the mitigating circumstances in subparagraphs (A) to (I) are present. Proof of the

presence of one or more of these circumstances weighs greatly in favor of dismissing the

enhancement, unless the court finds that dismissal of the enhancement would endanger

public safety. ‘Endanger public safety’ means there is a likelihood that the dismissal of

the enhancement would result in physical injury or other serious danger to others.”

Section 1385, subdivision (c)(2), provides nine non-exclusive mitigating factors a

trial court should consider, such as racial impact, whether multiple enhancements are

alleged in a single case, whether the crimes are connected to defendant’s mental illness,

whether the defendant experienced childhood trauma or abuse, and whether application

of the enhancement could result in a sentence over 20 years. (See § 1385, subd.

(c)(2)(A)-(I).) “[S]ection 1385[, subdivision] (c)(2) does not require the trial court to

consider any particular factors in determining whether ‘there is a likelihood that the

dismissal of the enhancement would result in physical injury or other serious danger to

others.’” (Mendoza, supra, 88 Cal.App.5th at p. 299.)

In Walker, supra, 16 Cal.5th 1024, our high court addressed how section 1385,

subdivision (c)(2)’s “great weight” language impacted a trial court’s sentencing

discretion. Based on that section’s plain language (Walker, supra, at p. 1033), the court

found it “clear that the structure [of section 1385, subdivision (c)] does not ‘presume’

[citation] an enhancement should be dismissed whenever an enumerated mitigating

circumstance is present, but instead ‘the ultimate question before the trial court remains

whether it is in the furtherance of justice to dismiss an enhancement’ [citation] and this

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‘furtherance of justice’ (§ 1385, subd. (c)(1)) inquiry requires a trial court’s ongoing

exercise of ‘discretion’ (id., subd. (c)(2)). Thus, notwithstanding the presence of a

mitigating circumstance, trial courts retain their discretion to impose an enhancement

based on circumstances ‘long deemed essential to the “furtherance of justice” inquiry.’”
3
(Ibid., citing People v. Ortiz (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 1087, 1098-1099 (Ortiz).)

Disagreeing with the appellate court in People v. Walker (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th
4
386, the California Supreme Court determined that the statute’s plain language did not

create a rebuttable presumption that can only be overcome by a finding that dismissal

endangers public safety but “emphasize[d] . . . that in most cases, ‘if the trial court finds

that dismissal of an enhancement would endanger public safety, then it is hard to see how

dismissal would further the interests of justice,’ notwithstanding the applicability of any

mitigating factors identified in subdivision (c)(2).” (Walker, supra, 16 Cal.5th at p.

1033.)

3
The court also cited in part to the Advisory Committee comment to California
Rules of Court, rule 4.428, which addresses “[f]actors affecting imposition of
enhancements” and provides: “‘Case law suggests that in determining the “furtherance of
justice” the court should consider . . . the factors in aggravation and mitigation including
the specific factors in mitigation of section 1385[, subdivision] (c); and the factors that
would motivate a “reasonable judge” in the exercise of their discretion.’” (Walker, supra,
16 Cal.5th at p. 1033.)
4
The Court of Appeal “conclude[d] that section 1385’s mandate to ‘afford great
weight’ to mitigating circumstances erects a rebuttable presumption that obligates a court
to dismiss the enhancement unless the court finds that dismissal of that enhancement . . .
would endanger public safety.” (People v. Walker, supra, 86 Cal.App.5th at p. 391.)

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The Supreme Court proceeded to “consider what it means for a mitigating

circumstance to ‘weigh[ ] greatly in favor’ . . . of dismissal.” (Walker, supra, 16 Cal.5th

at p. 1034.) The court adopted the Ortiz court’s understanding as consistent with the

statute’s construction: “[A] trial court must ‘engage[] in a holistic balancing with special

emphasis on the enumerated mitigating factors,’ in which the mitigating factors weigh

‘strongly in favor of . . . dismissal . . . .’” (Id. at p. 1036, quoting Ortiz, supra, 87

Cal.App.5th at p. 1096.) And “mitigating circumstances are entitled to ‘increased

significance and importance in the [court’s] overall balancing of factors’ under section

1385.” (Walker, supra, at p. 1036.) The court explained: “Stated simply, if the court

does not conclude that dismissal would endanger public safety, then mitigating

circumstances strongly favor dismissing the enhancement. But ultimately, the court must

determine whether dismissal is in furtherance of justice. This means that, absent a danger

to public safety, the presence of an enumerated mitigating circumstance will generally

result in the dismissal of an enhancement unless the sentencing court finds substantial,

credible evidence of countervailing factors that ‘may nonetheless neutralize even the

great weight of the mitigating circumstance, such that dismissal of the enhancement is not

in furtherance of justice.’” (Id. at p. 1036.)

