CourtListener 10375436•People v. Pancoast CA1/3
Gesamter Gesetzestext
Filed 4/9/25 P. v. Pancoast CA1/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
A169766
v.
THOMAS JON PANCOAST, (Contra Costa County Super. Ct.
No. 01001852466)
Defendant and Appellant.
Thomas Jon Pancoast appeals from a postconviction order imposing
$50,000 in noneconomic damages under Penal Code section 1202.4,
subdivision (f)(3)(F).1 He contends the trial court failed to provide a rational
basis for its award because it did not state its method for calculating such
damages. We disagree and affirm the order.
BACKGROUND
The Contra Costa County District Attorney filed an amended felony
complaint charging Pancoast with multiple counts of committing a lewd act
upon a child under 14 years of age (§ 288, subd. (a); counts 1–3, 11–14, 16–18,
20, & 22), rape by use of drugs (§ 261, subd. (a)(3); counts 4 & 6), sexual
penetration by foreign object (§ 289, subd. (e); counts 5 & 7), committing a
lewd act upon a child (§ 288, subd. (c)(1); counts 8–10, & 19), committing a
1 All undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
forcible lewd act upon a child under 14 years of age (§ 288, subd. (b)(1);
counts 15, 25–26), oral copulation or sexual penetration of a child under ten
years of age (§ 288.7, subd. (b); count 21), and aggravated sexual assault of a
child (§ 269, subd. (a)(1); counts 23–24). It was further alleged Pancoast
committed the charged offenses in counts 1–3, 11–20, 22, and 25–26 against
multiple victims.
Defendant pled guilty to counts 1, 9, 11, 14, 16, 21, and 23. The court
subsequently sentenced Pancoast to a prison term of 25 years to life on
counts 1, 11, 14, and 16, a prison term of 15 years to life on counts 21 and 23,
and a two-year term on count 9. The issue of restitution was reserved for a
subsequent hearing.
Although Jane Doe2 initially sought economic damages for medical
bills, that request was withdrawn. Instead, Jane Doe’s parents requested an
award of $250,000 in noneconomic damages. Following discovery, briefing,
and a hearing, the court concluded the record supported an award of
noneconomic damages and set the amount at $50,000, with statutory interest
accruing from the date of sentencing. Pancoast timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
On appeal, Pancoast contends the trial court failed to identify the basis
for the $50,000 noneconomic damages award or how it reached that amount.
Pancoast asserts the court’s failure to make such findings constitutes an
abuse of discretion and requires remand for a new hearing.
2 Jane Doe was one of multiple victims. However, we do not discuss the
other victims because this appeal only challenges her award of noneconomic
damages.
2
I. Standard of Review
“ ‘A restitution order is reviewed for abuse of discretion and will not be
reversed unless it is arbitrary or capricious. [Citation.] No abuse of
discretion will be found where there is a rational and factual basis for the
amount of restitution ordered.’ ” (People v. Lehman (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th
795, 801 (Lehman).) “The court ‘must demonstrate a rational basis for its
award and ensure that the record is sufficient to permit meaningful review.
The burden is on the party seeking restitution to provide an adequate factual
basis for the claim.’ ” (People v. Valenti (2016) 243 Cal.App.4th 1140, 1182
(Valenti).)
“Section 1202.4 does not provide guidelines for evaluating a child
victim’s noneconomic damages for sexual abuse. Unlike economic damages,
which encompass ‘objectively verifiable monetary losses’ (Civ. Code, § 1431.2,
subd. (b)(1)), noneconomic damages compensate the victim for ‘subjective,
non-monetary losses including, but not limited to, pain, suffering,
inconvenience, mental suffering, [and] emotional distress . . . .’ (Civ. Code,
§ 1431.2, subd. (b)(2).)” (Valenti, supra, 243 Cal.App.4th at p. 1182; People v.
Gomez (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 111, 115 (Gomez).) The party seeking
restitution has the burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence, but
“the evidentiary bar is a low one.” (Gomez, at p. 119.) “[S]ection 1202.4 does
not require any particular kind of proof to establish a victim’s losses,” and a
victim need not “present testimony or a statement about the impact,
something prosecutors and trial courts may be reluctant to require,
particularly when the victim is still a minor.” (Gomez, at pp. 119–120;
Lehman, supra, 247 Cal.App.4th at p. 803.)
