People v. Rocha CA2/5

CourtListener 10376132Calctapp10.04.2025

Gesamter Gesetzestext

Filed 4/10/25 P. v. Rocha CA2/5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FIVE

THE PEOPLE, B334356

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. TA122213)
v.

MARTIN ROCHA, JR.,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Tammy Chung Ryu, Judge. Reversed and
remanded.

Michael Reed, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Scott A. Taryle, Supervising Deputy
Attorney General, and Viet H. Nguyen, Deputy Attorney General,
for Plaintiff and Respondent.

******
Martin Rocha, Jr. (defendant) appeals the trial court’s
order denying his petition for resentencing under Penal Code1
section 1172.6.2 He contends the trial court engaged in
impermissible judicial factfinding by relying on the preliminary
hearing transcript to deny defendant’s petition at the prima facie
stage. Although the court properly relied on the preliminary
hearing transcript, the transcript itself does not conclusively
establish that defendant was the actual killer and hence not
entitled to relief under section 1172.6 as a matter of law. We
accordingly reverse and remand for an evidentiary hearing.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
I. Facts3
A. The underlying crime
In late August 2011, Lorenzo Terrazas (Terrazas) was at a

1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code
unless otherwise indicated.

2 Effective June 30, 2022, section 1170.95 was renumbered
section 1172.6, with no change in text (Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 10).
We therefore refer to the law formerly codified at section 1170.95
as section 1172.6.

3 We summarize these facts from the transcripts of the
preliminary hearing conducted on June 25 and 26, 2012.

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backyard party inside rival gang territory. Defendant confronted
Terrazas and issued the traditional gang challenge “where [are]
you from?” Terrazas responded with his affiliation. Defendant
walked away but returned shortly afterwards and punched
Terrazas in the face. Terrazas threw a return punch but missed.
Bottles were being thrown and fights were breaking out when
gunfire erupted and six shots were fired toward Terrazas.
Terrazas suffered a grazing wound to the forehead and his
girlfriend Cynthia Bravo was shot through her kneecap. Two
other party attendees were also struck by .38 caliber bullets:
John Garcia (Garcia) was shot in the leg, but Edgar Juarez
(Juarez) was shot in the abdomen and died of his wound.
A few hours after the shooting, Oscar Fernandez
(Fernandez) told police that defendant had admitted to shooting
the “bitch-ass fool” and had asked Fernandez to hide his gun, but
Fernandez later denied making those statements. Police
recovered a .38 caliber handgun from Fernandez’s home.
B. Charging, plea, conviction and appeal
The People charged defendant with the first-degree murder
of Juarez (§ 187, subd. (a)), and the attempted murders of
Terrazas, Bravo, and Garcia (§§ 187, subd. (a), 664). The People
further alleged that defendant personally discharged a firearm
causing great bodily injury or death (§ 12022.53, subd. (d)) (as
well as lesser firearm enhancements), and that the crimes were
committed “for the benefit of, at the direction of, [and] in
association with a criminal street gang” (§ 186.22, subd.
(b)(1)(C)). The People additionally alleged that defendant had a
prior “strike” conviction within the meaning of our Three Strikes
law (§§ 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d)) and had served
two prior prison terms (§ 667.5, subd. (b)).

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On October 17, 2012, defendant pled no contest to
voluntary manslaughter (§ 192, subd. (a)) and admitted the
allegations that he personally used a firearm (§ 12022.5, subd.
(a)) and that he had suffered a prior strike conviction. Defendant
did not admit any other facts in connection with his plea; instead,
pursuant to People v. West (1970) 3 Cal.3d 595, he entered ‘“a
plea of nolo contendere, not admitting a factual basis for the
plea.’” (People v. Estrada (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 328, 334.)
The trial court sentenced defendant to 26 years in state
prison comprised of a 22-year base term (that is, a high term of
11 years, doubled due to the prior strike) plus four years for the
firearm enhancement.
II. Procedural Background
On August 15, 2022, defendant filed a form petition for
relief under section 1172.6 seeking vacatur of his manslaughter
conviction and resentencing.
On August 30, 2022, the trial court appointed defendant
counsel and ordered the prosecution to file a response to the
petition.
On January 10, 2023, the People filed a response
contending the record of conviction conclusively establishes
defendant was the actual killer. With the response, the People
attached as exhibits the transcripts from the preliminary
hearing, the plea colloquy, and the sentencing hearing.
On September 6, 2023, defendant filed a reply brief arguing
the court could not review the preliminary hearing transcript
because he did not stipulate to a factual basis for his plea.
On December 11, 2023, the trial court denied the
resentencing petition, finding defendant was ineligible for relief