Our Supreme Court concluded that its formulation gave “force to the ‘great

weight’ standard: Pursuant to section 1385, subdivision (c)(2), absent a finding that

dismissal would endanger public safety, a court must assign significant value to the

enumerated mitigating circumstances when they are present. In practice, the presence of

14
an enumerated mitigating circumstance will generally result in the dismissal of an

enhancement unless the sentencing court finds substantial, credible evidence of

countervailing factors that ‘may nonetheless neutralize even the great weight of the

mitigating circumstance, such that dismissal of the enhancement is not in furtherance of

justice.’” (Walker, supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 1038.)

We review a trial court’s decision whether to strike or reduce an enhancement

under section 1385 for abuse of discretion. (Mendoza, supra, 88 Cal.App.5th at p. 298.)

Likewise, we review for abuse of discretion the “court’s determination that dismissal of

[an] enhancement would endanger public safety.” (Ibid.) Further, in assessing

sentencing issues, we apply a presumption of regularity of judicial exercises of discretion.

(People v. Mosley (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 489, 496.) “‘“[T]he burden is on the party

attacking the sentence to clearly show that the sentencing decision was irrational or

arbitrary. [Citation.] In the absence of such a showing, the trial court is presumed to

have acted to achieve legitimate sentencing objectives, and its discretionary

determination to impose a particular sentence will not be set aside on review.”’” (People

v. Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367, 376-377.) “The court is presumed to have considered

all of the relevant factors in the absence of an affirmative record to the contrary.”

(People v. Myers (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 305, 310.) But “‘an abuse of discretion arises if

the trial court based its decision on impermissible factors . . . or on an incorrect legal

standard.’” (People v. Gonzalez (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 215, 225 (Gonzalez).)

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We conclude defendant has not shown the trial court abused its discretion in

declining to reduce the firearm enhancement to a lesser enhancement. The court’s

explicit finding that such dismissal would endanger public safety, under Walker’s

formulation of section 1385, subdivision (c)(2), means it was not required to “assign

significant value to the [applicable] mitigating circumstances . . . .” (Walker, supra, 16

Cal.5th at p. 1038 [“absent a finding that dismissal would endanger public safety, a court

must assign significant value to the enumerated mitigating circumstances when they are

present”]; accord, Mendoza, supra, 88 Cal.App.5th at p. 296 [“if the court finds [under

section 1385, subdivision (c)(2)] that dismissal of an enhancement ‘would endanger

public safety,’ then the court need not consider the listed mitigating circumstances”].)

Defendant argues the trial court applied the wrong legal standard in making the

endanger to public safety finding because the court failed to properly consider

defendant’s possible dangerousness at the time of his eventual release if he were

sentenced to a lesser term. In support, he relies on Gonzalez, supra, 103 Cal.App.5th

215.

In Gonzalez, supra, 103 Cal.App.5th 215, the defendant argued that the trial court

committed error by “focusing on whether [Gonzalez] ‘presently’ and ‘currently’

endangered public safety rather than assessing whether, looking forward, public safety

would be endangered due to an earlier release from prison (i.e., in 50 years to life rather

than in 75 years to life) if the enhancement was dismissed.” (Id. at p. 224.) The

Gonzalez court determined “the trial court erred because it considered only whether

16
Gonzalez currently posed a danger to the public when assessing if a dismissal of the

firearm enhancement would ‘endanger public safety.’” (Id. at p. 230.) The trial court

had “specifically explained, ‘I think presently [Gonzalez] does represent a danger to

society, and for that reason . . . I do think it is appropriate for the Court to impose an

additional 25 years to life for the gun use enhancement.’” (Id. at p. 231.) Because the

trial court in Gonzalez relied on that single factor for its decision, and “gave no indication

of how it would rule if it did not limit its inquiry to Gonzalez’s current dangerousness”

(ibid.), the Court of Appeal concluded that the trial court’s error was prejudicial. (Id. at

p. 232.) It explained that, in deciding whether an enhancement’s dismissal would

endanger the public, sentencing courts should employ a “‘forward-looking inquiry’” that

not only accounts for the defendant’s current dangerousness, but also considers “the date

on which the defendant would be released under the revised sentence, and, in the case of

an indeterminate sentence, the safety valve that exists due to the review by the Board of

Parole Hearings.” (Id. at p. 229.)

