CourtListener 10374562•People v. Terrell CA2/7
Gesamter Gesetzestext
Filed 4/8/25 P. v. Terrell CA2/7
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION SEVEN
THE PEOPLE, B337267
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. NA037516)
v.
DAMON TERRELL,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Christopher J. Frisco, Judge. Dismissed.
Christopher Love, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Kenneth C. Byrne, Supervising
Deputy Attorney General, and Sophia A. Lecky, Deputy Attorney
General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
___________________
In 1999 a jury convicted Damon Terrell on four counts of
robbery and found true for each conviction he personally used a
firearm, within the meaning of Penal Code section 12022.53,
subdivision (b).1 In a bifurcated proceeding the trial court found
true allegations that Terrell had prior convictions for serious or
violent felonies, within the meaning of the three strikes law
(§§ 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d)), and serious
felonies, within the meaning of section 667, subdivision (a). The
trial court also found Terrell had served a prior prison term,
within the meaning of section 667.5, former subdivision (b).
On one of the four robbery convictions, the trial court
sentenced Terrell as a third strike offender to a prison term of
25 years to life, plus 10 years for the firearm enhancement and
five years for the enhancement under section 667, subdivision (a),
for an aggregate term of 40 years to life. The court imposed and
stayed (under section 654) execution of a one-year enhancement
under section 667.5, former subdivision (b). Of particular
relevance to this appeal, although the minute order states the
court imposed the enhancement under section 667.5, former
subdivision (b), the abstract of judgment does not. The court also
imposed identical, concurrent terms on the other three robbery
convictions.
In February 2024 Terrell filed a petition under the
predecessor to section 1172.75 to strike his one-year
enhancement under section 667.5, former subdivision (b). The
superior court, among other rulings, denied the petition. The
court ruled that, though section 1172.75 “provides relief, with
limited exception, for prison inmates who were sentenced to a one
1 Statutory references are to the Penal Code.
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year prior pursuant to” section 667.5 former subdivision (b),
Terrell “was not sentenced in this case” under that statute, and
was “therefore not entitled to relief.” Terrell timely appealed.
The superior court was right to deny Terrell’s petition
under section 1172.75, but not because the trial court did not
impose an enhancement under section 667.5, former
subdivision (b). The trial court did impose that enhancement
(although the court stayed execution of it). The superior court
correctly denied Terrell’s petition because the court did not have
jurisdiction to rule on it. The Legislature did not authorize
defendants to file a petition under section 1172.75; only the
California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR)
can initiate that resentencing process.
Effective January 1, 2022, Senate Bill No. 483 (Stats. 2021,
ch. 728, § 3) added section 1171.1, later renumbered as
section 1172.75, which provides: “Any sentence enhancement
that was imposed prior to January 1, 2020, pursuant to
subdivision (b) of Section 667.5, except for any enhancement
imposed for a prior conviction for a sexually violent offense . . . is
legally invalid.” (§ 1172.75, subd. (a); see People v. Garcia (2024)
101 Cal.App.5th 848, 854.) Section 1172.75 prescribes the
procedure for resentencing affected defendants. The CDCR and
the county correctional administrator must first identify
individuals serving terms that include no-longer-valid
enhancements and then provide certain information about those
individuals “to the sentencing court that imposed the
enhancement.” (§ 1172.75, subd. (b); see People v. Newell (2023)
93 Cal.App.5th 265, 268.) “Upon receiving the information,” the
superior court, if it determines a judgment includes an invalid
enhancement, must “recall the sentence and resentence the
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defendant.” (§ 1172.75, subd. (c).) Section 1172.75 prescribed
two timelines for this process. For “individuals who have served
their base term and any other enhancements and are currently
serving a sentence based on the [now-invalid] enhancement,” the
deadline for review and resentencing was October 1, 2022.
(§ 1172.75, subd. (c)(1).) For individuals like Terrell, who are not
serving time on an invalid enhancement, the deadline was
December 31, 2023. (§ 1172.75, subd. (c)(2).)