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as a matter of law because the record of conviction showed that
he was prosecuted as the actual killer.
Defendant timely filed this appeal.
DISCUSSION
Defendant argues that the trial court erred in summarily
denying him relief under section 1172.6.
In 2018, our Legislature amended the definition of
“murder” in our State to preclude a jury from “imput[ing]” the
“[m]alice” element of that crime “based solely on [a defendant’s]
participation in a crime.” (§ 188, subd. (a)(3).) Our Legislature’s
purpose was to ensure that “[a] person’s culpability for murder
[is] premised upon that person’s own actions and subjective mens
rea.” (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 1, subd. (g).) As amended, liability
for murder is limited to persons (1) who are the actual killer; (2)
who aided and abetted the actual killer in the murder (that is,
who acted with the intent to kill); or (3) who were a major
participant in the underlying felony that resulted in the killing,
but only if they also acted with reckless indifference to human
life. (§§ 188, subd. (a)(3), 189, subd. (e).)
Section 1172.6 is the procedural vehicle by which persons
convicted of murder in a now-final judgment can seek to vacate
convictions that do not satisfy the currently permissible theories
for homicide liability. (§ 1172.6, subd. (a).) Summary denial of a
so-called section 1172.6 petition is appropriate only if the
defendant petitioning for relief fails (1) to file a facially valid
petition, or (2) to make a “prima facie case for relief” under the
statute. (Id., subds. (b) & (c); People v. Patton (2025) 17 Cal.5th
549, 558-559, 562.) A defendant files a facially valid petition as
long as he “recit[es]” “section 1172.6’s requirements.” (Id. at p.
562.) A prima facie case for relief entails a “more demanding”

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“inquiry.” (Id. at p. 566.) To evaluate whether a petition
establishes a prima face case, a court must take the petition’s
factual allegations as true and ask “‘“whether the petitioner
would be entitled to relief if [those] allegations were proved.”’”
(People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 971.) “‘However, if the
record, including the court’s own documents [from the record of
conviction], “contain[s] facts refuting the allegations made in the
petition,” then “the court is justified in making a credibility
determination adverse to the petitioner”’” and summarily
denying the petition. (Ibid.) Where a petition makes only
“conclusory allegations” (including those made by “checkbox”),
the record of conviction controls and summary denial is
appropriate. (Patton, at pp. 564-565.) But where a petition
“points to specific facts” indicating that the defendant was
convicted on a now-invalid theory, there is a “material fact
dispute” necessitating an evidentiary hearing and precluding
summary denial. (Id. at p. 567.)
The trial court erred in summarily denying defendant’s
section 1172.6 petition in this case. Here, the transcript of the
preliminary hearing indisputably identifies defendant as the
person who got into a fist fight with Terrazas, but it does not
establish who shot Juarez. No witnesses, including Terrazas,
saw defendant shoot Juarez. And the first fight that defendant
started touched off a larger melee at the party. There was no
evidence that all of the bullets fired came from a single gun.
Terrazas’ testimony that it “sound[ed]” like all the shots were
fired from a single gun does not, as the Attorney General
suggests, conclusively establish that only a single gun was used
or that defendant was the person who fired it. Although
Fernandez told police that defendant had admitted to the

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shooting, Fernandez later recanted that statement. On this
record, we cannot conclude that the record conclusively identifies
defendant as the actual killer.4 Thus, summary denial of
defendant’s petition was unjustified.
DISPOSITION
The order of December 11, 2023, denying defendant’s
section 1172.6 petition is reversed and remanded for an
evidentiary hearing.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS.

______________________, P. J.
HOFFSTADT

We concur:

_________________________, J.
MOOR

_________________________, J.
KIM (D.)

4 Our analysis of what the record conclusively shows is not
meant to indicate what the trial court may or may not find true
beyond a reasonable doubt at the evidentiary hearing.

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