Here, the trial court’s comments at the sentencing hearing do not demonstrate it

interpreted section 1385 in the manner rejected by the appellate court in Gonzalez. Nor

do its remarks reflect that the trial court expressly limited its analysis to defendant’s

current dangerousness. (Cf. Gonzalez, supra, 103 Cal.App.5th at p. 224.) Instead, the

court explained that it could not “lose sight of the heinous actions of the defendant in

shooting and killing an unarmed man during an ambush.” After noting the impact the

17
murder had on the victim’s family, the court enumerated defendant’s extensive violent

criminal history.

Thereafter, the court analyzed the factors enumerated in section 1385, subdivision

(c). The court expressly rejected that the current sentence was based upon racial

discrimination and observed that there was only a single enhancement involved in the

case. (See § 1385, subd. (c)(2)(A)-(B) [articulating factors about racial disparity and

whether multiple enhancements are involved in the case].) The court also noted that the

lengthy nature of the underlying sentence was not attributable to the enhancement but

rather to the Three Strikes Law, which required the 50-years-to-life term for the murder

conviction. (§ 1385, subd. (c)(2)(C) [articulating a preference that enhancements not

increase sentences to beyond 20 years].) The court further stated that even if the

imposition of the enhancement somehow implicated concerns about a sentence greater

than 20 years, “public safety and the interest of justice” weighed against enhancement

reduction. The court also explained that defendant’s “willfulness, deliberation, and

premeditation, and lying in wait,” precluded a finding that the murder was connected to

mental illness or childhood trauma. (§ 1385, subd. (c)(2)(D)-(E).) The court noted that

defendant was raised by two working parents who did their best to raise their son. They

were involved and responsive to disciplinary issues that arose in the school environment.

They tried to send him to military school to separate him from his gang affiliations.

Defendant’s self-serving assertions of child abuse claims were simply not substantiated.

Likewise, the court noted that while defendant may have been the victim of a shooting at

18
age 21, there was no evidence showing that experience contributed in any way to the

current murder. In its review of the final factors articulated in section 1385, subdivision

(c), the court observed that the murder was indeed a violent offense, defendant was not a

juvenile, the enhancement was not based upon conduct over five years old, and the

firearm was obviously operable and loaded. (§ 1385, subd. (c)(2)(F)-(I).)

The court found the psychological assessment evidence to be troubling. The court

explained that, by his own admission, defendant conceded that he had a “bad temper,”

that he “did violent stuff thinking it was okay,” and that “‘[m]ost of the things [he did

were] in a violent way because that’s what [he’s] used to.’” Defendant acknowledged

feelings of paranoia and that he tended toward violent outbursts taken “‘to the extreme.’”

The court observed that defendant had participated in rehabilitative programs while in

prison prior to the murder, but that these programs obviously had no “‘effect in changing

his attitude and behavior toward violence.’” The court further noted that while others

spoke in favor of defendant and expressed that he was remorseful, it had found no

instance in which defendant personally expressed remorse.

As explained above, the trial court did not specify, let alone limit, the temporal

nature of that risk. In contrast to the facts of Gonzalez, here the trial court considered

defendant’s criminal and incarceration history, as well as his current offense, his

character, and his prospects, after giving great weight and consideration to the mitigating

circumstances raised by defense counsel. Indeed, given defendant’s criminal history,

nature of the crime, defendant’s character and his prospect for the future, the court could

19
reasonably conclude defendant’s early release would endanger public safety. (See In re

Coley (2012) 55 Cal.4th 524, 561-562 [prior criminal history together with the nature of

current offenses “may properly be viewed as an indicator of potentially significant future

dangerousness”].) Based of the foregoing, we reject defendant’s argument based on

Gonzalez.

Even if the court failed to properly consider defendant’s possible dangerousness at

the time of his eventual release if he were sentenced to a lesser term, we find any error to

be harmless. As previously explained, the “public safety exception” is an exception to

the requirement to consider all the mitigating factors under section 1385, subdivision (c).

However, here the court did consider all of the appropriate mitigating factors. As such,

the court’s public safety finding was irrelevant. Further, the Gonzalez court stated “it is

conceivable that, if the trial court holds a new sentencing hearing in which it does not

limit its inquiry to [the defendant]’s current dangerousness, it will decide to exercise its

discretion under section 1385, subdivision (c)(2) in a different manner.” (Gonzalez,

supra, 103 Cal.App.5th at p. 231.) In this case, based on the trial court’s well-reasoned

statements, there is no likelihood the court would exercise its discretion differently.

In sum, we reject defendant’s contentions that the trial court abused its discretion

in declining to reduce his firearm enhancement under section 1385.

20
IV.

DISPOSITION

The trial court’s postjudgment order declining to reduce the firearm enhancement

to a lesser is affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

CODRINGTON
Acting P. J.

We concur:

FIELDS
J.

MENETREZ
J.

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