Nonetheless, “some evidence of the harm incurred by the particular
victim of the crime is required to support a victim restitution award . . . . [I]t
3
is insufficient that the average victim would suffer injury from a particular
type of crime, or that generally victims of such crimes suffer injury.” (Gomez,
supra, 97 Cal.App.5th at p. 118.)
Pancoast claims this matter is “virtually indistinguishable” from
Valenti because both cases contained no evidence of lasting harm to the
victims. He is wrong. In Valenti, the appellate court reversed the
noneconomic restitution award of $50,000 for each of three child victims
because the only information about the victims came through their parents,
who reported the children were doing “ ‘fine’ ” or “ ‘excellent’ ” or “ ‘did not
sustain actual child abuse.’ ” (Valenti, supra, 243 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1182–
1183.) There was no evidence the children were experiencing emotional
distress, struggling in school or life, considering or engaging in self-harm, or
receiving counseling; thus, the court found no rational basis for the award.
(Id. at pp. 1183–1184; accord Gomez, supra, 97 Cal.App.5th at p. 118
[prosecutor’s statement “that appellant ‘was a setback’ for [the minor]” and
contained “no elaboration or even connection to the underlying crimes” was
insufficient to support a noneconomic damages award.].)
In stark contrast, Jane Doe and her mother provided testimony at the
sentencing hearing about the psychological harm Jane Doe suffered due to
Pancoast’s conduct. Jane Doe discussed locking “all of [her] doors,” placing
“as many things in front of that door as possible” when her grandparents
removed the locks to be able to get to her if she was in danger, having trouble
sleeping and “sitting at the edge of [her] bed, waiting for the sun to come up,”
being unable to trust people, and being unable to “handle a lot of things.”
She also demonstrated ongoing self-loathing, repeatedly stating to the court
that she was “stupid” and describing herself as “ruined.” Jane Doe also
expressed her belief that she would be dealing with the trauma “for the rest
4
[of her] life.” Jane Doe’s mother provided a statement about the impact on
Jane Doe, explaining how they lived in a tight-knit, loving community, and
Pancoast’s actions “stripped away” Jane Doe’s innocence and trust.
Contrary to Pancoast arguments, the court also specifically explained
the evidentiary basis for its noneconomic damages award. The court first
noted that Jane Doe’s and her mother’s statements at the sentencing hearing
regarding the direct impact of the abuse on Jane Doe provided “ample
evidence” for an award. The court specifically identified Jane Doe’s
testimony that she “feels ruined” and her trust and sense of security is
damaged. The court also referenced the context surrounding Jane Doe’s
abuse, which it concluded caused the impact on her to be “magnified”: Jane
Doe’s abuse occurred as part of Pancoast’s abuse “of multiple children” in a
“very small close-knit community,” “many of whom were friends.” Based on
this evidence regarding the direct impact of Pancoast’s conduct on Jane Doe,
the court concluded noneconomic damages for psychological harm were
appropriate, “as amply demonstrated by [Jane Doe’s] eloquent, moving,
indeed searing words from the [sentencing] hearing.”
We find this case more analogous to Lehman than Valenti. In Lehman,
supra, 247 Cal.App.4th at pages 802–803, the appellate court rejected the
defendant’s challenges to the trial court’s noneconomic restitution awards
because the court specifically identified the evidentiary bases for its awards
to the two victims: (1) one victim described the emotional pain she suffered
from the extensive abuse by her grandfather, and (2) the other victim
experienced an emotional breakdown while testifying, which the court cited
as evidence of the psychological harm she suffered. (Id. at pp. 803–805.) The
appellate court explained that the trial court’s reference to this evidence
provided ample support for the noneconomic restitution awards. (Ibid.)
5
In short, the record contains sufficient evidence that Pancoast’s actions
emotionally traumatized Jane Doe and the trial court appropriately
referenced the evidence on which it relied in making its award.3 As a result,
Pancoast fails to demonstrate that the trial court abused its discretion by
awarding noneconomic restitution in the amount of $50,000.
DISPOSITION
The order imposing noneconomic restitution damages is affirmed.
3 In his reply brief, Pancoast suggests noneconomic damages are only
appropriate if the court also finds actual damages. We are unaware of
authority adopting such a rule and decline to do so here. (See Lehman,
supra, 247 Cal.App.4th at p. 803 [section 1202.4 “does not require any
particular kind of proof to establish a victim’s losses.”].)
6
_________________________
PETROU, J.
WE CONCUR:
_________________________
TUCHER, P. J.
_________________________
FUJISAKI, J.
A169766/People v. Pancoast
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