Under the “express procedure” provided in section 1172.75,
“any review and verification by the court in advance of
resentencing is only triggered by receipt of the necessary
information from the CDCR Secretary or a county correctional
administrator, not by any individual defendant.” (People v.
Burgess (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 375, 384; see People v. Gray (2024)
101 Cal.App.5th 148, 165 [“‘section 1172.75 does not authorize a
defendant to seek resentencing on his or her own motion or
petition’”; rather, “‘the process is triggered by [the CDCR or
county custodian] identifying a defendant as a person serving a
sentence that includes a prior prison term enhancement’”].)
“Section 1172.75 contains no provision for an individual
defendant to file” a petition for resentencing under the statute.
(People v. Newell, supra, 93 Cal.App.5th at p. 268; see People v.
Gonzalez (2024) 107 Cal.App.5th 312, 323, fn. 12 [section 1172.75
does not authorize a defendant to initiate a petition for
resentencing]; People v. Escobedo (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 440, 447
[“section 1172.75 does not authorize appellants to file a petition
or a motion to strike the unauthorized enhancements”]; Burgess,
at p. 384 [“section 1172.75 simply does not contemplate
resentencing relief initiated by any individual defendant’s
petition or motion”].)
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Because Terrell did not have authority to file a petition
under section 1172.75, the superior court lacked jurisdiction to
hear his petition and resentence him. (See People v. King (2022)
77 Cal.App.5th 629, 634 [“‘once a judgment is rendered and
execution of the sentence has begun, the trial court does not have
jurisdiction to vacate or modify the sentence’”]; see also People v.
Burgess, supra, 86 Cal.App.5th at p. 381 [same].) “And, ‘[i]f the
trial court does not have jurisdiction to rule on a motion to vacate
or modify a sentence, an order denying such a motion is
nonappealable, and any appeal from such an order must be
dismissed.’” (King, at p. 634; accord, People v. Newell, supra,
93 Cal.App.5th at pp. 268-269; Burgess, at p. 381.)
Terrell acknowledges “there is no evidence indicating that
the CDCR informed the court that [he] was a person in CDCR
custody currently serving a term for a judgment that includes an
enhancement described in section 667.5, subdivision (a).” Terrell
explains, however, that “is probably because the abstract of
judgment erroneously does not show that the enhancement was
imposed and stayed.” Terrell’s explanation may well be correct.
After all, because the abstract of judgment does not include the
one-year enhancement, the CDCR may not know the trial court
imposed it. But the solution to that problem is to correct the
abstract of judgment, so that the CDCR will be able to identify
Terrell as an individual serving a prison term that includes a no-
longer-valid enhancement and provide that information to the
court. The solution is not to allow Terrell to file a petition he is
not statutorily authorized to file or to create jurisdiction for the
superior court and this court where none exists.
Though a court with jurisdiction may correct an abstract of
judgment at any time (People v. Breceda (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th
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71, 100), we do not have jurisdiction to correct it in this appeal.
(See People v. Mitchell (2001) 26 Cal.4th 181, 185 [“appellate
courts . . . that have properly assumed jurisdiction of cases have
ordered correction of abstracts of judgment that did not
accurately reflect the oral judgments of sentencing courts”];
People v. Gobert (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 676, 689 [same].) Terrell’s
remedy is to file an appropriate writ or motion in the superior
court to correct the abstract of judgment to add the (stayed)
one-year enhancement under section 667.5, former
subdivision (b), and to send a corrected abstract of judgment to
the CDCR. If the court grants relief, the CDCR will then be in a
position to advise the superior court under section 1172.75,
subdivision (b), Terrell is an individual serving a prison term that
includes a no-longer-valid enhancement.
The appeal from the order denying Terrell’s petition under
section 1172.75 is dismissed.
SEGAL, Acting P. J.
We concur:
FEUER, J.
STONE, J.
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